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Abstract 
 
Since the creation of the Department for International Development (DFID) in 
1997, much scholarly effort has been concentrated on describing New Labour’s 
international development policy outputs. Within these accounts however, there 
has been little, if any, treatment of how its development policies actually came 
to be formed, or even more specifically, analysis of the linkages between this 
branch of foreign policy and New Labour’s domestic political economy. My thesis 
seeks to fill this gap in the literature. My major contribution is to show that the 
character and orientation of a set of policies designed initially by New Labour 
officials for the domestic economy were subsequently ‘recycled’ and transmitted 
abroad into the field of international development. I test such a claim empirically 
through three case studies exploring in depth the core policy areas of debt relief, 
HIV and AIDS, and overseas aid, through which I am able to trace the way that 
ideas first developed at home were subsequently transposed into its 
international development policy. This provides the framework which allows me 
to examine how the Blair and Brown Governments managed the frequently 
conflicting expectations of the two sets of ‘market’ and ‘social’ constituencies in 
the construction of their international development policy. While ‘social’ 
constituencies were successful in influencing processes of policy change which 
iteratively moved policy closer to their expectations, on the whole its character 
still favoured the demands of the ‘market’ constituencies, as had been the case 
previously in its domestic political economy. Although New Labour’s 
international development policies appeared to become more ‘social’ over time, 
this did not mean that they became dominated by ‘social concerns’. My overall 
characterisation of New Labour’s often complex phasing of its international 
development policy, then, is that it remained market-driven albeit not exclusively 
market-oriented.  
 
Keywords:  New Labour, International Development, Globalisation, Economic Policy,  
 Business, Competitiveness, Welfare, Debt Relief, HIV and AIDS, Overseas Aid 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction: New Labour and the Political 
Economy of International Development  
 
I want to say a few words about two remarkable men.  
 
Like a lot of great partners, they didn’t always get along as the years 
passed. They didn’t always agree. They drifted apart. They did 
incredible things on their own, as individuals. But they did their best 
work as a pair. I love them both: John Lennon and Paul McCartney.  
 
I’m also fond of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. They are kind of the 
John and Paul of the global development stage, in my opinion. But the 
point is, Lennon and McCartney changed my interior world – Blair and 
Brown can change the real world. 
 
Bono, addressing the 2004 Labour Party Conference1 
 
Central to the tale of New Labour is the relationship between Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown. Political commentators and academics alike have pored over the apparent 
tensions that existed between the two men, the division between Number 10 and 
Number 11, and the fulfilment or otherwise, of their respective legacies. As Bono suggests 
however, it was in the field of international development where the two men appeared to 
work closest together, and where, the singer argues, their best work was realised. Indeed, 
under the Blair and Brown governments, matters of global poverty were afforded a 
priority not seen under any previous British government and international development 
formed an integral part of New Labour’s policy outputs. The contribution to the literature 
that this thesis makes is an assessment of New Labour’s international development 
policies in respect of its political economy, and in particular, its claim “to apply the 
                                                             
1
 Bono (2004) 
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principles of economic reform and social justice to its work abroad”.2 This thesis will 
evaluate the success of its commitment to eliminate global poverty by drawing out those 
themes that underpinned both its domestic and international political economy.  
 
The Contribution of the Thesis 
Given the priority it was afforded it is perhaps unsurprising then that a considerable 
amount of scholarly analysis has been given over to New Labour’s international 
development policies. However, within these accounts there has been little, if any, 
treatment of how these development policies actually came to be formed, or even more 
specifically, the linkages between this branch of foreign policy and New Labour’s domestic 
political economy. In filling this gap in the literature, this thesis identifies and assesses 
those policies that were designed initially by New Labour officials for domestic 
consumption, but which would be ‘recycled’ and transmitted abroad into the field of 
international development.  
 
Fig. 1.1 New Labour and International Development: a Research Agenda 
The thesis analyses three aspects of New Labour’s international development 
policies to make three distinct contributions to the literature:  
 
(1)  The linkages between the model of political economy that New Labour officials 
created at home and the framework of international development policies it 
designed for the developing world 
 
(2)  The different policy ‘constituencies’ and the way in which senior New Labour 
officials sought to manage the ‘expectations’ of these groups 
 
(3)  The patterns of change that occurred in the direction and temporality of 
government policy as it unfolded over time 
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 HM Treasury (2000c: 115) 
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This core question is supported by two further areas of research. The first of these 
attempts to identify the ‘constituencies’ who through their respective ‘expectations’ of 
government policy sought to shape the orientation of New Labour’s policy process. My 
analysis in the case study chapters here will focus upon the way in which Whitehall 
officials managed these frequently-conflicting expectations, and the prioritisation that the 
government gave to ‘market’ constituencies over other, more ‘social’ constituencies in 
this process. The relationship between the government and these different constituencies 
would mediate this transmission of policy, and reveal the orientation and character of 
New Labour’s international development policies. The second supporting research 
question interrogates the temporality in the political economy of New Labour’s 
international development policies, and the patterns of change that occurred as these 
policies unfolded over time. In order to capture the essence of New Labour, it is necessary 
to view its policies as contingent, and its political economy, not as static but continually 
changing. Taken together, these three lines of enquiry demonstrate their interrelationship 
to one another by yielding an assessment of the changing character of New Labour’s 
political economy in the light of its commitment to matters of international development. 
 
Situating the Thesis within the Existing Literature  
The proliferation of academic literature assessing the policy and practice of the New 
Labour Government meant that it was somewhat inevitable that out of these more 
general debates an extensive body of scholarship would emerge assessing the activities 
and performance of the newly created Department for International Development 
(DFID).3 Indeed, this was hardly surprising since there were all manner of fascinating sub-
                                                             
3
 See for instance Hewitt and Killick (1998); Young (2000); Dixon and Williams (2001); Williams (2005); Manning (2007); Webster (2008); 
and Gallagher (2009).  
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plots at play. There was for instance, the appointment of Clare Short as Secretary of State, 
a popular yet somewhat surprising choice since she was by no means an ally of Blair.4 
There was the publication of not one but two White Papers within New Labour’s first term 
in office, each offering bold statements of intent as to the ambitions of the new 
department;5 and there was an intriguing relationship with its former parent department, 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as well as both Number 10 and the Treasury. 
These different dynamics, combined with increased levels of public support for matters of 
international development gave scholars plenty to consider. Given that my own thesis 
seeks to add to our understanding of New Labour’s international development policies, it 
is appropriate that I take as my point of departure this literature to give a sense of where 
my own contribution might be situated. 
 
The existing literature surrounding New Labour’s international development policies falls 
broadly into two camps. The first provides more or less a descriptive narrative or review of 
New Labour’s policies in this area.6 This ‘output’-orientated literature is useful in providing 
an overview of both New Labour’s successes and shortcomings concerning international 
development, and in doing so is able to offer some explanation for the outcomes that 
emerged within this area of policy. The literature found in the second camp however 
moves beyond these narrative-based accounts to offer a far deeper level of analysis.7 The 
more critical accounts focus upon the ‘inputs’ of New Labour policy by interrogating the 
material and ideational factors that came to shape the formation and subsequent 
outcomes of government policy. Literature situated in this second camp arguably provides 
                                                             
4
 Short (2005) 
5
 DFID (1997; 2000) 
6
 See for instance White (1998) and Webster (2008).  
7
 See for instance Abrahamsen and Williams (2001) and Cammack (2006).  
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a far more detailed explanation of New Labour’s specific international development 
policies, and it is within this particular body of literature that this thesis should be read.  
 
Of the early assessments made of DFID and New Labour’s international development 
policies, some in this second camp including Paul Cammack, Coates and Hay, and Dixon 
and Williams all judged this new department to be merely the development arm of New 
Labour’s ‘neoliberal project’. These accounts sit clearly within the broader critical 
literature of the Blair government, which viewed the New Labour project as merely an 
extension of the free market, Thatcherite settlement. For Cammack, New Labour’s 
international development policies “adopted precisely the *neoliberal+ formulation set out 
by the World Bank…calling for the incorporation of the world’s poor into production 
networks dominated by private enterprise and free flows of global capital”.8 Coates and 
Hay have argued that New Labour’s advocacy of reform within the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO) was derived, not from any anti-poverty 
agenda, but rather its own general growth theory. Here New Labour’s calls for 
international reform acted in tandem with the Party’s internal exercise of ‘cautionary 
discretion’ in monetary and fiscal policy.9 Similar claims have been made by Dixon and 
Williams who identified New Labour’s commitment towards debt relief as remaining 
firmly embedded with the neoliberal paradigm espoused by the World Bank and IMF.10 
Although Dixon and Williams agreed that increasing debt relief was in and of itself a 
laudable ambition, as long as New Labour remained wedded to the understanding that it 
                                                             
8
 Cammack (2001: 399–400). Cammack’s analysis of New Labour’s international development policies should be read alongside his  later 
(2002) critique of the broader ‘neoliberal revolution’ that he argues has occurred within the World Bank and IMF. Cammack claims that 
the aim of these institutions has been to extend the scope of the global marketplace and the reach of unfettered capitalism. 
9
 Coates and Hay (2001: 456) 
10
 Dixon and Williams (2001) 
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could only be achieved through a neoliberal strategy of development, any genuine success 
would be limited. 
 
Others such as Rita Abrahamsen and again Paul Williams, in a similarly critical vein, 
pointed to the contradictions that appeared to be inherent within New Labour’s ambitions 
for international development.11 In attempting to formulate ‘a Third Way for the Third 
World’, New Labour had, according to Abrahamsen and Williams, assumed that the 
pursuit of economic liberalism and social justice were two easily reconcilable goals. Indeed 
it was a central narrative of New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ discourse at home that these two 
themes could and indeed should mutually reinforce each other. For Abrahamsen and 
Williams however, this understanding when applied to New Labour’s efforts to combat 
global poverty, simply glossed over the potential contradictions and conflicts that actually 
existed between the two.   
 
Other scholars, located in the first camp, have tended to be less critical, preferring to give 
New Labour’s initial forays into international development the benefit of the doubt. 
Certainly the focus of this new ministry differed from previous incarnations that had been 
attempted by Labour governments in the past. This reflected in part New Labour’s own 
period of modernisation post-1994, but also the changes that had occurred within the 
international community since Labour was last in office. Reviewing DFID’s first White 
Paper, Peter Burnell was fulsome in his praise of the promises New Labour offered, 
identifying strong continuities from Labour’s past work in this area and suggesting ways in 
which DFID could breathe new life into development debates both within the UK and 
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 Abrahamsen and Williams (2001) 
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abroad.12 These sentiments were later echoed by Gardner and Lewis who noted the 
purposefulness of the new department and the lessons it offered to other development 
agencies.13  
 
Other accounts shared certainly some of this optimism but acknowledged that questions 
still remained concerning the longer-term impact of New Labour’s work in this area. For 
this reason, at this early stage of New Labour’s time in office a number of scholars decided 
to adopt a ‘wait-and-see’ approach before reaching any definitive conclusions. While it 
was still a fledgling Whitehall institution, Ralph Young noted how DFID’s autonomy and 
newly acquired independence from the Foreign Office had been used effectively to chart a 
distinctive course for Britain’s aid agenda.14 Despite expressing concerns over the lack of 
policy instruments at Clare Short’s disposal to meet New Labour’s commitments in this 
area, Paul Mosely nevertheless also applauded DFID’s honesty and pragmatism in 
confronting the central dilemma of ‘making globalisation work for the poor’.15  
 
Concerns however were raised over the specific implementation of DFID policies by Adrian 
Hewitt and Tony Killick,16 and Howard White.17 For Hewitt and Killick, although DFID’s 
1997 White Paper was certainly much broader and more sophisticated in its outlook than 
the 1975 White Paper, it nevertheless lacked the strategy and policy specifics of its 
predecessor. White agreed. Although DFID’s White Paper was strong on broad ambitious 
statements of intent, White argued that it lacked the necessary detail as to how to deliver 
on these promises effectually. Although New Labour’s commitments to refocus aid 
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 Burnell (1998) 
13
 Gardner and Lewis (2000) 
14
 Young (2000: 265) 
15
 Mosley (2001) 
16
 Hewitt and Killick (1998) 
17
 White (1998) 
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towards poverty reduction, replace one-sided conditionalities with ‘partnerships’, and 
increase policy coherence were all welcomed, all three authors pointed to a clear lacuna 
in DFID policy delivery. This, they each suggested would make it extremely difficult for 
New Labour to meet the challenges it set out in its White Paper.  
 
In a relatively short space of time DFID quickly established itself as a key Whitehall 
department. It became an important focal point for the rising public interest in matters of 
global poverty, and went on to play a critical role in the ‘Blair-Brown’ nexus as both men 
sought to press the case both at home and abroad to confront the challenges faced by 
Africa and other developing areas. The triumvirate between DFID, Number 10 and the 
Treasury was at its strongest point in 2005 when the UK took up the presidency of the G8; 
the Commission for Africa published its findings; the UN World Summit in New York met to 
discuss progress on the Millennium Development Goals; and the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Conference took place as part of the ongoing WTO Doha Development Round. This 
coincided with an unprecedented push amongst NGOs to raise public awareness about 
international poverty through the Make Poverty History campaign. This campaign was 
made visible by white wristbands that were worn by members of the public, politicians 
and celebrities alike, the rally that took place in Edinburgh as political leaders of the G8 
met at their summit in Gleneagles, and the global Live8 concerts.18  
 
This heightened interest in the issues of international development prompted further 
scholarship to emerge as a means of evaluating New Labour’s policy outputs, performance 
and achievements in this field. Again however, opinion over New Labour’s success was 
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 Commission for Africa (2005); Lockwood (2005); Bond (2006); Ware (2006); Biccum (2007); Brainard and Chollet (2008); Harrison 
(2010); Van Heerde and Hudson (2010) 
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divided. On the positive side, Webster, Morrissey and Wood were among the authors who 
fully endorsed the approbation that New Labour received over its development record.19 
In altogether critical terms however, Cammack and Williams again both noted the 
persistent tendency on the part of New Labour officials to embed their response to 
development issues within the neoliberal paradigm,20 while Payne, Porteous and Taylor 
each contended that conflicts with other strategic objectives and a misreading of the 
issues faced by the developing world rendered New Labour’s efforts as being rather more 
problematic than its acolytes would admit.21 Taken together, the tensions and problems 
identified by these authors raised more questions than solutions, which limited the 
success that New Labour might have otherwise had.  
 
The conclusion of Blair’s premiership in 2007 triggered a further reappraisal of New 
Labour’s international development policies, and a number of scholars have contributed 
to broadly healthy assessments of New Labour’s policy record in this area.22 For these 
authors, in spite of the tensions that may have existed in DFID’s policies, the increases in 
aid, debt relief and largely successful efforts to combat HIV and AIDS within the 
developing world left Tony Blair with a broadly positive legacy in this particular aspect of 
foreign affairs. Despite his extensive contribution to New Labour’s international 
development policies however, Gordon Brown’s own achievements are likely to be 
overshadowed by his brief and largely unsuccessful premiership, a time which coincided 
with a period of deep recession for the British economy.  
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 Wood (2004); Morrissey (2005); Webster (2008) 
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 Cammack (2006); Williams (2004, 2005a, 2005b); Curtis (2005)  
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 Payne (2006); Porteous (2005); Taylor (2005)  
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 Morrissey (2009); Brown, W. (2007); Manning (2007) 
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This raises a particularly pertinent point within the wider context of this thesis. As 
Chancellor, Gordon Brown was the chief architect of a model of political economy that 
New Labour sought to export to the developing world. However, as David Coates has 
remarked, the economic problems that afflicted Brown’s tenure as Prime Minister and 
which arguably cost New Labour the 2010 General Election, were due to a domestic set of 
policies designed or agreed to by Gordon Brown himself while he was Chancellor.23 If the 
core claim of the thesis is correct – that New Labour’s domestic political economy was 
exported abroad to meet the concerns of the developing world – then the toxicity of this 
model would fatally undermine the government’s commitment to the developing world, 
exposing already vulnerable countries to economic crisis and instability.  
   
The Theoretical Underpinnings of the Thesis 
Running throughout the thesis is the theme of temporality and contingency. This is 
important since much of the existing literature that surrounds New Labour attempts to 
impose a single essence upon its character, as if it was an unchanging phenomenon over 
time. Whether sympathetic or critical of New Labour, the majority of these accounts tend 
to offer a ‘snapshot’,24 or what Colin Hay has termed a “synchronic” analysis of the 
empirical evidence at a given moment in time.25 Unremarkably, there has been a great 
deal of conjecture as to what constitutes the most appropriate ‘label’ for New Labour. 
What these accounts do however assume is that a single designation is appropriate across 
all domains of policy and for the whole length of its government.26 As I demonstrate here 
however, the historical and more recent trajectories of Labour Party policy, both at home 
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 Coates (2009: 423–424)  
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 Hay (2002: 144–145) 
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 See for instance Hay (1999a); Krieger (1999); Callinicos (2001); Heffernan (2001); Giddens (2002); Jessop (2007).  
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and abroad, have rendered it to be far too complex and far too contingent to read off a 
single, linear characterisation. To truly capture the complexity of New Labour’s political 
economy, it is necessary to trace the processes of change, or as I show in altogether more 
specific terms in the case study chapters, the ‘phases’ that New Labour’s policies 
underwent concerning its commitment to international development. Only by taking into 
account the processes of change that New Labour’s political economy underwent, can the 
full extent of its complex character be understood. As Ben Clift and Jim Tomlinson have 
persuasively argued – ironically in a reply to Hay concerning the character of New Labour’s 
‘putative neoliberalism’ – it is simply not possible or even desirable to make bold claims 
about a singular, consistent political economic logic underpinning the making of New 
Labour’s political economy.27  
 
In order to capture this temporality and the complexity, it is necessary to provide a 
diachronic analysis. Hay again, describes this approach as being “a form of analysis which 
does not prejudge the issue of change over time and for which, consequently, the pace 
and timing of political change are empirical issues”.28 Such an approach borrows 
eclectically from scholars located across the spectrum of the social sciences, including 
historical institutionalists who emphasise the importance of ‘process-tracing’;29 discursive 
institutionalists who analyse the ideas and discourses present in moments of policy 
change;30 evolutionary economists and political scientists who reject the static approaches 
of their neoclassical counterparts;31 and some neo-Marxists for whom the changing 
strategic context that policymakers are faced with imposes pressures to pursue certain 
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strategies over others.32 Despite the apparent plurality of these approaches, each one 
shares in common a commitment to analyse the pace and timing of those processes – 
whether structural, historical, discursive or ideational – that trigger political and economic 
change. It is the emphasis that each of these perspectives places upon contingency that 
this thesis uses to interrogate both the processes of change in the political economy of 
New Labour, and the spatial transmission of policy from one realm to another.  
 
Elements of each of these approaches appear – even if they are not explicitly referred to – 
throughout the thesis. In chapter 2 for instance, I demonstrate the extent to which the 
changing contours of the global economy acted as the strategic context upon which the 
New Labour project was positioned. Here, I borrow Bob Jessop’s concept of ‘strategic 
selectivity’ to demonstrate the way in which New Labour ministers chose and justified 
certain policy strategies over others by deploying a particular discourse of globalisation at 
specific moments in time. Jessop’s later work notes how discourses provide an 
interpretative framework to make sense of the structural changes in the global economy 
and the transformation of the national state, the crises that often accompany them and 
appropriate responses thereto.33 As Peter Kerr has remarked, change here can be 
understood to be “an evolutionary process which is the product of constant ‘adaptation’ 
of strategies by agents to an evolving, strategically ‘selective’ context”.34 This is evident in 
chapter 2 in particular where I demonstrate the extent to which New Labour’s response to 
the strategic context of globalisation mediated the way in which policy was implemented 
at home before being exported abroad. Treating globalisation as a discourse – in fact, 
multiple discourses – I demonstrate how, as this strategic context changed, so too did the 
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policy perceptions of New Labour officials, prompting them to recalculate and reformulate 
their strategies accordingly. 
 
‘Strategic selectivity’ is a useful analytical device to frame the context in which political 
actors find themselves, and the effect that this has upon their conduct. However, if 
globalisation shaped the contours upon which New Labour’s contemporary political 
economy was to be located, then its past commitment to social democracy and 
international development also provided the Blair government with a historical context 
within which to animate its ostensibly ‘new’ set of policies. It is against this particular 
backdrop that the remarks of Stephen Krasner concerning ‘historical institutionalism’ are 
particularly pertinent. For Krasner, “it is necessary to understand both how institutions 
reproduce themselves through time and what historical conditions gave rise to them in 
the first place”.35 As Paul Pierson has noted however, such analysis “requires genuinely 
historical research”; that is, “work that carefully investigates processes unfolding over 
time”.36 Reinforcing the point made by Hay earlier, Pierson adds that such explanations 
require a diachronic as well as synchronic analysis. With this in mind, chapter 3 therefore 
attempts to capture the evolution of Labour’s international development strategy within 
the post-war period, by charting the processes of change and continuity that the Party’s 
policies underwent both at home and abroad. It explores the drivers of these processes in 
comparative terms, assessing both what went before and what New Labour included in 
(and indeed, what it excluded from) its development policies. 
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Fig. 1.2  Conceptual Matrix of ‘Market’ and ‘Social’ Imperatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Jessopian concept of ‘strategic selectivity’ returns again in chapter 4 when I assess the 
attempts made by New Labour officials to manage in a coherent and ‘joined-up’ way, the 
different expectations of the various constituencies that made up the policy process. 
Given the contested nature of this policy process, starkly demonstrated here in ‘market’ 
and ‘social’-based terms, it was, I argue inevitable that government officials were forced 
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to privilege certain constituencies over others, and incorporate certain expectations into 
policy strategies at the expense of others. My diachronic analysis of the policy phases in 
each of the case study chapters (5–7) shows a close relationship between the government 
and ‘market’ constituencies and a gradual and inconsistent shift towards more social 
outcomes over time. To illustrate this, in each of the case study chapters that form the 
second part of the thesis, I offer a schematic representation (illustrated in Fig. 1.2 on the 
previous page) of the different policy inflections that were present in each of three phases 
that each strategy underwent. An amalgamation of these three policies and the diachronic 
analysis thereof demonstrates the changing and contingent character of New Labour’s 
international development policies. It reveals much of the strategic decisions taken by 
government officials and the orientation of New Labour’s policies to provide a fuller 
picture of the character of its political economy.  
 
The chronology and evolution of these specific development policies is mapped out in Fig. 
1.3. This diagram is useful in that it illustrates where in relation to each other these 
policies were located, and the ‘point of transition’ at which there was a clear shift from 
one phase to another. The cause and effects of changes are explored in detail in the case 
study chapters, which will lead me to explore in the concluding chapter, the pattern of 
change within and between each of the three case studies, and the relationship of these 
individual policies to one another. Throughout the thesis however, the central concern 
remains the relationship between the domestic and the international policies. The 
diagram overleaf (Fig. 1.3) will be reworked later in chapter 8 (Fig. 8.1) to illustrate the 
core claim of policy transmission, the timing of this transmission, and the lag between 
when the domestic policy was introduced and its incorporation into New Labour’s 
international development policies.  
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Fig. 1.3  The Phases of New Labour’s International Development Policies, 1997–2010 
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The Structure of the Thesis 
Having outlined the main claims of the thesis, the contribution it will make to the existing 
literature, and the theoretical approach that will be used to frame my analysis, I now turn 
to the way in which my thesis will unfold. Chapter 2 begins by exploring the multiple 
narratives of globalisation that were articulated by New Labour officials. I do this initially 
in a domestic context, by demonstrating three different ways in which globalisation was 
understood as a ‘constraint’ before exploring the way in which it was articulated as an 
opportunity within the realm of international development. Resolving the ‘constraint-
opportunity’ paradox that appeared to be evident in New Labour’s multiple discourses of 
globalisation, I proceed to demonstrate how this impacted upon those areas of policy that 
formed the basis of New Labour’s domestic political economy. New Labour’s redesign of 
Britain’s macroeconomic architecture, its claim as the ‘new party of business’, and its 
welfare strategy would all feed into the development policies explored in the second half 
of the thesis, demonstrating a clear transmission of policy from one spatial scale of 
governance to another.  
  
KEY TO PUBLICATIONS AND EVENTS 
 DFID White Paper ‘A Challenge for the 21st 
Century’ 
 Commission for Africa publishes its findings 
 ‘Mauritius Mandate’ debt relief initiative 
agreed by Commonwealth Finance Ministers 
 G8 summit in Gleneagles. Make Poverty 
History campaign, Edinburgh rally and Live8  
 G8 summit in Birmingham and Drop the Debt 
campaign 
 Hong Kong Trade Ministerial as part of the 
WTO Doha Development Round 
 Enhanced HIPC initiative agreed in Cologne  DFID White Paper ‘Making Governance Work 
for the Poor’ 
 DFID White Paper ‘Making Globalisation Work 
for the Poor’ 
 DFID White Paper ‘Building a Common Future’ 
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Chapter 3 places New Labour’s commitment to international development in an 
altogether more historical context, highlighting the patterns of change and continuity 
between ‘old’ and New Labour. This provides a further layer of analysis to my work by 
situating New Labour’s approach to international development in relation to that of its 
predecessors. One clear break between ‘old’ and New Labour was the centrality of the 
Treasury in the design and formation of the Blair government’s international development 
policies. The steps that the erstwhile Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown and his 
advisor, Ed Balls, took to make the Treasury the pilot agency of New Labour’s political 
economy is the focus of the first part of chapter 4. Here I argue that although DFID was 
granted formal independence when New Labour came into power (thereby delivering 
upon a pledge that previous Labour leaders had made) it was the Treasury who was 
instrumental in setting domestic and foreign policy. Indeed, the influence of the Treasury 
was writ large over each of the policies explored in the case study chapters and this was 
crucial in the ‘internationalisation’ of New Labour’s domestic political economy. 
 
The second part of chapter 4 identifies the specific normative expectations that were held 
by constituencies concerning what precisely New Labour’s policies within this field should 
look like. This enables me to examine in the case study chapters that follow the priority 
that the government afforded to each of these constituencies by identifying which of 
these expectations were actually met by New Labour. My intention here is to show how 
having derived its international development policies from its domestic political economy, 
New Labour strategically framed these policies to manage these expectations of its core 
policy constituencies. I argue that a judgement of New Labour’s political economy can be 
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made from the degree of influence that the various constituencies were able to bring to 
bear upon the government’s international development policies. 
 
With this analytical framework in place, my attention in the second half of the thesis turns 
to the three core policies that the New Labour government pursued in order to meet its 
commitment to the elimination of poverty through international development. It is in 
each of these three empirical case studies that the central claims of the thesis rest. Laid 
out chronologically and following the same running order as the domestic policy themes 
that were explored in chapter 2, these case studies focus upon the commitment that was 
made by New Labour to relieve the debt burden of the world’s poorest countries; to 
increase access to HIV medicines; and to frontload and increase the levels of finance 
required for development.  
 
The first of these case studies in chapter 5 draws parallels between the economic 
architecture that was drawn up by Treasury officials at home and ‘the new international 
economic architecture’ that Gordon Brown was keen to pursue abroad. Both sets of 
frameworks were predicated upon the same ideas of macroeconomic stability, ‘open rules 
for an open economy’, and credibility through transparency and clear standards and 
codes. These principles were deemed to be essential for ‘inclusion’ – a key discourse of 
New Labour – in the global economy where ‘opportunities’ (another core New Labour 
theme) for wealth creation and increased prosperity lay. Eligibility for debt relief for the 
poorest countries under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and latterly, 
the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) would be conditional upon recipient 
countries meeting their obligations towards the ‘good economic governance’ supported 
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by the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ (PWC). Embedded firmly within this ‘new economic 
architecture’ by the international financial institutions (IFIs), these policy initiatives 
emphasised the new economic orthodoxy as a means of achieving the economic growth 
understood to be necessary for development.  
 
This approach to policy however would bring officials, both in Whitehall and Washington 
into conflict with constituencies who viewed the issue of debt relief in ‘moral’ rather than 
simply ‘economic’ terms, and as an issue of social justice and economic redemption. 
Under a series of high profile anti-poverty campaigns, some Labour backbenchers joined 
with trade unions, church groups, and celebrities in urging the New Labour Government, 
other creditor countries and lenders to cancel developing world debt on more normative 
grounds of morality and social justice. This left New Labour in a further difficult position: 
whether to focus upon increasing the urgently needed funds for global development (as it 
would do through initiatives such as the International Financial Facility explored in chapter 
7) and in doing so answer the calls of justice demanded by civil society, or impose, as the 
IFIs themselves had done in the past, a new form of ‘conditionality’ – a specific form of 
economic governance upon developing countries designed to equip these states to meet 
the challenges of globalisation and confer its opportunities.  
 
The second case study, explored in chapter 6, addresses New Labour’s commitment to 
increase the availability of antiretroviral drugs needed to combat HIV and AIDS in the 
developing world. The main theme of this chapter is the partnership that existed between 
the New Labour Government and the British pharmaceutical industry, explored in chapter 
2 and located within the strategic context of an increasingly global and highly competitive 
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economy. Despite passing through a series of policy phases, this particular partnership 
was dominated by a series of demand and supply-side policies designed to accommodate 
the expectations of the pharmaceutical industry, with a number of market-based 
measures introduced to incentivise rather than regulate the industry into meeting its 
wider obligations towards HIV and AIDS.  
 
Given the centrality of this relationship to New Labour’s ambitions, both at home where 
ministers had talked at length about placing Britain, and its pharmaceutical industry at the 
heart of ‘the knowledge economy’, and in this particular area of development overseas, I 
assess in this particular chapter the space that was left for other ‘non-market’ 
constituencies within the policy process to voice their expectations of New Labour’s 
commitments over HIV and AIDS. Although most government officials appeared to share 
these concerns, and recognised the critical shortfall in the amount of antiretrovirals that 
were available in the developing world, having inculcated the market logic of 
globalisation, New Labour ministers remained committed to creating an economic and 
regulatory framework conducive to retaining and attract further domestic investment. I 
suggest that this presented New Labour with a further dilemma: whether to prioritise the 
economic competitiveness of the UK-based pharmaceutical firms or press forward with its 
wider commitments concerning global public health. 
 
The final case study picks up the theme of financing for development explored in the first 
case study. However, whereas chapter 5 focused upon the macroeconomic context, 
chapter 7 examines the linkages between New Labour’s domestic welfare policies, or 
specifically the ‘New Deal’ that the Chancellor introduced at home, and the ‘global New 
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Deal’ that he sought to promote abroad. The centrepiece of this ‘global New Deal’ was the 
International Finance Facility (or latterly, the International Finance Facility for 
Immunisation), a means by which finance for development could be raised on 
international bond markets for investment now and repaid at a later date. There were 
clear linkages here with New Labour’s approach to government spending at home, and in 
particular, the Treasury’s ‘golden rule’ ‘to borrow only to invest’, and its enthusiasm to 
use private finance to fund public goods, as it had at home through Private Finance 
Initiatives and Public-Private Partnerships.  
 
As well as these spending proposals, the format of the New Deal was internationalised as 
a means of encouraging greater inclusion in the global economy. Like the New Deal at 
home which sought to lift people out of unemployment and include them in the world of 
work, this ‘Global New Deal’ worked on the same principles of ‘rights and responsibilities’ 
as a means of including developing countries in the global economy so that they might 
confer its benefits. Like the discourse of globalisation that underpinned New Labour’s 
approach to debt relief, the discourse here was one of negotiable constraint through 
disciplined opportunity. If ‘properly managed’ – i.e. if developing countries opened up 
their economies and pursued pro-trade policies – then globalisation would be more likely 
to work in their favour. The role of aid in this was similar to that of welfare; not an end in 
itself but a springboard for inclusion in the global economy; and for poor countries, 
development and growth. In this interim period however, like Britain’s own welfare 
claimants who were compelled to undertake training and voluntary work under New 
Labour, recipients of this aid had to meet a set of globally-oriented set of obligations in 
order to become eligible for this finance. Having already explored the macroeconomic 
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implications of this in chapter 5, I argue here that casting aid as a form of global welfare, 
presented officials with a similar dilemma to the one it faced when attempting to 
negotiate the issue of debt relief. Ascribing aid with the same contractual obligations of 
‘rights and responsibilities’ served only to impose a new form of ‘conditionality’ and 
restrict the already-limited economic autonomy of those countries in need of this finance.  
 
In chapter 8, as a means of concluding the thesis, I return to the core theoretical and 
empirical claims made here in this opening chapter, and throughout the thesis. I 
summarise those policies that were transposed from New Labour’s domestic political 
economy to meet its commitment to international development, the constituencies that it 
incorporated at each phase of policy, and the processes of change that these policies, and 
New Labour’s political economy more generally, underwent whilst in office. It is at this 
stage of the thesis that I explore the significance of this policy transmission from the 
domestic to the international realm, and the tensions inherent in such a strategy. Despite 
a clear desire to address the issues of global poverty, and the acknowledgement of a 
moral imperative, the New Labour government attempted to meet this commitment 
through a model of political economy designed explicitly to work with and indeed enhance 
the structures of global capitalism. As a result, its development strategy not only 
assimilated ‘market’ constituencies in its policy process but, more often than not 
prioritised the expectations of these constituencies over the delivery of a more equitable 
set of outcomes. This would fail to address the structural causes of global poverty and 
limit the scope for any genuine success in this field.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Home from Home: the Internationalisation of 
New Labour’s Domestic Political Economy 
 
 
The purpose of this opening chapter is to assess those policy themes that New Labour 
officials designed and implemented initially for domestic consumption but which would go 
on to form the basis of its core international development policies relating to debt relief, 
HIV and AIDS, and overseas aid. Both the content and the trajectory of these particular 
policies are explored in chapters 5, 6 and 7 respectively. In this chapter however, the main 
focus is upon those domestic policies that were recycled by government ministers and 
officials to meet these global concerns, and incorporated into New Labour’s flagship 
international development policies overseas.  
 
Before assessing these specific policies however, I develop an important analytical point 
concerning the strategic context of New Labour’s political economy. The dominant 
leitmotif of New Labour’s political economy was globalisation, or more specifically 
Britain’s place within the global economy. This subject alone has generated a tremendous 
volume of scholarly literature; here however my focus is upon the multiple ways in which 
‘globalisation’ was invoked by New Labour officials as a means of discursively framing and 
justifying government policy decisions. In the opening part of this chapter, I explore the 
three different discourses that were deployed by ministers at home, casting globalisation 
in an unforgiving light. To different degrees, these discourses emphasised the ‘constraint’ 
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that globalisation was understood to place upon both policymakers and citizens alike. This 
theme of ‘constraint’ at home is striking since when it was exported abroad via New 
Labour’s international development policies, globalisation was framed as an ‘opportunity’; 
a means by which millions living in the developing world could be lifted out of poverty. As 
Wyn Grant has observed, the approach of the Blair government in dealing with 
globalisation was to view it as a challenge and as an opportunity.1 Whilst providing 
considerable evidence in support of Grant’s claim, I argue here that the logic of 
globalisation, whichever way it was understood by New Labour officials, had the effect of 
mediating the way in which policy was subsequently presented to various domestic and 
international constituencies. 
 
Such an observation might appear to crucially undermine the core claim of this thesis: that 
New Labour took elements of its domestic political economy and policies designed for the 
British polity, and transposed these into its international development policies, for 
consumption abroad. I reject this however, arguing instead that even within these 
seemingly contradictory discourses of globalisation there is clear evidence of policy 
transmission. The domestic pronouncements of ‘constraint’ in the speeches of 
government ministers and the language of ‘opportunity’ that appeared in New Labour’s 
international development policies represented two sides of the same coin. As I go onto 
show later in the chapter, the ‘opportunities’ that officials in Whitehall spoke of regarding 
matters relating to international development could only be achieved by managing 
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‘properly’ the ‘constraints’ upon policy that globalisation had putatively imposed upon 
government officials at home. My analysis of the effects that globalisation had upon the 
framing of policy reveals the different, and indeed often contradictory ways in which New 
Labour officials internalised and articulated the perceived challenges and opportunities of 
the global economy.  
 
Structure of the Chapter 
This chapter unfolds in four stages. I begin with a series of preliminary remarks in the 
opening part of this chapter to provide the strategic context upon which my assessment of 
New Labour’s domestic political economy proceeds. My attention here turns to those 
domestic policies that were ‘internationalised’, that is, transmitted from one spatial scale 
of governance to another, in order to meet New Labour’s commitments concerning global 
poverty. The division into three specific areas of New Labour’s domestic policies in this 
chapter chime with the way in which the Blair and Brown governments conducted the 
three international development policies assessed in the second part of the thesis. The 
focus of the final part of this chapter therefore shifts to firstly, New Labour’s management 
of the UK economy; secondly, its relationship with business; and thirdly, the welfare 
policies it introduced whilst in office. I argue, both here and in the empirical case study 
chapters that these three respective areas of domestic policy informed the way New 
Labour set about addressing the three issues of debt relief, HIV and AIDS, and overseas 
aid, all of which were central to its international development policies overseas.   
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New Labour and the Discourse of Globalisation  
Globalisation was central to both the politics and economics of the New Labour project. 
Indeed, as Coates and Hay have remarked, the Labour Party, “to an unprecedented 
extent, emphasised the degree to which international (indeed, global) processes, 
pressures and tendencies [served] as external constraints circumscribing the parameters 
of political possibility”.2 Under Tony Blair, and latterly Gordon Brown, New Labour’s 
political economy was particularly sensitive to and acutely aware of the pressures that 
globalisation was assumed to impose upon national governments. Of course, as Steven 
Fielding has rightly pointed out, it would be wrong to think of New Labour as being unique 
in imagining Britain’s place within the world economy. Due to the UK’s historic and 
ongoing dependence upon international trade, every government, irrespective of its 
stripe, has had its policies shaped by external forces.3 For Martin Smith however, Blair’s 
government was the first which operated in “a post-Cold War, post-Keynesian era where 
international borders and relations are more open than and complex than in any 
preceding period”.4 According to Noel Thompson, for the Labour Party, this phenomenon 
“posed major problems, not just for Keynesian social democracy but, more generally, for 
the national economic policy autonomy of medium-sized nations such as Britain”.5  
 
It is from these assessments in particular that my analysis takes its point of departure. The 
central theme that runs through this thesis, and indeed, as I shall demonstrate, that was 
present throughout New Labour’s political economy, was the manner in which the ideas 
of globalisation held by New Labour officials served to configure the Party’s policies both 
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in a domestic setting and within the policy arena of international development. To frame 
my analysis, I follow Philip Cerny, amongst others, who have noted that the most crucial 
feature of globalisation:  
 
…is that it constitutes a discourse – and increasingly, a hegemonic 
discourse…*the spread of which] alters the a priori ideas and perceptions 
that people have of the empirical phenomena which they encounter; in 
so doing, it engenders strategies and tactics which in turn may 
restructure the game itself.6   
 
Taking this a stage further, Hay notes the importance of differentiating between the 
discourse, rhetoric and reality of globalisation.7 Having internalised these perceived 
changes in the global economy, New Labour officials deployed a discourse of globalisation 
selectively and often inconsistently, according to the strategic terrain with which it was 
faced. Both at home and abroad, globalisation was presented as a challenge and as an 
opportunity. Globalisation was understood by officials to constrain and discipline the 
policy decisions open to the government. At the same time however, it also offered the 
prospect of increased prosperity and the realisation of “social justice on a global scale”.8   
 
My principal concern then relates to the different discourses of globalisation that were 
evident in New Labour’s domestic and international political economy. Neither space nor 
scope allows me to either accept or dispute the material realities or otherwise of the 
various arguments put forward in the globalisation debate.9 There is already an 
abundance of literature using all manner of empirical data to trade claim and counter-
claim, to prove the empirical veracity or otherwise of globalisation, and the reconfigured 
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roles of the state and the market in the global economy. Space does not permit me to 
revisit these debates here. My focus in this section is the manner in which globalisation 
acted as a strategic narrative comprising of several overlapping discourses that enabled 
Party officials to animate and position the New Labour project. In opening up this strategic 
narrative, I build upon the previous remarks made by Cerny and Hay to extend the claims 
made by Hay and Rosamond who argue, quite rightly, that globalisation has become “the 
lens through which policymakers’ view the context in which they find themselves”.10  
 
To do this, I explore the multiple ways in which the discourse of globalisation was 
articulated by ministers. To underpin this claim even further, I utilise the work of John K. 
Galbraith, whose concept of ‘conventional wisdom’ is also helpful in unpacking New 
Labour’s assessment of its strategic environment. Globalisation, I argue, provided New 
Labour officials with what Galbraith termed their “understanding of contemporary 
economic and social life”.11 Having internalised the ‘conventional wisdom’ of globalisation, 
that is, to borrow the definitive terms of Held et al., the “widening, deepening and 
speeding up of interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life”,12 
government officials strategically manipulated the phenomenon to frame and to justify 
policy decisions. It is evident, both in each of the three areas of domestic policymaking 
and the three international development policies explored later on in the thesis, that 
there was a great deal of contingency and strategic convenience in the way in which New 
Labour deployed the concept of globalisation both in the construction and justification of 
policy. This however would reveal a paradox in New Labour’s globalisation discourse at 
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home and its transmission abroad when it came to addressing matters relating to 
international development. 
 
My argument here is two-fold. The first explores the invocation of globalisation by New 
Labour officials in a strictly domestic setting. Here I examine how globalisation came to 
frame the way in which New Labour viewed those parts of its political economy at home – 
its management of the UK economy, its relationship with business and its welfare policies 
– all of which were subsequently recycled for consumption overseas. The second part to 
my argument concerns New Labour’s discourse of globalisation within the sphere of 
international development, which I discuss in this chapter and demonstrate empirically 
within the case study chapters later in the thesis. When it came to addressing matters of 
international development, New Labour officials emphasised the opportunities of 
globalisation. Far from acting as a constraint upon policy, globalisation in this context 
served to act as the underlying, and altogether more positive, rationale for New Labour’s 
intervention within the developing world. Here globalisation could be ‘a force for good’; 
one that if managed correctly, was able to lift millions out of poverty.13 Therefore, instead 
of restricting the parameters of the politically possible, globalisation actually extended 
and necessitated New Labour’s remit into the developing world. When situated against 
New Labour’s discourse of globalisation at home however, this approach to and 
understanding of international development reveals a paradox in policy thinking, 
particularly in the light of the transmission from the domestic to the international scales 
of governance. Here there was a fundamental inconsistency between New Labour’s 
domestic discourse of globalisation which was articulated as a constraint upon political 
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agency at home, and the discourse of globalisation that New Labour viewed as an 
opportunity within its international development policies abroad. 
 
Globalisation and New Labour’s Political Economy 
The processes of globalisation formed the basis of what Stuart Hall and others defined as 
the ‘new times’ that necessitated the modernisation of the Labour Party, and 
subsequently the birth of the New Labour project.14 However, it is out of this analysis that 
a sharp divide in the New Labour literature has emerged. There are those on the one hand 
who have argued that the Party retained, albeit in a modified sense, its commitment to 
social democracy in the light of these global pressures, and those on the other, who claim 
that New Labour simply capitulated to the ‘conventional wisdom’ of neoliberalism and its 
underlying support for global capitalism.  
 
Michael Kenny and Martin Smith are among those broadly sympathetic to the constraints 
that the Blair government faced in terms of the international economy and the 
transformations that the British state had undergone in the preceding twenty years. In the 
light of these ‘new times’, policy now had to be:  
 
…conceived and applied in the context of the globalisation of financial 
markets, fundamental reconfigurations of international economic power 
and a transformed macroeconomic environment in which interest rates, 
inflation and public sector borrowing are far more difficult to manage.15  
 
For Kenny and Smith, this meant that a line had to be drawn between the policies of 
previous Labour governments and those appropriate to today’s conditions. Developing the 
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work of Swank, Lindblom, Przeworski and Wallerstein, Mark Wickham-Jones has argued 
that the Labour Party acted in a manner consistent with the theory of the structural 
dependence of the state upon capital in the way in which it set about making economic 
policy.16 The Party’s desire to retain investment, maintain economic prosperity and secure 
re-election meant prioritising the demands of global capital over some of its most 
cherished social democratic beliefs. Quite simply, as Driver and Martell suggest, the 
challenge of globalisation meant that the Left had to find new ways to deliver its 
traditional values.17  
  
Responding to these assessments of New Labour’s ‘revised’ social democracy however, 
Colin Hay has argued that “this is an exceedingly dangerous, however well-intentioned, 
move”.18 According to Hay, the consequence of New Labour’s strategy merely served “to 
restrict the limits of the possible, the feasible and the desirable to that imaginable within 
the ascendant neoliberal worldview”.19 In his assessment of these ‘new times’, Alan 
Finlayson has gone further still. By treating globalisation as “an inevitable force” and 
allowing neoliberal theories of the market to “remain dominant”, Finlayson argues that 
New Labour took “the easy way out, failing to live up to its historic opportunity, [and] 
serving only to adjust us to a post-Thatcherite settlement”.20 This point is reinforced by 
Bob Jessop, who has suggested that although New Labour “invoked ‘the stakeholding 
society’, ‘the giving society’, ‘communitarianism’, ‘social citizenship’, ‘social capital’, 
‘partnership’, and, of course, ‘the Third Way’ to distinguish its approach from Thatcherite 
neoliberalism”, these programmes in practice rarely threatened the neoliberal project. 
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Instead, New Labour “embraced the City agenda and neoliberalism” to “become the 
natural governing party of international capital”.21 In these accounts, New Labour’s 
acceptance of globalisation and the exigencies of free-market capitalism meant 
abandoning its social democratic credentials in favour of the existing neoliberal 
hegemony.  
 
This, of course, is but a flavour of the much broader debate concerning the frequently 
contested, quadraphonic relationship between New Labour, globalisation, social 
democracy, and neoliberalism.22 It is nevertheless useful in providing a backdrop to my 
own analysis of the way in which globalisation was viewed by Party officials. Using a wide 
array of policy statements and speeches, the purpose of this particular section is to assess 
the precise way in which globalisation configured New Labour’s political economy both at 
home and abroad. What is abundantly clear from these speeches is that in spite of the 
wider conjecture surrounding the precise nature of globalisation, New Labour ministers 
were themselves convinced that such transformations were not only taking place but 
were an intrinsic part of contemporary economic and social relations.  
 
What is arguably more important however – certainly insofar as the central claim of this 
thesis is concerned – is that for government officials, globalisation was integral in drawing 
together and blurring the previously distinct boundaries that had demarcated domestic 
and foreign policymaking. As Baroness Amos, during her time as Secretary of State for 
International Development remarked:  
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Globalisation is reinforcing the need for an integrated approach to 
policymaking. Policies no longer fit into neat sectoral boxes and the 
distinction between domestic and international policy is increasingly 
blurred. Most domestic policies, such as taxation, have international 
implications and most international policies, such as trade, have 
domestic implications.23 
 
Similarly for the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, “domestic and international policy *was+ 
becoming ever more intertwined as a result of globalisation, travel and technological 
advance”.24 This understanding of globalisation underpinned the transmission of policy 
from the domestic to the international that I claim was evident in New Labour’s political 
economy. Therefore it is from these statements that my analysis unfolds. Since 
globalisation had rendered the lines between ‘the domestic’ and ‘the international’ 
indistinguishable, policies designed by government officials for consumption at home 
were tailored to meet the perceived realities and challenges of this new global economy 
abroad. 
 
For Tony Blair, the new politics of ‘the Third Way’ sought to address the “radical” changes 
that were taking place in the new global economy.25 As Blair took this message of ‘the 
Third Way’ across the world, it provided the Prime Minister with several opportunities to 
discuss these perceived realities with a number of different audiences. Blair’s underlying 
message was consistent throughout: the “globalisation of the world economy is a 
reality”.26 He believed that “we are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not”,27 
because “we have one economy, all of which is affected profoundly by developments in 
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both technology and global markets”.28 For countries to be successful, the Prime Minister 
remarked, globalisation should be ‘accepted’,29 for it is “transforming the world 
economy”.30 For Blair, globalisation quite simply, was “a fact of life”.31 
 
Gordon Brown too – both while he was Blair’s Chancellor and Prime Minister himself – 
spoke repeatedly of the challenges and opportunities presented by globalisation and the 
global economy. Like Blair, Brown argued that “globalisation has happened”, and the 
challenges that have arisen from it have done so “from our ever greater interdependence 
in an integrated global economy”,32 ”with its ever more rapid waves of innovation and its 
fast-moving and often destabilising capital markets”.33 At a social level, the Chancellor 
noted how “changes in the global economy *had created+ a worldwide culture: global 
communications and travel, global brand names, global music, films, and entertainments 
and global media outlets”.34 These changes meant that governments were “of course 
subject not just to national pressures, but to global pressures too”.35 That governments 
felt compelled to yield to these global pressures is striking as it illustrates the extent to 
which New Labour felt constrained to treat globalisation as an inevitable outcome, or as 
Watson and Hay have remarked, to pursue a distinct ‘logic of no alternative’.36 
 
New Labour’s discourse of globalisation also featured heavily in the policy 
pronouncements of other senior cabinet officials. Given that the focus of the thesis is 
upon New Labour’s international development policies, it is appropriate that I begin with 
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Clare Short, New Labour’s first Secretary of State for International Development. For 
Short, the fixed realities of globalisation meant that “it is not a question of whether 
people are for or against it”, globalisation was for “real”, as “part of history, just as 
industrialisation was *and+ as big a historical change as the industrial revolution”.37 Not 
only was globalisation an undisputed reality, it was, according to the late Robin Cook, as 
inevitable as sunrise. During his time as Foreign Secretary, Cook remarked, “it is a good 
thing that the sun rises every day, but I also know there is nothing I can do to stop it even 
if I wanted to”.38 
 
During his first stint at the Treasury as its Chief Secretary, Alistair Darling offered a 
similarly fatalistic assessment of the strategic environment that faced New Labour and 
Britain. “We live in a global economy” Darling noted, and “we are moving towards a single 
global economy”.39 Indeed many New Labour figures shared this sense of inevitability 
towards globalisation. As the Labour peer, Lord McIntosh remarked, “I just take the view 
that it is a fact which we can do nothing about; we will not turn it back”.40 The Defence 
Secretary, Geoff Hoon agreed. He, like both Blair and Brown, viewed globalisation as “a 
fact of life”.41 Echoing these remarks, the Leader of the House of Commons, Peter Hain 
argued that it was indeed “a fact of life” and that “we, in Britain, are part of a global 
economy”.42 This ‘fact’ could not, according to the Home Secretary Charles Clarke, “be un-
invented”, it was simply “the realities with which we have to live”.43 As a result, 
globalisation was, in the terms of the Science and Innovation Minister, Malcolm Wicks, 
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“here to stay”.44 New Labour’s last International Development Secretary, Douglas 
Alexander noted that “in our age, shaped as it is by the twin forces of globalisation and 
interconnectedness, to talk of one world is no longer to utter an abstract thought but to 
describe a concrete reality”.45 
 
These statements are just a handful of the hundreds that were made throughout New 
Labour’s time in office to demonstrate the extent to which the ‘conventional wisdom’ of 
globalisation was appealed to by government ministers across Whitehall as a very fixed 
reality of the modern age. However, while these assessments are revealing both in this 
sense and in providing the rationale for the policy decisions that were subsequently 
reached, simply taken on their own, they give little indication either of how these 
discourses themselves were internalised by New Labour officials or how they went on to 
shape government policy. As Watson and Hay note, “that the Labour Party has chosen to 
deploy the rhetoric of globalisation is undeniable. It is crucial then that we establish on 
what terms it has done so”.46 While Watson and Hay focus purely upon the domestic 
sphere, I take this analysis a stage further by exploring the terms upon which globalisation 
was deployed within the realm of international development. I argue here that the terms 
upon which it did so were inconsistent, resulting in a paradox in New Labour’s political 
economy. Despite the apparent fixity and inevitability of globalisation, government 
officials believed that they could, either through prudent policy management or strategic 
manipulation of the realities of globalisation, negotiate its otherwise inexorable pressures, 
both at home and abroad.  
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The pattern to New Labour’s discourse of globalisation mirrors that one of what Bob 
Jessop has termed “strategic selectivity”.47 The various discourses of globalisation were 
used strategically by government officials to justify certain policy decisions within specific 
contexts, and to discipline expectations amongst the electorate and the wider polity 
concerning what was (or indeed, what was not) politically or economically feasible. As I 
demonstrate in the following section, the selectivity stemmed from globalisation as being 
understood by New Labour as both as a challenge and an opportunity. This Janus-faced 
view of globalisation was epitomised by the appeal made by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer himself, Alistair Darling; the Minister for the Armed Forces, Bob Ainsworth; the 
Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Ed Balls and his predecessor, Ivan Lewis to “embrace” 
and “respond” to both “the challenges and opportunities presented by globalisation”.48 
 
The Challenges and Opportunities of Globalisation 
To illustrate how these various patterns of constraint were reflected in New Labour’s 
discourse, I assess three ways in which globalisation was strategically used by officials at 
home. The first led government ministers to view globalisation as a fairly straightforward 
non-negotiable constraint. This resulted in a discourse that accounted for a series of 
structural changes over which government ministers felt they had little or no control. The 
second allowed for some room for manoeuvre but in broad terms still imposed a 
framework of discretionary constraint upon policymakers. In this instance, it was felt 
amongst policy officials that any political latitude that may have existed needed to be 
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tempered in order to meet the challenges of the global economy. The third of these 
discourses presented globalisation as a negotiable constraint through disciplined 
opportunity. Invoking the ‘threat’ of the first discourse by appealing to the challenges 
faced externally from elsewhere in the global economy, globalisation was viewed as an 
opportunity that may be negotiated but only if certain constraints were imposed upon the 
electorate. The clear difference between this particular discourse and the previous two is 
that the constraint inherent within first two discourses were largely self-imposed by policy 
officials. This third discourse however shifted the burden of constraint from the shoulders 
of the government and onto those of the individual citizen. I examine each of these 
domestic discourses in turn, before assessing the discourse of globalisation that appeared 
in the organisation of New Labour’s international development policies. 
 
Discourse 1: Globalisation as a Non-Negotiable Constraint 
This particular discourse is derived from arguably the dominant understanding of 
globalisation, certainly within the more mainstream literature. This ‘business school’ 
literature, labelled by Watson and Hay for its influence in expounding the conventional 
wisdom of globalisation amongst the business and media elites, was ‘the public face’ of 
globalisation in Britain during the mid to late 1990s.49 According to these accounts, 
globalisation was characterised by ever increasing flows of capital, production and other 
resources across borders and continents, all mobilised by advances in technology and 
communication. However while globalisation was perceived to be comprised of a 
constellation of dynamics all mediating and interacting with one another, in terms of a 
political and economic discourse each of its processes were considered to be inexorable 
and non-negotiable. As New Labour itself made clear in its 2005 General Election 
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manifesto; “in a fast changing global economy, government cannot postpone or prevent 
change”.50 
 
New Labour officials were far from slow in detecting these trends, and indeed, as one of 
the chief architects of New Labour, Peter Mandelson remarked during his time as the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry “the growth of electronic mail and the internet, 
changing customer demands and greater liberalisation of markets are the key drivers of 
change worldwide”.51 For his Prime Minister Tony Blair, these changes meant that we now 
lived “in a completely new world”.52 The increased liberalisation of financial markets for 
instance made it possible for trillions of dollars to move across the foreign exchanges in a 
single day. However, the ‘completely new world’ that Blair envisaged was rapidly 
transferring power from the state to the market. In his now famous Doctrine of the 
International Community speech, Blair warned his audience in Chicago that “any 
government that thinks it can go it alone is wrong. If the markets don’t like your policies, 
they will punish you”.53 
 
This appeared to be a stark and straightforward discourse, something that the Prime 
Minister himself alluded to in a speech to British business leaders. “What is happening 
today is not complex but simple...there is huge restructuring, here and elsewhere in the 
industrialised world”.54 This restructuring, Gordon Brown added, was taking place “across 
continents” and driving forward “mobility of capital and openness to competition”.55 The 
key economic problem then that now confronted policymakers was not merely economic 
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downturn but these “very large and profound global structural changes”. The Chancellor 
argued that these structural changes were responsible for “shifting many industries and 
services to the industrialising world and challenging us in the industrialised world to 
respond and adjust more quickly and more flexibly”.56 
 
Understood in these terms, globalisation was an inevitable and non-negotiable part of the 
contemporary age. The pace at which globalisation was taking place was leading to 
“people *being+ displaced, industries [being] made obsolete, communities re-shaped, even 
torn apart”.57 As Blair went onto argue “the premium is on a country’s ability to adapt. 
Adapt quickly and you prosper. Fail to do so and you decline”.58 The Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury, Des Browne borrowed directly from the conventional wisdom of globalisation to 
make a similar point to Blair. Drawing upon the analysis of the latest proponent of this 
conventional wisdom, Thomas Friedman,59  Browne noted how the world is now ‘flatter’; 
how globalisation has made outsourcing, teleworking and other modern ways of working 
even more relevant. Browne, like Friedman and Blair, argued that “we must face up to this 
challenge or be left behind”.60 
 
Despite its apparent simplicity however, this specific discourse of globalisation still posed 
a number of dilemmas to policymakers, most notably the type of role governments now 
had in the midst of these inevitable global pressures. By assuming the near perfect 
mobility of capital and factors of production, government officials were left, by 
implication, to pursue a set of policies centred upon national competitiveness, cost 
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reductions, welfare retrenchment and greater labour market flexibility – in effect, policies 
that ceded power to the markets. However, this discourse had the effect of becoming a 
self-fulfilling prophecy.61 These were policies that recognised implicitly the shift in the 
balance of power from the state to the market yet merely reinforced this transfer of 
power by offering a set of policies that accommodated and conformed to the expectations 
of market actors. 
 
The explanation offered by the Chancellor, Alistair Darling, concerning the Treasury’s 
approach to corporation tax provides a useful illustration of this point: 
 
A few years ago, one of our airlines used to say ‘we never forget you 
have a choice’. Today, governments should remember that. Business 
does have a choice. Business is increasingly mobile. Tax rates have to be 
globally competitive. I am determined that British business will not be 
the fiscal fall guy. Business is the lynchpin of the British economy. 
Business creates jobs, wealth and generates growth. And government 
must ensure the right framework within which business can prosper. 
And tax is an essential part of that framework...We need to ensure that 
the tax system is competitive and predictable, as well as ensuring that 
the business environment is attractive to increasingly mobile 
businesses.62 
 
There is a clear and somewhat disarmingly simple logic in Darling’s statement. In a global 
economy, businesses are footloose and can relocate with ease. In the light of this context, 
if the New Labour government wishes to retain the investment of these firms (thereby 
safeguarding jobs and prosperity) then it is necessary to make the British tax system 
globally competitive. The underlying message here is that while businesses have a choice, 
governments do not. Irrespective of whether Darling was correct in his assessment, his 
statement, rather strikingly, demonstrates how this particular discourse of globalisation 
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might result in two very real material outcomes. Firstly, the discourse embedded the 
Treasury’s tax framework within the perceived demands made by market actors for a 
more competitive and less burdensome tax regime. By doing this however – and this is the 
second outcome – Darling himself actually imposed constraint upon the government’s 
own corporate fiscal policy, thereby reinforcing the shift in power from the state to the 
market. 
 
As I shall show in the next discourse, strikingly however, despite its clear concession to the 
market, this was not New Labour’s only understanding of globalisation. It was however 
clearly convenient for government officials as they sought to describe the changes that 
they believed they were faced with in setting policy. In the midst of these profound 
structural changes in the wider global economy, ministers and other Party officials 
frequently treated globalisation a non-negotiable constraint upon policy. If this then was 
the material reality with which New Labour was faced, what role did it now envisage for 
itself in government? It is to the second discourse I now turn, and assess how an 
altogether more contingent view of globalisation enabled it to exercise more in the way of 
‘discretionary constraint’ in the way policy was set within the domestic sphere. 
 
Discourse 2: Discretionary Constraint 
The second discourse of globalisation invoked by New Labour gave policymakers slightly 
more latitude in setting policy. Like the first discourse, it took as its point of departure the 
inexorability of globalisation. However, this second discourse was articulated by officials 
as possessing what Hay and Rosamond have termed, a “fragile and contingent quality”.63 
If managed correctly through the prescription of the right policy-mix, New Labour could 
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ensure that globalisation was less a threat but more an opportunity that could stand to 
benefit the British economy. Here, the transforming context of the new global economy 
compelled policymakers to act with ‘discretionary constraint’. Borrowed from the then 
Chief Economist and future Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, this 
particular term appeared in the post-monetarist policy framework of the Treasury. It 
underpinned the ‘key principles for policymaking in an open economy’ advocated by its 
Chief Economic Advisor, Ed Balls, and supported the government’s commitment to 
credibility during its first term in office.64    
 
For King, and latterly Balls, “credibility is the elusive elixir of modern macroeconomics”.65 
According to Balls, “the rapid globalisation of the world economy *had+ made achieving 
credibility more rather than less important, particularly for an incoming left-of-centre 
government which has been out of power for two decades”.66 The importance of 
credibility in this particular discourse of globalisation can be traced back to the remarks I 
made earlier concerning Galbraith’s ‘conventional wisdom’. Galbraith argued that 
“familiarity is such an important test of acceptability”,67 since “the hallmark of any 
conventional wisdom is acceptability”.68 For New Labour, policy was framed in a manner 
that the government’s core economic constituencies, at home and abroad, would find 
both ‘familiar’ and ‘acceptable’. As Paul Krugman has remarked, “one’s agreement with 
that conventional wisdom becomes almost the litmus test of one’s suitability to be taken 
seriously”.69 Within the context of New Labour’s own political economy, this point is 
further underlined by Colin Hay who has noted that although credibility is an internal end, 
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it requires external, and indeed international, validation.70 If for example, the policies that 
New Labour pursued were ‘familiar’ to – that is to say, if they internalised the same logic 
as – international markets concerning the increased mobility of global capital, then it 
would be far more likely that these policies would be accepted as being authoritative and 
credible by the these constituencies.  
 
Gordon Brown set out his understanding of contemporary state-market relations thus: “in 
theory...governments are free to run the economy as they see fit. They have, in theory, 
unfettered discretion”.71 Even in an era of globalisation, national governments could 
implement any type of policies that they wished. However, it was understood that such 
was the structural power of global capital, in reality, should a government exercise 
‘unfettered discretion’, this would result in “market distrust” and the likelihood of rapid 
disinvestment, unemployment and a loss of confidence in the government itself. It was 
therefore vitally important for national governments to secure the trust of the markets, 
and to put in place policies that supported a long-term, predictable macroeconomic 
framework. Under the chancellorship of Gordon Brown, this was to be achieved by 
limiting the policy discretion of the New Labour government through a series of binding 
fiscal rules. For Brown, this would entail sending the UK down a “post-monetarist path to 
stability”, and putting into place “the discipline of a long-term institutional framework”,72 
imperatives that I explore both later in this chapter and in chapter 4.  
 
Despite the political constraints that it would invoke, this particular discourse of 
globalisation was necessary to secure the acceptability, and concomitantly, the credibility 
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of New Labour’s policies. Whilst serving as Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Alistair Darling 
argued that, “economic policy must be open and transparent” since “openness builds 
confidence and credibility *which+ is essential in today’s global economy”.73 This 
commitment to openness would, Ed Balls claimed, be supported by four symbiotic 
principles: (1) stability through constrained discretion; (2) credibility through sound, long-
term policies; (3) credibility through maximum transparency; and (4) credibility through 
pre-commitment.74 These principles would underpin the credible rules by which New 
Labour’s economic policy would be set. Treasury officials feared that in an era of increased 
globalisation, “governments which lack credibility – which are pursuing policies which are 
not seen to be sustainable – are punished not only more swiftly than in the past but more 
severely and at a greater cost to their future credibility”.75 New Labour therefore felt 
compelled to reassure markets that not only had it learnt the painful lessons of its own 
past, but that it would maintain a policy framework which would continue to 
accommodate the expectations of markets. New Labour’s credibility therefore meant 
keeping the accepted, ostensibly neoliberal, ‘conventional wisdom’ of globalisation central 
to its model of political economy. 
 
The Treasury’s pursuit of credibility, particularly amongst market constituencies 
demonstrates the extent to which New Labour not only accepted the inexorability of 
globalisation, but also the extent to which it felt compelled to respond to it through a 
series of constrained policy decisions. This discourse of globalisation enabled New Labour 
to re-envisage globalisation not simply as a threat, but as a ‘discretionary constraint’ upon 
policy; essentially a self-imposed means of ‘changing the rules’ by which the game of 
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economic governance must now be played. However, only by playing by these new rules 
would Britain confer the opportunities presented by globalisation. It is to these and other 
opportunities that I now turn my attention. 
 
Discourse 3: A Negotiable Constraint through Disciplined Opportunity 
Given my analysis thus far, it may be tempting to view New Labour’s invocation of 
globalisation as simply having, to a greater or lesser degree, a constraining effect upon 
policy formation and the activity of state actors. While there is little, if any, evidence of 
antipathy amongst New Labour officials towards globalisation; the discourses I have 
assessed so far present globalisation to be non-negotiable, and any room that government 
ministers may have had to manoeuvre to be severely constrained by these global 
pressures. As widespread and as pervasive as these two discourses were however, even 
they do not fully reflect New Labour’s invocation of globalisation. A wider reading of 
policy pronouncements and speeches made by New Labour officials actually reveals 
globalisation to represent a series of opportunities for Britain. 
 
This adds a further layer of complexity to New Labour’s political economy. Amidst the 
constraints that globalisation was understood to now impose upon national governments, 
there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that New Labour officials were in fact hugely 
enthusiastic about the opportunities that these increased levels of global integration 
offered to the UK. Unsurprisingly perhaps, no more clearly was this evident than in New 
Labour’s trade policy. Indeed, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Stephen Byers 
viewed globalisation “as a bringer of opportunity, not of threat”.76 Another Trade 
Minister, Mike O’Brien would later argue that globalisation offered “great opportunities 
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and benefits”.77 As Chancellor, Alistair Darling believed that the possibilities that had 
arisen from “opening new markets, sharing new ideas *were+ endless”.78 For Darling, far 
from being the constraint he had argued previously, globalisation actually appeared to 
offer instead infinite possibilities. For these and other New Labour officials, it was vital 
that Britain seized these opportunities with both hands. In the light of this particular 
discourse, an important question immediately arises: what happened to the overarching 
narrative of constraint that was evident elsewhere? I argue that it was still present, but in 
a far more subtle way. It was deployed via a third discourse of globalisation; one which 
shifted the burden of constraint away from the state and onto the individual. 
 
This discourse was particularly evident in New Labour’s welfare strategy, and specifically 
those concerning its education, skills, training and employment programmes. I shall 
elaborate upon the content and the significance of these policies in the context of New 
Labour’s broader political economy later in the chapter, but here I demonstrate the 
significance of globalisation upon the way in which the Blair and Brown governments 
operationalised their respective welfare strategies. It was in this policy domain in 
particular that the self-imposed constraint of globalisation was articulated through a 
discourse of ‘rights and responsibilities’. In practice, this meant that it was obligatory for 
recipients of welfare to increase their skills and training in order to improve their job 
prospects and employability in the labour market. Should claimants of welfare be 
unwilling to meet these responsibilities, they would be denied the ‘rights’ afforded to 
them under previous welfare regimes. 
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New Labour maintained that for the opportunities of globalisation to be realised, the 
individual needed to take far greater responsibility for their physical and financial well-
being, their employment prospects and role within society. The Chancellor, Gordon Brown 
was quite clear on this:  
 
This old and misguided view of the state, irrelevant for a global 
economy, was accompanied by a failure to place sufficient emphasis on 
personal responsibility.79  
 
Situating New Labour’s welfare strategy within this new strategic context of globalisation, 
Brown believed that for its benefits to be realised, they should be done so, “by asserting 
the responsibility of the individual”.80 This meant that although the Blair government 
remained committed to giving “people the chance to get off benefit and into work”,81 a 
“new social contract” was necessary, one based upon “the citizen sharing responsibility 
with the state”.82 After all, Blair argued, “the government can’t do it for the people. We 
have to do it together”.83  
 
The imperative of ‘competitiveness’ was also integral to both New Labour’s welfare 
strategies and this particular discourse of globalisation. For Britain to remain competitive 
within the global economy, it was vitally important that labour markets became more 
flexible, that individuals acquired the right skills, and that public services reflected the 
demands of this global economy. In his role as the Minister of State for Employment and 
Welfare Reform, Stephen Timms remarked that “developing Britain’s skills base [was] key 
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for competing in the global economy”.84 To this end, New Labour’s welfare strategy was 
primed to ‘make work pay’, and to equip individuals with the skills required to participate 
and to compete in an increasingly competitive, global labour market. Under New Labour, 
welfare was to act not as a ‘hammock’ but rather as a ‘springboard’ into this labour 
market and to this end, it was up to the individual to respond to the challenges and seize 
the opportunities of globalisation.  
 
It is at this point that these three discourses merge. Heavily interlinked with one another, 
the first two discourses emphasised the inevitability of globalisation, and the need for the 
government – in the light of these inexorable pressures – to design and implement 
policies that accommodated the demands of global capitalism. In similar terms, the third 
discourse emphasises the constraint upon the individual to take responsibility for their 
integration into the global economy and confer the benefits presented by globalisation. 
Although the underlying message of constraint was the same, the nuance of each of these 
discourses reflected the complex character of New Labour’s political economy, and the 
contingent strategic selectivity with which these discourses were articulated.  
 
Despite the handbrake of constraint that globalisation was understood to place upon 
government policy, not one official appeared to view globalisation as ‘a bad thing’. Of 
course, it may be argued that given the extent to which officials viewed globalisation to an 
irreversible and inevitable ‘fact of life’, any such antagonism would have been understood 
to be futile anyway. Perhaps the most striking aspect of New Labour’s understanding of 
globalisation however – even more so in the light of my previous observations – was the 
sense of opportunity that it offered if the right policies were adopted, even in spite of the 
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constraints it was assumed to place upon government policy. Given the centrality of 
globalisation to New Labour’s political economy, this created a clear paradox in the policy 
thinking of senior Party officials. Policies designed for domestic consumption and loaded 
with this discourse of constraint, were recycled for use overseas and framed using a 
discourse of opportunity. No more clearly did this paradox appear to be than in New 
Labour’s international development policies, and it is to the relationship between New 
Labour’s discourse of globalisation and these policies that I now turn my attention.   
 
Globalisation and New Labour’s International Development Policies 
If globalisation proved to be constraint at home for New Labour, it appeared to provide 
both the Blair and Brown governments with significant latitude to intervene abroad, 
particularly within the field of international development. Whether addressing audiences 
across the globe or pursuing a series of distinct, if at times, controversial foreign policy 
missions, the opportunities that global politics now afforded were taken up with relish by 
both men. This was perhaps no more clearly demonstrated than in the realm of 
international development. As Bono alluded to in his address to the 2004 Labour Party 
Conference, here Blair and Brown worked more closely together than they did in any 
other aspect of New Labour’s political economy to address the issues of poverty within 
the developing world. Rather tellingly perhaps, it was in this particular policy area that, as 
I noted in chapter 1, the New Labour government received the most approbation.  
 
What was striking about New Labour’s discourse of globalisation and its commitment to 
international development however, was the way in which globalisation appeared to be 
understood as being far less of a determinant and more of a driver of the government’s 
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policies. This stood in stark contrast to its invocation at home, where to varying degrees, 
globalisation was appealed to as a constraint upon British policymakers and citizens alike. 
Within the realm of international development however, globalisation was identified as an 
opportunity; a means to generate the wealth needed to eliminate poverty within the 
developing world. These two different positions raise a paradox that runs right to the 
heart of this thesis: where do these two contrasting narratives of globalisation leave the 
policy transmission, or process of ‘internationalisation’ that both I and New Labour 
officials claimed was evident in New Labour’s political economy?  
 
A detached reading of this paradox would appear to reveal an almost fatal flaw in the core 
thesis of policy transmission. If the thesis was correct then one would surely expect New 
Labour to have claimed that the pressures brought about by globalisation would be just as 
great, if not greater within the realm of international development. Indeed, policymakers 
could quite plausibly have argued that the different structural factors understood to be at 
the root of global poverty were well beyond the control of British policymakers. Given the 
structural constraints inherent within the processes of international development, one 
would expect that any internationalisation of policy to be framed within the language of 
‘constraint’ rather than that of opportunity, and the subsequent formation of 
international development policies to be severely limited. That they did not is surely 
striking, and warrants further investigation as to why this was, or certainly appeared to be 
the case.  
 
It is to its great credit that New Labour chose not to shrink from the challenge of 
international development, or more specifically, of ‘making globalisation work for the 
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poor’, and orientated its model of political economy to meet these aims. However, it does 
raise three crucial questions, most notably concerning the transmission of these domestic 
policies overseas. Firstly, where did the discourse of constraint that was so evident in New 
Labour’s policy discourse at home disappear to when these same policies from the same 
model of political economy were exported abroad? Secondly, why, given the ‘inevitable’ 
constraints that it placed upon government and individual autonomy, did New Labour 
officials view globalisation as an opportunity to eliminate world poverty? The third 
question asks whether, in the light of its international development policies, the New 
Labour government over-emphasised the constraints that its officials spoke about at 
home. It is the purpose of the thesis to answer these questions. I begin by exploring two 
areas. The first of these examines the discourse of globalisation that was present in New 
Labour’s international development policies. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, as 
within my analysis of the domestic context, I assess the terms upon which the appeal of 
opportunity that ministers made concerning globalisation as being able to fulfil New 
Labour’s stated aim of eliminating world poverty.  
 
The commitment of both the Blair and the Brown governments to eradicating global 
poverty was evident in the succession of White Papers published by DFID between 1997 
and 2009. Up until 1997, only two White Papers – one in 1964 and another in 1975 – had 
been published, both by Labour governments. Under New Labour, four White Papers were 
published by DFID, each one committed to and set out under the banner of ‘Eliminating 
World Poverty’. The first of these noted “the increasing globalisation of the world 
economy in terms of trade and finance” and the challenge of creating “a global society in 
which people everywhere are entitled to live in peace and security with their families and 
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neighbours, and enjoy in full their civil and political rights”.85 This was certainly an 
ambitious aim, and one that Hewitt and Killick suggest, was heavy on rhetoric and light on 
substantive policy.86 Nevertheless, this discourse appeared to reflect the increased 
latitude that New Labour officials felt they had within the international sphere. The only 
challenge to New Labour in this respect was not globalisation itself, but how to make the 
most of the opportunity that the “massive new wealth” that globalisation was creating so 
as to extend New Labour’s commitment to social justice abroad.87   
 
New Labour’s Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short argued that 
“the challenge before our generation is to ensure that wealth is used to lift up that fifth of 
humanity by establishing basic, decent standards for all. The wealth gives us an 
opportunity”.88 The fastest rates of poverty reduction were to be found in East Asia where 
for the past thirty years there had been rapid economic growth. According to Short, this 
growth had occurred because inward investment had been attracted from multinational 
capital, which had brought with it knowledge and technology. Therefore, for Short the 
answer lay in “*harnessing] those things: by attracting investment to create opportunities 
to export and trade that will grow economies rapidly”.89 
 
DFID’s first White Paper was supplemented three years later with the publication of its 
second, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor. As well as 
reaffirming New Labour’s commitment to the elimination of poverty and the achievement 
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of the recently launched Millennium Development Goals, it laid out clearly New Labour’s 
belief that: 
 
Managed wisely, the new wealth created by globalisation creates the 
opportunity to lift millions of the world’s poorest people out of their 
poverty. Managed badly and it could lead to their further marginalisation 
and impoverishment. Neither outcome is pre-determined; it depends on 
the policy choices adopted by governments, international institutions, 
the private sector and civil society.90 
 
Gordon Brown was clear that there would be no “retreat from globalisation”.91 Crucially 
however, government policy would not, as it appeared to be at home, be pre-determined 
by globalisation. Globalisation could, and indeed should instead be managed. As Clare 
Short would later argue, the purpose of this second White Paper was to “set out an 
agenda for managing globalisation, increased trade, investment and the new technologies 
in a way that could ensure that the abundance of wealth currently being generated brings 
benefits to the one in five of humanity who live in extreme poverty”.92 Rejecting the 
fatalism that was a feature of New Labour’s globalisation discourse at home, Short added 
“the future is not pre-determined; it is a matter of will and choice”.93 Therefore although 
globalisation was viewed to be inevitable, its outcomes were not and New Labour’s 
international development policy would be concerned principally with “managing 
globalisation to ensure that poor people are able to share in its benefits”.94 Clare Short 
argued that “properly managed, globalisation opens up possibilities we have never had 
before...creating conditions that make it possible for us to overcome deep-seated 
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historical inequalities...in a way that can begin to heal the divisions inherited from 
colonialism and uneven development”.95 
 
This message of ‘managing’ globalisation was repeated across Whitehall and beyond. In 
the Treasury, Gordon Brown recognised that “globalisation can be for the people or 
against the people. Poorly managed, globalisation can create a vicious circle of poverty, 
widening inequality and increasing resentment. Managed wisely it can lift millions out of 
deprivation and become the high road to a more just and inclusive global economy”.96 For 
the Chancellor, ‘proper management’ of globalisation required “greater global co-
operation not less, and...stronger, not weaker, international institutions”.97 This 
assessment squared with Brown’s proposals for a new global financial architecture that I 
explore in chapter 5; an international framework designed to deliver economic and social 
justice to those living in the developing world. Elsewhere, the Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry, Patricia Hewitt stressed the importance of “maximising the benefits of 
globalisation to deliver greater opportunity and prosperity for all”.98 Again, it was 
understood that globalisation offered opportunity rather than constraint; a point 
elaborated upon by Peter Hain, the Minister of State in the Foreign Office. He cited an 
address made to a Special Session of the United Nations by the Minister for Employment, 
Welfare to Work and Equal Opportunities, Tessa Jowell in which she had emphasised “the 
government’s determination to ensure that the wealth and opportunities created by 
globalisation are used to reduce global poverty”.99 
 
                                                             
95
 Ibid. 
96
 Brown (2001h) 
97
 Ibid. 
98
 Hewitt (1999) 
99
 Hain (2000) 
 
57 
 
It is perhaps not surprising that having been instrumental in orientating the Labour Party 
towards the global economy, Tony Blair was similarly keen to extol the opportunities 
presented by globalisation. What is perhaps surprising however was the Prime Minister’s 
view that the process of globalisation within the sphere of international development was 
– unlike at home – not inevitable. For Blair, the very failure of globalisation to reach much 
of the developing world had contributed to under-development and continued poverty. In 
a series of speeches in the Far East, Blair expressed the view that there were no “losers” 
or “victims of globalisation”, merely people who “are not participating in globalisation”.100 
The Prime Minister offered two reasons for this lack of participation. “Sometimes it is 
through their own choice. Sometimes, to our collective shame, it is through our own 
imposition”.101 Blair repeated this claim a few days later. “Those who are usually 
suggested to be losers in this are not actually the victims of globalisation. Their problem, 
on proper analysis, is that they are not participating in globalisation”.102 
 
These assessments are striking since they emphasise the clear understanding amongst 
officials of the need to manage globalisation in the correct or ‘proper’ way. Although the 
actual benefits of globalisation were assumed a priori, it was nevertheless crucial that 
policymakers adopted the ‘right’ policies since neither globalisation nor its benefits were 
in fact inevitable. Instead, both required carefully made decisions on the part of 
policymakers to ensure that the wealth and extension of social justice that globalisation 
promised were in fact realised. Blair’s assessment in particular is interesting in this respect 
since it reinforces the self-fulfilment of the globalisation ‘prophecy’ that was present in 
New Labour’s domestic discourses. For Hay and Watson, “it is the discursive construction 
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of globalisation, rather than globalisation per se which is driving political change in 
Britain”.103 As Dan Coffey and Carole Thornley have since noted, “it would be quite 
misleading to see the UK economy as a passive victim of a globalisation process, since 
globalisation…is not something that has simply happened to Britain”.104 Globalisation itself 
is heavily contingent upon the policy decisions made by government officials. Despite the 
apparent inexorability of globalisation, Blair actually granted governments far more 
latitude to exercise considerable discretion in the way policy was to be set.  
 
It is at this point that the lines of transmission between the domestic and the international 
begin to re-appear and become a lot clearer. For globalisation to lift people out of 
destitution and end the vicious circle of poverty, developing countries in the global South 
had to adopt the right set of policies. Despite the rhetoric of ‘choice’ articulated by New 
Labour ministers concerning matters of international development, this was tempered 
with the rhetoric of ‘constraint’ that appeared in New Labour’s discourse at home. For 
New Labour officials, whether at home or abroad, globalisation remained, for all intents 
and purposes, ‘a fact of life’. The opportunities it presented however could only be 
realised through the right mix of policies and increased participation and integration into 
the global economy. In an era of globalisation, New Labour understood the role of 
governments to be restricted to one of discretionary constraint; of orientating their 
national economies to meet the demands of the global economy. In resolving the paradox 
of ‘challenge’ and ‘opportunity’ that was evident in both the domestic and international 
dimensions of New Labour’s political economy, ‘opportunity’ and ‘constraint’ appeared as 
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two sides of the same coin. The ‘opportunity’ of globalisation could only be realised 
through the ‘constraint’ putatively imposed by globalisation upon policymakers.   
 
This particular claim is reinforced by later remarks made by Blair concerning the way in 
which globalisation was understood by officials and subsequently incorporated into policy 
strategies. This statement is particularly pertinent in light of the language of ‘constraint’ 
that appeared throughout New Labour’s multiple discourses of globalisation: 
 
Occasionally we debate globalisation as if it were something imposed by 
governments or business on unwilling people. Wrong. It is the individual 
decisions of millions of people that is creating and driving globalisation. 
Globalisation isn’t something done to us. It is something we are, 
consciously or unconsciously doing to and for ourselves.105 
 
Blair is both right and wrong, and what this statement does is reflect New Labour’s 
contradictory and therefore problematic view of globalisation. Globalisation is the direct 
result of political and social activity. It is therefore, ‘something we are and do’, and (if and) 
when millions of individuals do this on a global scale then this leads to something that 
might be termed ‘globalisation’. There might be nothing new in this sense, but 
technological advances have made us perhaps more aware of the ways in which these 
processes occur. What Blair does not acknowledge however – nor indeed did any of his 
cabinet colleagues – is the role that the various discourses of globalisation, articulated by 
his government ministers, played in shaping policy, and how these very statements acted 
both as an opportunity and constraint upon political activity. In this sense, Blair is wrong 
to argue that globalisation is not something that is imposed by governments on unwilling 
people.  
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The conventional wisdom of globalisation became a self-fulfilling prophecy for New 
Labour’s policymakers. Policies designed for consumption both at home and abroad 
internalised globalisation’s logic of opportunity-through-constraint. Since policies were 
framed by the perceived effects of globalisation, officials imposed globalisation upon their 
polities. Therefore while Blair is surely right to argue that “it is the individual decisions of 
millions of people that is creating and driving globalisation”; it is also the decisions of 
policymakers, pursuing a similar path, which perpetuate the effects – real or otherwise – 
of globalisation. 
  
Creating a New Economic and Financial Architecture at Home: New  
Labour’s Management of the UK Economy  
Officials at the heart of the New Labour project understood the strategic context of 
globalisation to require a qualitatively new economic architecture. The British model of 
political economy, explored briefly here, and in greater depth in chapter 4, provided the 
blueprint of this new architecture. Designed by Gordon Brown and his chief Economic 
Advisor and closest political ally, Ed Balls, this architecture would guide New Labour’s 
management of the UK economy, both at home (see chapter 4) and, as I argue in chapter 
5, abroad as well.  
 
This architecture would provide the Chancellor with, what David Coates has called the 
“frameworks from which a sustained assault on continuing economic underperformance 
and social inequality could and should be launched”.106 What I intend to make clear as the 
thesis unfolds, is that these were both domestic and international targets with clear a line 
of policy transmission between each. Before either could be ‘attacked’ however, it was 
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necessary to strengthen the respective institutional frameworks through a system of rules, 
codes and standards. These were necessary to make such institutions, both at a national 
and an international level, robust enough to withstand the uncertainty, and threat of 
instability that was understood to have increased within a putatively global economy.    
 
‘Working with the Grain of Globalisation’ and Locking-in Macroeconomic  
Stability to Ensure Market Credibility 
Stability was at the heart of the Treasury’s policies to equip Britain to meet the challenges 
of globalisation, and New Labour, even prior to entering office, had already identified 
stability as the route to growth in a global economy.107 As Clift and Tomlinson have 
remarked, there was a perception amongst policymakers “of the inherent instability of a 
capitalist economy, and especially its inability unaided to deliver a full use of 
resources”.108 This much was clear from New Labour’s understanding of globalisation as a 
‘challenge’. For all the wealth the global economy promised, it was by no means 
guaranteed to deliver, while its interdependency meant that it was, by its very nature, 
inherently unstable. As Gordon Brown himself noted “however successful we aim to be at 
avoiding crises, we should recognise that shocks will occur”.109  
 
These were understood to be inexorable consequences of globalisation; consequences 
that national governments could only “work with” and seek to ameliorate.110 However, 
since it was neither possible nor desirable to retreat from these global processes, in order 
to mitigate the damage caused by this volatility, it became critically important to “create 
an economic framework that would bring stability to the British economy and…promote 
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investment, productivity and growth”.111 Despite the challenges of globalisation, as the 
Chancellor explained, there was a clear political and economic pay-off for implementing 
such a framework:  
 
Governments which…are judged by the markets to be pursuing, sound 
monetary and fiscal policies, can attract inflows of investment capital 
more quickly, in greater volume and at a lower cost than even ten years 
ago.112  
 
However Britain – or any other country for that matter – would only attract this capital if 
the right economic architecture was in place. Clearly, “over the long-term, investors will 
choose to invest for the future in a stable environment rather than an unstable one”.113 
For Ed Balls, this new framework would serve as the “essential prerequisite for stability, 
economic growth and prosperity in a globalised world”,114 and underpin the credibility 
that the Treasury sought in order to encourage the continued flow of international 
investment into Britain. Put simply, the prosperity of a nation would depend on its ability 
to work with the grain of globalisation, and for the government to put in place a credible 
policy framework as a means of capturing its wealth and minimising its instability.  
 
Stability, for Treasury officials at least, would consist of low and stable inflation, and sound 
public finances. This “monetary and fiscal stability” Brown added, was “a necessary pre-
condition for national economic success. In a global economy, funds will flow to those 
countries whose policies inspire confidence”.115 Conversely, if governments got their 
policies wrong, then “investors *would+ punish mistakes more quickly and more severely 
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than in the past”.116 These realities – perceived or otherwise – would be crucial in a global 
setting if it was understood that development and poverty reduction could only be 
achieved through increased investment and economic growth.  
 
As Balls had previously argued however, stability was only a means to an end. The aim of 
the government’s macroeconomic strategy “was not simply to ensure low and stable 
inflation and sound public finances, but to deliver high levels of growth and employment 
by ensuring economic and employment opportunities for all”.117 Delivering these three 
objectives would depend upon three policy pillars, each one reinforcing the other. While 
the first of these pillars, long-term macroeconomic stability would be necessary for 
investment, the second – a strong economy – was also necessary to entrench this stability. 
However, the strength of this economy would only be sustained if it could generate both 
jobs and rising incomes.118 As the Chancellor made clear however, stability was to be the 
essential precondition upon which everything else would rest.119  
 
This stability could only be achieved “through constrained discretion”.120 Rejecting out of 
hand the fixed targets set by national governments, Balls called for instead a discretionary, 
counter-inflationary macroeconomic policy which would “respond flexibly to different 
economic shocks – constrained, of course, by the need to meet the low inflation objective 
or target over time”.121 This ‘constrained discretion’ was designed to appeal to market 
constituencies, as Colin Hay explains:  
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Given a (belief in the) short-term-term trade-off between inflation on 
the one hand and unemployment and/or growth on the other, 
governments would seek to engineer a ‘political business cycle’, over-
inflating the economy in the run-up to an election in order to reap the 
short-term electoral benefits of growth with little consideration to the 
longer-term consequences… In practice, governments could not be 
trusted to stick to any inflation target they had set for themselves. For it 
was it was rational for them to renege on any such bargain.122 
 
As Ed Balls would later freely admit, “an incoming government might declare that it 
wanted to achieve low inflation, but this government’s incentive would always be to cheat 
and dash for growth, knowing that the resulting recession would only come along later”.123 
New Labour was acutely aware of the mistrust that market investors had of governments. 
As Glyn and Wood note, economic mismanagement was widely blamed for Labour’s loss of 
power in 1979; while thirteen years later, the Conservative government suffered an 
irretrievable collapse of support after sterling’s ignominious exit from the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism.124 The ‘private discretion’ exercised by government ministers 
in these two instances had precipitated a loss in confidence amongst markets. With 
investors left in the dark as to the real intentions of governments, the credibility of 
national policymakers was fatally undermined.  
 
In response to these market fears, ‘credibility’ would become the touchstone of this new 
architecture and, as Simon Lee has remarked, New Labour’s ‘constrained discretion’ would 
be central maintaining this credibility amongst market constituencies:  
 
By aligning policymakers’ incentives with long-term objectives; 
[delivering] flexibility through the devolution of operational 
responsibility for decision-making to front-line agents; and 
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transparency, through both the provision of clear, precise and 
publically-stated objectives, and the regular reporting of agents’ 
performance to against their objectives.125  
 
These three principles, Balls argued, would make private discretion more difficult and 
more costly to pursue. Taking monetary policy out of the hands of self-interested 
politicians, this new approach to policymaking would have at its centre processes which 
were long-term, open, transparent, and locked-in. These processes would form the basis of 
New Labour’s ‘new architecture’, a model of political economy that, as the following quote 
and chapters 4 and 5 show, was designed for consumption both at home and abroad.  
 
These principles, which stress the importance of open macroeconomic 
policymaking, apply to any small or medium-sized open economy. 
Indeed, this is why the UK was at the forefront in proposing that the 
International Monetary Fund draw up codes of good practice on 
openness and transparency covering several aspects of economic and 
social policy.126          
  
Reiterating the purpose and the appeal of the political economy of this new architecture, 
the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Alistair Darling noted that “stability will of course 
depend, to a large extent, on markets having confidence in the commitment of 
government to prudent and sound management of the economy”.127  
 
If governments are judged to be pursuing sound long-term policies, 
then they will also be trusted to do what is essential – to respond 
flexibly to the unexpected economic events that inevitably arise in an 
increasingly integrated but more volatile global economy. Therefore, in 
the era of global capital markets, it is only within a credible framework 
that governments will command the trust they need to exercise the 
flexibility they require.128 
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For Balls, even in a world of rapidly mobile capital, governments could retain policy 
credibility and maintain constrained policy discretion if they dealt with problems swiftly 
and reflexively, and if they pursued, and were seen to be pursuing, monetary and fiscal 
policies that are sustainable over the long term. 
 
As Balls went on to suggest however, while this is a step in the right direction, certainly in 
terms of providing predictability to market investors, governments suffered from a time-
lag; a ‘time inconsistency’ whereby new administrations in particular are faced with the 
problem of ‘proving’ their competence and credibility. Clearly, within a post-monetarist 
framework, fixed policy rules were out of the question, so how might a new government – 
particularly one with a historical commitment to ‘tax and spend’ social democracy – prove 
that it had ‘changed its spots’ and that is qualitatively ‘new’ economic intentions are 
genuine? The solution put forward by Balls to solve this particular problem was “credibility 
through maximum transparency”.129  
 
According to Balls, market failure frequently occurred because investors lacked perfect 
information. If investors had complete information then they could make better decisions 
concerning the market. Again, as Darling would go on to add, it was therefore important 
that economic policy was “open and transparent” since “openness builds confidence and 
credibility”.130 A number of measures were introduced by the Treasury as a means of 
making the decision-making processes of government more accountable. The Code of 
Fiscal Stability, the publication of minutes of meetings held by the Monetary Policy 
Committee together with the Long-Term Public Finances Report, were all noted by Alistair 
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Darling during his time as Chancellor of the Exchequer as “examples of increased 
transparency” that served to support the pursuit of macroeconomic stability and the 
Treasury’s appeal for credibility amongst its core economic constituencies.131 
 
However, while these were positive ways in which the problem of asymmetric information 
could be solved, they only went so far. For Balls, the answer was “to put in place 
institutional mechanisms which mean it is clearly the government’s intention to do the 
right thing – to make a strategic pre-commitment”.132 Locking-in the government’s 
economic strategy would make it virtually impossible to sacrifice the long-term plan in 
favour of short-term electoral convenience. This thinking underpinned the decision to 
grant operational independence to the Bank of England. This move, and its wider 
implications for New Labour’s political economy, is discussed in greater detail in chapter 4. 
In essence however, it charged the newly set-up Monetary Policy Committee with the 
independent responsibility of setting an interest rate baseline that it judged would enable 
the government’s inflation target to be met. It was a move that, according to Balls, would 
have “a decisive impact on both the international reputation of the government and on 
the wider credibility of Treasury”, and send the message to the markets that this was a 
government that “was not looking for short-termist quick fixes or to duck difficult 
decisions”.133 In one swift move, there was an authenticity to the Treasury’s claim of 
credibility amongst its key economic constituencies. 
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This was an economic framework and a set of principles designed explicitly to “make 
Britain the best competitive environment for businesses in the world”.134 Indeed, as the 
Gordon Brown had argued, one of the reasons why many of Britain’s rivals had enjoyed 
far higher levels of investment was because they had been able to deliver greater levels of 
economic stability.135 This platform of stability would “make Britain better equipped to 
face the new challenges of globalisation, with more competition, more business creation, 
more investment and a more skilled workforce”.136 According to Nicholas Macpherson, 
the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, this new approach to policymaking would 
“underpin the UK’s increased stability compared to other decades and other large 
economies”; and enable it to “perform the role of ‘strategic friend’ to the UK economy”.137  
 
This role of ‘strategic friend’ would appear to reflect a rapprochement with the market 
which is echoed in the following section concerning New Labour’s relationship with 
business. This relationship, and indeed the role that this new framework would enable the 
government to perform with business, was deemed by officials from across Whitehall to 
be necessary in the light of globalisation. For Arestis and Sawyer however, this new 
economic architecture, and its orientation towards securing increased business 
investment, signalled that New Labour would be seeking to shift income from wages to 
profits.138 This appeared to undermine any commitment to fairness. Clearly there are 
merits to – and indeed often a necessity for – inward investment. Nevertheless, as Arestis 
and Sawyer argue, one would expect a Labour government with any social democratic 
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claims, however modified or residual, to ensure that the gains of this investment accrue to 
the British people rather than the multinational enterprises.139  
 
This shift in emphasis reveals a distinct anomaly which has even wider implications when I 
explore later on in the chapter, New Labour’s welfare strategy. For Arestis and Sawyer, 
“there is little reason to think that inward investment will create jobs in areas of high 
unemployment”.140 Targeting firms rather than people will do little to encourage local 
entrepreneurial activity, and paradoxically, is more likely to result in the continuation of a 
dependency culture that New Labour was keen to eradicate. Understood in an altogether 
more global context, the pursuit of a similar type of investment in order to achieve growth 
is unlikely to succeed in areas that already suffer from high levels of poverty and 
underdevelopment. Before exploring the further domestic and international implications 
of this framework however, my attention turns to those rules, standards and codes that 
were introduced as a means of reinforcing this credibility amongst market constituencies.  
 
Playing by – and Sticking to – the Rules of the Game: The Importance of  
Standards and Codes in the Political Economy of HM Treasury 
With this new architecture in place, New Labour’s commitment to credibility through a 
series of institutional ‘lock-ins’ would be underpinned by a series of rules, standards and 
codes. This section explores specifically those rules that would appear in ‘the new 
international economic architecture’ discussed in chapter 5, and those strategies that that 
were evident in Britain’s overseas aid commitment under New Labour, explored in 
chapter 7. The pledges made by the Blair and Brown governments here to increase the 
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amount of overseas aid and roll out immunisation programmes across the developing 
world would be predicated upon the same ‘prudent’ rule of ‘borrowing only to invest’ that 
the Treasury promised to stick to at home. I conclude this section by drawing out a further 
theme of New Labour’s domestic political economy, Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs) and 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). Linking in with the fiscal rules set out by the Treasury, 
these mechanisms were also evident in New Labour’s commitment to increase aid, and 
latterly vaccines in the developing world, through the International Finance Facility (IFF).    
As I discussed earlier, Treasury officials had already outlined their commitment to 
credibility and transparency in the context of monetary policy. However, these measures 
were “just as important when it came to setting fiscal policy”, and it was in this context 
that the government saw a role for the Code of Fiscal Stability”.141 The Code was designed 
to address past weaknesses in the fiscal policy framework by strengthening the openness, 
transparency and accountability of fiscal policy; features which of course mirrored the 
Treasury’s monetary policy framework.142 Returning to the underlying provision of 
stability, the Code reasserted the importance of stability for growth and employment to 
increase. The conduct of fiscal policy was of “critical importance” to economic stability.143 
Ed Balls, together with the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, Gus O’Donnell, the 
Permanent Secretary for the Treasury, argued that the Code would provide “valuable 
discipline on fiscal policy”, and help “rebuild trust in economic policy more generally”.144 
This trust would be further enhanced with the alignment of the Treasury’s own Code (Fig. 
2.1), with the IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency in Fig. 2.2.  
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Fig. 2.1 HM Treasury’s Code for Fiscal Stability  
 
(1) Conduct fiscal and debt management policy in accordance with a set of specific 
principles 
 
(2) State explicitly its fiscal policy objectives and operating rules, and justify 
 any changes to them 
 
(3) Operate debt management policy to achieve a specific primary objective 
 
(4) Disclose, and quantify where possible, all decisions and circumstances which may 
have a material impact on the economic and fiscal outlook 
 
(5) Ensure that best-practice accounting methods are used to construct the public 
accounts 
 
(6) Publish a Pre-Budget Report to encourage debate on the proposals under 
consideration for the Budget 
 
(7) Publish a Financial Statement and Budget Report to discuss the key Budget 
decisions and the short-term economic and fiscal outlook 
 
(8) Publish an Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report outlining the government’s long-
term goals, strategy for the future, and how it is progressing in meeting its fiscal 
policy objectives 
 
(9) Publish a specific range of information from its economic and fiscal projections, 
including estimates of the cyclically-adjusted fiscal position 
 
(10) Invite the National Audit Office to audit changes in the key assumptions and 
conventions underpinning the fiscal projections 
 
(11) Produce a Debt Management Report outlining the government’s debt 
management plans 
 
(12) Refer all reports issued under the Code to the House of Commons Treasury Select 
Committee 
 
(13) Ensure that the public have full access to the reports issued under the 
 Code   
 
Source:  HM Treasury145 
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Fig. 2.2 The IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency 
 
(1) Clarity of roles and responsibilities 
 
1.1 The government sector should be distinguished from the rest of the public sector 
and from the rest of the economy, and policy and management roles within the 
public sector should be clear and publicly disclosed 
 
1.2 There should be a clear and open, legal, regulatory, and administrative framework 
for fiscal management 
 
(2) Open budget process 
 
2.1 Budget preparation should follow an established timetable and be guided by well-
defined macroeconomic and fiscal policy objectives 
 
2.2 There should be clear procedures for budget execution, monitoring, and reporting  
 
(3) Public availability of information 
 
3.1 The public should be provided with comprehensive information on past, current, 
and projected fiscal activity and on major fiscal risks 
 
3.2 Fiscal information should be presented in a way that facilitates policy analysis and 
promotes accountability 
 
3.3 A commitment should be made to the timely publication of fiscal information 
 
(4) Assurances of integrity  
 
4.1 Fiscal data should meet accepted data quality standards 
 
4.2 Fiscal activities should be subject to effective internal oversight and safeguards 
 
4.3 Fiscal information should be externally scrutinised    
 
Source:  IMF146 
 
Although revised in 2007, the IMF’s code retained the original four pillars of fiscal 
transparency that underpinned the 1998 code,147 which Treasury officials sought to 
assimilate into its own Code for Fiscal Stability. Policy consistency with the international 
institution, whose very remit was to maintain global macroeconomic stability would seal 
New Labour’s own credibility, and the integrity of its monetary and fiscal policies in the 
eyes of global market investors. It would ensure that actors were provided with the 
                                                             
146
 IMF (2007a)  
147
 IMF (2007b)   
 
73 
 
information they required to make ‘correct’ investment decisions, thereby squaring its 
commitment to stability with the principles of ‘transparency’, responsibility’, ‘fairness’ and 
‘efficiency’ that informed the conduct of its fiscal management.148   
 
As Malcolm Sawyer notes, the Code for Fiscal Stability was operationalised through two 
rules governing public expenditure and borrowing.149 Designed and implemented by the 
Treasury, these rules would “deliver sound public finances and in doing so, assist greatly in 
restoring the credibility of fiscal policy”.150  
 
(1) The golden rule: Over the economic cycle, the government will 
borrow only to invest and not to fund current expenditure 
 
(2) The sustainable investment rule: Public debt as a proportion of 
national income will be held over the economic cycle at a stable 
and prudent level 
 
New Labour’s monetary policy framework was therefore “reinforced by the Chancellor’s 
public announcement of an equally rigorous fiscal regime”.151 Broadbent and Laughlin 
argue however that neither of these rules restricted the capacity of the government to 
borrow to fund current investments.152 In keeping with the spirit of New Labour’s 
monetary policy framework, what really was at stake was the Treasury’s pursuit of 
credibility. These rules institutionalised and controlled government borrowing in a 
prudent (and therefore credible fashion), in an attempt to reassure markets that the 
government would not run up an unsustainable level of debt.  
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Insofar as the ‘golden rule’ was concerned, Alan Budd notes how this was justified by the 
Treasury on two grounds. The first was that it distinguished between current and capital 
spending, which a failure to do in the past had resulted in the latter being sacrificed when 
attempts had been made to control public borrowing.153 This had squeezed the public 
sector’s net wealth in relation to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The second 
justification for the ‘golden rule’ was that it contributed to inter-generational equity. 
Current spending would be paid for by those who would benefit directly from it, while the 
cost of capital spending would be spread over the lifetime of the assets.154 There was a 
clear political appeal to this strategy. It would enable New Labour to present itself as ‘a 
government of modernisation’, one that was generous in its level of public investment and 
committed to improving Britain’s social infrastructure. However, with the initial cost 
borne by private contractors, it also enabled the New Labour government to disassociate 
itself from the profligacy of ‘old’ Labour with what appeared to be at least, a healthy 
balance sheet.    
 
John Grieve Smith has labelled the second rule concerning the public debt to GDP ratio as 
being “quite inappropriate in varying and unpredictable circumstances”.155 This 
observation is striking in the light of the inherently unstable conditions that, as I remarked 
earlier in the chapter, New Labour officials were only too aware of. Citing the work of the 
economist, Christopher Dow who noted the lack of any correlation between the level of 
national debt and the economic performance of a country,156 Grieve Smith has argued 
that New Labour made “a serious mistake” in applying rigid arithmetical rules to an area 
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of policy where greater flexibility is often required to mitigate against shocks and 
recessionary pressures that emerge from the global economy.157 Of perhaps even greater 
significance in the light of the IFF model proposed by the Treasury to increase Britain’s aid 
programme, is the way in which this rule has contributed to continuation of PFIs and PPPs 
as a means of funding the delivery of public services.  
 
When the Major government launched the PFI in 1992 it was met with widespread 
condemnation by Labour officials. It was denounced as “privatisation by another name, 
the thin end of a commercial wedge that could only, over time, corrode the communal 
ethos of public service provision by commodifying the services provided”.158 No more 
clearly was this being seen than in the National Health Service (NHS), where the Labour 
Party warned of a “creeping privatisation” that was undermining the provision of public 
health in favour of private market interests.159 The new PFI hospitals that were springing 
up were owned by private consortiums of building firms, facilities management companies 
and financiers, who would employ all the non-clinical staff, while the local NHS trust 
concerned would sign leases up to thirty years.160 Since these PFI projects were, in effect, 
underwritten by the state, the actual risk to the private sector was minimal,161 prompting 
credit agencies to award these projects a ‘triple-A’ rating.  
 
As Eric Shaw has remarked however, Labour’s initial hostility was soon replaced with “the 
zeal of a convert”,162 and in its 1997 General Election manifesto, the Party promised to 
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“overcome the problems that have plagued the PFI”.163 True to its word, the Blair 
government rechristened the PFI, ‘PPP’, and between 1997 and 2004, New Labour signed 
off just over 600 such deals.164 The government argued that these revised public-private 
arrangements would bring much needed investment, skills and expertise to public sector 
provision. Criticism of these PFIs/PPPs still remained however. Stephen Driver has noted 
how increased private sector involvement locked public agencies into procuring private 
sector supplies; distorted clinical priorities; and diverted resources from frontline 
services.165 Sally Ruane has shown how the PFI procurement process created pressures on 
both private consortia and NHS trusts to depress the terms and conditions of experienced 
by support staff.166 According to Colin Leys, there has also been a clear conflict in interest 
in the management of these consortia and their wider commercial instincts. Not only did 
many consortia seek a voice in major management issues, a large number too attempted 
to sell health insurance policies, long-term care, and other health services to the patients 
using their facilities.167 Doubts were raised too as to the cost-efficiency of this type of 
finance. John Grieve Smith for instance, argues that a number of these PPPs have put 
public investment in a ‘double-jeopardy’, imposing higher costs upon these public projects 
with less efficient management structures.168  
 
These concerns however, appear to have been sacrificed at the altar of the Treasury’s 
fiscal rules. The money raised by PFIs in support of these PPPs allowed the two rules to 
square with one another. As well as keeping debt ‘at a stable and prudent level’, the PFIs 
and PPPs also allowed the Treasury’s ‘golden rule’ to be met by increasing public 
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expenditure over the life of a project, whilst also leading to an underestimation of current 
public liabilities.169 In effect, PFIs turn any item that would previously have been 
accounted for as capital expenditure by the government into current expenditure. The 
building of a new hospital for example, using ‘conventional’ government finance would 
have been accounted for as a capital cost incurred in the present, followed by interest 
payments on the borrowing. Under the terms of a PFI however, the hospital would be 
financed by the private sector, leased back to the government, and the leasing charges 
would appear as current expenditure. As a report by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) 
suggests, in the absence of the PFI, the public sector would have had to fund the building 
itself, leading to higher debt if this was financed through borrowing.170 Concurring with 
the earlier remarks of Grieve Smith concerning the significance of PFI to the second of the 
Treasury’s fiscal rules in particular, the IFS goes on to note that “while the use of the PFI 
should make little difference to the ‘golden rule’, the reduction in public sector net debt 
does make the sustainable investment rule easier to meet”.171  
 
In this sense, and to borrow New Labour’s oft-cited mantra, ‘what counts is what works’. 
In spite of the criticism that PFIs and PPPs received, they offered to New Labour officials a 
pragmatic means of delivering much-needed levels of investment into Britain’s social 
infrastructure, in a manner that appeared to be financially sound and did not over-burden 
the public purse. Supporting the Treasury’s fiscal rules, these borrowing initiatives linked 
directly into New Labour’s ‘new economic architecture’. As I demonstrate in chapters 5 
and 7 respectively, distinct aspects of this new blueprint would form the basis of the 
government’s commitment to increase the amount of debt relief and aid to the 
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developing world. As this section has shown however, in domestic terms at least, this was 
a model of political economy based upon monetary and fiscal stability, designed explicitly 
to meet and accommodate the expectations of core market constituencies.  
 
Mirroring the emphasis that institutions such as the IMF placed upon stability, openness, 
and transparency, New Labour’s was a framework that sought to achieve and maintain 
credibility amongst global investors and institutions of international finance. I will return 
to a number of these themes in chapter 4 when I explore the institutionalisation of this 
new architecture, but it is in the two case study chapters mentioned above that I will 
assess the effects that the ‘internationalisation’ of this new architecture had upon New 
Labour’s commitment to debt relief and overseas aid. Since this architecture was so 
clearly geared towards meeting the expectations of market constituencies at home, this 
would suggest that any direct transmission of policy abroad would similarly prioritise 
these economic actors over the most vulnerable men and women living in the world’s 
poorest countries.  
 
New Labour as ‘the New Party of Business’: Securing Knowledge and  
Competitiveness in a Global Economy 
 
International development relies on commerce to create the wealth 
and the jobs that will end poverty. That’s why business is good for 
development and development is good for business.172 
 
Both prior to and throughout its time in office, New Labour sought to position itself as ‘the 
new party of business’, principally at home, but also abroad where it afforded business a 
key role in the fight against global poverty. The purpose of this section is to explore not 
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simply New Labour’s claim in this respect, but crucially the effects of such a claim upon 
the character of New Labour’s political economy. For David Osler, if there was one theme 
that dominated Labour’s politics then it was the Party’s increasing accommodation of 
business and the private sector.173 Representing something of a departure from Labour’s 
previous ambivalence towards business,174 New Labour’s relationship with business would 
be far more clear-cut. It would not offer merely consultation, but extensive opportunities 
for direct input into the policy process, both at home and, as I shall demonstrate in 
chapter 6 of the thesis, abroad as well. 
 
Although in the light of the evidence that follows, Osler is surely right in his assessment, 
he offers little in the way of an explanation as to why such a shift took place, or indeed the 
effects that such an accommodation to business constituencies had within the policy 
process. Situating my own analysis within the strategic context of globalisation that is the 
focus of this chapter, this section attempts to offer an explanation of New Labour’s 
relationship with business and the effect that it had upon the government’s domestic 
political economy. To frame these effects empirically, I explore New Labour’s relationship 
with arguably the most powerful of these business constituencies, the pharmaceutical 
industry. Its centrality to the ‘new’ or ‘knowledge economy’ that the Blair government was 
keen to support, gave the industry considerable leverage in dictating New Labour policy. 
Perhaps no more clearly was this leverage evident than in the relationship that I explore in 
chapter 6 between the New Labour government and the pharmaceutical industry, and the 
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attempts of the former to increase the availability of the antiretroviral treatments needed 
to fight HIV and AIDS in the developing world.  
 
The Importance of Business to the New Labour Project 
 
The partnership we have tried to build with you over these past four 
years is one I am deeply committed to. It is a founding principle of New 
Labour and it will not change.  
Tony Blair addressing the Confederation of British Industry175 
 
Throughout his time in office, the Prime Minister remained true to his word. As Eric Shaw 
has remarked, “the Blair government, from its inception, demonstrated…a willingness to 
be attentive and obliging towards business needs”.176 Even after Blair had left Downing 
Street, and Gordon Brown had moved into Number 10, this pledge continued. Announcing 
the remit of the newly-formed Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform in 2007,177 its Secretary of State, John Hutton promised to give “a strong voice for 
business at the heart of government” that would help British businesses become “a 
powerful force for competitiveness and wealth creation in our country”.178 Fêting business 
leaders as “the wealth creators…the entrepreneurs…the innovators…the people who 
make a difference”, Hutton applauded the activities that they carried out, which he 
argued “contributed to the success of Britain”.179 For the Secretary of State, there was 
“nothing we can achieve as a nation without the dynamism and wealth that is created by 
business”.180  
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One theme that emerges throughout the thesis is that of both continuity and change 
between ‘old’ Labour and ‘New’. No more clearly is this apparent than in the following 
chapter that explores the historical trajectory of Labour’s international development 
policies. Of particular relevance here is the transformation of the Party, its gradual 
acceptance of the market and the eminence that Labour would give to it over the state. 
Falconer and McLaughlin describe this change thus, observing the respective stances that 
‘old’ Labour and New Labour took towards the private sector:  
 
A political party which once held firmly to the view that the state should 
play a leading role in the workings of a nation’s economy now promotes 
the belief that very little can be achieved in government without the 
active support of business.181   
 
Within an increasingly global context, there is an obvious reason for this. Gill and Law note 
the assumption that “governments have to be concerned with the cultivation of an 
appropriate ‘business climate’, or else investment might be postponed…An elected 
socialist party with a radical programme would therefore be constrained in its policy 
choices by the nature of its ‘business climate’, because it would need tax revenue and/or 
loans to finance its ambitious spending plans”.182 The welfare of society was understood 
to depend upon a flourishing private sector, and as such there could or should be no 
antagonism between the private interests of business and the public good.183 These 
statements capture not simply the key difference between New Labour and its 
predecessors, but crucially, the main reason why New Labour chose to position itself as a 
party that was, in the terms of Gamble and Kelly, so openly “pro-market and pro-
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business”.184 In this section, I explore firstly how such a shift took place before 
interrogating the reasons behind such a shift. My analysis both here and in chapter 6, will 
enable me to assess the effects of such a strategy.  
 
New Labour’s relationship with business was symbiotic to the pursuit of ‘credibility’ that I 
have discussed previously and analyse in greater detail in chapter 4. Just as New Labour 
sought credibility with financial markets, so too was securing the support of business 
central to the Party’s strategy prior to government, and the ongoing delivery of its policy 
commitments once elected. According to Panitch and Leys, for New Labour officials:  
 
The aim must be to win at least two successive elections, not just the 
next one, so that long-term policies, such as education and training 
policies, would have time to bear fruit. This meant that New Labour 
must win acceptance by ‘business’ as a suitable, and if possible a 
preferred, governing party, so that investment would be forthcoming to 
support the growth on which everything else depends.185 
 
As with the credibility of its wider macroeconomic reforms, New Labour officials appeared 
pessimistic as to the prospects of social democracy should any strategy be chosen that 
was not met with the support of business constituencies. In order to acquire and retain 
this support, New Labour believed that it must prove its economic credentials. In practice 
this meant demonstrating extreme caution and sensitivity to the demands of business, 
and indeed, as I noted earlier in the chapter, exercising discretionary constraint when 
formulating policy. Writing in the lead-up to New Labour’s General Election victory in 
1997, Will Hutton noted that “the dominant discourse of political debate still prohibits the 
advocacy of public spending and higher taxes, however modest [whilst] the organisation 
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of company law…is portrayed as ‘corporatist’”.186 Despite an overwhelming rejection of 
the Conservative Party by the electorate, small ‘c’ conservative economic philosophy 
remained in the ascendancy. For Panitch and Leys, this was apparent in the very acute fear 
amongst officials of an adverse market reaction “to almost any measure that might be 
represented as limiting market freedoms”.187 As Colin Crouch has observed, “nothing that 
might displease the neoliberal business community, especially the financial community, 
could be risked”.188  
 
Obviating this fear meant recalibrating Labour’s political economy, and recasting the 
‘means’ and ‘ends’ associated with the ideology of ‘old’ Labour. This, according to Blair 
was “renewed social democracy”.189 For Noel Thompson however, this meant that any 
“policies guided, and institutions informed, by the principles of equity, fraternity and 
justice” were “seen as threatening growth, efficiency, profitability and thence national 
economic performance”.190 In an era of increased globalisation, these ‘old’ values and 
ideals were simply unaffordable and unsustainable. They limited entrepreneurial freedom, 
jeopardised labour flexibility and created economic uncertainty. In their place, a new 
economic discourse emerged, one articulated in the language of individual choice and self-
fulfilment; dynamism, entrepreneurialism and wealth creation; efficiency, competition, 
productivity, and profitability. Bound up within the context of the market economy, these 
would become signifiers of New Labour’s political economy, designed to chime with the 
expectations of business constituencies.   
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The orientation towards meeting the market-based expectations of business did not 
appear however to preclude New Labour from pursuing this ‘renewed’ social democratic 
agenda of fairness, justice and opportunity. To this end, Will Leggett has noted Gordon 
Brown’s “sustained focus on how to reconcile economic efficiency and social justice”.191 
Underpinned and strengthened by institutional reform of the Treasury, these themes 
were frequently invoked in the annual budgets and spending announcements made by 
Gordon Brown, during the ten years he spent as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Designed to 
square market efficiency with social justice, Brown spoke of “building”, “investing in” and 
“working for” a “stronger and fairer Britain”;192 of “building a Britain of economic strength 
and social justice”;193 and delivering “fairness” and “opportunity for all”.194  
 
What unified these claims, according to Buckler and Dolowitz, was “the central idea of 
justice as fairness, a term that has quite systematically replaced equality, in New Labour’s 
rhetoric”.195 Putting aside for one moment the apparent jettisoning of ‘equality’ from the 
New Labour lexicon (a move I shall discuss this in the following section), the unity of this 
approach is significant because it enabled the Treasury to claim in its economic policy 
pronouncements that “the least well-off benefit in the long term from social 
arrangements…in a manner consistent with market liberty”.196 As Simon Glaze has noted, 
according to Brown, any “provision of ‘fairness’ [was] contingent upon such a 
commitment to ‘markets, competition and enterprise’”.197 ‘Benevolent’ interventions 
prompted by the Chancellor’s moral sense, such as Child Trust Funds, SureStart and the 
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New Deal initiatives were facilitated by New Labour’s commitment to economic stability, 
low corporation tax and labour flexibility.198 Put simply, greater economic efficiency 
through market liberalisation meant increased social justice. The concomitant 
‘socialisation’ of New Labour’s economic policy and the ‘marketization’ of New Labour’s 
social policy would enable the government to deliver on its dual and ostensibly socially 
democratic objectives concerning growth and fairness.  
 
This would appear to signal, at the very least, a reformulation of social democracy under 
conditions of increased globalisation. For Richard Heffernan however, quite how genuine 
New Labour’s ‘social democracy’ was, remained a moot point:  
 
Although concerned at the rhetorical level with the promotion of social 
justice (in common with all serious office-seeking parties in liberal 
democracies), ‘New’ Labour [was] principally concerned with 
strengthening the power of capital and allowing competition within the 
market to secure social reforms…Blair’s designated image for his Labour 
Party [was] a party for and of business, one that is ‘safe’, ‘prudent’ and 
‘sensible’…a party of an ill-defined centre, no longer a party of the 
Left.199 
 
Evidence for Heffernan’s claims emerges in a number of ways, and implicit in each was 
New Labour’s overriding commitment to business. New Labour did not merely court or 
even engage with business, as one might expect any government to do, it was wedded to 
business. One needs only to glance through the pages of the bibliography of this thesis to 
see where, and to whom government officials delivered the majority of their speeches on 
a regular basis: the CBI, Mansion House, the Stock Exchanges in London and New York, 
business councils, chambers of commerce, economic forums and, and various other 
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investment conferences. As Noel Thompson remarks “it was not surprising, therefore, that 
on coming to power, it was leading entrepreneurs and City figures who were appointed to 
guide many of New Labour’s policy reviews and policymaking committees”.200  
 
This was a trend that continued during Brown’s premiership, as he sought to lead Britain’s 
recovery from economic recession through a ‘government of all the talents’.201 Cabinet 
positions were filled by figures such as the former Director-General of the CBI, Digby 
Jones, and Paul Myners, who had made his name in the City as the Chief Executive of the 
pension fund manager, Gartmore. Jones was appointed the Minister of State for Trade 
and Investment, while Myners became Financial Secretary in the Treasury. Even 
international development did not escape such influence. Shriti Vadera, a former 
consultant at the investment bank UBS Warburg, was hand-picked by Brown to act as 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at DFID. Tellingly, Vadera’s previous work had 
included advising governments of developing countries, arranging debt relief and 
restructuring, and playing a prominent role in the partial privatisation of South African 
telecommunication firm, Telekom. These appointments reflected a tacit understanding 
amongst senior New Labour officials that ‘business knows best’, and gave considerable 
weight to the observation that Charles Lindblom has made concerning the perceived 
‘public value’ of businesspeople.202  
 
Of perhaps even greater significance was the content of the speeches that New Labour 
officials made to these business audiences. Despite a continued avowal of fairness and 
justice in the government’s spending plans, these were themes that were downplayed in 
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speeches made to business audiences. Officials used these opportunities instead to talk 
about the modern role of government in relation to business; ‘the enabling state’, cutting 
‘the red-tape’ and unleashing the creativity and entrepreneurialism of firms; and 
increasing the skills of workers that would enable firms to innovate and compete more 
effectively in the global economy. These speeches were clearly intended to reassure 
business that New Labour was speaking the same language, and that it had a unique 
position right at the decision-making heart of government. For Thompson, the crucial 
point here is that when one combines this rhetoric with the actual cuts that the Treasury 
made to the level of corporation tax; its efforts to maintain an economic environment 
attractive for inward investment; and the supply-side policies designed to increase labour 
flexibility, “there can be little doubt” as to “who New Labour saw as the primary 
beneficiaries of the improved economic performance *it+ sought to deliver”.203  
 
To use the observation made by Crouch, New Labour went “beyond the rapprochement 
and co-operation with business interests that is essential to all social democratic parties” 
to become “simply a business party”.204 This was of huge significance, particularly to critics 
of New Labour. As Michael Barratt Brown and Ken Coates have argued, “today’s 
transnational corporations suck profits out of employees stationed in every part of the 
world, and, if they are efficient in competition with their rivals, they will invest these 
profits in ways which will enrich them still further while diminishing or destroying the 
expectations of others”.205 Such a stark assessment reveals the critical flaw both in New 
Labour’s own boast as the ‘party of business’ and its claim that ‘business is good for 
development’. Undermining New Labour’s commitment to social democracy, it also calls 
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into question the way in which the government might respond to matters of global 
poverty.  
 
Maintaining Global Competitiveness through ‘the Knowledge Economy’  
 
Knowledge is the only source of competitive advantage…brainpower is 
more important than brawn; intelligence more powerful than energy; 
creativity more critical than raw materials; efficiency has to be 
combined with innovation.206  
 
Improving Britain’s economic performance in an era of globalisation would necessitate an 
altogether ‘new’ approach to Labour’s economic strategy. As Norman Fairclough has 
remarked, “making Britain more competitive”, through ostensibly ‘new’ means would 
become “the primary role” of the New Labour government.207 This meant that in keeping 
with his commitment to the free market, Blair rejected any notion of “picking winners” 
and favouring certain industries over others.208 Instead, New Labour’s mission became “to 
make Britain the best competitive environment for business in the world”.209 Competition 
was the driving force behind the Chancellor’s linked reforms to boost enterprise and 
innovation,210 and would dovetail with New Labour’s commitment to secure ‘credibility’ in 
the eyes of financial investors both at home and abroad.211  
 
In spite of this commitment to open competition however, the Blair government clearly 
did not want to be found guilty of backing ‘losers’. This led New Labour to become “rather 
dismissive of what it took to be the low-growth manufacturing sector, largely because it 
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now only accounted for a small proportion of the nation’s output”.212 British firms within 
this sector were simply unable to compete with the low-wage labour available elsewhere 
in the global economy. Here, as Fielding goes on to remark, “the global economy was 
deemed to have already spoken”.213 This said as much about Labour’s attitude to its past 
as it did its present. Historically, Labour had been recognised as the ‘party of industry’, 
with its core constituencies located in Britain’s industrial heartlands. However, its 
transition to a ‘party of business’ would see New Labour embrace this ‘new economy’ and 
“the competition state”.214 The attendant imperatives of ‘competitiveness’, ‘efficiency’ 
and ‘innovation’ invoked by New Labour officials, meant that very little was done to arrest 
the decline of firms in these ‘old’ industrial sectors.  
 
Three forces are driving modern economies – finance, knowledge and 
social capital. It is no coincidence that all are intangible: they cannot be 
weighed or touched; they do not travel in railway wagons and cannot be 
stockpiled in ports. The critical factors of production of this new 
economy are not oil, raw materials, armies of cheap labour or physical 
plant and equipment. These traditional assets still matter, but they are a 
source of competitive advantage only when they are vehicles for ideas 
and intelligence which give them value.215  
 
In keeping with the claims of novelty applied to ‘New’ Labour, the Blair government set 
about placing Britain at the heart of the newly emerging ‘knowledge economy’. As Alan 
Finlayson has noted, New Labour understood this new economy “in a distinctly 
Schumpeterian way”, one that laid to waste Britain’s manufacturing base and instead was 
“driven by creative, innovative and skilled individuals competing with each other for 
market advantage”.216 Alongside New Labour’s blueprint of a new economic architecture, 
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it would be this ‘human capital’ that would enable Britain to compete with other countries 
for investment from global economic enterprises. Together, this ‘credible’ macroeconomic 
framework and these supply-side reforms would enable New Labour to meet its 
commitment to improve Britain’s economic performance and adapt individuals to the 
exigencies of the global economy.  
 
The New Labour Government and the UK Pharmaceutical Industry   
If New Labour was to maintain both Britain’s competitiveness in this changing global 
environment and its ability to attract foreign investment, then building partnerships with 
leading knowledge-based industries such as the pharmaceutical sector would be vital. For 
New Labour, globalisation and the ‘knowledge economy’ were inextricably linked. 
Succeeding Mandelson as Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Stephen Byers 
continued the rhetoric of his predecessor. This ‘knowledge economy’ Byers argued, was 
“useful shorthand for the changes taking place in markets across the globe”.217 Echoing 
the remarks made by the Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short 
concerning “the wealth being generated by globalisation”,218 Tony Blair argued that this 
“knowledge economy is our best route for success and prosperity”.219 To this end, “a 
successful pharmaceutical industry”, the Prime Minister would later argue “is a prime 
example of what is needed in a successful knowledge economy”.220 Globalisation and the 
need to maintain Britain’s international competitiveness provided the economic rationale 
for New Labour’s partnership with the pharmaceutical industry. 
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Following a meeting in November 1999 between the Prime Minister and the CEOs of 
AstraZeneca, Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham, New Labour set about 
successfully meeting the expectations of the pharmaceutical industry at a domestic 
level.221 Under New Labour, the pharmaceutical industry would become the jewel in the 
crown of the British economy. It was, according to Tony Blair, “truly global” since its firms 
had “more choice than ever before when deciding where to place new investment”.222 
This opportunity for firms however was a challenge for the government since this 
increased capital mobility could seriously undermine Britain’s position as a leading site for 
the pharmaceutical industry. In a global economy where “China’s wage costs are 5 per 
cent of *Britain+’s”, the government was concerned that the UK could no longer compete 
on labour costs.223 To overcome this problem, the Prime Minister argued that it was 
necessary for Britain instead to compete “on intelligence, on innovation, *and+ on 
creativity”,224 attributes that of course were essential in the emerging ‘knowledge 
economy’.  
 
For Britain to retain its competitive advantage, it was important for Blair’s government to 
ensure “that the UK retains the features that have made it an attractive location for 
investment” in the past.225 To achieve this, Blair argued that it would be necessary for 
there to be “effective partnership at the highest levels between government and 
industry”.226 Integral to this partnership would be the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Competiveness Taskforce. Set up to provide a forum for dialogue between business and 
government officials, the PICTF was designed to maintain and facilitate the ongoing 
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competitiveness of the British pharmaceutical industry. New Labour’s discourse of 
constraint was writ large over the PICTF report. New Labour officials and industry 
representatives observed that:  
 
The conditions required for the industry to retain its competitive 
position are changing in the face of significant shifts in the global 
business environment. [The] rapid globalisation of markets, the ease of 
global communications and the existence of an increasingly international 
and mobile pool of scientific and commercial talent mean that firms can 
serve more markets from fewer locations, while at the same time they 
have greater choice than ever before about where to locate new 
investments.227 
 
This argument was seized upon by pharmaceutical firms themselves. Giving evidence to 
the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee in 2004, the pharmaceutical 
firm, AstraZeneca reminded MPs that “as India and China develop their own 
pharmaceutical expertise, they will become very attractive locations for growth and 
investment compared with the UK and Europe”.228 It therefore recommended “that the 
UK acts to develop close links in science with these countries in order to provide us with 
greater access to their growing science base”.229 For AstraZeneca, it was in the UK’s best 
interests to continue to embrace this logic of globalisation in order to secure future 
investment from the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
The final report published by the Ministerial Industry Strategy Group (the new name for 
the PICTF) under a New Labour administration reflected the extent to which the economic 
expectations of firms were accommodated by the government. It noted the perception by 
business leaders, across all sectors internationally, of the decline in UK labour 
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regulations.230 Although the US and Japan were perceived to have less obstructive market 
regulations than Britain, the UK continued to be seen as being more favourable to 
business than Germany, France and Italy.231 The report also argued that “rates of taxation 
on company profits in different countries have a clear influence on international location 
decisions”.232 From April 2008 (and throughout the rest of New Labour’s time in office) the 
basic rate of corporation tax stood at 28 per cent. Therefore only Switzerland, the 
Republic of Ireland and Singapore had lower corporate tax rates than the UK. Britain’s low 
tax regime and provision of tax credits provided “significant support for R&D in the UK. In 
April 2008, R&D tax credits were raised from 150 to 175 per cent for small to medium-
sized enterprises, and from 125 to 150 per cent for large companies”.233 Despite a drop in 
“the UK’s share of global R&D expenditure…from 10 per cent in 2000 to 9 per cent in 
2007”, Britain “continued to see greater pharmaceutical industry R&D expenditure than 
any other country outside the US and Japan”.234 
 
In comparative terms, the UK remained “a favoured site for research activity” and the 
productivity of UK pharmaceutical research was considered to be “good”.235 Based on a 
measure of the number of ‘world-first’ patents filed per pound spent on R&D, the UK was 
third only to the US and Spain.236 Firms with their headquarters in the UK had “for several 
years [produced] around one-fifth of the world’s leading 75 global medicines, both in 
terms of number of medicines sold and global sales revenues from those medicines”.237 
Similarly, UK-domiciled firms continued to have more new medicines launched in each of 
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the four major markets (the US, Germany, France and the UK) than any other country’s 
companies apart from the US.238 The report concluded by noting that the UK continued 
“to hold a strong position relative to most comparator countries, other than the US”.239 
Given the size and the dominance of the US pharmaceutical firms this was hardly 
surprising, but New Labour officials in Britain would have been pleased to see the UK-
based industry punch above its weight so effectively in international markets. Despite a 
difficult economic climate both at home and abroad, towards the end of its period in 
office, New Labour managed to build up an attractive framework of conditions for the 
industry to invest and sustain its profitability. 
 
New Labour’s credentials as a ‘party’ or indeed a ‘government of business’ were never in 
doubt. Its understanding of globalisation meant that New Labour frequently yielded to the 
expectations of businesses. Although there was an intuitive appeal to this – after all, 
without the support of business, it was understood that New Labour could not deliver on 
its ‘social’ commitments – the influence of business went right to the heart of 
government. Indeed, there were times when the lines of division between government 
and business became extremely blurred, and the language of New Labour sounded more 
market-orientated than social democratic. This had very real effects for policy, none more 
so than when it involved the pharmaceutical industry. Domestically, pharmaceutical firms 
were afforded a unique place in New Labour’s policymaking process, with their economic 
expectations clearly accommodated in the government’s strategy. Abroad however, New 
Labour was faced with a moral dilemma as to how to respond to a global health crisis 
which a lack of treatment provision by these pharmaceutical firms had only made worse. 
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Chapter 6 assesses New Labour’s response to this as a self-styled ‘government of business’ 
and its attempts to manage the economic expectations of an industry to deliver a policy 
outcome that would benefit millions of the world’s most vulnerable people. 
 
A Springboard Not a Hammock: ‘Rights and Responsibilities’ in New  
Labour’s Welfare Policy 
The third and final strand of New Labour’s domestic political economy that this chapter 
explores, concerns the employment and welfare strategies that the Blair and Brown 
governments implemented. The focus of this particular section is framed along the 
discourse of ‘rights and responsibilities’ that Party officials talked frequently about, both 
prior to and right the way throughout New Labour’s time in office. This dualism would 
underpin not only the take-up of welfare, but crucially, the provision of supply-side policy 
initiatives designed to encourage inclusion and participation in the labour market, and to 
increase access to skills and training. New Labour ministers were determined to end the 
chronic welfare dependency that had built up, particularly in socially and economically 
deprived areas.  
 
New Labour’s welfare strategy was primed to ‘make work pay’, and to equip individuals 
with the skills required to participate and to compete in an increasingly competitive, 
global labour market. Under New Labour, welfare was to act not as a ‘hammock’ that it 
had become to this enclave of hardened, and now inter-generational benefit claimants, 
but rather as a ‘springboard’ into an increasingly global labour market. To this end, it was 
the responsibility of the individual to respond to the challenges and seize the 
opportunities of globalisation. For this goal of social and economic inclusion to be realised 
however, and for this cycle of welfare dependency to be broken, it would be necessary to 
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increase the opportunities available for individuals to participate in the labour market. The 
“social investment state” would replace the old ‘passive’ entitlement state with a more 
contractual approach.240 As I demonstrate in this section, senior New Labour officials 
would make it clear that getting individuals off welfare and (back) into the workplace – 
what Fairclough terms the “social integrationist discourse” – would require a disciplinary 
framework.241 The contractual discourse of ‘rights and responsibilities’, and of ‘something 
for something’ invoked through the threat of benefit sanctions, and further economic 
exclusion, would provide just that.  
 
The assessment I make here of New Labour’s domestic welfare strategy bears a striking 
resemblance to the government’s commitment to increase overseas development aid 
(ODA) through the IFF mechanism that I explore in chapter 7. Contextual differences 
aside, welfare and aid were treated almost synonymously by New Labour officials. Both 
were viewed as a means to an end, rather than an end in and of itself. Both identified 
‘exclusion’ as being the fundamental problem, and the cause for welfare to be needed in 
the first place, and both, as a result, emphasised increased opportunity and inclusion as 
the means by which a specific individualised outcome – for instance, a greater sense of 
self-identity, financial independence and social mobility – might be realised. However, for 
as much as these discourses emphasised increased positive values of self-fulfilment, both 
were framed in terms of the notion of ‘something for something’, an arrangement that 
would discipline and modify the behaviour of the recipient. My third case study in chapter 
7 draws out several of these parallels and assesses their implications for New Labour’s aid 
commitment abroad. 
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It is this discourse of ‘opportunity through increased inclusion’ with which I open up this 
particular section, and its centrality to the discourse of ‘rights and responsibilities’ that 
was rehearsed frequently by government ministers throughout New Labour’s time in 
office. No more clearly was this link spelled out than in Tony Blair first speech as Prime 
Minister to the Labour Party conference, when he stated quite categorically that “to all 
should be given opportunity, from all responsibility demanded”.242 Communities, whether 
in Britain or abroad, could and should not to be based simply upon rights. Rather, they 
should be founded upon and emerge as a result of ‘opportunity plus responsibility’.243 For 
those on the Left in the Party however, this change in emphasis would come at a high 
price. Shifting the responsibility for welfare away from the state and onto the individual 
would replace the Party’s traditional commitment to equality, and reconfigure its 
conceptualisation of social justice. Under conditions of globalisation, the days of the state 
as a major provider of welfare were numbered. Welfare could no longer be delivered by 
the state through redistributive mechanisms but through the efforts of individuals. Under 
New Labour, the welfare state would have an altogether more ‘virtuous’ role; one of 
‘enablement’, equipping subjects with the skills and the knowledge required to navigate 
the exigencies of the global economy.  
 
Achieving Social and Economic Inclusion through Increased Opportunity:  
Reconfiguring Equality  
Central to Labour’s long-established commitment to social justice was its aim to deliver 
full employment. Although this would continue to remain an aspiration of New Labour, it 
stopped short of pledging this commitment in the traditional sense.244 Instead, the 
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Chancellor, Gordon Brown promised “a new approach – Employment Opportunity for All – 
to face the challenges of today’s dynamic labour market” which would create “a modern 
definition of full employment for the 21st century”.245 This new approach, centred upon 
‘opportunity’ and a restatement of ‘full employment’, would be crucial in terms of the 
delivery of New Labour’s welfare strategy. In keeping with the Treasury’s overriding 
commitment to stability explored earlier in the chapter, redefining ‘full employment’ 
would put clear water between New Labour and its ‘old’ Labour predecessors without 
appearing to lose any of its rhetorical appeal. As Raymond Plant has remarked, the ‘old’ 
Keynesian techniques used by previous Labour governments to promote full employment 
were criticised as being inflationary and harmful to the prospects of business investment 
and growth that the current New Labour government was keen to promote.246 In keeping 
with the Treasury’s pursuit of credibility, a redefinition of ‘full employment’ would serve 
to demonstrate the probity of New Labour’s economic and welfare strategies, and 
reassure market constituencies that a Labour government would neither buckle under the 
demands of the welfare state nor be blown off-course by inflationary pressures.  
 
Linked in with this point, the emphasis upon ‘opportunity’ is also hugely significant 
because it served to reproduce the contours of the same strategic context of globalisation 
that policymakers now faced. As I remarked earlier in the chapter, for all the challenging 
constraints that globalisation was understood to place upon governments and electorates 
alike, the global economy, along with its attendant processes, was also viewed as 
presenting a significant opportunity for wealth creation and increased standards of living. 
It was for this very reason that governments should ‘not retreat from globalisation’, but 
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actually ‘work with the grain of globalisation’, not simply because such processes were 
deemed as being ‘inevitable’, but also because of the economic benefits that it offered. Of 
course, as I remarked earlier, globalisation offered just the possibility of such benefits. 
New Labour believed that opportunities would not guarantee outcomes – let alone an 
equality of outcome – and it was therefore understood that governments, operating 
under conditions of globalisation, should seek to manage (and maximise) the 
opportunities offered by the global economy, rather than to explicitly promise an 
outcome such as ‘full employment’; irrespective of any political or ideological appeal it 
might hold. As I noted earlier in the chapter, this was understood to be the case in terms 
of New Labour’s own assessment of globalisation and its place within international 
development. As both Tony Blair and Clare Short remarked, within this policy setting, the 
opportunities and benefits offered by globalisation were not inevitable. Individuals had to 
actively participate in the global economy in order to confer its benefits. Indeed, as Brown 
argued, if the benefits of globalisation were to be realised, they should been done “by 
asserting the responsibility of the individual”.247 
 
As Ellison and Ellison remark, the notion of ‘opportunity’ was understood by New Labour 
as an important means of contributing to the social and political environment in which the 
individual is located.248 For Driver and Martell this led New Labour to focus more upon 
opportunities upon securing greater equal outcomes. Insofar as ‘opportunity’ was 
concerned, New Labour placed as much emphasis upon securing “greater chances for 
those excluded from basic, minimum opportunities as on equalising opportunities”.249 
Here, the difference between ‘old’ Labour and New Labour was stark. For Norman 
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Fairclough, ‘old’ Labour’s conception of equality was based on the assumption that 
“capitalist societies by their nature create inequalities and conflicting interests”, which 
crucially, New Labour’s goal of increased social inclusion failed to acknowledge.250 Rather 
than addressing the problem of inequality, Eunice Goes argues that “social exclusion was 
presented as a replacement for egalitarian concerns”.251 As Stephen Driver proceeds to 
note, “policies such as the New Deal, the National Childcare Strategy, ‘individual learning 
accounts’ and ‘baby bonds’” were designed to promote social inclusion and “were about 
enhancing life chances, especially for the less well-off, to find work and to increase 
earning capacities”.252 Indeed, during his time as the Education and Employment 
Secretary, David Blunkett argued that these forms of asset-based welfare could act as a 
vehicle for Labour’s longstanding commitment to social mobility by helping children and 
their families make the most of the education system.253 These, according to Driver, were 
strategies that would attempt to influence the market-determined allocation of resources, 
giving poorer individuals greater leverage to enhance their tradable skills.  
 
For some scholars however, despite the change in rhetoric, these measures did reflect a 
continuing commitment to equality. Judi Atkins accepts that although New Labour did 
appear to “move away from the egalitarianism of traditional socialism with its emphasis 
on market outcomes”; any criticism of this shift overlooks “the fact that social inclusion is 
about the promotion of equality of opportunity, which is itself an egalitarian concern”.254 
Matt Beech goes further still. Citing an interview held with a Treasury official, Beech 
argues that the welfare policies introduced by the Treasury provide some evidence of a 
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“Croslandite conception of greater equality of outcome” – albeit one that was applied “in 
a modern economic context”.255 Targeted tax credits, educational allowances and specific 
skills and training opportunities were measures designed not merely to make work pay, 
but to provide fairer outcomes and therefore a greater equality of outcome for low-
income families.  
 
In addition to the financial support they offered to help fund the cost of social mobility 
and greater levels of inclusion, asset-based forms of welfare, such as the Child Trust Fund 
(CTF),256 were introduced by the Treasury to “encourage saving” and “improving financial 
awareness”.257 Although officially launched in 2005, the idea had been circulating around 
the Treasury at the turn of the millennium.258 The CTF was presented to the electorate as 
a welfare strategy based upon financial empowerment and independence. One reason for 
such an idea, Rajiv Prabhakar suggests, was to induce a behavioural change in the financial 
mindset of individuals towards one that encourages economic and social development. If, 
Prabhakar argues, people were to have their way of thinking changed in this way then 
they are more likely to plan and invest in their future.259 However, the work of Michael 
Sherraden is instructive here, for he argues that such a behavioural change does not come 
about by providing people simply with a flow of income.260  
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For Matthew Watson, these and other types of investment such as home ownership 
represented an attempt to turn people from passive recipients of welfare rights into active 
managers of assets.261 Alan Finlayson argues that this transformation enabled asset-
holders to become active, “self-capitalising subjects…able reflexively to integrate 
themselves into a modernised economy”.262 This newly acquired financial independence 
would enable individuals and their families to take greater responsibility for their own 
financial affairs, rely far less upon the state and realise the opportunities that would foster 
greater inclusion in the new economy. What really lay at the heart of this strategy was the 
‘something for something’ approach that, according to the Treasury “underpins the other 
elements”.263 “If you save” the Treasury promised, “the government will reward you for 
your efforts”.264 The opportunity that this form of “independence for the long-term and 
intergenerational mobility” provided would only be available through a contractual 
arrangement between state and citizen.265  
 
Disciplining Opportunity: ‘Rights and Responsibilities’ in New Labour’s  
Welfare Conditionality 
Beyond these monetary incentives, the Chancellor also took steps to enhance Britain’s 
skills base by introducing a series of supply-side reforms. Again, globalisation provided the 
strategic context for this. For Brown, “in order to compete more effectively, an open and 
far more rapidly changing global trading economy, flexibility [and] the ability to respond 
quickly…is a necessary precondition of success”.266 In order to make the most of the 
opportunities presented by globalisation, individuals needed to be flexible, and willing to 
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adapt. This in turn would secure skilled, well-paid employment. Early on in New Labour’s 
time in office, the Chancellor argued that “the Britain that will succeed in the global 
economy will be the Britain that opens up the opportunity for employment and enterprise 
to all”.267 Crucially, Brown would later add, within the context of the global economy, with 
“emerging market countries ready to attract low value added, low investment and low 
skilled work”, Britain now had “to compete on ever higher levels of skill and technology 
rather than ever lower levels of poverty pay”.268 To this end, the Chancellor promised to 
increase investment in further welfare reforms in order “to give people, whether they are 
in work or out of work, the opportunity to get the skills necessary for them to succeed and 
for us [in the UK] to succeed in the new global economy.269 The justification for these 
reforms was rooted in Brown’s belief that “the way to respond to globalisation is to give 
people the skills and opportunities for the future”.270 The state however, could only go so 
far. It would be up to the individual to take up these skills and make the most of the 
opportunities presented by globalisation. As Judi Atkins has remarked, what is striking 
about this approach was that:   
 
New Labour’s commitment to education was not based on ideas about its 
intrinsic value, or its potential to increase personal well-being. Rather, its 
purpose was to equip people to take advantage of the job opportunities 
they were offered, and thus to become active participants in the 
employment market.271 
 
Under Brown’s premiership, his Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills, 
John Denham, proposed a raft of further changes to the benefits, skills and employment 
system to meet this very objective, again with the view of expanding Britain’s skills base in 
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light of the challenges and opportunities presented by the global economy. Denham told 
the Commons that “in an increasingly globalised and competitive world, we must use to 
the full the skills, talents and aspirations of all our people”. For Denham, “the global 
changes threaten those who are least well equipped to respond. Those with low skills will 
find it harder to find work” and as a result, “they and their families struggle to share in the 
increasing prosperity of Britain”.272 A succession of government ministers echoed these 
remarks. The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Peter Hain, spoke at length of the 
need to attach the provision of skills to welfare to enable individuals to participate in job 
markets, to become more flexible in their working practices, and to increase their skills.273  
These skills, Hain argued, would help “unlock the talents and skills of our people to equip 
them to compete in the globalised world”.274 In his role as the Minister of State for 
Employment and Welfare Reform, Stephen Timms remarked that “developing Britain’s 
skills base *was+ key for competing in the global economy”.275 There was a clear market 
logic to this discourse. If the UK as a nation was to retain or indeed increase its 
competitiveness within the global economy, and if individuals and their families were to 
confer the benefits of globalisation, then a broadened skills base would be integral to 
Britain and its citizens making the most of the opportunities presented by globalisation. 
 
Whether conceived as the Giddensian ‘social investment state’ or simply ‘welfare-to-
work’, New Labour’s approach to addressing welfare provision through the supply-side 
represented a clear departure from traditional social democratic thinking which, as Eric 
Shaw has remarked, had blamed structural factors and a lack of demand for labour. 
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However, since the ‘old’ welfare system had taken insufficient account of supply-side 
factors, there was now a weak attachment to the labour market. This had been further 
undermined by a lack of incentives to acquire skills or appropriate qualifications or (for 
groups such as single mothers) a lack of adequate childcare provision.276 To overcome this 
problem, New Labour enacted a series of policies designed to increase the availability of 
educational and employment opportunities intended to promote human capital and 
enhance Britain’s ability to compete in the global economy.277 For Paul Cammack, this was 
further evidence of Adam Smith’s influence upon Gordon Brown.278 Like Smith, the 
Chancellor sought to identify the causes of the “improvement in the productive powers of 
labour” that lay behind the contrast that Smith had observed between “miserably poor” 
nations on the one hand and the “civilized and thriving” nations on the other.279 This same 
focus on the proportion of the population in employment and the productivity of their 
labour was, Cammack argues, central to the thinking of the Blair and Brown governments.  
 
Central to New Labour’s welfare-to-work programme was the New Deal. The Chancellor 
introduced a “bewildering number of ‘New Deals’”,280 including the ‘Global New Deal’ 
which I explore in chapter 7. The flagship New Deal programme was the New Deal for 
Young People (NDYP) which sought to “improve the long-term job prospects of young 
people through early intervention and the options of subsidised employment, 
environmental work, voluntary work or full-time education, but with no ‘fifth-option’ of 
non-participation”.281 Individuals who found themselves unemployed within 13 weeks of 
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leaving an option would go onto the ‘follow-through’ programme of job assistance, similar 
to the initial gateway period.282 If an option was refused, the claimant was liable to incur a 
benefits sanction. Initially, these sanctions took the form of benefit withdrawals for two 
weeks, with further refusals resulting in repeated four-weekly withdrawals.283 New Labour 
did not shy away from meting out these sanctions, disciplining young people with 
children, carers, those with disabilities and pregnant mothers.284 The Chancellor would 
later boast of New Labour’s record of “tightening up sanctions for the unemployed” and 
“compelling young people into training and work”.285 This was arguably the clearest 
example of New Labour’s belief that rights required responsibilities. If individuals had the 
right to expect that the government would provide them opportunities to train so as to 
become better able to find work, the unemployed had a responsibility to take advantage 
of such openings: a life on benefits was not an option.286 As Janet Newman has remarked, 
“the discourse of ‘responsible citizenship’ was embedded in the coercive elements of the 
New Deal and welfare to work programmes”.287  
 
The discourse of ‘rights and responsibilities’ that New Labour used to frame its welfare 
policies pre-dated its time in office, and remained fairly consistent throughout the time it 
subsequently spent in government.288 Whilst Leader of the Opposition, Tony Blair spoke of 
the need to “create a society based on a notion of mutual rights and responsibilities”, 
supported by the principle of “‘something for something’”.289 For Blair, society must 
accept its duty “to give each person a stake in its future” while in return each person must 
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accept “a responsibility to respond, to work to improve themselves”.290 The premise of 
Blair’s ‘new social contract’ between the state and the individual was one of ‘something 
for something’. As David Blunkett, the Secretary of State for Education and Employment 
argued, “if you expect someone else to pay the bill for you, there is some obligation, 
moral, as well as political, to actually respond in kind”.291 For the Work and Pensions 
Secretary, John Hutton, the demands of the welfare state had to be raised to make it fair 
not only to claimants but “fair to taxpayers” as well.292  
 
Despite the punitive nature of New Labour’s welfare strategy, the government did retain a 
strong commitment to welfare provision and support for the most vulnerable in society. 
Indeed, despite an early cap placed upon spending across Whitehall, the Treasury 
announced a series of measures including £195 million to support disabled people, £190 
million for lone parents, and the first ever national child care strategy within the first year 
of New Labour coming into office.293 This initial outlay in government spending was 
followed up with the introduction of a number of skills and training programmes such as 
the New Deal, the minimum wage and a series of tax credit schemes. These initiatives 
however were presented not as a set of automatic rights or entitlements but on the 
condition that the individual concerned took on increased responsibilities and met their 
duties as citizens, as parents and as employees. In return for the money that the Treasury 
was prepared to spend on increasing benefits for instance, the Economic Secretary Alistair 
Darling argued that it was “reasonable that people of working age – lone parents, the 
unemployed and people claiming incapacity benefits – should be required to attend an 
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interview to discuss their options for work”.294 In 2002 these measures were extended by 
the Chancellor through the introduction of the StepUp scheme, which obliged “the long-
term unemployed to accept a guaranteed job which [offered], instead of the dole, secure 
waged employment”.295 This new programme, Brown announced, would be matched by 
“mandatory work preparation courses for the long-term unemployed”. Those who were 
recurrently in and out of work would now come within the same ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ of the New Deal. In return for new obligations, the government offered 
new opportunities to ensure that work paid significantly more than benefits.296 
 
Within this context, claimants would be compelled into accepting responsibility for their 
own participation in the global economy. Denham announced that “when people sign on 
for benefits, they should sign up for skills”, promising to “make it easier for those on 
benefits to gain new skills” and provide both “the tailored support that people need in 
order to get into work” and the “new opportunities for people to train”. However, “with 
those rights come responsibilities” Denham warned, “responsibilities to upskill and to 
work”.297 For the Minister for Science and Innovation, Malcolm Wicks, the opportunities 
of globalisation would only come to “those willing to reach out to embrace them”.298 
Brown believed that although “the prize for Britain is great”;299 there was still 
nevertheless “a duty on the inactive to take up those opportunities”.300 Again, placing this 
policy within the strategic context of globalisation, the Prime Minister differentiated 
between the ‘old’ economy, and the ‘new, global economy’. “In the old days” Brown 
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argued, “the obligation was on the unemployed to find a job”. “In the new world” 
however, “the obligation on the unemployed should be not just to seek work but to train 
for work”.301 With this discourse, Brown increased the pressure upon the individual to 
participate within the global economy and seize its opportunities. For Brown, in the light 
of this new global economy, opportunities, like rights, were no longer universal but 
dependent upon whether “we choose to seize them”, or whether we are willing to fulfil 
our responsibilities.302 Crucially then, these responsibilities would square with New 
Labour’s commitment to inclusion through increased opportunity.    
 
New Labour’s approach to welfare was far more ‘active’ than any of its predecessors, and 
demonstrated a clear commitment to address social exclusion through employment and 
increased social and economic opportunity. However, it also signalled what even one 
government insider called “the strongest ever attack on the workshy”.303 John Grieve 
Smith argues that this authoritarian attitude to welfare for the unemployed reflected the 
assumption amongst policymakers that unemployment was due to people simply being 
unwilling to take jobs that are available. Indeed, David Blunkett claimed that “jobs are 
there for the taking”.304 Grieve Smith disputed this, maintaining that “unemployment is 
primarily determined by the strength in demand for labour… People in areas of high 
unemployment are not more reluctant to work than people elsewhere: they are victims of 
job shortage”.305 This point was underlined to devastating effect in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis and subsequent recession experienced by the British economy. As Bryson 
and Fisher note, “after 2008 rising unemployment undermined any credibility that supply-
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side arguments might have had”.306 Furthermore, having ascribed the value of an 
individual on the basis of their inclusion in (or indeed, their exclusion from) the labour 
market, those who were now out of work were left without this legitimacy. It is this social 
and economic deficiency, rather than any improvement in that is arguably the lasting 
legacy of the New Deal.  
 
For critics of the New Labour project, much can be read into the Chancellor’s use of the 
supply-side as a welfare strategy to drive up skills and competitiveness. Mark Bevir argues 
that it represents a clear shift from Labour’s traditional emphasis upon ‘equality’ to 
‘efficiency’. New Labour believed that “redistributive measures should occur only when 
they do not damage industrial competitiveness”.307 Colin Hay agrees. Under New Labour, 
welfare expenditure was no longer justified principally in terms of its contribution to social 
justice but rather in terms of its contribution to competitiveness.308 This is a crucial point 
for it suggests that while New Labour did not jettison social justice from its political 
economy – both at home and abroad, it evidently remained committed to the spirit of this 
at least – it clearly believed that social justice could only be achieved within the context of 
an efficient and competitive market economy. There was a clearly punitive element to the 
Chancellor’s supply-side strategy. As Hay goes on to argue, work needed to be ‘made to 
pay’ through reform, and indeed a tightening of benefit eligibility criteria, in order to 
incentivise labour-market participation.309  
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The reconfiguration of the welfare state under New Labour, like the other areas of policy 
explored in this chapter, emerged as a result of the challenges that globalisation was 
understood to impose upon national governments. This prompted a re-conceptualisation 
of Labour’s traditional commitment to equality and social justice. A greater emphasis was 
placed upon social and economic ‘inclusion’ as opposed to ‘equality’, and increasing 
‘opportunity’ was deemed to be far more effective in achieving this aim than 
redistributive means, such as ‘tax and spend’. This approach however required far greater 
responsibility to be exercised on the part of the individual. This resonates with two 
themes already covered in this chapter. Firstly, New Labour’s approach to welfare was 
clearly based upon the third discourse of globalisation discussed in the opening part of the 
chapter; a discourse that viewed globalisation as a constraint upon policy, but one that if 
appropriately managed, could present an opportunity, in this instance for greater 
economic and social integration. This however would entail a shift in responsibility away 
from the state and onto the individual. The second theme develops the discourse of 
‘global competitiveness’ that was evident in the previous section. However, where this 
was talked about in terms of Britain’s competitive advantage, it was inflected here for 
consumption at an individual level. To realise the government’s commitment to global 
competitiveness, New Labour articulated a coercive discourse of ‘no rights without 
responsibilities’. Participation in the job market would be mandatory. Those who can work 
should work, and those out of work should acquire skills and undertake training in order 
to equip themselves to meet the demands of the increasingly global labour market. 
 
Chapter 7 explores the implications of such a strategy when exported abroad through 
New Labour’s aid policies. Since globalisation was understood to present significant 
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opportunities for wealth creation, there would be a clear imperative for developing 
countries to participate fully within the global economy in order to confer its benefits. The 
case study examining the IFF analyses how New Labour, in its commitment to tackling 
poverty would address this issue of ‘inclusion’, what ‘responsibilities’ it would demand of 
aid recipients, and how these would be orientated. Just as this section has demonstrated 
how responsibilities at home were geared towards ‘the logic of no alternative’ imposed by 
the market, chapter 7 will assess whether a similar logic was pursued abroad.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter opened with an assessment of globalisation as a discourse in the political 
economy of New Labour. This discourse had the effect of providing the strategic context 
upon which policy decisions were taken and strategies were formed. Its perception 
amongst officials of an inevitable process had real effects in that it directly shaped policy. 
The terms upon which this discourse shaped policy however were far from even. 
Globalisation was instead discursively constructed in three different ways at home, all 
framed to different degrees by the language of ‘constraint’. Although pronouncements of 
globalisation made within the context of international development were made using the 
language of ‘opportunity’, this remained tempered by the language of ‘constraint’. 
‘Constraint’ and ‘opportunity’ were two sides of the same coin; ‘opportunity’ could only 
be realised through careful management of the ‘constraint’ that globalisation was 
assumed to impose upon national governments. In order to realise the opportunities of 
globalisation, New Labour officials internalised its constraints by pursuing a set of policies 
that accommodated the logic and assumed exigencies of the global economy.  
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This logic was evident in each of the subsequent three areas of New Labour’s political 
economy that this chapter has explored. Placing considerable emphasis upon stability, 
openness and transparency, the macroeconomic architecture put in place by Treasury 
officials at home was designed to maintain credibility amongst investors and IFIs. As I will 
go on to demonstrate in chapter 5, the pillars of this framework would form the basis of 
the ‘new global economic architecture’ that Gordon Brown in particular was keen to 
promote abroad, and in doing so, underpin efforts towards increased levels of debt relief 
and more sustainable forms of financing for development.  
 
The second area of New Labour’s political economy that this chapter explored examined 
the Party’s rebranding as the ‘government of business’. Again derived from New Labour’s 
understanding of globalisation, officials argued that if Britain was to compete successfully 
in the global economy, it needed a strong ‘knowledge economy’. At the heart of this 
‘knowledge economy’ was the pharmaceutical industry, and this gave these firms a unique 
place within government in terms of setting domestic policy. The nature and orientation 
of this relationship is assessed in chapter 6 as I explore New Labour’s engagement with 
the industry over the issue of antiretroviral provision in the developing world.  
 
The third and final area of New Labour’s domestic political economy concerned its welfare 
policies. Under New Labour, Britain’s welfare state, along with the Labour Party’s own, 
traditional conceptions of social justice underwent a significant change, again largely as a 
result of the constraints that globalisation was understood to impose upon governments 
and electorates alike. These changes brought about a change in discourse and policy, with 
imperatives of ‘opportunity’ and ‘inclusion’ replacing Labourite values of ‘redistribution’ 
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and ‘equality’. Recipients of welfare were expected to take far greater responsibility of 
their lives in order to increase their employability in an increasingly global market. As I 
show in chapter 7, where New Labour officials spoke of the opportunities of globalisation 
to developing countries, these new values of ‘inclusion’ and ‘responsibility’ would be 
transmitted abroad in Britain’s aid programme.  
 
This chapter has revealed those aspects of New Labour’s domestic political economy that 
formed the basis of three of the government’s major international development policies. 
By way of contextualising these policies, and indeed the transmission that occurred 
between the domestic and international spheres of policy, my attention now turns to 
Labour’s historical engagement with these issues.  
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Chapter 3 
 
From ‘Old’ to New Labour: Historicising the 
Processes of Change and Continuity in 
Labour’s International Development Policies 
 
The previous chapter addressed concerns relating to New Labour’s political economy, and 
started to explore those themes and ideas that were designed by Party officials for 
domestic consumption, but which would, over time, find their way into its international 
development programme. This chapter keeps such a claim firmly in mind, but takes as its 
specific point of departure the historical context of New Labour’s international 
development policies. Historically, the British Labour Party had retained a longstanding 
commitment to matters of overseas development, and previous Labour governments had 
placed considerable emphasis upon addressing global poverty. In many respects then, 
when it created a new Department for International Development (DFID), separate from 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), New Labour was merely taking up a 
precedent set by Labour leaders such as Harold Wilson and James Callaghan who had, in 
the past, institutionalised and then re-institutionalised the Ministry of Overseas 
Development (ODM).  
 
Placing New Labour’s international development policies within this historical setting, I 
begin by comparing the approaches that ‘old’ and New Labour brought to bear in this area 
of policy. I use the term ‘old’ Labour to refer to the broad character of the Party up to its 
modernisation under Tony Blair, under whom the ‘New Labour’ project was completed in 
the mid-1990s. This transformation did not occur overnight, and as I note later in this 
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chapter, there was a significant change in Party thinking under Neil Kinnock’s leadership, 
still under the auspices of ‘old’ Labour, that paved the way for what would become ‘New 
Labour’. In this chapter, I argue that while there was a similar normative, moral 
commitment to address matters of global poverty running through its different policy 
narratives at different moments of time, there were distinct differences both in the 
specific issues faced by ‘old’ and New Labour officials, and the ways in which the two 
incarnations of the Party responded to the challenges of international development. 
Taking into account the wider geopolitical and economic context, I explore the 
temporality and transformation of these policies, alongside their significance in shaping 
the institutional and strategic context, explored in the following chapter, for New Labour 
in office.  
 
Structure of the Chapter  
I begin this chapter with a series of remarks concerning the internationalisation of the 
Labour Party, and the attempted extension of its socialist values abroad. These comments 
are particularly striking since they show that the transposition of themes and policies 
abroad that I claim was evident in New Labour’s political economy is not in any way new. 
Having contextualised my analysis, I move to the substantive analysis of the chapter, and 
again, in keeping with the overall themes of the thesis, explore the evolution of Labour’s 
international development policies over time. The remainder of the chapter is divided up 
into six sections, each one exploring the character of Labour’s commitment to matters of 
global poverty in a specific period of the Party’s post-war history. 
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I begin, appropriately with Harold Wilson and his self-declared ‘War on Want’. His work in 
addressing global poverty would be pioneering for the Labour Party, and pave the way for 
his successors to grant matters of international development a prominent place within 
Labour Party politics. Defeat at the 1970 General Election put the narrative on hiatus, only 
for it to resume again with Labour’s return to power and Wilson’s second spell as Prime 
Minister in 1974. An explicitly ‘poverty-focused’ development strategy would follow 
together with a considerable political commitment. However, further defeat for Labour, 
now under the leadership of Jim Callaghan, at the 1979 General Election would usher in a 
new period in Labour’s ongoing commitment to international development. A sharp swing 
to the Left under Michael Foot saw Labour adopt an altogether more socialist set of 
development policies. This entailed a clear rejection of market-led development and 
increased solidarity with Left-wing governments across the world. A heavy defeat at the 
1983 General Election marked the start of a period of modernisation overseen by Neil 
Kinnock, and crucially Labour’s gradual acceptance of the market. Interestingly though, 
this would not materialise in the Party’s international development policies until New 
Labour would be elected. In the meantime, Labour remained deeply suspicious of the role 
of market actors in the development process. Amongst officials, it was felt that 
multinational firms hindered the development process, and Labour urged greater 
regulation and tighter controls over their operations in developing countries. Of course, as 
my analysis in the previous chapter made clear, such a view was quite the opposite of that 
held by New Labour.  
 
The chapter reaches its conclusion by exploring the leadership of Blair’s predecessor, the 
late John Smith. His Christian socialism, arguably most evident in matters concerning 
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global poverty, would evoke aspects from Labour’s past but also point to the ‘moral 
challenge’ of development that New Labour itself would claim to face in office. Indeed, 
Smith’s brief leadership can be seen to have acted as a bridge between ‘old’ and New 
Labour. As the chapter unfolds, I will be looking to identify those values that Labour 
incorporated in its international development policies with a view to comparing and 
contrasting these with the policies taken up by New Labour in government. My analysis 
throughout this chapter will provide a sense of the scale of continuity and change that 
existed between ‘old’ and New Labour, and allow me to make an assessment of the 
character of New Labour in relation to its predecessors. 
 
The Internationalisation of the Labour Party  
Little of the extensive literature concerning the history of the Labour Party is given over to 
debates concerning its internationalism, let alone its commitment to overseas 
development. In many respects, this is not surprising. When the Party first emerged as the 
Labour Representation Committee in February 1900, it was neither particularly concerned 
with foreign policy, or the wider world. Rather, it was, as John Callaghan notes, formed as 
a means of promoting independent working-class representation in Parliament.1 Despite 
this ambivalence to international affairs however, the broader Labour movement actually 
did not want to ignore the wider world. As Andrew Thorpe has remarked, many rank-and-
file members believed that:  
 
Labour’s values and ideals were not ones that stopped at the English 
Channel; they were, instead, ones that were, and indeed had to be 
transferable to the whole world. Politics were not about Britain alone, 
but the whole of humanity.2  
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This claim was given greater credence by ever-changing international context that Britain 
faced throughout the twentieth century. This made Labour’s initial policy of isolationism 
simply unsustainable, and in many respects forced the hand of the Party’s leadership, 
causing it to review Labour’s position with the rest of the world. Subsequently, the 
outlook of the Party’s leadership gradually started to reflect the internationalism of its 
own members. In the post-war era, Labour was led by a succession of committed 
internationalists, each of whom took an active interest in the issues facing the developing 
world, and who, as a result, granted matters of global poverty a prominent position within 
their own foreign policies. Clearly, these particular issues were mediated to a certain 
degree by the external circumstances that Labour, and indeed, Britain as a country, found 
itself facing. However, in surveying the manner in which Labour Party policy unfolded over 
time, two rather striking features emerged.  
 
The first of these features draws a clear distinction between the ‘old’ and ‘New’ variants 
of the Labour Party, or more specifically, the espousal of an explicitly ‘socialist’ set of 
international development policies by ‘old’ Labour, and the rejection of these by New 
Labour. Although constrained by domestic pressures, initially through balance of 
payments difficulties during the 1960s, and then economic crisis in the 1970s, matters of 
international development were to prove of considerable significance to ‘old’ Labour. This 
position was consolidated by the Party in its support for the struggles of socialist, 
democratic governments and working-class movements in developing countries during its 
last few years in office and the early part of the 1980s. However, as Labour embarked 
upon an internal programme of modernisation and renewal in the late 1980s and early 
 
120 
 
1990s, these ‘old’ socialist values became gradually less visible and replaced with an 
altogether more ‘market’-oriented set of policies.  
 
If this first feature is indicative of the broader split between ‘old’ and New Labour, then 
the second feature of these international development policies reflects a connection that 
links both New Labour and its predecessors. Under both ‘old’ and New Labour, policy 
officials sought to address matters of international development through a clear 
transmission, or ‘internationalisation’ of domestic values and ideas. Reasserting the core 
claim of the thesis, this continuity is striking since it reveals the basis upon which Labour 
formed its international development policies, the subsequent character of these policies, 
and the trajectory of the Party’s broader political economy. Both these features however 
would suggest that there was both change and continuity in the making of Labour Party 
policy in the area of international development.   
 
Historical accounts of Britain’s aid policy traditionally take as their point of departure the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act passed by Ramsay MacDonald’s newly-elected 
Labour government in 1929. This Parliamentary Act formalised the provision of financial 
aid to projects in Britain’s colonies and linked such finance to the promotion of commerce 
with or industry in the UK.3 However, far stronger parallels can be drawn between New 
Labour’s contemporary international development policies and the efforts of a small band 
of post-war Labour politicians and socialists, who identified the issue of global poverty as 
one which they believed Britain needed to address as a matter of urgency. The 
commitment of the latter, including future Party Leader and Prime Minister, Harold 
Wilson, provide the starting point of a distinct lineage that can be traced from the post-
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war British Labour movement right up to the arrival into office of New Labour in 1997 and 
the respective premierships of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Although the character and 
the content of these policies would change over time, this genealogy reveals a clear 
priority afforded to matters of international development. Although space does not 
permit an exhaustive account of all aspects of Labour’s international development 
policies, this chapter does nevertheless assess those issues addressed in the later chapters 
of the thesis, and in particular the orientation, and the evolution of these policies over 
time. Analysis of the character, the temporality and the manner in which these policies 
unfolded allows a comparison to be drawn of New Labour’s own specific commitments to 
matters relating to international development in the contemporary era.  
 
Labour’s ‘British Socialism’ and the ‘War on Want’  
Perhaps the most significant forebear to Labour’s international development policies 
came not from the within the Party itself but from the wider socialist movement, and in 
particular the work of the social activist, Victor Gollancz. In a letter to the Manchester 
Guardian in February 1951, Gollancz stressed the need to take “action of some kind to 
meet the challenge presented to the world by millions of our fellow men and women 
living in destitution”.4 At the same time, Gollancz established the Association of World 
Peace and asked Harold Wilson, who at that time was still a junior Labour MP, to act as 
the Chair of a committee set up to address this issue of world poverty. The findings of the 
committee would lead to the coining of the phrase ‘War on Want’, out of which the NGO 
of the same name would come into being, and the publication a year later, of the report, 
War on Want: a Plan for World Development. Wealthy countries in particular, the report 
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argued, should not seek war with each other, but rather wage a new war on poverty and 
want in the developing world.  
 
The rationale of this plan was “that we are rich and they are poor, and it is our duty to 
help them…the attack on world poverty requires the people in wealthier countries to 
understand their obligations to the world community and to be aware of the problems of 
less fortunate people”.5 Furthermore, this fight against world poverty was not to be 
thought of simply in terms of self-interest. Rather, as two other Labour MPs, Richard 
Acland and Leslie Hale, who in a pamphlet written to precede the War on Want report, 
argued that “the basic reason for attacking world poverty is that it is the right thing to do 
in the name of God and man”.6 This gave Labour’s own ‘war on want’ both a profoundly 
ecclesiastical and humanistic purpose. These two strands of thought, influenced by the 
traditions of Christian socialism and the humanism of Karl Marx, provided the Labour 
Party with a distinctly moral purpose to its commitment to end world poverty. No more 
clearly was this eclecticism demonstrated than in Harold Wilson’s claim that the “British 
socialism” espoused by his Party was rooted in “…that uniquely British institution; the 
voluntary association – the trade union, the friendly society, the co-operative society and, 
not least, the church and the chapel”.7 Wilson argued that this voluntary association, and 
its different blocs, would support Labour’s socialist creed.  
 
This creed was defined by Wilson’s predecessor, Hugh Gaitskell who argued that the ideal 
of Labour’s social democracy was to be “the brotherhood of man” and its purpose “to 
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make this ideal a reality everywhere”.8 To achieve these aims, Gaitskell laid before the 
Party proposals to drop Clause IV from Labour’s constitution. As Arblaster notes however, 
it proved to be a step too far for Party members, and following much debate, Gaitskell’s 
proposals were abandoned.9 Almost as a compromise however, Labour’s continued 
commitment to Clause IV was supplemented by a set of twelve principles or statement of 
aims (Fig. 3.1, overleaf) that Gaitskell claimed (re)presented Labour’s British socialism in a 
clear and more “inspiring fashion”.10  
 
Citing these principles in his own writings,11 Harold Wilson sought to “widen the context” 
of this British socialism “to that of the development of the poor under-privileged areas” in 
the world.12 Labour’s commitment to assist poorer nations, abolish world poverty and 
reject economic exploitation dovetailed with Wilson’s involvement in the War on Want 
campaign, and the Labour leader would prove to be instrumental in exporting this vision 
of British democratic socialism abroad. Indeed, the imprint of the War on Want report 
was clearly stamped across this particular part of Labour’s 1964 General Election 
manifesto. Declaring a “New War – On Want”, Wilson’s Labour Party promised the 
electorate that his government would address the “ever-present fear” that poverty was 
“for more than half the world’s population”.13  
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Fig. 3.1 Refashioning Clause IV: Labour’s British Socialism under Gaitskell and Wilson  
The Labour Party:  
 
1. Rejects “discrimination on grounds of race, colour and creed”. Equality essential 
to the dignity to Man [sic.].   
 
2. Supports the right of all nations to self-determination and “the right of all peoples 
to enjoy freedom, independence and self-government”.  
 
3. Seeks the building of a world order based upon peace, rather than the struggle for 
power, amongst nations.  
 
4. Rejects “the economic exploitation of one country by another” and believes that 
richer nations have a duty “to assist poorer nations and to do all in their power to 
abolish poverty throughout the world”.  
 
5. “Stands for social justice”, and a society in which “the claims of those living in 
hardship come first, and the wealth produced by all is fairly shared among all”. 
“Differences in rewards depend not upon birth or inheritance but on the effort, 
skill and contribution made to the common good”. Equal opportunities for all to 
live a full and varied life.  
 
6. Regards the pursuit of material wealth as being “empty and barren” and “rejects 
the selfish, acquisitive doctrines of capitalism”. Instead it seeks to create “a 
socialist community based upon fellowship, co-operation and service”.  
 
7. Aims to establish “a classless society”, through the elimination of all “class 
barriers” and “false social values”.  
 
8. Believes it to be necessary for Britain’s economy to be planned and “all 
concentrations of power subordinated” in order to ensure and maintain “full 
employment, rising production, stable prices and steadily advancing living 
standards”.  
 
9. Stands for “democracy in industry” and in particular the right of workers to 
engage in full consultation with management over decisions affecting conditions 
of work.  
 
10. Is convinced that these social and economic objectives can only be achieved 
through “an expansion of common ownership substantial enough to give the 
community power over the commanding heights of the economy”.  
 
11. Stands for the “the happiness and freedom of the individual against the 
glorification of the state”. Workers, consumers and all citizens to be protected 
against any exercise of arbitrary power carried out by the state, or any other 
public or private authorities.  
 
12. Believes, as a democratic party, there to be “no true socialism without political 
freedom”. Power only to be obtained and held through free democratic 
institutions.    
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Under Wilson’s leadership, Labour would attempt to address the “gross inequalities of 
circumstances between the rich and poor nations” and frame its response to poverty in 
the “socialist axiom ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his need’”.14 
For Labour, Marx’ imagined banner was “not for home consumption only” but should be 
transposed into the fight against poverty abroad.15 The emphasis that Labour placed upon 
the redistribution of wealth was not simply a domestic priority, but one that should be 
transmitted into the international arena. In achieving this aim, Labour committed Britain 
to:  
 
(i) Discuss with other countries proposals for expanding the trade of 
developing nations. (ii) Increase the share of our national income 
devoted to essential aid programmes, not only by loans and grants but 
by mobilising unused industrial capacity to meet overseas needs. (iii) 
Revive the concept of a World Food Board for the disposal of agricultural 
surpluses.16  
 
Upon entering into office, a new Ministry of Overseas Development (referred to hereafter 
as the ODM), also promised in the General Election manifesto, was duly created by 
Wilson’s Labour government. Headed up by a senior Labour politician, Barbara Castle, this 
appeared initially at least to give the Labour’s ODM real muscle within Whitehall and a 
renewed impetus to Britain’s aid programme.17 Furthermore, the White Paper published 
by the ODM the following year appeared to offer a real statement of intent as to Labour’s 
commitment to meet the needs and promote the development of poor countries. 
 
Despite Labour’s ambitions however, there were clear differences between the scope of 
the White Paper, and the altogether more radical set of proposals put forward by the War 
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on Want report and Labour’s own election manifesto. These differences perhaps reflected 
the harsh realities of government that Labour now found itself facing; realities brought 
into sharp focus by the balance of payments difficulties experienced by Britain at the time. 
This particular constraint was duly noted in the White Paper. Held back by “the strength of 
our *Britain’s+ economy and of our balance of payments”, the remit of the ODM was 
narrowed thereby restricting the purpose and the policy solutions that it was able to 
offer.18 Seers and Streeten have remarked how disappointing Labour’s aid programme 
proved, even to policy officials working within the ODM, particularly given the promises 
the Party had made prior to the 1964 General Election concerning issues of overseas 
development.19 
 
Perhaps the most significant absence from the White Paper was the ‘inequality’ that 
Labour had in its election manifesto given as the principle reason for development and 
this ‘War on Want’. Now in office, the ODM argued that development meant not 
necessarily correcting this inequality, but rather “fulfilling aspirations towards steady and 
continued social and economic progress…the transformation of traditional societies into 
modern ones”.20 This claim owed more to the teleology of modernisation and Wilson’s 
1963 speech to the Labour Party conference than it did to the altogether more traditional 
socialist ideas concerning ‘equality’ and ‘redistribution’ that were expressed in Labour’s 
General Election manifesto a year later. Wilson’s own discourse of modernity called for an 
abandoning ‘on both sides’ of the “restrictive practices” and “outdated methods” that 
stood in the way of Britain embracing “the white heat of *a scientific+ revolution”.21 
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Thematically, this discourse of modernisation was far more evident in the ODM’s White 
Paper than it had been in Labour’s election manifesto. The White Paper for instance 
contained no reference to the revival of the redistributive mechanism of the World Food 
Board promised in the manifesto. Furthermore, although the declining value of trade 
imports into less developed countries was identified as an area of concern by the ODM,22 
the White Paper failed to offer neither any explanation for this trend nor any concrete 
proposals with which to address this clear inequality in the global trading system. Rather 
than addressing these structural problems in the world economy, the White Paper 
identified an altogether new set of issues, which the ODM argued, prevented poor 
countries from developing, and entering down the path of modernisation. 
 
According to the White Paper, the developing world was experiencing an exodus of skilled 
human capital to the global North and severe population pressures,23 declining financial 
flows into these developing countries (through falling bilateral aid) and increasing financial 
flows out of these countries (through increasing debt repayments).24 Although these 
issues had multiple causes and effects, the ODM restricted its policy response to 
strengthening Britain’s aid programme through a combination of ‘technical assistance’,25 
and increases in the provision of grants, interest-free and ‘soft’ loans to developing 
countries, predominately in the Commonwealth.26 However, the precarious economic 
position that Britain itself faced through its own balance of payments difficulties placed 
considerable strain upon the already limited and weak set of policy instruments that the 
ODM had at its disposal.  As the clamour for public spending cuts grew across Whitehall, 
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the proportion of GDP that Wilson’s government spent on overseas aid fell between 1964 
and 1970.27 Despite its ambitions to promote development and address the issues of 
global poverty, a rather toothless White Paper and an increasingly suppressed remit 
within Whitehall meant that by the time Labour left office in 1970, the ODM had become 
a department that was largely administrative in nature. 
  
Fig. 3.2  Labour’s ‘British Socialism’ and its Overseas Development Policies, c.1950–
1974  
 
Themes Policy Commitments Outside Antecedents Challenges 
“War on Want”  
 
British form of socialism 
to be exported overseas  
 
Moral imperative to 
address the global 
inequality that exists  
 
Ecclesiastical concern for 
the poor   
 
Marxian concept of 
wealth redistribution 
Cabinet post dedicated to 
matters of overseas 
development (ODM) 
 
Increase aid to end 
poverty  
 
The modernisation of 
LDCs 
 
 
 
 
War on Want report  
 
Socialist movements and 
humanitarian activists, 
Association of World 
Peace 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Difficulties with Britain’s 
balance of payments  
 
Spending cuts across 
Whitehall 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the table in Fig. 3.2 demonstrates, despite a strong rhetorical commitment to an 
explicitly ‘socialist’ set of development policies both at home and abroad, the policy 
measures that were introduced lacked the radicalism that Wilson had promised. Rather 
than carrying the fight in the ‘War on Want’, the ODM was left on the back-foot, and 
concerned principally with the unenviable task of maintaining Britain’s aid programme in 
the face of increasingly difficult economic circumstances.  
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Labour’s Return to Power and its Renewed Commitment to Overseas  
Development  
Having lost the 1970 General Election to Edward Heath’s Conservative Party, Labour 
attempted to return to power four years later faced with an even more austere economic 
climate. Heath’s government had failed to arrest the chronic stagflation that had gripped 
the British economy. As the electorate headed to the polls in February 1974 (and again the 
following October) industrial disputes, rising unemployment and spiralling inflation had 
placed domestic issues firmly at the forefront of voters’ minds. Despite Britain’s own 
experience during the 1970s of what Steven Fielding has described as a “decade of 
discontent”,28 Labour’s commitment to international development was arguably as strong 
during this particular period than at any other time during its history.  
 
Still under the leadership of Harold Wilson, Labour reaffirmed its dedication to addressing 
global poverty through a series of explicitly “socialist aims”.29 In its 1974 election 
manifesto, Labour promised “radical changes in aid, trade and development policies”.30 
Now however, it also had an internationally-agreed benchmark against which to measure 
its efforts. In 1970, the rich member states of the United Nations agreed to work towards 
committing 0.7 percent of their gross national income (GNI) to overseas aid. Since Labour 
had previously called for a 1 percent target, it was perhaps of no surprise that in its 
manifesto, the Party promised “to implement the United Nations Development Target of 
0.7 percent”.31 Furthermore, as it had promised ten years earlier in its 1964 manifesto, 
Labour pledged Britain “to a policy of equality at home and abroad”.32 This was significant 
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since it demonstrated again that there was to be a clear transmission of Labour values 
from the national to the international level. This transmission was evident both publically 
in the Party’s manifesto, and internally, in a discussion paper prepared for the National 
Conference of Labour Women. Labour’s election manifesto spoke of the Party’s joint 
“intention to…eliminate poverty wherever it exists in Britain, and [commitment] to a 
substantial increase in our contribution to fight poverty abroad”.33 The internal discussion 
paper concerned itself “not only with inequality in Britain” but “the elimination of world 
poverty” too. Any Labour government, the paper went on to argue “must act on inequality 
at home as well as promoting equality between nations in the rest of the world”.34  
 
Under the respective premierships of Wilson and his successor, James Callaghan, the 
Labour government offered what it claimed to be a “changing emphasis in British aid 
policies”.35 Although the newly-resurrected ODM promised that “many of the traditional 
activities of our aid programme *would be left+ largely unchanged”,36 the economic 
constraints faced by Labour during the latter half of the 1970s meant that aid had to be 
stretched further. Despite the sterling crisis of 1976 and subsequent IMF bailout, Labour 
appeared unwilling to compromise its commitment to international development. Instead, 
the ODM argued that Britain’s increasingly scarce aid resources should be “poverty 
orientated”, and used in ways which benefited “the poorest sections of the poorest 
countries”.37 This particular narrative would remain constant in Labour’s policy 
pronouncements, appearing frequently as a statement of intent both, both in and out of 
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government, and under the guise of both ‘old’ and New Labour.38 At this particular point 
in time, this commitment to ‘the poorest people in the poorest countries’ would focus 
specifically on areas such as rural development, education, housing and urban 
development, population, health, and trade. For government officials, the issue at stake 
was not “the overall size of the total aid programme” but “how we deploy the funds which 
are available”.39 The ODM clearly hoped that this shift in focus would square the financial 
constraints facing its own aid budget at home with Labour’s stated aim to address global 
poverty abroad. It is possible too that in the light of the problems which the ODM ran into 
the last time Labour was in government, officials were now deliberately seeking to 
downplay expectations of Britain’s aid programme. However, as Fig. 3.3 shows, Labour’s 
1974 election victory marked the beginning of a series of significant increases in overseas 
aid, a trend that Wilson’s successor, James Callaghan continued during his time as Prime 
Minister, right up until 1979 where it peaked at 0.51 percent/GDP.  
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Fig. 3.3 Britain’s Overseas Development Aid as a % of GNI, 1970–1979 
 
 
 
Source:  OECD and DFID40 
 
The 1970s saw a marked shift in the issues confronting developing countries, and this was 
reflected in the content of Labour’s 1975 White Paper. Indeed, it took as its point of 
departure, the impact of the first oil shock and worldwide food shortages upon the 
developing world. At the start of the decade, many of these economies had enjoyed an 
improvement in the terms of trade, rapid growth and an increase in their foreign 
exchange reserves. However, the rise in the prices of oil and food transformed world 
economic relationships. Combined with the fall in prices of the commodity exports of 
many developing countries and dramatic rises in the prices of the industrial products they 
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imported, the increase in the prices of imported oil and food quickly eroded the 
favourable position they had previously enjoyed. The net effect was that virtually all 
developing countries who did not export oil now faced a severe deterioration in their 
terms of trade.41 
 
The sharp increase in the price of oil in 1973 flooded the international credit market with 
cash from the oil-producing economies. Awash with this OPEC money, commercial lenders 
in Europe and the US were now able to provide loans to developing economies at very low 
(in some instances, negative) rates of interest.42 This in turn enabled many developing 
countries to embark upon a policy of what Jeffrey Frieden has termed “indebted 
industrialisation”.43 These favourable lending conditions enabled states to borrow from 
the Eurodollar markets as a means of capitalising the continued industrialisation of their 
economies, and repaying these loans using the profits generated by these new industries. 
Therefore, in spite of rising oil prices, it was widely assumed that this type of borrowing 
could return the developing countries to the high levels of growth they had experienced 
prior to the 1973 oil crisis.  
 
In the three year period between 1973 and 1976 however, the debts of non-oil exporting 
developing countries more than doubled from $78.5 billion to $180 billion, with around 60 
percent of this capital borrowed from private banks through syndicated loans.44 British 
government officials writing the ODM’s White Paper appeared to be unaware of the 
impact that this accumulated debt was having, and indeed would have upon the future 
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development of these indebted countries, since they gave the matter little consideration. 
However, developing world debt would be an issue that Labour would have to face soon 
enough, not just later in Callaghan’s administration but frequently over the course of the 
next 35 years as the issue came be at the forefront of Labour’s own international 
development policy agenda.      
 
One area that was given careful consideration in the White Paper was Britain’s 
relationship with other international organisations, particularly in the light of the new 
‘poverty orientation’ of Labour’s aid programme, and its principle of targeting aid towards 
the poorest people in the poorest countries. The ODM argued that it would support the 
World Bank’s ‘Third Window’ lending facility “on condition that most of the resources will 
go to the poorest countries”.45 Similarly, the proposals for a Special Trust Fund under 
examination by the IMF would be supported, and contributed to by the Labour 
government “provided its lending is…concentrated on those countries with per capita 
incomes of less than $200”.46 In their representations to the IMF/IBRD Joint Committee on 
the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries, ODM officials hoped to persuade 
the Committee that “poverty and population” should be “the main basis for *the+ 
distribution of scarce concessional money”.47 Labour’s theme of ‘poverty orientation’ was 
therefore writ large all over the White Paper, and defined the expectations that the 
government had of these core constituencies in its development policies. Labour’s support 
for these institutions, as well as the UN and the other specialised development agencies,48 
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was conditional upon “the concentration of their programmes on the needs of the poorest 
countries and poorest people in those countries”.49  
 
This increased multilateralism was further reflected in a tract published for the Fabian 
Society by the then Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan in December 1975. Drawing his 
remarks from his speech to the Labour Party conference that previous autumn, Callaghan 
opened his pamphlet by stressing how problems at home should not detract from Britain 
embracing “the age of the multilateralist”.50 Indeed, according to the Foreign Secretary, 
many of the problems that Britain itself faced at the present time could be traced to a 
series of “global problems”. These problems required “global solutions”, responses that 
were beyond the scope of individual nation-states.51 This new, altogether more 
cosmopolitan emphasis upon multilateralism was, in part at least, borne out of a response 
to the new kind of interdependency that now existed between states. In a clear 
antecedent to the discourse of ‘globalisation’ that, as I noted in the previous chapter, 
would be adopted by New Labour ministers twenty years later, Callaghan identified two 
types of interdependency. The first of these concerned “the intricate network of trading 
and monetary and miscellaneous links that joins the nations of the world”,52 while the 
second referred to “the way in which the issues of trade and economic relations are 
intertwined with those of defence and security and ideology and political relations”.53 For 
Callaghan, the way in which conflict in the Middle East had caused queues at British petrol 
pumps in the early 1970s was symbolic of this new type of interdependency.  
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The interdependency that Callaghan identified had two, broadly similar implications for 
governments. Again, pre-dating the claims made by New Labour officials that, in an era of 
globalisation, the lines between ‘the domestic’ and ‘the international’ had become 
increasingly blurred, Callaghan argued that foreign policy could no longer be treated as a 
separate branch of government. Rather, interdependency now required a foreign policy 
that was integral to “the government’s entire strategy; economic, cultural and social”.54 
There should therefore be a strong transmission of policy between the two spheres of 
government. Writing in the midst of difficult economic circumstances at home, Callaghan 
argued that “an active foreign policy should run parallel to domestic recovery, and can aid 
that recovery”.55 Indeed, so intertwined were these two spheres, that according to 
Callaghan “a successful foreign policy can have favourable reactions on the domestic 
scene, while conversely a confident, progressive and well-run society at home will 
certainly increase our stature overseas”.56 This new form of interdependency had changed 
the strategic context upon which foreign policy in all its forms – including international 
development – should be conducted. This in turn necessitated a new, altogether more 
multilateral approach to government.   
 
Although the Christian socialism and Marxian humanism that was evident in earlier Labour 
policy pronouncements concerning global poverty did not feature as heavily in Callaghan’s 
cosmopolitanism, this did not prevent Labour’s international development policies from 
being directed by a ‘moral compass’ and framed in distinctly ‘socialist’ terms. As the 
Foreign Secretary argued:  
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The accident of birthplace should not determine standards of education 
or of housing or whether a family can even get enough food to 
eat…There is a moral imperative for democratic socialists to refuse to 
accept that the world can be tranquil if it is divided into islands of 
prosperity amid a sea of misery.57 
 
If Britain was to secure world peace, it was necessary for there to be equality amongst the 
peoples of the world. It therefore followed that Labour’s development policies continued 
to be orientated towards meeting the needs of the poorest, and establishing a fairer, and 
more just world. One way in which Labour attempted to do this was by supporting those 
international institutions “dedicated to the promotion of human rights *and+ the rule of 
law”.58 The rights of the human would underpin Labour’s international development 
policies and commitment to socialism. As Labour’s own National Executive Committee 
(NEC) made clear:   
 
As socialists, our strongest motivating force must not be the commercial 
or political advantages which may or may not flow from a particular aid 
programme; our main motivation must be that our commitment to 
human rights on a world scale demands action from us.59    
  
Labour orientated its development policies – and in particular, its aid programme – to 
those political systems that were “based on multi-party political democracy” and which 
could “*guarantee+ freedom of the press, the trade unions and basic political rights”.60 
Reaffirming Labour’s continued opposition to totalitarian regimes, Callaghan stated that 
“we condemn violence of any kind; we condemn terrorism *and we feel+ it right to speak 
out when human rights and proper judicial processes were being ignored”.61    
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This statement would be influential, not simply in diplomatic circles, but in framing 
Labour’s renewed aid commitment and its response to the debt crisis that was escalating 
in the developing world. Again there was a distinctly moral imperative at play. In its 1979 
General Election manifesto, Labour committed to not only “continue to pursue our policy 
of aid to the poorest countries and the poorest people” and “implement the United 
Nations target of 0.7 percent of the gross national product for official aid”, but now “take 
account of human rights considerations when giving aid”.62 Furthermore:  
 
In respect of those countries of Latin America with dictatorial regimes, 
particularly Chile and Argentina, the Labour government will demand 
that these regimes pay promptly their due debts. The restoration of 
human and trade union rights will be a prior condition for the 
rescheduling of future debt payments.63  
 
Although Labour singled out the Right-wing governments of Augusto Pinochet and 
Leopoldo Galtieri in Chile and Argentina respectively, similarly repressive regimes were in 
place right across Latin America.64 Labour’s pledge in response to these dictatorships was 
distinctly socialist in its character, and signalled the Party’s solidarity with “the victims of 
repressive regimes” who, it promised in its General Election manifesto and subsequent 
policy documents would be supported through “the provision of refugee programmes”.65 
As Labour sought to respond to the debt crisis as it unfolded during the 1980s, this 
solidarity would be a dominant theme in the Party’s discourses.  
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Labour’s policy towards the debts of developing world countries was initiated in 1977; a 
year after James Callaghan replaced Harold Wilson as both Prime Minister and leader of 
the Labour Party. Callaghan’s Labour government oversaw a policy of converting aid loans 
into grants to the poorest countries and the retrospective terms adjustment of all the aid 
debt owed to Britain by low-income countries. As a result, repayments on outstanding 
debts worth up to £60 million a year due from 17 of the world’s poorest countries were 
cancelled by the Labour government.66 This conversion policy would go on to benefit over 
30 countries, providing debt relief in excess of US$1 billion by the time Labour returned to 
office twenty years later.67 Despite growing economic and industrial tensions at home, 
Labour remained resolute both in its support for those developing countries facing a 
spiralling debt burden, and in its commitment to make good on Britain’s pledge to meet 
the 0.7 percent/GNI aid target. However, defeat at the 1979 General Election to Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservatives would prevent Labour from fulfilling either of these policy 
commitments. Furthermore, 1979 would also signal the start of what has since been 
referred to as the ‘lost decade of development’,68 as a further oil shock placed the already 
heavily indebted economies of developing countries under further strain.  
 
Rather than allowing the higher price of oil to move through the global economy through 
inflationary means as it had after the 1973 shock, the Chair of the US Federal Reserve, 
Paul Volcker responded to this second oil shock by raising interest rates.69 This 
deflationary policy dampened down the rise in prices by making credit more expensive, 
leaving individuals, firms and countries with far less money to spend or invest. This 
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‘Volcker shock’ triggered a period of recession in both US and European markets. It was, 
however, across the developing world, and in particular those countries who had taken 
out large loans during the low interest ‘boom’ years, that the most severe effects of this 
sharp hike in interest rates were felt. Faced with increasing interest repayment charges, 
many of these debtor countries were left on the brink of insolvency. The debt crisis that 
ensued spread across the developing world and many countries particularly in Latin 
America and sub-Saharan Africa followed Mexico in 1982 in declaring that they could no 
longer service the interest on their loans. 
 
The debt crisis however would only exacerbate the human tragedy that was unfolding in 
the developing world, and underline the inequality that was evident between the wealthy 
industrialised economies in the global North and the poor Southern states. Between 1965 
and 1980, the rich countries saw their GNP per capita rise by 2.3 percent, and over the 
next ten years this figure increase further still by 2.0 percent so that by the end of the 
decade, GNP per capita across the developed world stood at US$10,760. The contrast with 
the world’s poorest nations, however, could not be starker. Although sub-Saharan Africa 
had seen some growth of 1.6 percent since the mid-1960s, by the end of the 1980s these 
gains had disappeared as GNP per capita across the region shrank by 2.4 per cent in just 
seven years. By 1990, sub-Saharan Africa’s GNP per capita was just US$440. Ending the 
decade considerably poorer than they had started it, millions of Africans were left living 
on barely a dollar a day, while the poorest, in the least developed of these countries, were 
living on less than 60 cents a day.70  
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In addition to experiencing low, and in some instances, negative growth rates, many 
countries in the global South saw their terms of trade slip to well below the levels that 
they were experiencing in 1980. For countries such as Cameroon, Congo, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Malawi, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda, these 
diminished by up to a third, while others, including Bolivia, Nigeria and Venezuela, saw 
their terms of trade almost halve.71 Sluggish growth rates and hyperinflation were 
problems that affected large parts of South America throughout much of the 1980s. 
Bolivia for instance experienced a staggering 601.8 per cent annual rate of inflation, while 
Argentina and Brazil saw inflation increase at an annual rate of 298.7 and 166.3 per cent 
respectively during this same period. Other countries, both in Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa suffered from particularly high levels of inflation, including Uganda (95.2 
per cent), Nicaragua (86.6), Zaire (53.5), Sierra Leone (50.0), and Ghana (48.3). Combined 
with their negative growth rates, each of these economies experienced chronic 
stagflation.72 If they did not directly cause the human crises such as famine, HIV and AIDS 
and conflict that emerged during this period, then these economic problems certainly 
exacerbated them, critically undermining the response to the lost decade of development.  
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Fig. 3.4  Social Democracy and International Development in the Midst of Global 
Economic Turmoil, 1974–79  
 
Themes Policy Commitments Outside Antecedents Challenges 
Explicitly “socialist” and 
moral policy framework; 
themes of inequality, 
global justice, and human 
rights 
 
Development for the 
‘poorest people in the 
poorest communities’ 
 
Aid and debt relief 
conditional upon these 
principles 
 
Increased multilateralism 
with international 
development agencies  
 
Interdependency  
ODM re-institutionalised  
 
New aid target of 0.7% 
GDP 
 
‘Social’ development 
 
Debt-to-aid policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1975 sterling crisis at 
home and subsequent IMF 
bailout 
 
Worsening economic 
conditions abroad  
 
Increasing indebtedness of 
LDCs  
 
Rising food prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Fig. 3.4 shows, despite the recession that Britain and indeed most of the world faced 
during this period, Labour’s development policies were framed by a commitment to 
address inequality and injustice through a broadly socialist development programme of 
development. The market-led approach to development was resisted in favour of a set of 
policies, such as aid and debt relief, that were targeted at the poorest. Although Labour 
was committed to working with the international development agencies, it sought reform 
of these institutions so that its commitment to the global poor was realised more 
effectively.  
 
Political Isolation at Home, Increased Socialist Solidarity Abroad 
Under the newly-elected Conservatives, the priority that Labour had previously afforded 
to international development changed almost overnight. As Fig. 3.5 illustrates, Labour’s 
defeat to Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party at the 1979 General Election marked the 
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start of a period of decline for Britain’s overseas development programme. The 
Conservatives made a series of dramatic cuts to Britain’s aid budget and repealed Labour’s 
1977 International Finance, Trade and Aid Act, replacing it in 1980 with their own 
Overseas Development and Co-operation Act.73 Thatcher herself considered aid as little 
more than a “handout”,74 a burden upon the Treasury that Britain could ill-afford, and as 
under Edward Heath’s previous Conservative government, the decision was taken to 
relegate the ODM as a sub-division of the Foreign Office, with little or no political 
autonomy of its own. Over the next eighteen years, the political fortunes of the Labour 
Party mirrored that of Britain’s aid programme. As Labour suffered successive General 
Election defeats at the hands of the Conservatives, Britain’s commitment to matters of 
international development dropped considerably.75 
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Fig. 3.5 Britain’s Overseas Development Aid as a % of GNI, 1980–1997 
 
 
 
Source:  OECD and DFID76 
 
Out of government, and now under the leadership of Michael Foot, Labour’s own 
international development policies during this period were characterised by a continued 
emphasis on addressing global poverty, inequality and injustice, the reaffirming of its 
commitment to human rights, and solidarity with the struggles of social democratic 
parties in the developing world. For Labour the objective of a socialist foreign policy was:  
  
To create the conditions necessary to free the world from poverty, 
inequality and war and to encourage the liberation of mankind from 
political and economic oppression. As the world becomes increasingly 
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interdependent, the international dimension of Labour’s policy becomes 
increasingly necessary to building a socialist Britain.77     
 
This statement reveals three central elements in Labour’s thinking in relation to 
international development during this time. The first identifies those key issues which the 
wider Labour movement viewed as vital in addressing; poverty, inequality, and war. 
Secondly, this statement speaks of the importance of confronting not simply political 
oppression, but economic oppression too. Labour was highly critical of the ‘free-market’ 
monetarist policies proposed by the institutions such as the IMF and the world’s bankers, 
which the Party argued, only exacerbated the problem.78 The ‘economic oppression’ of 
these policies in developing countries could “inflict economic damage of such severity as 
to cause the destruction of democratic governments”.79 The third strand draws from 
Callaghan’s earlier pronouncements concerning interdependency, and in particular, the 
linkages between Labour’s domestic and international political economy. For socialism to 
work, both at home and abroad, there needed to be a clear transmission of policy. This 
meant developing Labour’s internationalism, both in global forums such as the UN and the 
Commonwealth, as well as with other socialist movements and social democrats 
worldwide.80  
     
Following on from this claim, Labour’s internationalism during this time, was inspired by 
an influential report, North–South: a Programme for Survival, written by the Independent 
Commission and chaired by the former West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt.81 Like 
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Victor Gollancz’s earlier ‘War on Want’ campaign in the 1950s, the antecedents to 
Labour’s international development policies at the start of the 1980s were drawn, not just 
from the within the Party itself, but from the work of ‘outsider’ activists. The findings of 
the Independent Commission, or Brandt Report as it came to be known, prompted 
Labour’s NEC to establish the Development Co-operation Group as an internal Party forum 
in which the “complex and deep rooted” causes of poverty could be discussed and policy 
solutions reached.82 This group took as its point of departure the position taken by the 
Conservatives, who in their own response to the Brandt Report, had argued for “the 
merits of the present world economic system, with its reliance on open markets for trade 
and financial flows”.83 This market-led approach to development was subsequently heavily 
criticised by the Development Co-operation Group which argued that it would:  
 
…effectively leave the global economy in the hands of the 
multinationals, the currency and the commodity speculators, and the 
international financial institutions such as the IMF.84  
 
In seeking to establish an altogether more socialist set of overseas development policies, 
the Group rejected out of hand the assertion made by the Conservative Development 
minister, Neil Marten that “stability is of prime importance”.85 Labour’s response here to 
the minister’s remarks are all the more striking in the light of claims that would be made 
by New Labour officials, particularly in the Treasury, concerning Britain’s macroeconomic 
policy at home, and its response to the debt crisis abroad. As I shall show in the following 
chapter (4), New Labour ministers claimed that macroeconomic stability was in fact 
paramount, and set about constructing a model of political economy for consumption 
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abroad as well as at home, founded upon this principle. Here however, Labour chose 
instead to confront the injustice and inequality that it understood to be at the heart of 
global poverty. Stability would be a tacit outcome of Labour’s development policies, as 
opposed to an explicit means of development as advocated here by the Conservatives, 
and indeed, New Labour ministers later. To deal with global poverty, Labour here focused 
upon addressing ‘inequality’ and pursuing ‘social justice’, with the Development Co-
operation Group stating quite categorically that:  
 
The world is an unjust and an unequal place, and we are determined to 
radically alter the status quo. Abroad as well as at home we are a party 
committed to fundamental change.86  
 
Again the policy transmission between the domestic and the international was clear. At 
home, Labour’s commitment to ‘fundamental change’ was expressed through attacks on 
those institutions – “the EEC…the House of Lords…the civil service…the City or the 
multinationals” – all of which had in the past acted as “roadblocks” and prevented Labour 
governments from implementing their social priorities.87 Within the sphere of overseas 
development, Labour sought to pursue radical reform of the institutional ideas and 
practices that kept countries locked in an unequal and unjust global economic system. The 
Group called for systematic reform of the international institutions such the IMF and 
World Bank, whose policies had exacerbated the economic and social conditions faced by 
heavily indebted countries – particularly those with socialist governments – in the 
developing world.88  
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As well as addressing the economic and social effects of underdevelopment, Labour’s 
strategy attempted to address the politics of development by rejecting the 
confrontational ‘power politics’ of the Cold War. Instead, the Party sought to build an 
altogether more neutral, socialist development policy. This approach would result in 
Labour’s policy pronouncements during this period being inflected with a certain amount 
of anti-American sentiment. This can be attributed to a large degree to the election of the 
Republican Ronald Reagan to the White House in 1980, and his efforts through the 
‘Reagan Doctrine’ to confront the ‘evil empire’ of communism in Central and Latin 
America. Under Reagan – and with the fulsome support of Thatcher in Westminster – the 
White House offered political and financial support to authoritarian regimes in the region, 
most notably Chile and Argentina that Labour officials had previously criticised.  
 
Labour seized this opportunity to openly attack the stance taken by the United States 
concerning social democratic parties in Central America,89 and in particular, its role in the 
El Salvador civil war. Washington had openly given support for the Right-wing junta in 
order to bring down the Revolutionary Government of El Salvador and prevent the further 
spread of a Leftist movement across the country.90 Labour’s criticism of the White House 
was further reinforced by the NEC in 1983 when it issued a statement expressing its 
solidarity with the incoming socialist Sandinista government in Nicaragua and its struggle 
to build a new socialist society following Somoza’s dictatorship. Whilst declaring its 
support for the Sandinista Party, Labour attacked what it viewed as “a US-financed 
counter-revolution and direct military intimidation from the United States of America”.91  
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Labour’s hostility towards Washington was further fuelled by the debt crisis that was 
unfolding at the time.92 A policy document published in 1984 captured a growing sense 
within the Party that relations between the global North and the global South, particularly 
in regions such as Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, needed to be reconfigured in 
order to address the crisis and the impact that this was having upon the development of 
states in these areas. Two years later, Labour again called for root-and-branch reform of 
the IFIs based in Washington, whose interests, certainly in respect of the debt crisis, Party 
officials argued, were too heavily in favour of the global North and the US in particular. 
Labour instead called for reform of these institutions so that they worked in favour of the 
whole international community, rather than a handful of global political and economic 
elites.93  
 
Labour’s international development policies during this tumultuous period of the Party’s 
history nevertheless remained firmly ensconced within the socialist traditions of Labour’s 
past. The heavy General Election defeat that Labour suffered in 1983 meant that, in 
reality, these policies carried little weight abroad. Nevertheless, the discourse and the 
narrative of these policies reflected a continued commitment to addressing matters of 
global inequality and poverty, and the pursuit of social justice and progressive institutional 
reform overseas. Labour did not do this simply by reaffirming its commitment to “increase 
aid to developing countries towards the UN target of 0.7 percent *of Britain’s GNI+” and 
“re-establish a separate Ministry of Overseas Development” as it had at previous 
elections.94 Through the publication of key policy documents, Labour sought to also 
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address new issues that had emerged in the international arena, such as the debt crisis in 
the developing world and the effect that this was having upon global development.  
 
Fig. 3.6  Solidarity, Socialism and Labour’s International Development Policies  
 
Themes Policy Commitments Outside Antecedents Challenges 
Explicitly “socialist” and 
moral policy framework; 
themes of inequality, 
global justice, and human 
rights 
 
Criticism of a ‘market-
orientated’ approach to 
development  
 
Criticism of the emphasis 
placed upon ‘stability’ in 
development 
 
Address the fundamental 
cause of global poverty: 
inequality 
 
Need to address the debt 
crisis 
 
Root-and-branch reform of 
the IFIs – far less 
multilateralism 
 
Rejection of Cold War 
politics and criticism of the 
role of the US, particularly 
in Latin America 
 
Increased solidarity with 
socialist movements and 
governments in LDCs 
As above 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The North–South, or 
Brandt, report prepared by 
the Independent 
Commission  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deepening debt crisis 
abroad 
 
Extensive cuts to Britain’s 
aid programme by the 
incumbent Tory 
government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the table in Fig. 3.6 shows, under Foot’s leadership, Labour’s international 
development policies remained committed tackling poverty, and in particular the debt 
crisis, which by this point had started to escalate in its severity. However, what 
differentiated Foot’s party from its predecessors was the solidarity it declared with Left-
wing governments, particularly in Latin America where Cold War politics and the effects of 
the debt crisis were undermining the sovereignty of socialist movements. A more effective 
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response was required, one that dealt with the fundamental structural inequalities that 
the crisis was exposing.    
 
In the wake of this General Election defeat however, Foot’s resignation and Neil Kinnock’s 
subsequent election as Party leader, the socialist principles that underpinned Labour’s 
response to these issues would be gradually reconfigured through an extensive Policy 
Review. It would be this programme of modernisation that would eventually pave the way 
for New Labour, both at home and abroad. Kinnock prompted an extensive review of the 
Party’s priorities and policies.95 This Policy Review would signal a gradual move away from 
the explicitly ‘socialist’ politics of Labour’s more recent past and towards, what the Party 
leadership hoped would be an altogether more electable, socially democratic alternative 
to the Conservative government. 
 
Towards a ‘New Labour’ and a New Direction: Labour’s Transformation and  
the Re-orientation of its International Development Policies 
Labour’s programme of modernisation was extended to the Party’s international 
development policies, where a report, For the Good of All, was published, detailing how 
Labour would meet ‘the global challenge’ of poverty if it were elected into government. 
However, due perhaps in part to the transitory nature of the reforms that the Party was 
undertaking at the time, it is difficult to read-off the overall character of Labour’s political 
economy, and certainly the transmission between its domestic and foreign policies during 
this period of introspection. While the Party gravitated towards the market at home, its 
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international development policies remained distinctly socialist in character, even going so 
far as to reject global market actors in the development policy process.  
 
There was a certain amount of political expediency to Labour’s now well-established 
commitment to international development. Party officials argued that “Tory policies have 
contributed to the Third World’s problems – while the British people have shown 
unprecedented generosity and sympathy with the victims of underdevelopment through 
their contributions to Live Aid and other charities”.96 Again, Labour’s appetite for dealing 
with these types of issues came not simply through the work of the Party’s own members, 
but from pressures outside the Labour movement. Labour policymakers identified the 
British people as having displayed a great deal of support for and solidarity with the 
victims of the famine in Sudan and Ethiopia. The Conservatives on the other hand, had 
completely misread both the gravity of the famine unfolding in East Africa, and the 
response to it by the British public. Under the chancellorship of Nigel Lawson, the Treasury 
neither increased Britain’s aid contribution in the light of the famine, nor did it initially 
write-off the VAT on the proceeds of the Band Aid charity single Do They Know It’s 
Christmas? released to raise funds for the relief effort. Labour officials hoped to capitalise 
upon Lawson’s error of judgement and set about addressing four key areas; famine, 
recession, overseas aid and debt.97 To this end, Labour proposed a series of policy 
solutions (see Fig. 3.7) that would at least begin to address the issue of global poverty.  
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Fig. 3.7 Labour’s Policy Pledges – ‘For the Good of All’ (1987)  
 Provide new export markets for developing countries and increase demand for products 
from the developing world;  
 
 Promote better and more stable commodity prices to support developing world export 
earnings, and help countries plan more effectively;  
 
 Press for major reforms in the world’s trade and financial institutions;  
 
 Promote international action to share the burden of developing world debt;  
 
 Increase aid and investment in developing countries, supporting in particular the 
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference; 
 
 Regulate the activities of multinational companies to make them more accountable to 
host governments and their people;  
 
 More than double the aid budget, increasing aid spending to 0.7 percent of the national 
income within five years;  
 
 Restore priority to those most in need – to the poorest countries, to the poorest and 
most disadvantaged social groups, and to governments committed to progressive social 
change;  
 
 Improve the quality of aid spending, paying special attention to the needs of women and 
to the environmental impact of development programmes;  
 
 Restore funding for development education;  
 
 Greater support to voluntary agencies and other NGOs;  
 
 Revise the arrangements for aid procurement, giving more emphasis to local suppliers 
and suppliers in other developing countries;  
 
 Abolish the Aid-Trade provision;  
 
 Increase trade with developing countries;  
 
 Improve the Multi-Fibre Arrangement so to benefit the poorer developing countries;  
 
 Enforce international codes to regulate the conduct of multinational companies;  
 
 Negotiate development agreements with companies seeking to invest abroad, to bring 
their investments into line with the needs of the poor in developing countries;  
 
 Support research and development into better and more appropriate technology;  
 
 Set up a new Trade and Development Fund, to help match the skills of British industry 
with development needs of poor countries;  
 
 Put in place a new government department – the Department of Overseas Development 
and Co-operation – to take the lead role in areas of policy primarily affecting Britain’s 
economic relations with the developing world 
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Source:  Labour Party98 
 
Although space does not permit a thorough analysis of these pledges, several policies 
were significant both in the light of the Party’s new direction under Neil Kinnock, and 
those that New Labour would take up in office. It was Kinnock who, Shaw argues, made 
the historic and decisive step of commending the market, rather than the state, as the 
best mechanism for allocating goods and services.99 Outlining the role of the state as one 
of ‘enablement’, Kinnock argued that the “economic role of government is to help the 
market system work properly where it can, will and should – and to replace or strengthen 
it where it can’t, won’t or shouldn’t”.100 Labour’s attitude to the market was now far less 
overtly socialist and altogether more social democratic in character. The Party understood 
the role of the state as one that should enable the market to work properly and to create 
the conditions for a fairer and more efficient delivery of goods. Although this move 
represented the start of the historic compromise between Labour’s traditional 
commitment to socialism and its acceptance of the market, it was a position the Party 
found difficult, initially at least, to maintain in its international development policies. 
Labour remained uncomfortable with affording a role to market actors such as 
multinational firms and the IFIs in the development process. I shall evaluate this position 
shortly, but I begin by assessing Labour’s altogether more traditional commitment to “a 
bigger aid programme”.101 This would financially support the work of NGOs and trade 
unions, and enable these agencies to take a far more active role in the development 
process. In the case of the latter, trade unions would have a key role to play in confronting 
the power that multinational firms were able to wield in the developing world.  
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Labour’s proposed Department of Overseas Development and Co-operation would run a 
much-expanded aid programme, promising to not only meet the 0.7 percent target within 
a full Parliamentary term, but to extend this to a full 1.0 percent if re-elected for a second 
term.102 Rejecting the conditionality imposed by the IMF, Labour would play particular 
attention to those “countries that have been deprived of aid because they have refused to 
implement IMF austerity programmes”.103 Aid would not depend upon countries meeting 
certain economic criteria, but preference would be given to:  
 
Governments which are carrying out policies that benefit the poorest 
social groups…which have a good record of using aid effectively to 
promote progressive social change, and which respect human and trade 
union rights.104  
 
This move would restore to Britain’s aid programme the principle of focusing aid on the 
needs of ‘the poorest people in the poorest countries’ that Labour sought to incorporate 
in its policy commitments in the past.105 
 
Labour also committed to working far more closely with NGOs, voluntary agencies and 
trade unions, who the Party argued, had “vital skills and expertise to offer” in the 
development process.106 These constituencies would play a crucial role in maintaining 
addressing poverty and inequality in “repressive or corrupt regimes”, and working 
towards “social change and…a fairer society…when facing multinational companies”.107 To 
this end, Labour pledged to restore and increase financial support to NGOs and trade 
unions as an integral part of its development strategy. This particular commitment is 
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striking since officials identified multinational firms as a hindrance to the development 
process. Indeed, later in the report, “tackling the multinationals” was of vital importance 
since all too often they had:  
 
Secured investment opportunities which deprive local people of their 
land and income; ignored ILO standards of employment practice, 
including trade union rights; used ‘transfer pricing’…to minimise their 
tax obligations and the contribution they make to local development; 
promoted the sale of products banned or strictly regulated in the West, 
such as drugs and pesticides, with no regard for the safety of Third 
World consumers; intervened in the internal politics of developing 
countries to support dictatorships or oppose governments committed to 
meeting the needs of their people.108  
 
Despite the power of these firms, Labour nevertheless believed “that it is possible to 
defend the interests of people in other countries”, arguing that “urgent steps must be 
taken to make multinational companies more accountable for their actions” to “ensure 
that their investments do not harm the interests of local people”.109 Business had for far 
too long exploited the global poor, and it was time that the activities of these firms were 
much more closely regulated. For Labour, this was to be achieved through a series of 
stringent measures. It promised to:  
 
…enforce international codes of conduct on marketing practices…ensure 
that British-based multinationals provide detailed information on their 
activities in developing countries…support the ILO’s tripartite 
declaration on the employment policies of multinationals…build 
international trade union solidarity as a counterweight to the power and 
influence of multinationals…*and+ set up a new Trade and Development 
Fund to encourage British firms to develop and produce better products 
and to export these to developing countries.110  
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This barely-veiled contempt for business, and the exploitative role that multinationals had 
played in the developing world, would come to sit in stark contrast to the position taken 
by New Labour ministers. In an internal policy document prepared for the Labour Party, 
the Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short argued that “companies’ 
core commercial interests would be advanced by development success in poor countries” 
and that “sustainable competitive advantage requires companies to be economically 
viable, environmentally sound and socially responsible”.111 Previous Labour 
pronouncements attacking global poverty were addressed in distinctly ‘moral’ terms, and 
development was priority simply as a matter of socialist principle. For Short however, 
there was a strong ‘economic’ imperative of ‘enlightened self-interest’ that businesses 
operating in the developing world should, and indeed, did now consider. This revealed a 
stark difference between the respective positions of ‘old’ and New Labour concerning the 
role of business, and indeed trade unions in the development process. ‘Old’ Labour 
officials had warned in no uncertain terms of the inability of multinationals to self-
regulate, and made it clear that firms should be made to be more accountable for their 
actions. Here trade unions had a crucial role to play. New Labour however, was happy to 
accept that firms were now aware of their social responsibilities.112 This new 
understanding justified New Labour’s approach of ‘working in partnership’ with business, 
previously articulated in DFID’s first White Paper.113 As New Labour’s first Secretary of 
State for International Development, told the rest of her party:  
 
DFID consults widely with business on our development policies, both 
with local businesses in developing countries in drawing up our country 
strategies, and also through sector or issue-specific groups. We have 
also set up a Business Advisory Panel where my officials and I discuss 
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with key business leaders in the UK how best we can work together at a 
strategic level.114  
 
This new ‘business-friendly’ approach enabled New Labour to grant multinational firms a 
leading role in shaping New Labour’s development strategy. The trade unions however 
were nowhere to be seen. Indeed, as Ludlam, Bodah and Coates remark, unions from the 
perspective of New Labour, were but “one pressure group amongst many, with no special 
claim on government attention, sympathy or support”.115 No more clearly was New 
Labour’s reconfigured relationship with business demonstrated than in the Party’s 
response to the issue of HIV and AIDS in the developing world, explored in chapter 5. Here 
the New Labour government imputed business with a key role in increasing access to 
essential antiretroviral drugs, signalling a clear transformation in the Party’s attitude 
towards business and the role that multinational firms now had to play within the 
development process.    
 
Labour’s analysis of the debt crisis in 1987 was based upon “a travesty of economic 
justice”.116 Countries in the developing world were paying out more to Western banks and 
governments than they were receiving in new investment, while the cost of servicing 
these debts was taking money away from development projects, social welfare, food 
production, and the investment needed to build the base for future economic growth. 
Labour framed the debt crisis in distinctly multilateral and cosmopolitan terms. Since the 
debt crisis affected us all, Labour argued, it was in our mutual interest to share the debt 
burden and restore the prospects for better economic relations throughout the world.117 
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The Party identified the World Bank and the IMF as holding “the keys to debt 
management” and having a central role in arranging “for debt to be rescheduled, for 
payments to be deferred…and provide some money themselves to tide the debtors 
over”.118 In Labour’s eyes, these institutions were presently doing little to resolve the 
crisis, merely postponing it.  
 
Labour criticised the monetarist, deflationary austerity measures imposed by the World 
Bank and IMF, principally because they served to shift the burden of debt directly onto the 
poor, cutting deep into wages, welfare benefits and food subsidies.119 This analysis was 
again drawn from thinking outside the Party, this time through the strategy set out in the 
Socialist International’s Global Challenge report. Written as a follow-up to the Brandt 
Report published five years earlier, this worldwide organisation of social democratic, 
socialist and labour movements published a joint strategy calling for a programme of 
international action in order to meet the needs of the developing world.120 This report 
argued that the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), designed and implemented by 
the IMF to stabilise heavily indebted poor countries hindered, rather than helped global 
development. The receipt of additional finance to prop-up these economies were made 
conditional upon developing countries pursuing particular deflationary and deregulatory 
policies designed to accommodate market-led development. Not only did these SAPs 
serve to discourage governments from seeking funds before budgetary deficits reached 
crisis level, these policies were fundamentally asymmetric in the demands that they 
placed upon indebted countries. Clearly, economic reform was indeed necessary for some 
developing countries to achieve sustainable levels of development. For large parts of the 
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developing world however, these regressive policies only served to exacerbate poverty 
and the standards of living experienced by those living in these countries. Borrowing 
extensively from this analysis, Labour laid out a three-point strategy to deal with the debt 
crisis. This involved: (1) sharing the debt burden more fairly; (2) changing the policies and 
structures of the world’s financial institutions; and (3) increasing investment in the 
developing world.  
 
Labour’s debt relief policies continued to directly challenge the ideas and the practices of 
the IFIs. As Jim Callaghan’s government had done in the 1970s, Labour called for the 
cancellation of the debts of the poorest countries, and tied its aid programme with that of 
its debt policies. Just as the last Labour government had converted the debts of the 
poorest countries into aid, so too would a future Labour government continue this policy. 
Unlike the Conservatives, Labour again reaffirmed the promise it made earlier in the 
report not to withhold aid from countries unwilling or unable to meet the demands of the 
IMF. Instead, the Party would “provide additional aid to countries that refuse IMF 
austerity measures”, squaring this with Labour’s longstanding principle of supporting 
countries that “have a good record of using aid to meet the needs of the poorer sections 
of the community”.121    
 
Institutional reform was writ large over Labour’s debt policies. Dominated by the United 
States and a handful of other Western states, Labour argued that the developing world 
was poorly under-represented in these institutions. For Labour, neither the World Bank 
nor the IMF was fit for purpose. Pre-dating Gordon Brown’s call for ‘a new international 
economic architecture’ (examined in chapter 5) while he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
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as early as 1987, Labour were arguing for “a new financial system and new financial 
arrangements to deal with today’s economic problems”.122 Labour made it clear that it did 
not want these institutions to be scrapped. It did however promise that, if elected into 
government, it would “use its influence in the World Bank and IMF to press for changes in 
their policies and structures, and put development back on top of their agenda”.123 For 
Labour, this would mean these institutions giving developing countries a greater say in 
how the global economic system worked, and undertaking joint action with governments 
in the developing world to help them pursue democratic development strategies that had 
been rejected by the institutions.124  
 
As the table in Fig. 3.8 suggests, Labour’s policies concerning aid and debt were ‘path-
dependent’ in that they continued to draw from the ideas of development that had 
appeared in the Party’s previous policies. The 1987 report however, by identifying the 
negative role that multinational firms had played in the exacerbation of poverty in the 
developing world introduced a new constituency into Labour’s policy mix.  Together, these 
three areas of analysis revealed a reconfiguration of policy that ranged from ‘the radical’ – 
the regulation of multinational firms operating overseas and the restoration of Britain’s 
aid programme at home – to ‘the reformist’ and the gradual transformation of the IFIs in 
Washington. This shift in policy was striking however since the references to Labour’s 
socialism, clearly evident in Labour’s previous policies, and now even in its altogether 
more ‘radical’ policies, were now far less clear. Despite its continued commitment to, and 
solidarity with, ‘the poorest people in the poorest communities’, Labour started to talk in 
far more muted tones about themes of ‘inequality’ and ‘social justice’. At this stage of 
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Labour’s transformation, it was not entirely clear either what these values would be 
replaced with, or indeed how the Party would square its newly-acquired acceptance of the 
market with its traditional socialist principles and overarching moral commitment to 
addressing poverty both at home and abroad.  
 
Fig. 3.8  International Development and the Transformation of the Labour Party   
 
Themes Policy Commitments Outside Antecedents Challenges 
‘Shades of socialism’, 
rather than a distinctly 
‘socialist’ set of policies 
 
Closer partnership with 
NGOs and trade unions 
 
Rejection of MNCs in the 
development process 
 
Debt understood as an 
issue both of economic 
justice and self-interest 
 
Renewed engagement 
with IFIs, principally 
though as a means of 
reform 
As above 
 
Aid target to be extended 
to 1% if re-elected 
 
MNCs to be made far more 
accountable for their 
activities in LDCs through a 
rigorously enforced set of 
regulations  
 
Trade unions to play a key 
role in offsetting the 
structural power of firms 
 
 
 
 
Generosity of British public 
in response to the famine 
in Ethiopia and Sudan 
 
Socialist International and 
its report, Global Challenge  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peak of the debt crisis 
within the developing 
world 
 
Effects of SAPs beginning 
to undermine the 
prospects of development 
in poor and highly 
indebted areas  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dilemma at the heart of Labour’s policies in this field would not be resolved during 
Kinnock’s time as Party leader. A fourth successive defeat for Labour at the 1992 General 
Election would see Kinnock step down and John Smith elected in his place. Although the 
pace of modernisation would slacken during Smith’s brief tenure, this period of Labour’s 
history would nevertheless act as an important bridge between in the transition from ‘old’ 
to New Labour. Although the effects of this transition would only be realised until after 
Smith’s untimely death, the influence of Smith would be writ large over New Labour’s 
moral commitment to addressing matters of international development.  
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Edging Closer to Power: John Smith and the Renewal of Labour’s Moral  
Commitment to International Development 
John Smith spent just two years as leader of the Labour Party before his untimely death in 
May 1994. Despite this brief tenure, Smith was able to take his place in a long line of 
Labour leaders committed to overcoming “the crisis of debt and deepening poverty in the 
Third World”.125 As his biographer, Brian Brivati notes, now freed from the shackles of a 
domestic brief, Smith’s position as leader of the Party enabled him to think beyond the 
confines of Westminster politics, and address the complex international issues of the early 
1990s.126 Whilst Party leader, Smith made two speeches that revealed both an insight into 
Labour’s future policy direction in the field of international development, and the origins 
of Smith’s own politics. The first of these speeches would begin to bridge the gap between 
the findings of the Policy Review carried out under Smith’s predecessor, Neil Kinnock, and 
final stage of modernisation completed by Smith’s successor, Tony Blair. The second 
speech returns to the moral case for development, a theme that officials have used at 
various times throughout the Party’s post-war history to justify their commitment to 
tackling global poverty. Here however, Smith reveals the antecedent to his moralism, 
discussing at length his Christian socialism and the importance of this as a compass to 
guide his politics. As I shall show in chapter 4, this would be a theme taken up both by 
Blair and Brown, in their assessment of the debt crisis, and New Labour’s response to it.      
 
Smith used the Lothian Lecture in November 1992, to set out his own appraisal of the 
world in the post-Cold War era. His remarks, particularly in relation to matters of 
international development, drew largely from the earlier findings of Labour’s own Policy 
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Review of the late 1980s. This is unsurprising given how closely Smith himself was 
involved in this process. Nevertheless, now as Labour leader, Smith was keen to reassert 
these claims in an altogether new, post-Cold War context. Indeed, it was this context, and 
the difficulties that many transitory states in Central and Eastern Europe now faced that 
gave these claims added significance and greater urgency. In keeping with the position 
that the Labour Party had staked out over the past decade or so concerning the role of the 
IFIs in the global development process, Smith spoke extensively of the need to reform the 
structures and the ideas of these institutions. In this particular speech, Smith criticised the 
IMF for their slow disbursement of credit and debt relief. Although Smith did not dispute 
the legitimacy of the role played by the World Bank and IMF, he knew that “he was not 
alone in questioning the wisdom of their policy advice” which, Smith argued, “invariably 
proposes severe reductions in social expenditure and austerity measures…almost 
regardless of the political consequences”.127 For the Labour leader, the effects of this 
could be found across the developing world and in the transitional economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe, keeping these countries locked in poverty and under-development.  
 
Some, albeit limited, progress was being made towards rescheduling and writing-off the 
debt burdens of a number of middle-income countries in Latin America. Nevertheless, 
“Africa’s debt burden, owed overwhelmingly to Western governments” remained “still 
seriously neglected”.128 For Smith, this was both a “human tragedy for the millions living in 
poverty” and “a drag anchor on the world economy”.129 The result of this, and indeed the 
‘lost decade of development’ that had unfolded over the previous ten years, was that 
many sub-Saharan countries were now expected to experience minimal levels of per 
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capita income growth by the year 2000. Smith argued that rich countries had “a moral 
duty to provide a combination of debt relief and generous levels of official aid” as a means 
of boosting development.130 The thrust of Smith’s moral argument was reinforced by a 
commitment to trade, and global markets to deliver the high levels of growth required for 
development. For Smith, aid was not enough, and it was important that a fairer global 
trade regime was established to enable debt-ridden countries in the developing world to 
trade their way out of poverty.131 This explicit and increased emphasis upon trade as a 
means of meeting Labour’s development agenda enabled the Party to now square its 
domestic commitment to the market (outlined during the Policy Review) with its 
international development policies overseas. For Labour, increased trade within a fairer 
system would enable the changes that were taking place across the world – changes that 
would be referred to later by New Labour officials, as ‘globalisation’ – to benefit the 
world’s poorest people.    
 
The focus of Labour’s Policy Review was to elicit the cross-class support necessary to 
return the Party to power.132 There was therefore little space in the economic and political 
language afforded to the Christian socialism and Marxian antecedents that had featured in 
its earlier development policy rhetoric. Although the latter may have been undermined by 
the collapse of the Soviet Union at the start of the 1990s, the former found its way back 
into Labour’s development policies through the leadership of John Smith. Delivering the 
Tawney lecture in March 1993, Smith was clear that “there should always be an ethical 
and moral approach to public office”.133 Indeed, as Andy McSmith remarks, writing while 
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Smith was still alive, “what the public will gradually learn about Labour’s new leader is 
that he is a deeply moralistic family man, with a strong sense of public duty, rooted in 
religion”.134  
 
Smith’s faith gave him an acute “sense of obligation to others”.135 Given that by this point, 
Labour, and indeed Smith himself was only too acutely aware of the ever-increasing 
integration between domestic and international forms of policymaking, the Labour leader 
argued that such a moral duty should frame the implementation of policies at home, but 
particularly abroad. Smith recognised the responsibilities that his Party had towards the 
rest of the world: 
 
We must never allow the needs of the developing world, where live the 
majority of our fellow world citizens, to be anything but central to our 
political purposes.136 
 
This would resonate strongly with both Labour’s past and its future. The themes and 
policy commitments made by Smith (see Fig. 3.9) emerged out of Labour’s pasts, but 
would, as I shall go on to show, act as a signpost to Labour’s future. As I have 
demonstrated in each of the earlier phases of the Party’s policies, ‘old’ Labour’s approach 
to international development was framed, by and large, in these moral terms, drawing 
eclectically from Christian teachings concerning a responsibility to the poor (not, 
significantly, a responsibility from the poor that New Labour would demand), and the 
humanism of Marx. The ‘War on Want’ campaign for instance, which shaped the 
development policies of the first Wilson government, had a deeply moral, and indeed, 
spiritual impulse bound up in a duty to both God and fellow man. This was then supported 
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by altogether more Marxist principles concerning the redistribution of wealth, from those 
able to create this wealth to those who needed it.  
 
Fig. 3.9  International Development and the Birthing of New Labour  
 
Themes Policy Commitments Outside Antecedents Challenges 
Increasing acceptance of 
the market (through trade) 
as a means of delivering 
resources more equitably  
 
Moral responsibility of rich 
countries towards the 
poor, derived from Smith’s 
Christian socialism 
 
Revisiting of the ‘War on 
Want’  
Increased debt relief 
 
Structural and ideological 
reform of the IFIs  
 
More generous amounts 
of overseas aid 
 
Supported by more, and 
fairer terms of trade  
 
 
 
Christian socialist 
movements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-Cold War context: 
stagnant, and in some 
instances, regressive 
economies in both Central 
and Eastern Europe, and 
the developing world 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the latter was dropped from Labour’s more recent policy pronouncements, the 
former – as I show in chapter 5 – was mirrored to a certain extent by New Labour’s 
response to debt relief, and the attempted accommodation of church groups in the policy 
process. Deriving their policy expectations from the Biblical mandate of Jubilee, these 
groups appealed to the Blair government to cancel the debts of the world’s poorest 
countries. Insofar as Smith was concerned, his short spell in charge of the Labour Party 
meant he could offer little in the way of concrete policy proposals beyond his extensive 
contributions to Labour’s earlier Policy Review. In terms of international development 
however, what he did provide was both a bridge to Labour’s past and a signpost towards 
New Labour’s future. Smith’s social liberalism, drawn from his clear commitment to 
Christian socialism would underpin New Labour’s normative commitment to international 
development. This particular thread of Christian socialism would be taken up by both Tony 
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Blair and Gordon Brown, during their respective roles as Prime Minister and Chancellor of 
the Exchequer. 
 
Conclusions 
I conclude this chapter by assimilating the tables summarising each phase of ‘old’ Labour’s 
international development policy highlighting schematically in Fig. 3.10 the temporality of 
‘old’ Labour’s key policy commitments, themes, antecedents, and comparing these to 
what the following chapters will reveal to be the main themes of New Labour’s 
international development policies. This table is useful since it highlights the continuities 
and change between ‘old’ and New Labour, and the policy constituencies, explored in the 
following chapter that the latter incorporated into its international development policies. 
Summarising the analysis of this particular section, this table reveals more change than 
continuity, and it identifies a number of themes and constituencies that New Labour 
officials now deemed to be essential in eliminating global poverty. However, it also 
highlights those constituencies that New Labour no longer considered appropriate or 
necessary to prioritise in its policies.  
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Fig. 3.10  Change and Continuity in the Themes and Antecedents of Labour’s International Development Policies (c. 1950–2010)  
 
Time 
Period  
Key Elements of ‘Old’ Labour’s International Development Policies (c. 1950–1994)  New Labour in Government (1997–2010)  
Themes Policy Commitments  Outside Antecedents Challenges Continuity Change 
c. 1950-74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“War on Want”  
 
British form of socialism to 
be exported overseas  
 
Moral imperative to 
address the global 
inequality that exists  
 
Ecclesiastical concern for 
the poor   
 
Marxian concept of wealth 
redistribution 
Cabinet post dedicated to 
matters of overseas 
development (ODM) 
 
Increase aid to end poverty  
 
The modernisation of LDCs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
War on Want report  
 
Socialist movements and 
humanitarian activists, 
Association of World Peace 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Difficulties with Britain’s 
balance of payments  
 
Spending cuts across 
Whitehall 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutionalisation of DFID 
 
Increased commitment to 
0.7% GDP aid target, and 
now debt relief  
 
Emphasis upon 
modernisation 
 
 
 
 
 
Jettisoning of ‘socialist’ and 
Marxian references 
 
‘Inclusion’ rather than 
inequality, identified as the 
problem. Integration into 
the global economy 
understood as the solution 
 
 
 
 
 
1974-79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Explicitly “socialist” and 
moral policy framework; 
themes of inequality, global 
justice, and human rights 
 
Development for the 
‘poorest people in the 
poorest communities’ 
 
Aid and debt relief 
conditional upon these 
principles 
 
Increased multilateralism 
with international 
development agencies  
 
Interdependency  
ODM re-institutionalised  
 
New aid target of 0.7% GDP 
 
‘Social’ development 
 
Debt-to-aid policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1975 sterling crisis at home 
and subsequent IMF bailout 
 
Worsening economic 
conditions abroad  
 
Increasing indebtedness of 
LDCs  
 
Rising food prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As above  
 
Aid to be targeted at the 
“poorest people in the 
“poorest countries” 
 
Multilateralism, particularly 
with IFIs  
 
‘Good governance’. Human 
rights used as a condition of 
aid and debt relief  
 
‘Globalisation’ as a 
synonym of 
interdependency 
 
 
As above 
 
Multilateralism the pretext 
for reform of the IFIs and 
the building of a ‘new 
global economic 
architecture’  
 
However, policies that 
support trade liberalisation 
and encourage flows of FDI 
– ‘good economic 
governance’ –  viewed as a 
prerequisite to 
development 
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Time 
Period 
Key Elements of ‘Old’ Labour’s International Development Policies (c. 1950–1994) New Labour in Government (1997–2010) 
Themes Policy Commitments  Outside Antecedents Challenges Continuity Change 
1980-85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Explicitly “socialist” and 
moral policy framework; 
themes of inequality, global 
justice, and human rights 
 
Criticism of a ‘market-
orientated’ approach to 
development  
 
Criticism of the emphasis 
placed upon ‘stability’ in 
development 
 
Address the fundamental 
cause of global poverty: 
inequality 
 
Need to address the debt 
crisis 
 
Root-and-branch reform of 
the IFIs – far less 
multilateralism 
 
Rejection of Cold War 
politics and criticism of the 
role of the US, particularly 
in Latin America 
 
Increased solidarity with 
socialist movements and 
governments in LDCs 
As above 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The North–South, or 
Brandt, report prepared by 
the Independent 
Commission  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deepening debt crisis 
abroad 
 
Extensive cuts to Britain’s 
aid programme by the 
incumbent Tory 
government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As above  
 
Rather than pursue an 
altogether more 
multilateral approach to 
development, ‘old’ Labour 
here and New Labour both 
argued that reform of the 
IFIs was necessary. Both, for 
instance, called for a far 
more proportionate 
representation of LDCs in 
these institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As above 
 
Altogether more ‘market-
led’ approach to poverty 
reduction and development  
 
Macroeconomic stability 
viewed as being of principal 
importance as a means of 
attracting foreign 
investment. The basis of the 
Treasury’s proposals for its 
‘new global economic 
architecture’ 
 
Far closer relationship with 
the US, politically with the 
White House, and 
economically with the IFIs 
in Washington 
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Time 
Period 
Key Elements of ‘Old’ Labour’s International Development Policies (c. 1950–1994) New Labour in Government (1997–2010) 
Themes Policy Commitments  Outside Antecedents Challenges Continuity Change 
1985-92  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Shades of socialism’, rather 
than a distinctly ‘socialist’ 
set of policies 
 
Closer partnership with 
NGOs and trade unions 
 
Rejection of MNCs in the 
development process 
 
Debt understood as an 
issue both of economic 
justice and self-interest 
 
Renewed engagement with 
IFIs, principally though as a 
means of reform 
As above 
 
Aid target to be extended 
to 1% if re-elected 
 
MNCs to be made far more 
accountable for their 
activities in LDCs through a 
rigorously enforced set of 
regulations  
 
Trade unions to play a key 
role in offsetting the 
structural power of firms 
 
 
 
Generosity of British public 
in response to the famine in 
Ethiopia and Sudan 
 
Socialist International and 
its report, Global Challenge  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peak of the debt crisis 
within the developing world 
 
Effects of SAPs beginning to 
undermine the prospects of 
development in poor and 
highly indebted areas  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As above 
 
Closer partnerships with 
NGOs in particular 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As above 
 
No commitment to exceed 
the 0.7% target  
 
MNCs now afforded an 
integral role within the 
development process 
 
Less emphasis upon the 
role of trade unions. These 
constituencies now viewed 
as ‘roadblocks’ to global 
capital and ‘forces of 
conservatism’ 
 
 
1992-94  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increasing acceptance of 
the market (through trade) 
as a means of delivering 
resources more equitably  
 
Moral responsibility of rich 
countries towards the poor, 
derived from Smith’s 
Christian socialism 
 
Revisiting of the ‘War on 
Want’  
 
 
 
 
Increased debt relief 
 
Structural and ideological 
reform of the IFIs  
 
More generous amounts of 
overseas aid 
 
Supported by more, and 
fairer terms of trade  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christian socialist 
movements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-Cold War context: 
stagnant, and in some 
instances, regressive 
economies in both Central 
and Eastern Europe, and 
the developing world 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commitment to increased 
aid and debt relief. Free 
trade now an integral part 
of  international 
development agenda 
 
Acceptance of a ‘moral 
responsibility’ of rich 
countries 
 
Some emphasis upon 
Christian socialism by Blair 
and Brown. Inclusion of 
church and other faith 
groups into the policy 
process 
As above  
 
Debt and aid linked heavily 
to LDC acceptance of trade 
liberalisation policies 
 
Increased emphasis upon 
the ‘securitisation of 
development’. Poverty 
reduction strategies seen as 
complementary to, rather 
than replacement of 
military expenditure 
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The implications of this reconfiguration of New Labour’s political economy are 
explored in the case study chapters. As ‘old’ Labour evolved towards ‘New’, it is clear 
that the Party underwent a gradual distinct shift away from an explicitly ‘socialist’ set 
of development policies towards a strategy that was orientated specifically towards 
meeting the broadly ‘economic’ expectations of market actors. Although New Labour 
would retain the normative moral commitment to development that was present 
throughout its post-war history, the internal transformation that the Party underwent 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s meant that New Labour’s response to this ‘moral 
challenge’ would look very different to that of its predecessors. As each of the case 
study chapters show, this approach of securing moral outcomes through ‘economic’ 
means would reveal a number of policy tensions, not least in the way government 
officials, under the direction of the Treasury, chose to manage the expectations of core 
market constituencies. It is to the central role that the Treasury, under the 
chancellorship of Gordon Brown in particular, played in the formation of New Labour’s 
international development policies, and its management of these broadly economic 
expectations that the thesis now turns its attention. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Managing New Labour’s International 
Development Policies 
 
Having explored the historical antecedents to New Labour’s international development 
policies in the previous chapter, my attention now turns to two clear departures from 
the way in which ‘old’ Labour formulated policy but which heavily influenced the terms 
upon which New Labour’s policy was managed and delivered. The first of these 
concerns the influence that Treasury officials were able to wield, as they were in other 
areas of government located within traditional ‘spending’ departments, over the 
formation and the implementation of international development policies. The 
institutional dominance of the Treasury across Whitehall was central to New Labour’s 
model of political economy. Ceding responsibility for the policy duties normally 
assigned to the Treasury (such as monetary policy) to outside agencies (such as the 
Bank of England) gave the Chancellor of the Exchequer unprecedented scope to 
intervene in the setting of both economic and social policy both at home and abroad. 
The result of this was that all of the domestic policy themes identified in chapter 2 had 
been at least in one way or another influenced by the Treasury. As the case studies in 
the following three case study chapters demonstrate, the centrality of the Treasury 
was particularly evident in the formation of New Labour’s international development 
policies, where the personal imprint of, in particular, Gordon Brown’s thinking on such 
matters, was far greater than that of any Secretary of State at DFID. In this area of 
policy, the Chancellor sought to meet his own personal and moral commitment to 
eradicate global poverty with a series of measures that he and his team at the Treasury 
had designed to be implemented across Whitehall.  
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A further departure from ‘old’ Labour comes to the fore through my analysis of those 
constituencies that were incorporated into New Labour’s policymaking process. As I 
noted in the previous chapter, some of these policy constituencies like the IFIs such as 
the World Bank and IMF based in Washington, had featured in ‘old’ Labour’s policies.1 
Under New Labour however, the depth of these relationships changed considerably, 
becoming far stronger and much more central to Britain’s international development 
policies.2 Reflecting the dominant role that these institutions now played in global 
development affairs, the character of these new relationships was significant. Like a 
number of development practitioners and observers outside the so-called ‘Washington 
Consensus’, ‘old’ Labour policy pronouncements made clear the link between the 
market-oriented policies of these institutions and the persistent – and indeed, 
worsening – levels of poverty experienced across the developing world.3 Any 
alignment with or acceptance of the policies supported by these IFIs would put 
government ministers on a collision course with Labour’s altogether more ‘traditional’ 
constituencies such as rank-and-file party members, NGOs, and church groups, whose 
own expectations were either derived from or mirrored traditional Labour and socialist 
values concerning equality and justice.  
 
Other, altogether newer constituencies however, also emerged, largely as a response 
to the new issues, such as HIV and AIDS that New Labour faced in government. A 
relatively recent phenomenon, the AIDS epidemic that had swept through the 
developing world since the 1980s, was simply not an issue for ‘old’ Labour. Clearly this 
makes any direct comparison impossible. Nevertheless, the crisis that New Labour was 
faced with did open up space within the policy process for officials in Whitehall to 
demonstrate its commitment to include the business community in its international 
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development policies. To address the issue of a lack of access to antiretroviral drugs 
and other essential medicines in the developing world, New Labour set about 
increasing its dialogue with representatives from the pharmaceutical industry 
concerning this particular issue. Rather than simply increasing government spending, 
New Labour officials attempted to build a partnership with firms that, it was hoped, 
would increase access to these types of treatments and encourage more research to 
be carried out into the less-profitable, yet deadly diseases found in the developing 
world.4 New Labour’s strategy in this respect was striking, since, as I showed in the 
previous chapter, there was a clear shift in policy from the position ‘old’ Labour had 
taken, even as recently as the late 1980s, concerning the role of multinational firms in 
the development process.  
 
This chapter draws to a close by mapping out, on the basis of their specific 
expectations, both these ‘new’ and existing constituencies within a policy-matrix of 
‘market’ and ‘social’-orientated development outcomes. This matrix reveals a 
significant spatial divergence between these different policy constituencies, which 
would appear to present a problem for New Labour and its attempts to build a 
coherent – or in New Labour-speak – ‘joined-up’ set of policies. Given the tensions 
between the different constituencies that the Blair and Brown governments attempted 
to accommodate in the policy process, it would surely be problematic for the Party to 
meet and assimilate successfully all these expectations within its various policy 
strategies, due mainly to the simple fact that many of them were conflicting. Again, the 
theoretical concept of ‘strategic selectivity’ discussed in the opening chapters of the 
thesis is instructive. As Jessop has remarked, “particular forms of state privilege some 
strategies over others, privilege the access of some forces [or constituencies] over 
others, some interests [or expectations] over others, some time horizons over others, 
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*and+ some coalition possibilities over others”.5 Linking the core claim that runs 
through the thesis concerning the transmission of policies from the domestic to the 
international sphere, this chapter concludes by identifying those constituencies New 
Labour prioritised at home in the construction of its domestic political economy. I 
argue that if these domestic policies were designed to support the expectations of 
specific constituencies, then it is likely that New Labour would also prioritise these 
same constituencies abroad by ‘internationalising’ policies that supported the 
expectations of these constituencies at home.  
 
This claim is taken up and explored empirically in each of the three case studies that 
follow this chapter. Whilst in office, New Labour – and Gordon Brown in particular – 
played an instrumental role in reconfiguring the existing multilateral debt relief 
process by laying out proposals for a ‘new global economic architecture’. This new 
framework however, was designed not strictly to address the ‘social’ effects of 
developing world debt identified by ‘old’ Labour, but rather to prioritise the broadly 
‘market’ expectations of global investors and institutions of international finance. For 
New Labour, this was to be achieved through the pursuit of macroeconomic stability, a 
position that, as I noted in the previous chapter, had been criticised by ‘old’ Labour.6 
Similarly, New Labour’s commitment to increase access to the essential medicines in 
the developing world concerned itself principally, not with the ‘social’ impact of 
diseases such as HIV and AIDS, but instead with meeting the broadly market-based 
expectations of the pharmaceutical industry, and ensuring the ongoing 
competitiveness and profitability of British-based firms in this sector. The proposals for 
the International Finance Facility drawn up by the Treasury were designed not to meet 
‘old’ Labour concerns over equality, but rather to integrate and include developing 
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countries in the global economy, and make them more open to the trade and overseas 
investment that officials argued was necessary to encourage growth and eliminate 
poverty.  
 
Therefore, although New Labour framed its commitment to international development 
in terms of the elimination of poverty, its approach tended to prioritise ‘the economic’ 
over any ‘social’ or ‘moral’ imperative in reaching this objective. The precedence that 
New Labour gave to ‘the economic’ through the incorporation of these new market-
based constituencies into the policy process revealed a great deal concerning the 
character of the political economy of New Labour, both at home and abroad. 
Furthermore, these new patterns of incorporation also differentiated the policies 
offered by New Labour from those of its ‘old’ Labour predecessors, explored in the 
previous chapter. 
 
Structure of the Chapter 
This chapter is split into three parts. The first, larger part examines central role that the 
Treasury had in directing and implementing government policy. Although the Treasury 
extended its tentacles across all areas of Whitehall, the chancellorship of Gordon 
Brown saw the Treasury take a particular interest in matters of international 
development. In the first part of this chapter, I explore the domestic origins of the 
control exerted by the Treasury, and trace this back to themes already explored in the 
thesis concerning ‘credibility’ in macroeconomic policymaking.7 This commitment to 
credibility leads me to discuss the Chancellor’s claim of ‘prudence’ and latterly, 
‘prudence for a purpose’, and how this was realised both domestically and in terms of 
the government’s international development policies. I then look beyond Whitehall 
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and examine the ‘internationalisation’ of the Treasury. Here, I assess how the Gordon 
Brown’s model of political economy was hardwired into the framework of the ‘post-
Washington Consensus’. As a means of tying this section up and opening the case 
study chapters that follow, I conclude this particular part of the chapter by analysing 
the ‘stamp’ of Treasury preference upon New Labour’s international development 
policies.  
 
The second and third parts of the chapter are considerably shorter, but are 
nevertheless vital in enabling me to explore the two secondary areas of research that 
this thesis is concerned with. The first of these two parts identifies the constituencies 
and their respective expectations of New Labour’s policies in the field of international 
development. This section maps out the character of these different constituencies on 
the basis of their expectations of government policy to reveal the dilemma that New 
Labour officials were faced with in attempting to accommodate these constituencies in 
its policy process. The second of these two parts (third overall) provides an analytical 
framework that will, in the case study chapters that follow, enable me to trace not only 
the character but the changes and the direction that New Labour’s international 
development policies underwent while in office.  
 
The Institutional Dominance of HM Treasury and the Centrality of  
International Development to Gordon Brown’s Model of Political  
Economy 
Arguably the clearest difference between ‘old’ and New Labour, or indeed that of any 
of New Labour’s predecessors in government, was the latitude afforded to Gordon 
Brown, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the influencing of policy that would normally 
fall outside the traditional economic policymaking duties of the Treasury. This 
difference has been summarised pithily by one of Brown’s biographers, William 
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Keegan who has remarked that while “previous Labour governments had felt captured 
by the Treasury. Brown captured the Treasury”.8 This section examines how the 
Chancellor achieved this and the policy influence that Brown’s Treasury was 
subsequently able to exercise over other Whitehall departments and DFID in 
particular. Whilst serving as Chancellor, Brown peppered his annual Budget speeches, 
spending review announcements and other statements with frequent references to 
education, welfare and social policy. However, it was in the area of international 
development that the Chancellor devoted arguably most of his attention. In this 
section I trace the revolution that the Treasury underwent during the Blair government 
and the ways in which this gave Gordon Brown the unparalleled scope to shape New 
Labour’s international development policies to an even far greater degree than DFID’s 
own Secretary of State.  
 
The imprint of the Treasury and of Gordon Brown in particular, was writ large over 
each of the case studies explored in the following three chapters. The ‘new global 
economic architecture’, discussed in chapter 5 and recast as a response to the debt 
crisis in the developing world, was predicated upon the same principles of 
macroeconomic stability, improved regulation and increased surveillance introduced 
by the Treasury at home. Chapter 6 examines the supply-side reforms, such as tax 
credits for research and development that the Chancellor viewed as being essential as 
a means of incentivising pharmaceutical firms to increase the supply of essential drugs 
required to combat HIV and AIDS in the developing world. The focus of the final case 
study in chapter 7 explores Gordon Brown’s own proposals for an International 
Finance Facility. Designed to frontload the US$50 billion worth of aid that was required 
to meet the UN Millennium Development Goals, the IFF was based upon ideas central 
to the Treasury thinking at home concerning welfare policies such as the ‘New Deal’, 
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and spending strategies such as Private Finance Initiatives and public-private 
partnerships. As a means of contextualising these three policy initiatives, I begin by 
exploring the institutional reconfiguration of the Treasury under the Blair government 
and its impact upon New Labour’s international development policies.  
 
Historically, the Treasury has been regarded as an all-powerful agency able to exert 
policy influence through its control of resources. For Martin Smith, although formally 
the Treasury remains an economic, and not a co-ordinating department, the 
importance of its functions, the status of its ministers and the impact it has upon all 
other departments, has placed it in a unique position to affect the operation of the 
core executive as a whole.9 While Paul Fawcett accepts this to be true, he also notes 
that other contributions to the literature have been more circumspect in terms of the 
extent of this power.10 Thain and Wright for instance have commented that despite 
this power, “the Treasury cannot dictate to departments or impose *its+ will upon 
them”.11 For Deakin and Parry, quite simply, “whatever its apparent strength, Treasury 
power is less than absolute”.12 For these authors, irrespective of the dominance that 
the Treasury might claim in its control over the purse-strings of central government, 
Whitehall departments still enjoy relative autonomy in terms of how policy should be 
conducted.  
 
This section disputes these claims, exploring the unparalleled dominance that the 
Treasury enjoyed under New Labour. I do this not by focusing solely upon the 
budgetary or fiscal ‘dominance’ that the Treasury has traditionally been able to wield 
over other Whitehall departments. Rather, I follow John Hills, and more recently, 
Simon Lee both of whom have argued that the particular type of dominance in 
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Whitehall, exercised by the Treasury under New Labour, was both new and striking. 
For Hills:  
 
Not only have most of the significant developments [concerning New 
Labour’s welfare and social policies+ been made as part of its Budget 
and spending announcements, but the tax system is also being used 
as an explicit instrument of social policy. It has also greatly increased 
its power by making any additional spending by departments in cash 
terms over the next few years conditional on convincing the Treasury 
that agreed reforms have taken place.13 
 
According to Simon Lee, reforming welfare in this way enabled the Chancellor to 
strengthen the power of the Treasury by establishing it as the pilot agency of New 
Labour’s political economy and economic modernisation its core remit.14 This, I argue, 
was made possible by the crucial decision that Brown made to cede responsibility for 
monetary policy to the newly-reformed Bank of England and the Monetary Policy 
Committee (MPC). Although it was a decision taken initially to establish a monetary 
policy framework that would, in the terms of the Chief Economic Adviser to the 
Treasury, Ed Balls, “command market credibility and public trust” through an 
altogether more ‘prudent’ approach to spending.15 It was a move that would give the 
Treasury unprecedented scope to intervene in social as well as economic policy 
arrangements, both at home and abroad.  
 
The power that this gave to the Treasury enabled New Labour to pursue an altogether 
more ‘joined-up’ programme of government.16 ‘Joined-up government’ as it was 
articulated by policy officials was a meta-governmental response to the problem of 
separate compartmentalised Whitehall departments attempting to deal with “cross-
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cutting issues”.17 Several issues faced by the government fell, directly and indirectly 
within the remit of several Whitehall departments. Historically, this had led to inter-
departmental conflict and a less than consistent set of policies as various government 
ministers and officials attempted to assert their own stamp of authority upon policy. 
To resolve this problem, New Labour sought to govern far more cohesively, designing 
and delivering policy in a far more integrated manner. However, for New Labour’s 
policymaking process as a whole to take on the appearance of a single, ‘joined-up’ 
entity, it required an institutional agency at its core as a means of steering government 
policy. It was to be the Treasury that would fulfil this role, and this enabled Brown and 
his officials to extend their reach concerning the policy decisions taken by Whitehall 
ministers. Crucially, as Matthew Watson has remarked, although “the outcome might 
well be more consistency across different policy outputs…it is also likely that all 
policies will be inflected with a clear stamp of Treasury preference”.18 No more clearly 
was this demonstrated than in the policies of DFID, the work of which Brown took a 
particular interest in. Rooted in the Chancellor’s reforms to Britain’s economic 
policymaking at home, the section explores how the pursuit of ‘prudence for a global 
purpose’ enabled Brown and his colleagues in the Treasury to achieve this, and 
establish considerable control over New Labour’s international development policies 
as a result.  
 
Reforming the Treasury: Institutionalising and Locking-in Macroeconomic  
Credibility 
 
In order to do what a Labour government should do, you’ve got to 
earn credibility first.  
Ed Balls to Gordon Brown19 
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Biographers have noted the extent to which Gordon Brown’s politics were infused 
right from the very beginning with a strong sense of social justice and moral sense.20 
Inculcated with the strong values of compassion and civic duty of his Presbyterian 
parents, whilst Shadow Chancellor, Brown promised delegates at the Labour Party 
conference “that we in the Labour Party will not leave our conscience at the Treasury 
door: we will take moral purpose to the heart of government”.21 As the following case 
study chapters show, it was clear that Brown’s ‘moral compass’ was instrumental in 
directing the policies of the New Labour government, both at home and abroad. 
However, for Brown to fulfil both his and his party’s ‘moral purpose’, both in Britain 
and across the developing world, it was necessary to put in place a credible 
macroeconomic framework. As Andrew Rawnsley has remarked however, Gordon 
Brown was less interested in operating the levers of macroeconomic management 
than any previous incumbent at the Treasury.22 It would fall to Ed Balls to set out such 
a policy framework that would allow Gordon Brown to become, in the terms of Robert 
Peston, a “credible socialist”.23 
 
Much of the early literature concerning the post-1994 architects of the New Labour 
project, understandably focuses upon the Blair-Brown nexus, of which other players 
such as Peter Mandelson, John Prescott, Robin Cook, Alastair Campbell and Bryan 
Gould are afforded roles in the supporting cast of varying prominence.24 Rather 
surprisingly, Ed Balls features very little in these accounts. Yet, as I argue here, he was 
instrumental in New Labour’s efforts to secure credibility with the financial markets: a 
central objective of the Party, both in opposition and in government. It was the ideas 
of Balls, and in particular his argument concerning the need to build a credible 
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monetary framework based upon stability, low inflation and institutional reform, that 
underpinned the macroeconomic reforms initiated by Gordon Brown as Chancellor of 
the Exchequer. Without the support of the financial markets that this credibility would 
secure, Party officials felt that they would not be able to achieve the economic and 
social aims of the New Labour project.  
 
Through his role as Brown’s chief economic advisor within the Treasury, Balls was able 
to exert considerable influence upon the formation of New Labour’s domestic 
economic policy. Moreover, given the centrality of the Treasury in dictating New 
Labour’s international development policies, Balls’ influence also extended far beyond 
the British polity to an altogether higher spatial scale of governance. No more clearly 
was this evident than in Gordon Brown’s appeal for a new global financial architecture 
(explored in chapter 5) which was derived from the same policy narrative of 
macroeconomic stability, policy transparency, and clear and binding rules that Balls 
had frequently argued was necessary for the Treasury to instil at home.  
 
Balls was uniquely positioned in order to capture the credibility that New Labour 
officials were seeking. His position at the Financial Times gave him an array of 
important contacts in the City of London, which in turn provided him with an insight 
into what the financial markets were thinking. Politically too, although critical of ‘old’ 
Labour’s stance over the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, Balls was a leading 
member of the progressive, centre-left Fabian Society and a proponent of alternative 
economic strategies to those pursued by the Conservative government. Brown, for 
one, was impressed with Balls’ critique of the economic policy of the incumbent 
Conservative government and its failure to address the underlying structural 
weaknesses of the UK economy. In a paper written in the wake of the ERM debacle, 
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Balls called for “a credible and predictable macroeconomic policy framework which 
can deliver economic stability combined with active government measures to promote 
growth and full employment”.25 In a single statement, Balls had distilled what Brown 
would attempt to achieve as Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
 
Although senior party officials had sought to engage with the City and financial 
constituencies, since the launch of the so-called “prawn cocktail offensive” in 
November 1989,26 it was only after the appointment of Balls as Gordon Brown’s chief 
economic advisor in 1994 that New Labour adopted an altogether new approach to 
securing this credibility. Officials started to stress the importance of ‘predictability’ and 
‘stability’, and how this would be achieved through a framework of fixed rules, 
constrained government discretion and increased openness in macroeconomic 
policymaking. As I have already demonstrated in chapter 2, these were touchstones of 
New Labour’s political economy and central to the Party’s commitment to sustainable 
economic growth. Crucially, this approach would give Gordon Brown the latitude to 
fulfil what he saw as his own moral purpose as a Labour politician. Leaving Balls to 
engineer New Labour’s macroeconomic strategy,27 the Chancellor could realise his 
own commitment to social justice through the pursuit, both at home and abroad, of a 
series of microeconomic policies and supply-side reforms.  
 
The final piece in securing this credibility – the masterstroke for which Brown is 
frequently credited – was the decision to grant “the Bank of England operational 
responsibility for setting interest rates, with immediate effect”.28 Announced within 
days of being elected into office, it was a move that caught many by surprise, both for 
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the speed and the manner in which the decision appeared to have been taken. 
However, it was a move that should not have taken anyone aback. In May 1995, Blair 
used the Mais lecture to outline his plans for an independent monetary policy 
committee.29 Similarly, in a speech to business leaders in London in May 1995, Brown 
expressed his belief that:  
 
The Bank [of England] should establish a new Monetary Policy 
Committee which would decide on the advice given to the 
government on monetary policy. The committee could comprise of 
the Governor and the Deputy Governor of the Bank, both appointed 
by the government, [and] six directors including the Chief Economist. 
These six also appointed by the government following consultation 
with the Governor and the Deputy Governor…I believe that these 
reforms, together with our suggestions about more openness and 
transparency, and the conduct of decision-making including the 
budgetary process will make a positive impact on the way policy is 
made and greatly improve the credibility of the current process.30 
 
Although widely understood as a personal triumph for Brown, it was Ed Balls whose 
influence was, in fact, writ large in this decision. In his 1992 Fabian pamphlet, Balls had 
argued that “an independent central bank, charged to deliver low and stable inflation, 
is a better way to achieve macroeconomic stability”.31 Indeed, as he went on to argue, 
“a carefully reconstituted and statutorily controlled central bank, empowered to 
pursue low and stable inflation, would make policy more representative and more 
accountable than at present”.32 Although when he was writing in 1992, Balls was quick 
to point out that the Bank of England in its current form lacked the institutional 
capacity to fulfil such a task,33 by the time Brown made the announcement a little less 
than five years later, the necessary reforms had been completed, leaving the door 
open for central bank independence.  
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Although the government would continue to set economic policy through the 
Treasury, it would be the Bank of England, through the newly-established Monetary 
Policy Committee, whose responsibility it would be to ensure that the government’s 
monetary targets were met. For Balls, the logic of this move was clear. The creation of 
an independent central bank would strengthen a Chancellor’s credibility, and 
strengthen, rather than weaken the hand of a Labour government:    
 
Freed from debilitating market doubts about the government’s anti-
inflationary resolve, a Labour chancellor would be free to 
concentrate on many other aspects of policy, including fiscal 
policy.34  
 
Depoliticising monetary policy was essential in reassuring both the financial markets 
and the electorate that this was a very different kind of Labour government, one that 
rejected tax-and-spend, and short-term political decisions. Taking these decision-
making processes out of the hands of politicians, and placing them with a small group 
of non-elected economists at the Bank of England would, the Chancellor claimed, 
benefit both “business, which wants to plan ahead with confidence”, and “families, 
who have suffered enough from the uncertainties of short-term economic stability”.35  
 
The political and economic expediency of such a strategy has not gone unnoticed in 
the literature. As Claire Annesley and Andrew Gamble have remarked, an altogether 
more credible set of economic policies would be more likely to convince voters that a 
New Labour government “would not be blown off-course by the kinds of financial 
pressures that had wrecked its predecessors”.36 For Peter Burnham, granting the Bank 
of England the power to set Britain’s monetary policy could, politically, enable New 
Labour to “evade direct responsibility for high interest rates and the high value of 
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sterling, thus establishing its credibility with markets whilst, at the same time, 
*increase+ the pressure on labour and capital to become more competitive”.37 Simon 
Lee has gone further still, suggesting that this apparent loss of power was little more 
than a political con-trick:   
 
The Bank of England is not independent. The Monetary Policy 
Committee…exercises a degree of administrative autonomy over the 
setting of interest rates but only within the monetary policy 
framework and inflation target laid down by the Treasury and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. What Brown presented as a devolution 
of political power was, in practice, a delegation of administrative 
responsibility that provided Brown with an institutional alibi for 
unpopular economic policies.38        
 
New Labour officials did little to reject these claims. Indeed, the depoliticisation of 
monetary policy was deemed to be a useful tool in a wider strategic context in which 
the role of national politicians had supposedly been eviscerated by globalisation. As I 
argued in chapter 2, globalisation was understood by policymakers to have restricted 
the latitude of politicians to pursue only policies that worked ‘with the grain’ or 
accommodated the demands of global capitalism. As Ed Balls had previously observed, 
“in an internationally integrated world, companies can choose where to invest among 
countries”.39 By handing over power to an agency more attuned to the preferences of 
market, rather than political actors, as Flinders and Buller have suggested, 
depoliticisation could refine and change public expectations concerning both the 
capacity of the state and the responsibilities of politicians in setting policy.40  
 
Again, the views of Ed Balls dictated New Labour’s position on this issue. Depoliticising 
the setting of interest rates would signal to markets New Labour’s commitment to 
make its macroeconomic policy as open and as transparent as possible. According to 
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Balls, British economic policymaking up until this point was “shrouded in secrecy”, and 
the “absolute” power of the Treasury was “…inefficient and out of date. Successful 
developed economies, including left of centre governments…have realised that an 
independent central bank, charged to deliver low and stable inflation, is a better way 
to achieve macroeconomic stability”.41 By locking-in an altogether more transparent 
policy process, the Treasury could present far more demonstrably a credible set of 
policies, commensurable with the expectations held by international financial 
investors. Explaining and justifying this particular approach to policy, in the wider 
context of the global economy, Balls would later argue that:  
 
In a world of global capital markets…credibility in modern open 
economies requires three ingredients: a reputation for following 
long-term policies; maximum openness and transparency; and new 
institutional arrangements which guarantee a long-term view.42  
 
These new institutional arrangements would lock-in the government’s commitment to 
pursue a long-term macroeconomic strategy that incentivised global capital. Indeed, as 
Matthew Watson has argued such “institutional lock-ins” would “demonstrate, by 
their very presence, that no alternatives [were] possible to the pre-announced 
policy”.43 Rather, as Watson goes on to note, this new institutional arrangement put in 
place “a formal apparatus that, from the government’s perspective, *would run+ policy 
on automatic pilot”.44   
 
Running economic policy on ‘autopilot’ through these new institutional arrangements 
would be crucial in reassuring the global financial markets of the credibility of the Blair 
government. Putting macroeconomic policy out of the reach of meddling ministers 
would enable New Labour to make a decisive break both from its own past reputation 
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as a ‘tax-and-spend’ party, and the economic misfortune that had befallen previous 
Labour and Conservative governments. According to Gordon Brown, the monetary 
policy decisions taken by his predecessors had been “dominated by short-term political 
considerations”,45 which Ed Balls would later argue had contributed to “the violent 
boom-bust economic cycles of the past twenty or so years”.46 Balls’ reading of the 
British economy in the past was one that had been punctuated by recession, 
joblessness and high inflation, all of which had reduced Britain’s economic capacity 
and the willingness of firms to make long-term investment commitments. Having 
internalised this narrative of Britain’s recent economic crises, Treasury officials 
concluded that the political manipulation of monetary policy undermined not only the 
government’s aim to secure the macroeconomic stability necessary for investment,47 
but crucially, the very credibility of this commitment in the eyes of market investors.  
 
What was designed as a political strategy to demonstrate the credibility and the 
financial probity of the Treasury’s macroeconomic strategy under New Labour 
however, would also prove to be beneficial for Gordon Brown’s microeconomic 
reforms; a series of policies designed to tackle the barriers to productivity growth and 
to close the productivity gap.48 These reforms were intended to boost the supply-side, 
to enable markets to function more efficiently, and to allow firms and workers to 
maximise their productive potential by targeting five historical weaknesses that had 
undermined productivity performance. They included strengthening the competition 
regime; promoting enterprise; supporting science and innovation; improving skills 
through better education and encouraging investment to improve the stock of physical 
capital.49  
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As well as these microeconomic reforms, freed from monetary policy concerns, Brown 
could also enter into areas of policy such as healthcare, education, welfare, poverty 
and international development – areas that traditionally would have fallen outside the 
remit of the Treasury. The Chancellor frequently took it upon himself to make specific 
policy announcements and tie them into the Treasury’s broader commitments 
concerning economic policy. In 1998 for instance, Brown announced a series of supply-
side measures designed to boost the quality of education, skills and training as a 
means of “improving productivity, expanding opportunity and investing in our 
future”.50 Under previous governments such policies would have been announced 
either by the Secretary of State for Education and Employment or the Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry. Brown however, while giving the impression of ‘joined-up 
government’ made only a passing mention to the input of these ministers and their 
departments. Rather, these were policies taken over by the Treasury, and presented as 
reforms designed to “achieve our long-term goals for growth and employment” and 
support the “radical modernisation of our economic policy in favour of opportunity, 
enterprise and work”.51 This would signal the socialisation of economic policy that, 
under the chancellorship of Brown, the Treasury would roll out across Whitehall and, 
as I shall show in the following case study chapters, beyond into the developing world.  
 
Even these policy announcements however, were constrained, initially at least, by the 
Treasury’s overarching commitment to credibility. A credible macroeconomic strategy 
meant a credible microeconomic strategy based upon what was presented to the 
electorate as ‘prudent’ levels of public spending. To this end, New Labour chose to 
accept, for the first two years of office, the punitive expenditure targets set by the 
outgoing Conservative administration, promising to maintain a “tough inflation target”, 
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to keep “mortgage rates as low as possible” and “stick for two years within existing 
spending limits”.52 This prudence would be governed by the self-imposed ‘golden 
rules’ of borrowing and spending. These fixed rules – again reinforced by the perceived 
need for predictable government policies – would permit the Treasury to spend only 
what it could afford, and to borrow only as a means of financing future investment. As 
Robert Peston has argued, this initial prudence or “hair-shirtism” would be “crucial to 
acquiring economic credibility, to restoring the strength of the public finances and 
averting the kind of economic crises that undermined all previous Labour 
governments”.53  
 
This prudence however had significant payback once credibility amongst the financial 
markets was assured, thus revealing the temporality of Brown’s commitment to 
prudence. Having stuck assiduously to these spending levels in the first two years of 
being in office, the Chancellor moved to the next stage of this prudence, thereby 
revealing its purpose.54 This prudence would enable the government to:  
 
…target tax cuts on hard-working families and to release for our 
public services in the coming year alone additional resources of £4 
billion. These extra resources are not at the expense of our 
prudence; they arise because of our prudence.55  
 
With a little over a year to go before the next General Election, the prudence that 
Brown had exercised in a bid to secure macroeconomic credibility, would now enable 
the Chancellor to pursue an election-winning programme of tax cuts and increased 
investment in public services. With the fundamentals of macroeconomic “stability 
locked in” through its monetary policy framework and prudent set of fiscal policies, 
New Labour was now in a position to meet its “prosperity goal” of closing the 
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productivity gap; its “full employment goal” of employment opportunity for all; its 
“education goal” of 50 per cent of young people in higher education; and its “anti-
poverty goal” of halving child poverty by 2010 and ending it by 2020.56 In 2002, the 
purpose of Brown’s prudence was health. By “cutting debt, unemployment and waste” 
and pursuing “prudent management and economic stability and growth”, the 
Chancellor was able to announce significant increases in spending on the National 
Health Service.57 While in 2001 the Treasury invested £2,370 for the average 
household on the NHS, by 2007-08 the Chancellor promised it would increase this 
investment to £4,060 per household; a 48 percent increase in real terms after 
inflation.58  
 
Problematically for Brown – or more directly, his successor in the Treasury, Alistair 
Darling – once this prudence had been relaxed and levels of government spending 
started to rise towards the middle of New Labour’s time in office, it was difficult to 
retrieve. For David Coates, New Labour’s ‘chickens came home to roost’.59 According 
to Coates, the problems faced by the Brown government in the lead-up to the 2010 
General Election were due in no small part to the new Prime Minister’s largesse during 
New Labour’s second term in office, whilst he served at the Treasury. Indeed, Brown’s 
imprudence as Chancellor may have cost Brown his credibility as Prime Minister. Whilst 
it lasted however, Brown’s prudence enabled the Treasury to place its considerable 
imprimatur upon these other Whitehall departments. It was widely held by Treasury 
and other senior government officials that without a credible and prudent monetary 
and fiscal policy framework, none of the Whitehall departments concerned with New 
Labour’s social policy commitments – the Department for Trade and Industry, the 
Department for Education and Skills, the Department for Work and Pensions, or the 
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Department for Health – could deliver their objectives. It was therefore essential that 
the New Labour project retained at its centre the Treasury and its carefully-designed 
model of political economy. Its position at the heart of Whitehall enabled the Treasury 
to strengthen its grip upon these departments, not simply in terms of the money it 
provided as a ministry of finance, but crucially concerning the content and outcomes of 
policies in these areas. 
 
‘Prudence for a Global Purpose’: Establishing the Dominance of the  
Treasury in DFID 
One area of policy that Gordon Brown was particularly keen to intervene in was that of 
international development. Although New Labour had made good on its promise to 
establish a separate department from the FCO for matters relating to international 
development through the creation of DFID, this did not prevent the Treasury setting 
the tone for the policy outputs of this new department. Indeed, the decision to hand 
over the setting of interest rates to the MPC enabled Brown to pursue his very 
personal commitment to the alleviation of poverty in the developing world.60 As I 
noted earlier, each of the policies that I explore in the following case study chapters 
emerged largely as a result of Treasury-thinking, rather than from DFID itself. 
Furthermore, whilst Chancellor, Brown made frequent references to international 
development in his numerous public spending announcements. Where Brown had 
claimed ‘prudence for a purpose’ in relation to increased spending in domestic policy 
areas such as education, skills, welfare, productivity and health, there was a distinctly 
‘global’ purpose to Brown’s prudence concerning matters of international 
development. This, as the table in appendix A1 shows, enabled the Chancellor to make 
issues relating to global poverty central to the political economy of the Treasury under 
New Labour. With only a handful of exceptions, issues relating to international 
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development featured heavily in the frequent spending announcements made by 
Brown as Chancellor. 
 
From this table, a number of key trends continually reoccur. Firstly, the Chancellor 
placed a clear emphasis upon the core areas of debt relief, access to antiretrovirals and 
other essential medicines, and increasing aid to developing countries. Debt relief was 
to be achieved through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative but the 
Chancellor was also keen to extend debt relief through other mechanisms that he had 
designed such as the ‘Mauritius Mandate’ and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
(MDRI). Access to the antiretrovirals, vaccines and other medicines required to combat 
the ‘diseases of poverty’ would be subject to a series of supply-side measures, such as 
tax credits to incentivise pharmaceutical firms into scaling-up levels of research and 
development. Brown also sought to increase the amount of aid that was available for 
developing countries to finance their growth. A specific International Development 
Trust Fund was suggested initially but this was replaced in favour of an International 
Finance Facility that would frontload aid money borrowed from private markets.  
 
A new compact – a ‘Global New Deal’ – between rich and poor countries was 
suggested. If developing countries implemented ‘pro-poor’ policies – that is, policies 
which maintained economic stability, good governance, trade liberalisation and open 
markets – developed countries would open up their markets to exports from 
developing countries and continue to meet their commitments. Elsewhere, four steps 
were identified by the Chancellor as a means of achieving global prosperity: new codes 
and standards; an increased role for the private sector and business within the 
development process; a freer and fairer global trade regime; and increased finance. 
These were areas that were clearly central to New Labour’s commitment to the 
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developing world, and crucially, areas that the Chancellor would retain full control 
over.     
 
Despite a pre-election commitment to increase Britain’s aid spending sufficiently to 
meet the longstanding 0.7 percent/GNI target, Brown in his prudence, was reticent to 
finance this aim straightaway. Rather than meet this particular pledge, the Chancellor 
elected to stick to his principle of ‘prudence for a purpose’ believing that this would 
enable the newly-formed department to deliver on its policy commitments in the 
longer term. This pursuit of prudence however meant that New Labour relied upon 
hard economics rather than any moral sentiment to dictate the amount of money 
Britain was willing to spend on aid. Indeed, as the Treasury’s Chief Secretary, John 
Healey would later remark, although the government remained committed to making 
progress towards meeting the 0.7 percent target, it would do so only “as the fiscal 
climate permits”.61 Therefore, although overseas aid did increase under New Labour 
(compare Fig. 3.5 in the previous chapter, with Fig. 4.1 for instance) there were times 
when it fell back quite considerably. In 1999 for example, Britain’s ODA actually 
dropped to its lowest level during the forty-year period between 1970 and 2010. 
Although this figure did climb back up to 0.51 percent/GNI in 2006, it slipped back 
again to 0.36 percent in 2007. It was this cut in particular – a cut almost as great as 
that made by Thatcher’s Conservative government in 1980 – that put back New 
Labour’s initial commitment to meet the 0.7 percent target by 2009,62 to 2013 
instead.63  
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Fig. 4.1 Britain’s Overseas Development Aid as a % of GNI, 1998–2010 
 
 
 
Source:  OECD and DFID64 
 
As the table in A1 shows, Brown’s prudence was exercised in two ways: firstly, by 
creating a tax relief scheme to encourage British taxpayers to increase their giving; and 
secondly, by selling off the government’s majority stake in the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC). The creation of the tax relief scheme was designed to 
shift away, or at least share the burden of responsibility of development aid from the 
government onto the British taxpayer. The sale of the government’s share of the CDC 
paved the way for it to become initially a public-private partnership and then a public 
limited company in 1999. Both these decisions enabled the Treasury to prudently 
increase Britain’s commitment to international development, and in particular its level 
of overseas aid, two years after entering office.   
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During the first two years of New Labour’s time in government, spending limits were 
imposed across all Whitehall departments. Therefore, although clearly supportive of 
DFID’s commitment to addressing matters of global poverty, Treasury officials were 
left to look for alternative, yet prudent ways in which to support the financing of this 
commitment. To do this initially, the Chancellor urged the British taxpayer to increase 
their contributions to projects in the developing world by introducing a ‘gift aid’ or tax 
relief scheme, designed symbolically at least, to mark the new millennium. The money 
raised by this policy would support the work, not of DFID itself but of charities and 
NGOs working within developing areas, who as Brown would later claim, shared New 
Labour’s own commitment to debt reduction, poverty relief and development. In 
policymaking terms, this statement fitted in with the government’s openness to 
working with a plurality of outside actors, and matched the importance that DFID had 
already afforded to ‘building partnerships’ in its own White Paper.65  
 
As with the Treasury’s decision to cede responsibility for other aspects of New 
Labour’s economic policy, this ‘Millennium Gift Aid’ scheme enabled the Chancellor to 
depoliticise the government’s initial forays into international development. By 
incentivising British taxpayers to increase their contributions to the work of the 
charities and NGOs that have “led the crusade to combat Third World poverty”, the 
Chancellor deliberately imputed to these agencies a principal role in the delivery of the 
government’s own international development goals. This strategy shifted expectation 
away from the government and upon a set of actors understood to be far better 
placed to address the issues faced by developing countries. During a period of self-
imposed fiscal rectitude, this would be useful since it would dampen any expectations 
of the government itself, especially amongst core policy constituencies such as Labour 
Party members who, as the previous chapter suggested, had come to attach a great 
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deal of significance to matters of global poverty. In reordering these expectations, this 
strategy would also buy government ministers more time in building an altogether 
more fiscally ‘credible’ set of development policies.  
 
The second means by which the Treasury sought to prudently finance its commitment 
to international development, and in particular Britain’s level of overseas aid, was 
through the sale of the government’s majority stake in the CDC. The Corporation was 
set up as the UK’s own development finance institution to “create and manage new 
business and act as a catalyst for other investors”.66 Using its own resources, the CDC 
invested in a number of private equity funds which in turn enabled it to help finance 
the development of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Upon entering office, 
New Labour officials argued that the CDC was “an under-utilised asset” and therefore 
set about extending the role it could play within the development process.67 However, 
rather than increasing the government’s stake in this public corporation, policy officials 
decided to retain just a minority holding in the CDC and transform it into a public-
private partnership. This would enable an injection of private capital through the PPP 
that would increase the resources at CDC’s disposal, and enable its proceeds to be 
recycled into the government’s aid budget.  
 
This CDC would represent New Labour’s newfound commitment to working in 
partnership with the private sector, and typify its new altogether more ‘market-
orientated’ approach to development.68 For New Labour, the new “dynamic 
government/private sector partnership” that underpinned the CDC would enable the 
Treasury to increase Britain’s aid commitment overseas, whilst at the same time 
balance the books at home. With this money, New Labour could finance its healthcare, 
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education and anti-poverty programmes in the developing world, as well as offer debt 
relief for the poorest countries. This, in and of itself, represented a significant break 
from ‘old’ Labour. For New Labour officials, the Party could and should no longer be 
held hostage to the means by which development should be achieved. Instead, as Tony 
Blair and others would remind constituencies both in and outside the Labour Party, 
‘what counts was what works’. What was important was the outcome, not the means, 
and addressing issues of international development was all that mattered. For the 
Treasury, the loosening of these ideological constraints and, concomitantly, New 
Labour’s acceptance of the private sector as being vitally important in the 
development process, allowed Brown to meet the expectations of his core party 
constituencies in a prudent, ‘fiscally-responsible’ manner.  
 
Combined with the Chancellor’s ‘Millennium Gift Aid’ initiative, the selling-off of the 
government’s majority stake (and the subsequent transformation into a PPP) of the 
CDC provided Brown with the prudence that he sought in sticking to the Treasury’s 
spending commitments during New Labour’s first few years in office. This spending 
strategy would provide the platform for the Treasury and Gordon Brown in particular, 
to intervene in the setting of New Labour’s international development policies. From 
2001 onwards, the Chancellor’s parliamentary announcements became less about the 
financing of development (although, clearly, in the spending reviews this remained the 
case), and more about the substance of the policies themselves. Traditionally, such 
policy announcements would be made by the Secretary of State. Brown however, 
would, as he did on behalf of other ‘spending’ departments at home, take it upon 
himself to outline the significance of these policies in terms of New Labour’s political 
economy; offering explanations as to the way certain policies had been formulated, 
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and the role that particular actors, both in and outside of government, had to play 
within the policy process.  
 
The ‘Internationalisation’ of the Treasury and its Emergence as an  
Institutional Focal Point for Global Development 
The Treasury became the institutional mechanism at the heart of New Labour’s policy 
process. However, it not only mediated, influenced and engaged with Whitehall 
departments, but external policy constituencies as well. As the appendix A1 makes 
clear, the spending announcements made by the Treasury relied upon ongoing 
dialogue with institutions of global financial governance such as the World Bank, IMF 
and WTO, transnational business constituencies such as the pharmaceutical industry, 
and non-governmental actors such as charities, development agencies and faith 
groups. The Treasury retained a unique role in being able to talk directly with each of 
these constituencies, giving the Chancellor considerable leverage in directing and co-
ordinating New Labour’s international development policies both at home and abroad. 
As well as becoming the longest-serving and most senior finance minister within the 
G7/G8 group of countries, Brown also served as the Chair of the powerful International 
Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) in Washington. This gave the Chancellor 
unparalleled scope to impress upon his fellow finance ministers his proposals – for 
instance, to establish a ‘new global economic architecture’, or introduce policy 
mechanisms such as a Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (chapter 5) and the 
International Finance Facility (chapter 7) in a way that the Secretary of State simply 
could not do. As well as these ‘market-orientated’ constituencies, Brown was also keen 
to engage in dialogue with representatives from faith groups and NGOs. Throughout 
his chancellorship, Brown delivered far more speeches and lectures to these audiences 
than any Secretary of State for International Development. Indeed, very rarely did the 
likes of Clare Short or Hilary Benn speak to these constituencies without the Chancellor 
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present. Keen to ‘micro-manage’ New Labour’s international development programme 
in a similar way that he had in other areas of government spending,69 Brown would 
frequently use such opportunities to explain and justify the rationale for the policy 
decisions that had been made in an attempt to secure support amongst these 
altogether more ‘socially-orientated’ constituencies for the government’s own 
position. 
 
Even in areas of policy where the Chancellor was not afforded quite such a high profile, 
such as the Prime Minister’s High Level Working Group on Increasing Access to 
Essential Medicines in the Developing World (the Secretary of State, Clare Short 
chaired this particular group), there was a sufficiently strong Treasury presence in the 
Group to ensure that the Chancellor’s preferred strategy of strategy of supply-side 
measures such as tax credits and other incentives were incorporated into the 
government’s strategy.70 As I show in chapter 6, Short favoured a more ‘demand-side’ 
approach based upon creating the right ‘market conditions’ in developing countries for 
pharmaceutical firms to invest; Brown, on the other hand, believed the government’s 
priority should be to incentivise firms to undertake far more research into the 
‘diseases of poverty’. It would be this research, combined with more equitable pricing 
strategies that the Chancellor argued, would increase the amount of vaccines and 
treatments available in the developing world and enable the government to meet its 
commitment to securing universal access to essential medicines. Short’s departure 
from the government in 2003 and the subsequent appointment of Hilary Benn as 
Secretary of State for International Development merely made this approach to policy 
a formality. As a backbencher, Benn had already sided with the position taken by the 
Chancellor, arguing that “the pharmaceutical companies have a moral obligation to 
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make [life-prolonging] drugs available to the people of Africa at a price they can 
afford”.71 Benn’s later promotion allowed DFID’s strategy in this area of policy to be far 
more aligned, or in New Labour-speak, ‘joined-up’ with that of the Treasury.  
 
The scope of the Treasury to intervene in the setting of government policy was 
strengthened further by the extensive role that Brown played beyond Whitehall within 
what Robert Cox (and latterly, Andrew Baker) has termed the “nébuleuse” of global 
financial institutions: the World Bank and IMF, or more specifically the IMFC.72 The 
Chancellor’s long-standing status as one of the world’s leading finance ministers gave 
Brown a prominent voice within these institutions. The “complex, reciprocal” 
relationship between the global agencies of this nébuleuse and national governments 
to which Baker refers,73 enabled New Labour’s own development policies to be 
‘internationalised’ and embedded within these institutions in an unprecedented 
manner. This meant that although New Labour was undoubtedly influenced by the 
Party’s own historical commitment to addressing matters of global poverty, its policies 
were also framed and mediated by the contemporary ideas – the ‘conventional 
wisdom’ – held by these international institutions. This has left Paul Williams to 
conclude that New Labour’s international political economy was, in practice, much 
closer to New Right economics than to its traditional commitment to social democracy, 
and displayed more than a passing resemblance to the so-called ‘post-Washington 
Consensus’ (PWC).74   
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Hardwiring New Labour’s Political Economy into the ‘Post-Washington  
Consensus’ 
Coinciding with the arrival of New Labour into office in 1997, the emergence of the 
‘post-Washington Consensus’ was supposed to mark a decisive break from the failures 
of structural adjustment and the chronic underdevelopment experienced in large parts 
of the developing world. As I remarked in chapter 3, ‘old’ Labour, in its own policy 
pronouncements, had been hugely critical of the policies of privatisation, deregulation, 
liberalisation that many developing countries had been forced to undergo during the 
1980s. Although further denunciation of the old ‘Washington Consensus’ came from 
economists such as Paul Krugman in 1995,75 the real tipping-point came with the 
financial turmoil experienced in South East Asia, Russia and parts of Latin America in 
the period 1997–1998. It was in the aftermath of the Asian crisis in particular that IMF-
led reforms came under attack,76 prompting senior officials at the Fund, such as the 
Managing Director, Stanley Fischer, to reassess how it as an institution might respond 
to future market crises.77 Crucially, it was this crisis that flagged up to Treasury officials 
in the UK of “the need for action”.78 These financial crises highlighted the ways in 
which the global economy has changed the environment for domestic policymaking, 
and the need for “a shift in the focus of global financial governance away from ex post 
crisis resolution and toward strengthened ex ante procedures for crisis prevention and 
containment”.79 Linking my remarks in chapter 2 with my analysis to follow in chapter 
5, Treasury officials noted that:  
 
At the heart of this new approach lies an enhanced mechanism for 
international economic surveillance based on a framework of 
internationally agreed codes and standards of best practice and 
embodying a greater degree of openness and transparency.80  
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Within the existing neoliberal orthodoxy, the expansion of the market had meant 
reducing the role that the state had to play in the economy. As Ziya Öniş and Fikret 
Şenses have noted however, although the PWC maintained the importance of market 
liberalisation, it now conceived states and markets as “complementing rather than 
substituting for each other”.81 This fundamental shift in emphasis was underpinned by 
the publication by the World Bank of the 1997 World Development Report, The State 
in a Changing World. It argued that:  
 
An effective state is vital for the provision of goods and services – 
and the rules and institutions that allow markets to flourish and 
people to lead healthier, happier lives. Without it, sustainable 
development, both economic and social, is impossible.82 
 
Where there had been what Craig and Porter term, “an over-withdrawal of the 
state…paradoxically, a strong and capable state was *now+ required to implement the 
neoliberal reform agenda”.83 The World Bank, for instance, argued that the 
“liberalisation of the business environment can be a powerful catalyst, setting off a 
virtuous spiral whereby each reform makes the next one easier”.84 The challenge 
however, was “finding a way to set this virtual spiral in motion”.85 The Bank argued 
that the state, through better regulation, institutional reform and increased capability 
was best placed to meet this challenge, and it offered a template of responsibilities 
that governments should take up in order to make markets work. Countries should put 
in place “commitment mechanisms that credibly restrain arbitrary government 
action”, and demonstrate to markets “the ability to respond quickly to surprises, a 
competitive business environment and a track record of public-private partnership”.86  
 
                                                             
81
 Öniş and Şenses (2005: 275) 
82
 World Bank Group (1997: 1)  
83
 Craig and Porter (2006: 98)  
84
 World Bank Group (1997: 63) 
85
 Ibid. 
86
 Ibid., p. 75 
 
206 
Crucially, this narrative underpinned New Labour’s political economy and its 
understanding of contemporary state-market relations, both at home and abroad. In 
its first White Paper, DFID made it clear that “only governments can create the right 
political and economic framework within which the march of poverty can gather 
momentum”.87 Officials claimed to have learnt the lessons from the shortcomings of 
post-war development thinking. An over-reliance upon the state in certain areas had 
only served to create distortions, which had led to inefficiency and corruption, while 
the free-market approach of the 1980s had failed to deliver sustainable economic 
growth, giving rise instead to an increase in inequality across the developing world.  
 
This assessment of international economic policy mirrored that of New Labour’s own 
‘Third Way’ project at home, and specifically Tony Blair’s personal “pursuit of a ‘Third 
Way’ between the laissez-faire of the last twenty years, and the model of statist and 
corporatist policies that used to be fashionable on the Left”. Neither of these policies, 
‘New Right’ or ‘Old Left’, Blair argued, fitted the modern world.88 New Labour’s ‘Third 
Way’ however gave governments a new role. “Not as a director but as enabling of 
wealth generation. Not trying to run industry or protect it from proper competition; 
but stepping in, where the market fails, to equip business and industry compete better 
in that market [sic]”.89 For New Labour, government had an ostensibly new role; to 
create ‘the right political and economic framework’. Rejecting out of hand a return to 
‘big government’ – after all, “leverage, not size, is what counts”, Blair maintained – in a 
modern society, what was more important is “what government does, and how well, 
not how much”.90 This was, as I remarked earlier, Blair’s frequently-cited aphorism 
that ‘what counts is what works’.  
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For New Labour’s broader international development policy framework, this newly 
defined role for government opened up “an opportunity to create a new synthesis 
which builds upon the role of the state in facilitating economic growth and benefiting 
the poor”.91 This ‘Third Way’ thinking led New Labour to realise that “both states and 
markets make good servants and bad masters”. Consequently, it became the aim of 
the New Labour government to create what DFID labelled “the virtuous state”, one 
that might start the World Bank’s ‘virtuous spiral’ necessary to create the conditions 
attractive to business. There are parallels here with the shift from the ‘safety-net state’ 
to the ‘enabling state’ that Mark Bevir has argued, occurred under New Labour.92 This 
‘virtuous’ or ‘enabling’ state would support the “economic arrangements which 
encourage human development, stimulate enterprise and saving and create the 
environment necessary to mobilise domestic resources and to attract foreign 
investment”.93 With its own emphasis upon credible economic decision-making, 
prudent approach to monetary and fiscal policy, and commitment to working in 
partnership with the private sector, Treasury officials set about institutionalising the 
framework supported by the World Bank, both domestically and – as I demonstrate in 
chapter 5 – at an international level too. At home, as well as ceding responsibility for 
the setting of interest rates to the MPC, in line with the World Bank’s wish to see 
national governments introduce “commitment mechanisms that credibly restrain 
arbitrary government action”,94 Gordon Brown set about introducing new measures 
including a Memorandum of Understanding between the Treasury, Bank of England 
and Financial Services Authority, and Code for Fiscal Stability. These new rules and 
codes were designed to make the decision-making processes of the government and 
British financial institutions more transparent and accountable to market actors.   
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For both the World Bank and New Labour, the PWC and its attendant model of political 
economy was to be implemented through a strategy of specifying “the content of 
policy in precise rules, and then [locking] in those rules using mechanisms that make it 
costly to reverse course… *working+ in partnership with firms and citizens, and, where 
appropriate, *shifting+ the burden of implementation entirely outside government”.95 
This strategy would form the basis of the ‘new global financial architecture’ that Brown 
himself was keen to introduce. Underlying this new strategy was the unwavering belief 
that capitalism could be made to work for the good of all.96 For this to occur however, 
it was necessary to introduce a series of institutional reforms to minimise the inherent 
instability of market activity and make economic policies responsive to the needs of 
global capital. Under the terms of the PWC, the problem rested not with markets, but 
national governments. By emphasising and institutionalising the principle of ‘good 
governance’, this new PWC could restrict the profligacy of national and local 
politicians, and orientate government policy towards the exigencies of the 
international economy.  
 
Although this new paradigm for development represented a considerable 
improvement of the terms of the crude neoliberal understanding of development that 
underpinned the earlier Washington Consensus, its policy arrangements nevertheless 
remained problematic. For Ben Fine, the PWC shares the same “intellectual 
narrowness and reductionism” of its predecessor,97 while Öniş and Şenses have noted 
that it retains a continuing “systematic bias towards domestic reforms as opposed to 
systemic or global reforms”.98 Although this new emphasis upon institutions 
represented an important recognition that markets do not function unless they are 
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socially embedded, the focus of the PWC towards regulatory and institutional reform 
was designed principally to improve the performance of the market. As I demonstrate 
in chapter 5, Gordon Brown frequently championed such measures, particularly in 
respect of banking and finance, as part of moves towards this new global financial 
architecture. For the Chancellor, increased transparency and a more effective 
supervision of government policymaking, together with a more robust set of standards 
and codes were understood to be key elements in maintaining macroeconomic 
stability. The platform of stability that Brown was careful to stake out, both at home 
and abroad, would be essential in creating the right investment climate for economic 
growth and development.  
 
Despite the Chancellor’s fulsome endorsement of the PWC and the way in which the 
Treasury embedded both its domestic and international policies within an IFI-approved 
model of political economy, it did not always follow that Brown’s own proposals 
concerning international development were met with the backing that he or his Party 
would have liked. Clearly it gave the Chancellor considerable scope to ‘hardwire’ his 
ideas within this institutional nébuleuse yet there were times in which his proposals hit 
a roadblock. Attempts to build support for faster and deeper levels of debt relief were 
often made in vain, whilst the International Finance Facility, proposed as a means of 
increasing the amount of finance for development was met with a decidedly lukewarm 
response from the United States, and other leading OECD countries.99 Nevertheless, 
the Chancellor’s unique position within both Whitehall and Washington meant he 
retained unparalleled influence at both a national and an international level in the 
formulation of strategies designed to address the most pressing issues facing the 
developing world. Back home, such was the influence of Brown that in spite of the 
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independence granted to DFID upon its institutionalisation in May 1997, the Treasury 
remained the central actor in determining New Labour’s international development 
policies. As a result of this, it became the pre-eminent institution out of which the 
government’s own policy ideas emerged, and through which other strategic ideas from 
external agencies, such as the IFIs, were filtered. New Labour’s international 
development policies therefore were imprinted with the stamp of ‘Treasury 
preference’. The following section explores the implications for this in terms of the 
political economy of New Labour’s international development policies.  
 
The Stamp of ‘Treasury Preference’ and its Effect upon New Labour’s  
International Development Policies 
The key elements of New Labour’s strategy for addressing matters of global poverty – 
debt relief, improved access to medicines and increased aid – all displayed the 
hallmark of ‘Treasury preference’ in that the content and the delivery of these policy 
proposals borrowed extensively from the Treasury’s political economy at home. Just as 
the Chancellor frequently argued that monetary policy stability and prudent 
government spending should be at the heart of New Labour’s reforms of Britain’s 
economic policymaking, so too should this ‘new global financial architecture’ be based 
upon these same principles in order to stabilise the global economy and relieve the 
world’s poorest countries of their debt. Furthermore, just as the focus of Brown’s 
domestic political economy was upon raising Britain’s productivity and 
competitiveness through a series of supply-side reforms, the Chancellor introduced 
similar policies in order to incentivise pharmaceutical firms to increase access to 
essential medicines in the developing world. By the same token, Brown’s ideas 
concerning welfare and in particular, the New Deal programme introduced to tackle 
youth unemployment, found their way into the formation of ‘a global New Deal’, the 
centrepiece of which was the IFF and the delivery of aid, or welfare, to the global poor.     
 
211 
As each of the following case studies demonstrates, such was the dominance exerted 
by the Treasury in this area of policy that even where other government departments, 
including DFID itself, were incorporated into the policymaking process, the ‘voice’ and 
the expectations of these other departments were sidelined if they did not conform to 
the Treasury’s way of thinking. Similarly, for those constituencies beyond Whitehall, 
although Brown gave the impression of engaging in open policy dialogue with these 
groups, when the expectations of these constituencies did not match that of the 
Treasury, their voice too within government policy was silenced. It is to these 
‘outsider’ constituencies and their expectations that this chapter now turns its 
attention, for it is these sets of actors to whom the Treasury’s policies were directed. 
As this section and the following case study chapters show, it was the strategic 
direction of these policies that reveals arguably the most concerning the character of 
New Labour’s political economy, and particularly that of its international development 
policies.  
 
Managing Great Expectations: Identifying and Mapping the  
Constituencies in New Labour’s Policymaking Process 
So far this thesis has explored the contingent character of New Labour’s political 
economy as it intersected across the different strategic, ideational, historical and 
institutional contexts. In this brief final section of the chapter, I offer a breakdown of 
the ‘expectations’ of the various policy ‘constituencies’ with whom New Labour 
officials engaged in its policymaking process. The following case study chapters will 
explore the extent to which these constituencies, together with their expectations 
were incorporated into New Labour’s international policies. Here however I identify 
the actors and institutions that made up these constituencies and their expectations of 
New Labour’s international development strategy. Having captured these 
constituencies and their expectations empirically, I then frame, in strictly theoretical 
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terms, the way in which the processes of change and temporality discussed in chapter 
2 might be conceptualised. There is a two-fold purpose to this. By tracing the shifting 
proximity of New Labour officials to each of these constituencies over time, this 
diachronic analysis reveals the degree to which the expectations of each of these 
constituencies was accommodated by the New Labour government and subsequently 
assimilated in its policy process. Locating both the orientation of these policies and any 
change in trajectory or emphasis that occurred within a matrix of ‘market’ and ‘social’ 
imperatives will bring to light in a far more nuanced fashion the contingent character 
and the political economy of New Labour’s international development policies.   
 
Policy Constituencies and their Expectations  
A policy constituency is an ensemble of actors each of whom shares a certain set of 
normative preferences concerning what government policy should look like in order to 
secure a specific set of outcomes.100 Tied in with this, constituencies are shaped by the 
shared ‘expectations’ that they have of government policy. These expectations are 
based upon a shared commitment to a particular set of normative ideas or beliefs. 
Laden with all manner of values, expectations concerning poverty reduction, for 
instance, may be articulated in terms of economic growth, or derived from a moral or 
ecclesiastical concern for the poor and desire for global justice. In keeping with the 
underlying issue of temporality and contingency explored throughout the thesis, 
sufficient allowance must also be made for these expectations to alter over time. In 
the same way that government policy cannot be treated as being static, positioned as 
it is upon what is perceived to be a changing strategic context, neither then should one 
expect the emphasis of these expectations to remain the same over time, even if their 
overall trajectory is maintained. For instance, a business constituency might concern 
                                                             
100
 Policy constituencies are not in the strictest sense of the word, policy actors because, although they can influence policy, they 
do not actively implement policy – this remains the responsibility of government officials in Whitehall. 
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itself initially with profit-maximisation and shareholder value, pay little attention to its 
social responsibilities and expect the government to put in place the right framework 
for its own growth and continued profitability. Over time, however, the business may 
come to realise its wider obligations and begin to incorporate a social imperative into 
its own activities. It will continue to pursue a profit-maximising strategy but do so in a 
more ‘socially-aware’ manner, perhaps through the adoption of a greater degree of 
corporate social responsibility. Injecting this nuance into these types of expectations 
reflects the changing character of the said constituency at a particular moment in time, 
thereby indicating where it might be located in terms of the government’s own policy 
objectives. I discuss how I will go about capturing this change in the following section 
of this chapter.  
 
Space does not permit me to assess all the constituencies that made up the audience 
with whom New Labour sought to engage with in its international development 
policies. I therefore focus only upon those constituencies with whom New Labour 
engaged in each of the three policy case studies that I explore in the following 
chapters. Temporal changes to these expectations notwithstanding, these 
constituencies (listed in Fig. 4.2) can be divided up fairly easily into two distinct camps. 
The first of these constituencies ‘expected’ a distinctly economic or ‘market’-
orientated set of policy outcomes. The expectations of IFIs, for instance, would be met 
if New Labour supported the ongoing integration of developing countries into the 
global economy, and subscribed to the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ as the paradigm 
through which growth and development might be achieved. As I noted earlier in this 
chapter, and will go on to demonstrate in chapters 5 and 7, this particular set of 
expectations would be realised through national governments recognising their 
‘responsibilities’ in adopting market-led reforms that supported macroeconomic 
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stability, trade liberalisation and open monetary and fiscal policies, all of which, it was 
believed would attract the levels of international trade and foreign investment 
required for sustained economic growth and development. Although already part of 
such a framework, other ‘market’ constituencies however brought their own self-
interest to bear on the policy process with their own particular set of expectations. 
Domestically, as I have already demonstrated in chapter 2, pharmaceutical firms for 
instance emphasised the need to protect their own profitability in an increasingly 
competitive global economy. As I shall show in chapter 6, in order to satisfy the 
expectations of this powerful industry abroad, the New Labour government was 
expected to put in place a series of suitably ‘investment-friendly’ policies, and create 
the right market conditions for firms through a series of demand and supply-side 
reforms.  
 
Alongside these ‘market’-orientated constituencies however, New Labour officials 
were also faced with an array of an altogether more ‘social’ set of constituencies. In 
keeping with the traditions of the Labour Party (see chapter 3), rank-and-file members 
as well as churches, other faith groups, NGOs, charities, trade unions, celebrities, and 
members of the general public all tended to view development in altogether more 
‘moral’ terms. Whether this morality was derived from a faith-based understanding of 
duty towards the poor, a commitment to international socialism and/or simply a belief 
in humanity, development was understood by these groups as a means of improving 
the lives of those presently trapped in poverty. Despite the plurality of voices in this 
particular constituency, expectations centred around an appeal for social justice on a 
global scale. Within their broader demands for a fairer world trade system and greater 
investment in education and healthcare, these groups called for the cancellation of the 
debt owed by the world’s poorest countries (chapter 5); urged pharmaceutical firms to 
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take far more seriously their responsibilities in the global fight against HIV and AIDS 
(chapter 6); and pressed national governments to increase the amount of overseas aid 
as a means of financing development (chapter 7). 
 
Fig. 4.2  Selected Constituencies and their Expectations in New Labour’s 
International Development Policymaking Process 
 
Constituency Expectations of Government Policy  
Business101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policies that not only “ensure firms are best able to compete effectively and create 
employment” but also “fit within the broad themes of delivering economic growth and 
balanced public finances, building a flexible high-skilled labour market, reforming public 
services and working towards a sustainable future”. 
 
Helping businesses influence economic decision-making.  
 
Improving education and skills.   
 
“A forward-looking approach to employment law…to promote economic growth”.  
 
The need for “a healthy financial system to help businesses to invest and grow” (see 
also Financial Market Investors). 
 
“The UK economy can only grow with the right infrastructure powering it”.  
 
“A competitive tax regime [for businesses] to prosper in an increasingly globalised 
economy”.  
Churches and other 
faith groups102 
 
 
 
The ‘moral’ imperative of development is supplemented by a faith-based dimension. A 
number of leading NGOs such as Christian Aid, Tearfund, and World Vision have their 
roots in churches and rely heavily upon the support of Christians both in Britain and 
across the world. The expectations of these groups are underpinned by Biblical teaching 
concerning social justice and compassion for the poor.    
Commission for 
Africa103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Five pillars to “generate new thinking and effective action in Africa”:  
 
(1)  governance and capacity-building  
 
(2)  peace and security 
 
(3)  investing in people  
 
(4)  growth and poverty reduction 
 
(5)  more and fairer trade 
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 CBI (n. d) 
102
 Clifford (2010); Tearfund (2011); World Vision UK (2011) 
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Constituency Expectations of Government Policy  
Financial market 
investors104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not necessarily a question of simply more or less government regulation, but an issue of 
better government regulation. Market failure often occurs not because of the extent of 
state intervention, but because of the poor design of existing regulatory mechanisms.  
 
For markets to work at their optimal level, investors require information. One way in 
which governments can intervene more effectively in markets is by providing that 
information to enable investors to make appropriate market decisions.  
 
Greater transparency of macro and microeconomic decision-making processes. 
Standardised procedures will give financiers the confidence they need to invest in 
markets.  
 
Credible and sustainable economic policies; emphasis upon deflationary policies and 
low interest rates to encourage borrowing.  
 
Heavily securitised bonds with strong credit ratings in order to give investors the 
confidence that (government) borrowing will be repaid.       
GAVI Alliance105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In GAVI’s first six years (2000–2006) , the Alliance concentrated on two primary areas: 
 
(1) supplying new and underused vaccines 
(2) strengthening vaccine delivery systems 
 
During the second phase (2007–2010) GAVI sought to: 
 
 Contribute to the strengthening the capacity of the health system to deliver 
immunisation and other health services in a sustainable manner 
 
 Accelerate the uptake and use of underused and new vaccines and associated 
technologies and improve vaccine supply security 
 
 Increase the predictability and sustainability of long-term financing for national 
immunisation programmes 
 
 Increase and assess the added value of GAVI as a public-private global health 
partnership through improved efficiency, increased advocacy and continued 
innovation  
International 
Monetary and 
Financial Committee  
 
 
 
“Responsible for advising, and reporting to, the Board of Governors as it manages and 
shapes the international monetary and financial system, the IMFC also monitors 
developments in global liquidity and the transfer of resources to developing countries; 
considers proposals by the Executive Board to amend the Articles of Agreement; and 
deals with unfolding events that may disrupt the global monetary and financial 
system”.
106
 
  
                                                             
104
 On the expectations of financial investors see Mosely (2003); Sinclair (2005); Hall (2009).  
105
 GAVI Alliance (n. d – a, n. d – b)   
106
 IMF (2011) 
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Constituency Expectations of Government Policy  
International 
Monetary Fund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fundamental mission of the IMF is to help ensure stability in the international 
system through surveillance, lending and technical assistance.107  
 
(1) Surveillance:  
“When a country joins the IMF, it agrees to subject its economic and financial policies to 
the scrutiny of the international community. It also makes a commitment to pursue 
policies that are conducive to orderly economic growth and reasonable price stability, to 
avoid manipulating exchange rates for unfair competitive advantage, and to provide the 
IMF with data about its economy. The IMF’s regular monitoring of economies and 
associated provision of policy advice is intended to identify weaknesses that are causing 
or could lead to financial or economic instability”.
108
 
 
(2) Lending:   
“IMF loans are meant to help member countries tackle balance of payments problems, 
stabilize their economies, and restore sustainable economic growth”.109 
 
(3) Technical assistance: 
 “The IMF shares its expertise with member countries by providing technical assistance 
and training in a wide range of areas, such as central banking, monetary and exchange 
rate policy, tax policy and administration, and official statistics. The objective is to help 
improve the design and implementation of members’ economic policies, including by 
strengthening skills in institutions such as finance ministries, central banks, and 
statistical agencies”.110 
 
The IMF expects national governments to pursue policies that are conducive to its own 
remit to “foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate 
international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and 
reduce poverty around the world”.111 
Labour Party 
membership,
112
 
including trade 
unions113  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A fairer world, in which wealth and opportunity are shared by all. Core Labour values of 
equality and social justice should determine how Britain engages with the rest of the 
world.   
 
Emphasis upon ‘the moral case’ to alleviate poverty, protect human rights and promote 
democracy.  
 
A commitment to global solidarity, supporting people around the world in their struggle 
to avoid persecution, to achieve decent standards of healthcare, education, 
employment and the right to say how they are governed.  
 
The untying of aid from blanket economic conditions to political reform instead, such as 
decent labour standards, democracy, good governance and the promotion of equality. 
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 IMF (n. d – a) 
108
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109
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 TUC (2009a, 2009b, 2009c); UNISON (2009); Unite (2009) 
 
218 
Constituency Expectations of Government Policy  
Non-Governmental 
Organisations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“To improve the policies that impact on the lives of people in poverty”.114  
 
Expectations will vary but typically these agencies will:   
 
 Place greater emphasis upon the social rather than the economic case for 
development, and be driven by moral concern rather than the reasons of self-
interest  
 
 Use different discourses of development. For instance, ‘debt cancellation’ rather 
than ‘debt sustainability’; ‘poverty eradication’ rather than ‘alleviation’ 
 
 Call for more tailored, more community-based approaches to development rather 
than the blanket, one-size-fits-all models prescribed in the past by global 
development agencies 
 
 Focus upon the broader social impacts of development, e.g. the implications for 
women and children, welfare and education rather than simply the economic 
concerns 
 
 Seek a fairer, more equitable international system both in terms of trading and 
democratic representation in the institutions of global governance 
Pharmaceutical 
industry115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The life science industry is a critical part of the knowledge economy and key to the UK’s 
global economic competitiveness”. It therefore “needs a better environment to foster 
and reward innovation if it is to continue to be a world-leader in life sciences…world-
class R&D skills, a competitive framework for undertaking clinical trials and an attractive 
business environment to maintain jobs and investment in the UK”.  
 
To achieve this, the government should: 
 
 Reduce burdens on employers  
 
 Review the tax system to improve the UK’s international competitiveness and 
introduce new tax regimes, such as the “patent box”, to support the generation, 
retention and exploitation of intellectual property in the UK 
 
 Support small and medium-sized enterprises by simplifying R&D tax credits and 
making them more widely applicable 
 
 Accelerate the formation of globally competitive life science clusters by providing 
incentives for companies to locate in the UK 
  
                                                             
114
 BOND (n. d) 
115
 ABPI (2009: 5)  
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Constituency Expectations of Government Policy 
The World Bank Group  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The World Bank Group comprises of two institutions. The first, the International 
Development Association (IDA) aims to reduce poverty in the world’s poorest countries 
by providing interest-free credits and grants for programmes that boost economic 
growth, reduce inequalities and improve people’s living conditions.116  It emphasises 
broad-based growth, based upon: 
 
 Sound economic policies, rural development, private business and sustainable 
environmental practices 
 
 Investment in people, in education and health, especially in the struggle against HIV 
and AIDS, malaria and TB 
 
 Expansion of borrower capacity to provide basic services and ensure accountability 
for public resources 
 
 Recovery from civil strife, armed conflict and natural disaster 
 
 The promotion of trade and regional integration 
 
The second institution, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) aims to “reduce poverty in middle-income and creditworthy poorer countries by 
promoting sustainable development through loans, guarantees, risk management 
products, and analytical and advisory services. IBRD raises most of its funds on the 
world's financial markets and has become one of the most established borrowers since 
issuing its first bond in 1947. The income that IBRD has generated over the years has 
allowed it to fund development activities and to ensure its financial strength, which 
enables it to borrow at low cost, and offer clients good borrowing terms”.117 
World Trade 
Organization
118
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A country should not discriminate between its trading partners and it should not 
discriminate between its own and foreign products, services or nationals. 
 
Trade barriers such as customs duties (or tariffs) and measures such as import bans or 
quotas should be lowered in order to encourage trade. 
 
Foreign companies, investors and governments should be confident that trade barriers 
should not be raised arbitrarily. With stability, transparency and predictability, 
investment is encouraged, jobs are created and consumers can fully enjoy the benefits 
of competition — choice and lower prices. 
 
Unfair practices, such as export subsidies and dumping products at below cost to gain 
market share are to be discouraged. 
 
Less developed countries should be given greater flexibility, special privileges and more 
time to adjust to the more unfamiliar and, perhaps, difficult WTO provisions. 
 
The WTO’s agreements permit members to take measures to safeguard public health 
and protect the environment. However, these measures must be applied in the same 
way to both national and foreign businesses. In other words, members must not use 
public health protection measures as a means of disguising protectionist policies. 
 
Although this table provides a fairly comprehensive list of constituencies, there are a 
number of constituencies who for methodological reasons I have not included here. 
Perhaps the most surprising of these omissions are other countries, both developing 
and developed, who the New Labour government sought to help and engage with 
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respectively. Normatively speaking, one would assume that since they are the 
recipients of government policy, the expectations of developing countries would be 
heavily prioritised in the policymaking process. Likewise, since New Labour deemed 
these issues to be of a global concern (requiring global solutions) one might expect the 
expectations of developed countries to also be included. Indeed a key part of New 
Labour’s strategy was to try to build support amongst rich countries for its proposals to 
address the key areas of debt relief, disease and aid in the developing world. However, 
the sheer extent of problems that developing countries face and which lie at the heart 
of global poverty means that tabulating these types of expectations in any coherent 
fashion is virtually impossible. There are all manner of outcomes that both rich and 
poor countries alike may well seek, including improved economic and social 
development; an eradication of poverty, disease and debt; properly targeted and 
sustained investment; autonomy in economic decision-making and political self-
determination; a fairer and more representative international system; and an 
increased access to developed country markets. However, quite how these outcomes 
should be achieved and incorporated into policy solutions remains a matter of 
considerable debate. A series of collapsed trade talks, slow progress towards debt 
relief, a failure to secure universal access to essential medicines, broken promises over 
aid commitments all demonstrate that there has been little in the way of agreement 
amongst developed countries, let alone between developed and developing countries, 
as to the most effective way of ending global poverty. 
 
A further constituency that has been left out of the analysis is the British public. Again, 
this may appear to be somewhat surprising given the apparent popularity of the 
Chancellor’s Gift Aid initiative since its launch in 1997,119 and the generosity displayed 
by Britons following a number of major humanitarian crises. As Labour had noted 
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previously in its Policy Review, the British public had shown unprecedented generosity 
in donating large sums of money to the Ethiopian relief effort in the mid-1980s.120 This 
was topped by the response to the Boxing Day tsunami that affected large parts of 
South East Asia in 2004, when £300 million was donated by Britons.121 Despite this 
munificence, however, global poverty remained a low priority for voters. As Jennifer 
van Heerde and David Hudson have noted, even in 2005 when, as I noted in chapter 1, 
international development dominated the political and social agenda, it remained “a 
low-salience issue” amongst the electorate.122 It is precisely this divide between public 
levels of ‘giving’ and actual ‘understanding’ that has led Ian Smillie to suggest that “in 
general, public support for development assistance is a mile wide and an inch deep”.123 
Given this tension, it is virtually impossible to assimilate a linear set of expectations. 
Therefore, rather than attempt to capture these expectations as a unified bloc, I have 
instead subsumed into other, more discrete constituencies such as faith groups, NGOs 
and/or the Labour Party itself, the British public and the various expectations that it as 
an aggregated constituency might otherwise hold. 
 
As the case studies that follow this chapter show, those constituencies that I have 
included in Fig. 4.2 engaged in extensive dialogue with New Labour officials, making it 
quite clear what their expectations were of government policy, and what the 
government should be aiming to achieve in the developing world. Conversely, the 
speeches and statements delivered by ministers and other officials concerning 
government policy act as a gauge as to the level of influence that these constituencies, 
in voicing their expectations, were able to exert within New Labour’s policymaking 
process. This would reveal those constituencies that the government prioritised at a 
given time, and equally, those whose expectations it marginalised. Both the extent to 
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which New Labour transmitted its domestic policies into the global polity and the 
division of expectations contained within its international development policies reveals 
the overall character of New Labour’s political economy.  
 
Before turning to these empirical case study chapters that demonstrate the different 
aspects of this character, I return to the themes of temporality and contingency that I 
explored at the beginning of the thesis. New Labour’s management of the policy 
process was by no means static, and again, as each of the case studies will show, each 
set of policies underwent changes that altered the emphasis, trajectory and character 
of New Labour’s commitment to matters relating to global poverty. Supporting the 
major claim of the thesis concerning the ‘internationalisation’ of New Labour’s 
domestic political economy, the following chapters will also assess the extent to which 
Whitehall officials, in seeking to end global poverty, internalised the expectations of 
these constituencies, and modified policy accordingly over time in order to meet and 
accommodate these expectations. 
  
Charting the Temporality and Contingency of New Labour’s International  
Development Policies 
Building upon the explanatory framework shown at the start of the thesis in Fig. 1.2, 
the diagram shown in Fig. 4.3 (overleaf) will be operationalised in each of the case 
studies to illustrate the temporality of government policy, and the processes of change 
that each policy strategy underwent during New Labour’s time in office. On the basis 
of the evidence presented in each of the three distinct phases, I demonstrate 
schematically the key policy instigators within Whitehall, the changing relationships 
between each of the respective government departments, and the different policy 
constituencies with whom there was ministerial dialogue.  
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Fig. 4.3  Tracing the Contingency of New Labour’s International Development 
Strategy over Time: a Policy Matrix of ‘Market’ and ‘Social’ Imperatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dummy framework shows that the ‘social’ constituency has remained firmly 
committed to a ‘social’ form of development over time, whilst demonstrating a gradual 
acceptance of market imperatives. For its part, the ‘market’ constituency has started 
to accept its ‘social’ responsibilities whilst retaining its commitment to ‘market’ 
imperatives. The government department however, has moved away from its initial 
position in which it prioritised ‘the social’ aspect of development to one that is much 
more in line with the expectations of market-based constituencies.  
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Once operationalised in the case study chapters, this explanatory framework 
demonstrates the spatial distance between the various Whitehall departments on the 
one hand, most notably DFID and the Treasury, and the expectations of these policy 
constituencies listed in Fig. 4.2 on the other. Consequently, this allows in each of the 
case studies a picture to be built up that reveals the changing orientation of New 
Labour’s overarching commitment to eliminate world poverty. Running alongside this 
analysis will be the competing expectations held by these two different sets of 
constituencies: one that viewed the issue of development through the lens of ‘the 
market’, and the other that viewed it in altogether more ‘social’ terms. Given the 
polarity between these two sets of constituencies, attempts at building a coherent 
‘joined-up’ set of policies on the basis of dialogue with these two groups would clearly 
be problematic for the New Labour government as it sought to meet its own 
commitment concerning global poverty. This particular observation is significant in the 
light of the main claim of the thesis concerning the transmission of policies from the 
domestic to the international sphere. If, as I claim, there was a pattern of policy 
‘internationalisation’ in New Labour’s development policies then in order to overcome 
the problem of policy incoherence abroad, one would expect government policy to 
meet the expectations of those constituencies that New Labour had prioritised at 
home. To test this claim empirically, it is necessary to identify those constituencies 
whose expectations were incorporated into New Labour’s international development 
policies in each of my chosen case studies, and how these patterns of assimilation 
altered over time.  
 
Conclusions 
Split into two parts, this chapter has explored the ways in which New Labour’s 
policymaking process was managed, both at home and abroad. The first and most 
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prominent part of this chapter explored in broadly empirical terms the institutional 
dominance that was exerted by the Treasury across Whitehall in the design of New 
Labour’s domestic and international political economy. Here the Treasury was 
identified as the pilot agency for the socialisation of economic policy with a remit that 
was to extend further than it had before, reaching across Whitehall into virtually all 
areas of government spending policy and beyond. The imprint of the Treasury’s 
influence would be writ large over the delivery of New Labour’s political economy. The 
institutional measures designed by Gordon Brown and his advisor, Ed Balls gave the 
Treasury, under Brown’s chancellorship, unparalleled influence in all areas of policy, 
both at home and abroad. The second part of this chapter identified those 
constituencies with whom New Labour officials engaged in the policy areas that the 
three case studies focus upon, staking out the expectations that the former had of 
government policy in the field of international development. In concluding this 
chapter, I draw out the key implications of my analysis here for the claims of the thesis.  
 
The dominance of the Treasury under New Labour should not be understood simply in 
terms of the control it exercised over the strings of the public purse. Clearly, this was 
part of it and Brown’s initial commitment to ‘prudence’ and his pledge to stick to the 
spending limits imposed by the previous Conservative government would appear, 
initially at least, to reinforce the control that the Chancellor was able to exert over his 
cabinet colleagues. However, this ‘hair-shirtism’ was only part of Brown’s carefully 
planned model of political economy. What was far more important to the Chancellor 
was ‘credibility’, both amongst the electorate and crucially, the financial markets 
whose support New Labour required in order to fulfil its policy objectives. On the 
advice of Ed Balls, ‘credibility’ would become the cornerstone of New Labour’s political 
economy. Acquiring this credibility however would mean relinquishing, or at least 
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appearing to relinquish control of certain policy instruments such as monetary policy, 
and designing an economic strategy that, once locked-in, would reassure financial 
constituencies by offering greater stability, transparency and openness for investors.  
 
As well as securing this credibility however, there was a further political pay-off for the 
Chancellor. Having handed over responsibility for the setting of interest rates to the 
newly established Monetary Policy Committee, Brown could concentrate on supply-
side concerns and orientating New Labour’s economic policy towards meeting its social 
objectives. The credibility that was gained through Brown’s initial prudence and 
institutional reform enabled the Chancellor to reveal the purpose of this prudence, 
namely increased public spending in areas such as healthcare and education, and tax 
cuts. There was however also a global purpose to this prudence, and having stuck 
assiduously to spending limits overseas – as he had done at home – in the first two 
years of New Labour’s time in office, the Chancellor subsequently increased Britain’s 
contribution in the fight against global poverty. The pattern of prudent spending that 
the Treasury would follow abroad would match that of its spending commitments at 
home with the fiscal climate, rather than any moral imperative, dictating the amount 
of money that would be made available.  
 
The strategy designed by Gordon Brown and Ed Balls in order to secure credibility had 
given the Chancellor greater scope to intervene in the setting of policy across 
Whitehall. Nowhere was this more evident than in the area of international 
development, an area in which Brown took a keen interest. Under Brown’s 
chancellorship, the Treasury (rather than DFID) became the focal point of New 
Labour’s international development strategy. Brown’s appointment as Chair of the 
IMFC in Washington hard-wired New Labour’s political economy into the nébuleuse of 
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these international financial institutions, and enabled the Treasury to take the policy 
lead over matters relating to global poverty. The ‘post-Washington Consensus’, the 
conventional wisdom espoused by the IFIs, validated the domestic reforms carried out 
by New Labour concerning central bank independence, and the introduction of clearly 
defined standards and codes in order to maintain stability, openness, and transparency 
for market investors. As I shall demonstrate in the following chapter, this transmission 
of policy thinking between Whitehall and Washington would enable the further 
internationalisation of these reforms into the developing world. Here the Chancellor 
sought to create a new global financial architecture into which developing, or more 
specifically, heavily indebted countries were to be integrated as a means of putting 
them on the path towards debt relief, economic growth and sustainable development. 
 
As each of the following case studies show, New Labour’s international development 
policies bore the considerable imprimatur of the Treasury. As at home, this would give 
the appearance of policy being designed and delivered in a far more integrated, or in 
New Labour-speak, ‘joined-up’ manner. However, this would have a considerable 
impact upon the array of different constituencies who sought to engage with the 
government – and indeed who the government sought to engage – over issues relating 
to global poverty. In the final part of this chapter, these constituencies and their 
expectations of government policy were identified and mapped out. Although the 
incorporation (or otherwise) of these constituencies into New Labour’s international 
development policies will be explored in the following chapters, it is clear from the 
different expectations that not all these constituencies could be assimilated equally 
into the government’s policymaking process. Some would inevitably be prioritised over 
others. If, as I argue throughout the thesis, there was a distinct transposition of New 
Labour’s domestic policies into its international development policies, then it is likely 
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that the government would give precedence to those constituencies it had supported 
at home. In the following case study chapters I test this claim empirically: firstly, by 
exploring those elements of New Labour’s domestic political economy that found their 
way into its international development policies; secondly, by identifying those 
constituencies New Labour prioritised in this process of policy transmission; and 
thirdly, by revealing the contingency of these processes – of policy transmission and 
constituency assimilation – that occurred over time. 
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Chapter 5  
 
A Matter of Life and Debt: New Labour and 
the Debt Relief Process    
 
Through its analysis of New Labour’s domestic political economy (explored in chapter 
2) and the strategic, historical, and institutional context within which the Party’s 
commitment to international development was located (chapters 3 and 4), the first 
part of the thesis has provided the framework necessary to conceptualise the political 
economy of New Labour’s international development policies whilst in office. The 
purpose of this second part of the thesis is to take this framework as a means of 
explaining how New Labour addressed the three key areas of its international 
development policies: debt relief, HIV and AIDS, and overseas aid. Using a series of 
three case studies, each one assessing New Labour’s response to these development 
issues, I operationalise this framework by demonstrating empirically the three core 
themes of the thesis: (1) the internationalisation of policy ideas as they there 
transposed from one spatial scale of governance to the other; (2) the constituencies 
that New Labour engaged with throughout its policy process, and (3) the processes of 
change that New Labour’s policies – and subsequently the character of its political 
economy – underwent over time.  
 
Pursuing these lines of empirical inquiry will, I argue, yield two mutually-reinforcing 
findings: firstly, the changing character of New Labour’s political economy; and, 
secondly, the likelihood of policy success within the sphere of international 
development. The success of New Labour’s international development policies will, I 
contend, be contingent upon the character of its political economy, something which 
itself would be shaped by the way in which the government formulated and 
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implemented policy, the constituencies and the expectations it prioritised, and 
concomitantly, those it sidelined. Interrogation of the character of New Labour’s 
political economy in this respect provides a measure of the government’s success in 
meeting its commitments towards those living in the developing world. 
 
The first of these case studies, rather appropriately, assesses the first of the many 
forays into the realm of international development that the New Labour government 
made during its time in office. The issue of debt relief was central to New Labour’s 
stated desire to eliminate global poverty, and it would become a hugely important 
instrument in freeing up the financial resources urgently required to meet this aim. 
Alongside the other means of development finance, such as increases in bilateral aid 
and the Treasury’s own proposals for an International Finance Facility (IFF) assessed in 
chapter 7, debt relief provided an important means by which the most heavily 
indebted of these poor countries could finance the projects needed for their 
development and growth. Eligibility for debt relief, like the aid that would be made 
available through the IFF, would be dependent upon recipient countries meeting a 
certain set of conditions laid out by the international community. However, where my 
analysis of the IFF links the disbursement of aid with the discourse of ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ and the language of welfare, or more specifically, ‘the New Deal’, that 
New Labour had articulated at home (see chapter 2), the case study I assess here 
concerning New Labour’s approach to debt relief examines the material effects of 
these global ‘responsibilities’, and what they looked like in practice. I argue in this 
chapter that these ‘responsibilities’ were designed to embed the economies of heavily 
indebted poor countries (HIPCs) into a qualitatively ‘new’ international financial 
architecture; an arrangement of state-market relations based upon the framework of 
the ‘post-Washington Consensus’ (PWC), discussed previously in chapter 4. Although 
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designed principally for the global polity, this new architecture was derived upon a 
similar set of reforms that New Labour officials working within the Treasury had 
introduced to the management of Britain’s economy in order to minimise the risk of 
exposure to market volatility and instability in the global economy.  
 
New Labour’s approach to management of the global economy was derived from its 
almost unwavering belief in market liberalism. Here, UK government officials time and 
again reiterated their commitment to open markets and to pursue policies that 
facilitated, rather than hindered international market activity. By opening up the global 
economy still further, increased flows of international capital could reach developing 
countries, encouraging growth and reducing poverty. This acceptance of free market 
activity was complemented by a tremendous enthusiasm to work closely alongside the 
existing Bretton Woods and other international financial institutions (IFIs) to introduce 
a ‘new’, rules-based financial architecture that would enable global capitalism to be 
made to work for the world’s poor. For British Treasury officials, this new financial 
architecture was required to maintain the stability that, under the terms of the PWC 
was identified as being essential for market-led development. This macroeconomic 
stability was to be achieved through national governments adhering to internationally-
agreed codes of conduct relating to standards of fiscal and monetary discipline, market 
openness, accountability and transparency. Granting the IFIs the power to monitor the 
policymaking activities of national economies, these measures would lock-in economic 
prudence and discipline, and provide market actors with the context in which they 
could now make more informed investment decisions.  
 
I argue in this chapter that the mechanisms designed in support of this new 
architecture provided the opportunity for the IFIs to discipline much more extensively 
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the governments of these heavily indebted poor countries. Debt sustainability would 
only be granted to HIPCs who were prepared to orientate their economies towards the 
demands of this new financial architecture; whether the country concerned was willing 
or not to open up its borders to the global economy, and whether it was prepared to 
create an appropriate institutional policy framework that would maintain the stability 
that market investors sought. Therefore although the HIPC process and latterly, the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) were created under the pretext of poverty 
reduction and development, both were in fact based upon “market-reinforcing 
reforms”,1 designed to encourage a process of “market civilization”.2 Embedding these 
reforms into this new global architecture through a clearly defined system of standards 
and codes enabled IFIs and other market actors to – in Foucauldian terms –
‘panoptically’ monitor the performance and policy activities of national governments.3  
 
Since the market-led development sought by both Whitehall and Washington relied 
upon the flows of trade and inward investment, this architecture was designed to 
meet the expectations of market actors. In meeting this particular set of expectations 
however, this panopticism simultaneously restricted the policy activities of debtor 
governments, further undermining their economic sovereignty and autonomy as they 
embarked upon the process towards debt relief. With the full and explicit support of 
the New Labour government, these debtor countries were coerced into pursuing a 
distinct set of economic policies that met the criteria of this new global financial 
architecture, while at the same time giving the IFIs increased scope to discipline and 
punish the ‘inappropriate’ or ‘unsound’ monetary and fiscal activities of national 
governments. In many respects then my claims here are similar to those made by 
Susanne Soederberg who has argued that this architecture has merely recreated the 
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conditions for capital accumulation, masking the relations of power and exploitation 
that underpin it, and in effect serving as a form of social discipline.4 Foucault’s 
depiction of power is a useful metaphor to describe how, under the new arrangements 
of this new global architecture, the balance of power has continued to favour 
economic elites in the global North.  
 
Two key issues emerge from this line of argument, both of which support the broader 
claims of this thesis. Firstly, there were strong linkages between the formation of New 
Labour’s macroeconomic strategy at home, and the design of this new financial 
architecture abroad. At home, as I argued in chapter 2, Treasury officials set about 
building a model of political economy sensitive to the perceived demands of the global 
economy and based upon a ‘rules-based’ system of openness and accountability. The 
emphasis upon transparency was crucial since New Labour ministers understood 
instability to occur when market actors lacked full information. To secure the 
government’s principal goal of macroeconomic stability, government officials, already 
committed to increased market liberalisation, deemed it both logical and necessary to 
provide market actors with the information they required to make the appropriate 
investment decisions that would maintain this stability. Through the creation of a 
series of credible, binding standards that investors could rely upon, both at home and 
abroad, New Labour pursued a two-fold strategy of maintaining open markets and 
creating an institutional framework that would support macroeconomic stability and 
policy credibility. While at home this was a strategy created to meet the expectations 
of domestic market investors, abroad its principles were reproduced to underpin the 
building of a new international financial architecture based upon macroeconomic 
stability, policy transparency, and clear and binding rules. In this chapter I argue this 
was achieved through a strong and distinct transmission of policy between Whitehall 
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and Washington that embedded the New Labour project squarely within what chapter 
4 describes as the global nébuleuse of these international economic institutions. 
Crucially however, New Labour’s response to the debt crisis only served to reinforce 
disciplinary forms of debt relief such as the HIPC process and MDRI across the 
developing world.  
 
Such an assessment brings me to the second set of issues that the thesis explores. 
Following this line of argument raises important questions concerning New Labour’s 
commitment to the moral dimension of debt relief, and the extent to which concerns 
centred upon ideas of global justice and equality were taken seriously by government 
ministers. A rapidly-expanding civil society coalition, which drew together not only 
NGOs, faith groups and celebrities but also core Labour constituencies such as 
grassroots party members and trade unions, viewed the continued indebtedness of 
poor countries as at best a form of Western usury, or at worst, economic slavery.5 Both 
collectively and individually, these groups were unanimous in singling out the IFIs as 
being to blame for their mismanagement of the crisis. Rather than a further round of 
debt rescheduling, they argued that what was required was outright debt forgiveness, 
root-and-branch institutional and ideological reform of the IFIs, greater representation 
of the global poor, and a (re)-orientation towards a form of development that was 
focused less upon market-led growth and more upon those most at risk from the 
systemic failures present in the global economy.  
 
The argument made by these constituencies posed New Labour officials with a 
dilemma. Government ministers could not ignore this increasingly vociferous civil 
society coalition, yet as this chapter shows, they persisted in embedding this new 
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financial architecture within the existing institutional and ideological framework of 
these heavily-criticised IFIs. This is not to say that New Labour ministers completely 
sidelined the civil society coalition. Indeed, government officials would frequently 
meet senior figures and representatives of different parts of this movement, often 
going so far as to borrow the language and the imagery of these constituencies to 
signal their support for these expectations and their commitment to deeper and faster 
debt relief. However, government officials deployed these discourses selectively and 
managed these particular expectations carefully in the formation of policy narratives. 
Only those that fitted New Labour’s appeal for a new global financial architecture were 
included, and those which were would be frequently used to legitimise the 
government’s debt relief policy to this particular audience. Those elements however 
that challenged New Labour’s received economic orthodoxy were either simply 
ignored or criticised as being outdated and out-of-step with the assumed realities that 
faced by states in the new global economy.  
 
To demonstrate these arguments, this opening case study proceeds by tracing the 
evolution of New Labour’s debt relief policies from the legacy of the HIPC initiative 
that the Party took up upon arrival into office in 1997. Although, as I shall demonstrate 
in each of the other case study chapters, New Labour’s development policy throughout 
its time in government would go through several stages, the evolution of its debt relief 
strategy was far more pronounced in terms of the points at which it evolved. The 
Chancellor’s ‘Mauritius Mandate’ launched in 1997, and the G8 summit in Birmingham 
the following year provided the first of many opportunities for New Labour to take its 
proposals for a new approach to debt relief to an international audience. The summit 
however also placed the issue firmly within the public arena since it gave civil society, 
under the umbrella of the Drop the Debt/Jubilee 2000 coalition, an increased 
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opportunity to press for faster and deeper levels of debt relief. New Labour ministers, 
their counterparts in the G8 and the IFIs signalled a willingness to reform the initiative 
with the agreement of the Enhanced HIPC initiative at the Cologne G8 summit in 1999. 
This, it transpired, paved the way for the formation of the MDRI introduced at the 
2005 G8 summit in Gleneagles. Rather than looking explicitly at these initiatives, I 
focus upon their discursive formation in the light of the new financial architecture. Out 
of these movements, I map out New Labour’s debt relief strategy into three distinct 
phases. 
 
This particular chapter follows these changing phases as a means of tracing and 
characterising the political economy of New Labour’s debt relief policy. It charts the 
efforts made by the New Labour government to position itself at the heart of this new 
‘post-Washington Consensus’ through its appeal for a new global financial 
architecture, and its response to the growing voices within civil society who were 
demanding a fairer and more just resolution to the debt crisis. Having already made a 
few brief remarks concerning the debt crisis, and its significance for the developing 
world in chapter 3, the focus of this chapter is upon the policy measures that New 
Labour endorsed and undertook while in government. Evaluating the content of these 
policies at specific moments in time tells us a great deal, not simply of New Labour’s 
debt relief strategy, but more broadly, of the character of its domestic and 
international political economy as it unfolded during its time in office.  
 
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative  
Arguably the most significant, and certainly the most durable set of debt relief 
measures proposed by the international community was the HIPC initiative, agreed in 
1996. Although this initiative predated New Labour’s time in office, it nevertheless 
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provided the framework within which the Blair government’s own nascent debt relief 
strategy would be embedded. It is therefore appropriate that I briefly examine the 
mechanics of the HIPC initiative before turning my attention to how New Labour 
animated its own debt relief policy within the strategic context of this initiative. It is 
from this point that my analysis of New Labour’s debt relief strategy proceeds. It is 
within this framework that in the later part of this chapter, I demonstrate how 
Treasury officials set about incrementally reforming the HIPC debt relief process by 
institutionalising at a global level the financial architecture that would reinforce New 
Labour’s domestic political economy.  
 
Emerging in part out of a proposal in the mid-1990s by John Major’s Conservative 
government, the HIPC initiative laid out a commitment by multilateral organisations 
and governments to work together in order to reduce to sustainable levels the 
external debt burdens of the most heavily indebted poor countries. It was designed to 
ensure that “no poor country faces a debt burden it cannot manage”.6 By ruling out 
straightaway the idea of debt forgiveness, this statement of intent by the IMF 
polarised the core constituencies that New Labour would face in the formation of its 
own response to the debt crisis. Much to the chagrin of debt activists, the HIPC 
initiative did not promise to cancel the debts of poor countries, but rather consolidate 
and reduce the debt burden to a sustainable or more manageable level. Rejecting out-
of-hand any notion of debt cancellation, the Deputy Director of the IMF’s African 
Department, G. E. Gondwe asked supporters of debt forgiveness to consider:  
 
Who would lend again to recipients of such cancellation? …Why 
should countries that have misused resources more than others have 
more of their debt cancelled? …and what guarantee was there that 
the money saved would be put to effective use?7 
                                                             
6
 IMF (2011a) 
7
 Gondwe (1998) 
 
238 
Gondwe went on to argue that moves towards total debt write-off would be “sadly 
mistaken”. Debt, he argued was “only one of many problems that Africa must grapple 
with”, while “the pressures to misallocate money are strong. Unconditional 
cancellation could risk debt relief being squandered on corruption, military 
expenditure, or grandiose projects with little, if any, benefit in terms of sustainable 
growth or poverty reduction”.8 Similar sentiments were expressed by the President of 
the World Bank Group, James Wolfensohn, who also pointed to the large losses that 
the Bank was likely to incur if these debts were written-off. These losses, Wolfensohn 
argued, would undermine the financing of the International Development Association 
(IDA) whose lending activities support the poorest countries by providing interest-free 
loans and grants.9 However, Wolfensohn’s claims reveal the paradox of the Bank’s 
lending practices. Although he suggests that these repayments were needed for the 
Bank to continue to underwrite the development in these countries, clearly, if these 
funds were retained by the debtor countries then this money could be used by these 
countries independently themselves to finance their own development. Under the 
existing terms of the initiative, HIPCs were in effect paying the Bank to finance their 
own development. Rather than supporting the ‘national ownership’ of development as 
the IFIs had promised under the terms of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme 
(PRSP), this recycling of repayments continued to give the Bank leverage to dictate the 
terms of development.  
 
The other side to the ‘debt sustainability’ discourse was supported by the IMF’s 
“principal mandate *which+ has been, and remains, the maintenance of international 
financial stability, without which sustained global growth would not be possible”.10 As 
the debt crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s showed, unsustainable debt clearly 
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constituted a grave risk to the stability of the global economy. It was therefore in the 
best interests of the Fund, as the guarantor of global macroeconomic stability, to 
address this threat. The HIPC initiative would ensure that borrowing countries lock-in 
the reforms necessary to prevent the accumulation and default of unsustainable debt 
in the future; maintain fiscal responsibility; and, as Ben Thirkell-White has remarked, 
act as a catalyst for private capital flows in an era of increased financial globalisation.11  
 
To secure this debt sustainability, the HIPC initiative was designed as a two-stage 
process: the initial ‘decision point’ and final ‘completion point’. In order to successfully 
reach the first of these two stages, the indebted country must fulfil four criteria. As this 
short section will show, by virtue of their orientation towards the neoliberal 
framework laid out in the PWC, these criteria were designed by the IFIs to discipline 
and ‘civilise’ developing countries to undertake the appropriate market and 
institutional reforms at the national level. For the IFIs, these criteria remained 
important, not simply as a means of securing debt sustainability, but more broadly, to 
enable developing countries to participate far more fully in the global economy and in 
doing so, confer the benefits of globalisation.  
 
In order to meet the first criteria, the HIPC must face an unsustainable debt burden 
which cannot be addressed through traditional debt relief mechanisms. For their part, 
the Bank and the Fund consider a debt burden to be unsustainable when it exceeds a 
debt-to-export ratio of 150 percent. Since it is, by definition, a ‘poor country’ initiative, 
in order to meet the second criteria the debtor country must be eligible – i.e. poor 
enough – to borrow from the IDA arm of the World Bank and the IMF’s Extended 
Credit Facility (ECF).12 These agencies act, in effect, lenders of last resort, since the 
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fundamental test of a country’s eligibility for access to IDA and ECF resources is its 
level of poverty (measured by per capita income) and its lack of creditworthiness for 
market-based borrowing, including both the commercial sector and from the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).13 Despite this lending 
status, such a form of borrowing does not exempt countries from having to meet 
“appropriate standards of performance”. IDA eligibility still depends upon countries 
meeting certain criteria – “of which macroeconomic stability is an important one” – 
before funds are released.14 Similarly, under the ECF, member countries agree to 
implement a set of policies “that will help them support significant progress toward a 
stable and sustainable macroeconomic position over the medium term”.15 
 
This emphasis upon macroeconomic reform is supported by the third and fourth 
criteria, both of which are interlinked through the conditionality imposed upon debtor 
governments. For HIPCs to secure relief there must be a firmly established track-record 
of reform and ‘sound’ policies through IMF and World Bank supported programmes. 
The emphasis upon ‘sound’ policies is a recurring theme both of policy documents and 
in speeches made by IFI officials. It is interesting to note that, publically at least, very 
little is given away as to what these ‘sound policies’ actually look like in practice. The 
IFIs will often say why such policies are important. The Managing Director of the IMF, 
Horst Köhler, for instance identified “sound macroeconomic policies and domestic and 
international financial stability” as being the “preconditions for sustained growth”.16 
Anne Krueger, the Acting Managing Director of the Fund, continually underlined the 
importance of such policies, arguing that “sound fiscal policies give governments and 
citizens more choice” making it easier “for society to decide on its priorities”.17 Krueger 
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has also noted how “better policies” deliver “stability at the national level” thereby 
“greatly reducing the risk of instability at the global level”.18 Policy literature produced 
by the IMF notes how ‘sound’ economic policies are both desirable and necessary 
since they create “the room for fiscal stimulus without jeopardising economic 
stability”,19 and in doing so “*support+ economic growth”.20 However, what is striking 
about this continual appeal for ‘sound’ policies is the lack of any real description of 
what these, or indeed ‘unsound’ policies actually look like. Despite their absence in IFI 
policy discourse, they nevertheless form an integral part of contemporary 
development policy and the renewal of a global financial architecture in the era of the 
PWC.  
 
An implicit understanding – or perhaps even a straightforward disinclination – amongst 
IFI officials might preclude a discussion of what these ‘sound policies’ actually entail. 
For the purposes of the thesis however, it is important to offer a characterisation of 
such policies. Here the work of prominent World Bank economists, Craig Burnside and 
David Dollar is instructive. In their seminal work on aid and growth, they spell out quite 
explicitly what these ‘sound policies’ should look like in practice, and how these are to 
be embedded institutionally in an era of liberal market reforms. Situating their analysis 
within the framework of the PWC, Burnside and Dollar argue that ‘sound policies’ are 
those measures “that have been shown in a wide range of studies to promote growth: 
open trade regimes, fiscal discipline, and avoidance of high inflation”.21  
 
There is a clear link between the analysis offered by Burnside and Dollar, and the 
broader narratives of the IFIs concerning the importance of achieving and maintaining 
stability through ‘sound’ macroeconomic principles. If developing countries create the 
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right policy framework, that is, “if they stabilise their macroeconomic situations and 
liberalise their trade, they can create a sound environment for investment and 
growth”.22 Although “these policies will produce improved results even without an 
increase in a country’s receipts of aid” (which may also be read as debt relief), 
Burnside and Dollar argue that growth and poverty reduction will occur “significantly 
faster” in countries to which aid/debt relief is increased since these “increasing inflows 
of foreign aid, in and of themselves, increase the confidence of private investors in a 
country’s economy”. “In a sound policy environment” Burnside and Dollar go on to 
suggest, “aid attracts private investment, whereas in a poor policy environment, it 
displaces private investment”.23  
 
Burnside and Dollar’s logic underpins what Jeremy Gould terms as the “new 
conditionality” that supports both the HIPC initiative and the broader new global 
financial architecture.24 Rather than simply focusing upon policy outcomes – i.e. 
poverty reduction and debt relief – this ‘new’ conditionality seeks to influence the 
policy and decision-making processes designed to secure these outcomes. At the heart 
of this ‘process conditionality’ therefore is the role of institutions. If aid donors, 
creditors and market actors are confident that states have the institutional capacity to 
maintain market discipline and stabilise the macroeconomic environment, then these 
states are more likely to attract the flows of aid, debt relief and/or private investment 
necessary to support poverty reduction strategies. Conversely, poverty is more likely to 
remain in those areas with weak institutions since they are not able to sustain market 
confidence.    
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This appeal for developing countries to pursue ‘sound policies’ squares with the 
emphasis, explored in the previous chapter, that the PWC places upon more state-led 
forms of development, and putting in place the institutional reform required to make 
aid and debt relief ‘work’ and crucially, to attract private investment. However, rather 
than offering any radical move away from market-led development, the framework 
itself – and concomitantly, the HIPC initiative – remains orientated towards an 
approach to development designed to accommodate the preferences of global flows 
of finance and capital. Although framed within the ‘reformist’ language of the PWC, 
the continued emphasis upon macroeconomic stability and processes designed to 
tackle budgetary deficits and inflation, merely locks-in the neoliberal fundamentals 
that practitioners at the IFIs require to support greater integration into the global 
economy. Rather than looking to address the systemic fault-lines upon which debt had 
been allowed to accrue and which was now being serviced by these HIPCs, these 
institutions reinforced the need of debtor countries “to pursue cautious borrowing 
policies and strengthen their public debt management”.25 What is clearly striking 
about this caveat, as I shall explain later in this chapter, is the similarity of this 
discourse with the mantra of ‘prudence’ and ‘stability’ that Gordon Brown pursued 
through New Labour’s own economic policies at home.  
 
This emphasis upon ‘sound’ economics, poverty reduction, and a new, ‘process’-
orientated form of conditionality underpins the fourth criteria that debtor countries 
are required to meet in order to reach ‘decision point’ of the HIPC process. When the 
initiative was first launched in the mid-1990s, HIPCs were expected to have 
undertaken a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in order to restructure their 
economies. Towards the end of the decade however, these SAPs were phased out and 
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replaced with PRSPs, and debtor countries have since been required to have 
developed a PRSP through a broad-based participatory process in the country.  
 
These PRSPs promise to work in ‘partnership with the poor’ and offer increased 
‘country ownership’ of poverty reduction programmes.26  In many respects, PRSPs 
reflect the shift in emphasis from the old, policy-orientated ‘Washington Consensus’ to 
the newer, more process-orientated ‘post-Washington Consensus’ discussed in chapter 
4. What has remained however is the commitment to neoliberal ideas, reproduced in 
the narrative of ‘sound policies’ concerning open markets, macroeconomic stability, 
and monetary and fiscal discipline. Under the terms of the PWC, there would be much 
greater emphasis upon the role of the state in poverty reduction strategies. SAPs had 
failed to secure local ownership of policy, and this had undermined efforts towards 
economic development. By stressing the importance of processes and institutions 
however, PRSPs offered a putatively new means by which the overall aim of poverty 
reduction might be achieved. As Thirkell-White has argued, macroeconomic theory 
began to place an increasing emphasis upon ‘the economics of information’. 
Development practitioners and economists in Washington were becoming more 
interested in how institutional factors, particularly those promoting transparency and 
information provision could ensure efficient capital allocation.27 With a renewed 
emphasis upon the state, these PRSPs were designed to instil the ‘correct’ institutional 
processes to increase and support flows of finance into the economy, whether through 
aid, debt relief or private investment.  
 
However, the underlying commitment to deflationary policies in these PRSPs presents 
a problem for this ‘process’ conditionality. There is a clear conflict between the 
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monetary and fiscal discipline that remains an integral part both of the HIPC process 
and the broader framework of the PWC, and the high levels of government spending 
that is required to support poverty reduction programmes. The fear amongst policy 
officials was that increased government expenditure would lead to the inflationary 
pressures that would clearly run contrary to the ‘stability’ and ‘sound policies’ sought 
by the IFIs, donors and market actors. As the World Bank made clear:   
 
Stability requires a monetary and fiscal policy stance consistent with 
maintaining public sector solvency at low levels of inflation, while 
leaving some scope for mitigating the impact of real and financial 
shocks on macroeconomic performance.28  
 
Even the altogether more ‘development-friendly’ United Nations Development 
Programme has argued that “an expansion of public expenditures is only desirable 
when it does not compromise short-term macroeconomic stability”.29 Both statements 
suggest that macroeconomic discipline should be prioritised over any spending plans a 
government may have, leaving HIPCs facing a trade-off between playing by the strict 
deflationary rules of the neoliberal game on the one hand, and making the necessary 
investments in poverty reduction and development on the other. This scenario, of 
course, presents developing countries with a further dilemma since it is the same 
institutions that set the rules of the game, and that also hold the purse-strings for the 
funding required for development. Understood in this light, the commitment towards 
increased ‘country ownership’ would appear to be very hollow indeed.  
   
Even having met these criteria – and therefore reaching the ‘decision point’ – it still 
remains up to the Executive Boards of the IMF and World Bank to formally decide 
whether or not the country in question is eligible to receive debt relief. Should these 
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institutions be satisfied with the progress made by the debtor country, they will 
recommend that its creditors commit to reducing debt to a level that is considered 
sustainable. Once a country successfully reaches this ‘decision point’, it may 
immediately begin receiving interim relief on its debt servicing as it falls due, and start 
to take the second step towards ‘completion point’. This second stage ensures that the 
debtor country receives full and irrevocable debt reduction. To achieve this second 
stage however, the country still needs to meet a further three set of policy conditions 
to reassure its creditors and demonstrate its commitment to the ‘sound’ policies 
pursued prior to ‘decision point’. Firstly, the debtor country must continue and 
establish a further track record of good performance under programmes supported by 
loans from the IMF and the World Bank. Secondly, it must implement satisfactorily key 
reforms agreed at the ‘decision point’, and thirdly, the country must adopt and 
implement its PRSP for at least a further year. Once a country meets these criteria, it 
reaches its ‘completion point’, which allows it to receive the full debt relief agreed at 
the earlier ‘decision point’. 
 
Since the late 1990s, the HIPC process has been embedded in the framework of the 
PWC to move countries away from a policy-led form of development to one orientated 
more towards the processes and institutions that support poverty reduction and 
economic growth. This change in direction has enabled the IFIs to rebrand the HIPC 
process as one that gives countries a greater sense of ‘ownership’ over their 
development. However, these attempts to institutionalise neoliberal reforms have 
resulted in a strong tendency to discipline and ‘civilise’ these countries into pursuing 
market-based reforms reflecting the preferences of international finance and capital. 
This can be seen most clearly in the prioritisation of ‘sound policies’; monetary and 
fiscal discipline, open markets and crucially, macroeconomic stability. These policies, I 
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argue lie at the heart of the new financial architecture supported vigorously both by 
the IFIs and the New Labour government. Indeed, as I shall argue in the remaining part 
of this chapter, picking up my argument from chapter 2, these were principles upon 
which New Labour’s domestic political economy were based, but which would now be 
transposed into the international sphere through the government’s debt relief 
strategy, and its commitment to building a new global financial architecture.  
 
Phase 1:  Sustainability, Stability and Sound Policies: New Labour’s  
Formative Debt Strategy 
New Labour staked its early development credentials upon supporting “further 
measures to reduce to reduce the debt burden borne by the world’s poorest 
countries”.30 An early test of this commitment came at the meeting of the 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers in Mauritius in September 1997, during which 
Gordon Brown set out the ‘Mauritius Mandate’. This five-point plan, the Chancellor 
promised, would lead to every eligible poor country in the Commonwealth having at 
least started to embark upon the process of securing a sustainable exit from debt by 
the year 2000. To meet this target, Brown committed the UK to: (1) helping countries 
meet the conditions to escape from the debt trap; (2) cancelling the remaining debt 
due to the UK from lower income Commonwealth countries, on the condition that 
they remain “committed to the ‘pro-poor’ policies, transparent and accountable 
government and sound economic policies”; (3) financing technical assistance to poor 
countries in the Commonwealth; (4) providing unconditional finance to the IMF Trust 
Fund, and (5) ensuring that export credits for poor, highly-indebted countries only 
support “productive expenditure”. Only those countries “with the strongest reform 
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programmes, including a focus on transparency and productive expenditure, should 
get the maximum possible relief needed to ensure their debt burden is sustainable”.31  
 
As a statement of intent it was ambitious to say the least, but the Mandate did at least 
confirm that the issue of developing world debt would be an important priority for the 
New Labour government. Although question marks remained over some of the 
Chancellor’s proposals, it was, by and large, welcomed by most NGOs. After all, it 
demonstrated the government’s commitment to go a considerable way in addressing 
the longstanding problem of debt in a relatively short space of time.32 Where NGOs did 
express concern, it was that the government’s approach remained, to borrow Paul 
Williams’ terms, “reformist rather than revolutionary”.33 Like the HIPC initiative, 
Brown’s ‘Mauritius Mandate’ emphasised the central importance of debt 
sustainability, rather than debt relief, and upon the ‘sound’ economic policies 
advocated by the IFIs. Number 10, together with Treasury ministers and DFID officials 
in particular acknowledged the importance of policies that encouraged ‘human 
development’. For these officials however, this normative commitment could only be 
realised through the pretext of ‘sound’ economic reforms. In this phase of policy, I 
assess the implications of these themes as British government ministers initially 
brought the issue of debt into the international arena. I also examine the significant 
role that civil society played during this period, and the impact that this set of 
constituencies had upon New Labour policy in this area.   
 
Despite the maelstrom of economic and social upheaval that debt had wreaked across 
the developing world over the previous two decades, DFID officials were convinced 
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that borrowing remained, in principle at least, a sound investment strategy. DFID’s first 
White Paper, for instance, acknowledged that nearly all developing countries need to 
import the capital necessary for development from abroad.34 This would suggest that 
New Labour was keen for the governments of developing countries to pursue a 
strategy of ‘neo-indebted industrialisation’, whereby the economic growth and 
development of these states would continue to be financed by borrowing on 
international capital markets. Such an assessment would also suggest that New Labour 
was dismissive of the claims made by some debt activists who argued that it was 
precisely this present system of continued borrowing that was keeping developing 
countries locked in a cycle of dependency and poverty. For DFID officials however, 
borrowing only became problematic when money was wasted or spent 
unproductively, loans began to accumulate and developing countries were faced with 
increasingly unsustainable debt burdens. As DFID’s 1997 White Paper argued, it was 
this “overhang of unpayable foreign debts” that was likely to “discourage new 
investment and therefore growth [thereby] creating a long-term barrier to 
development”.35 Policymakers clearly believed that countries could avoid this scenario 
by managing their loans more effectively, investing in capital productively and pursuing 
beneficial and transparent economic policies.  
 
There were clear similarities between the arguments put forward by Whitehall officials 
and those of Burnside and Dollar at the World Bank. Both pinpointed the causal effect 
of weak economic governance and an unsustainable debt burden upon 
macroeconomic instability and a subsequent lack of development, while the focus of 
the Blair government upon the processes and institutions rather than policy 
instruments echoed that of the emerging PWC. For there to be lasting poverty 
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reduction, national government institutions needed to pursue policies that would 
maintain macroeconomic stability. As a means of securing this “economic and financial 
stability”,36 New Labour’s principle goal was to achieve debt ‘sustainability’.37 As I 
noted in chapter 2, upon arriving into office, Brown stated that “high and stable levels 
of growth and employment” would be the central economic objective of the new 
government.38 “Stability with low inflation”, the Chancellor would later argue, was the 
first of five “building blocks of prosperity” needed to build the national economic 
purpose.39 However, this “*could+ only happen if we build from solid foundations of 
prudent economic management and sound finance”.40 Both at home and abroad, the 
link between maintaining macroeconomic stability and pursuing prudent or “sensible 
economic policies” was unmistakeable.41 Domestically, the high levels of national 
economic growth and employment sought by the Treasury could only be achieved 
through prudent economic decisions. Similarly, within the field of international 
development, poverty reduction strategies would only work if they were underpinned 
by ‘sound’ economic reforms.   
 
The character of these ‘sound’ reforms matched those that had been tacitly appealed 
to by IFIs: a continued orientation towards an open economy, macroeconomic 
stability, low inflation, market discipline, and monetary and fiscal rectitude. The 
Treasury was adamant that any commitment made by the international community 
towards debt relief must be matched with an equal commitment by the debtor 
countries to adopt and adhere to appropriate economic and structural reforms.42 The 
International Development Secretary, Clare Short was similarly clear on this point. 
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“Governments must have a good *economic+ track record to qualify for their first stage 
of debt relief, and their record must continue to be good”.43 As the World Bank and 
the IMF, in charge of the HIPC process had argued, debt relief would not take place 
until countries had taken onboard and institutionalised the neoliberal policy reforms 
required to sustain the poverty reduction strategies. 
 
This raised suspicions amongst civil society that these reforms were too heavily geared 
towards ‘process conditionality’ and penalising ‘poor macroeconomic performance’. 
Oxfam for instance, noted that these conditions continued to give “insufficient regard 
for their impact on the poor”.44 The international think-tank, the South Centre, argued 
that the PRSP programme, designed to institutionalise these reforms and ensure that 
HIPCs reached ‘decision point’, merely constituted a ‘rebranded’ form of the 
conditions to the old structural adjustment policies.45 Crucially, for debt campaigners, 
unsustainable debt was not a macroeconomic problem, but rather it was a human 
tragedy exacerbated by the greed and profiteering of Western lenders. The Jubilee 
Debt Campaign criticised the HIPC process as being “entirely controlled by 
creditors…not *accepting+ responsibility for their part in creating and maintaining the 
debt crisis… *and not allowing+ poor countries to have a say”.46 These processes of 
macroeconomic discipline and ‘market civilisation’ not only ensured that government 
policies reflected and accommodated the expectations of market constituencies, but 
actually undermined the ability of debtor countries to invest in adequate levels of 
healthcare, education and other forms of social welfare. Similar to those arguments 
put forward earlier in the chapter, World Vision also remarked that indebted countries 
were “allocating less than 15 percent of their budgets to the provision of basic services 
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such as health, education and water, while more than 40 percent was being used to 
repay debts”.47 
 
Despite the clear emphasis in the White Paper linking ‘debt sustainability’ to 
‘macroeconomic stability’, the significance of the ‘human’ dimension to the debt crisis 
was not entirely lost on New Labour officials. Tony Blair acknowledged that “some of 
those countries spend a vast proportion of the public money they spend simply on 
debt repayment, so that, of their overall expenditure, only a small percentage is left for 
trying to develop their countries”.48 Similarly, Clare Short recognised that policies and 
processes concerning debt should be designed to benefit the needy and the poor since 
“they are the ones who suffer the consequences of debt”.49 Gordon Brown went even 
so far as to argue that debt was a “moral issue” because “millions of people in the 
world’s poorest countries *were+ suffering because money that could be spent on 
health and education and on ensuring economic self-sufficiency is currently going to 
repay debt”.50 In its response to a report published by the Commons Select Committee 
on International Development, the Treasury maintained its stance that “unsustainable 
debt is a moral as well as an economic issue”.51 The assimilation of these two distinct 
narratives revealed how New Labour intended to frame its own debt strategy at this 
early stage, and how this enabled the government to appeal to the two main policy 
constituencies with whom Whitehall ministers were in dialogue.  
 
Politically, Tony Blair’s rejection of “doctrine…dogma *and+…a return to the past”,52 
and move instead towards what he termed “‘permanent revisionism’, a continual 
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search for better means to meet our goals”,53 meant that what really counted in policy 
terms was what worked. To meet the government’s commitments towards debt and 
poverty reduction, it was considered to be necessary to orientate the processes of 
institutions in developing countries towards the market as a means of stabilising their 
economies and setting them on the path towards development. Focusing upon the 
outcome, rather than the means enabled Whitehall officials to justify these policies as 
being ‘pro-poor’. Of course, to audiences in Washington the policies themselves 
represented ‘sensible’ policies and ‘sound’ reforms. The outcome however – the ‘pro-
poor’ narrative – was used as a discursive device in an attempt to appeal to those 
constituencies situated in civil society who had expressed concern at the ‘human’ or 
moral dimension to the debt crisis, which they argued had been sidelined in favour of 
Western and economic interests.  
 
That New Labour could claim these policies to be ‘pro-poor’ would be useful as 
government officials set about addressing – albeit selectively – the expectations of civil 
society, and in particular the nascent Jubilee 2000 Coalition (out of which the 
subsequent Drop The Debt and Jubilee Debt Campaign would later emerge), as it 
gathered momentum in the lead up to the crucial G8 summit in Birmingham.54 Ahead 
of this summit, the Coalition gave evidence to the Parliamentary Select Committee for 
International Development, in which it called “on the Prime Minister to place debt high 
on the agenda of the G8 nations at their Birmingham summit in May” and “exert 
maximum pressure on other G8 leaders at the summit to take a significant step toward 
the cancellation of the unpayable debt of the world’s poorest countries by the year 
2000”.55 
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For their part, Gordon Brown and Clare Short convened a joint Treasury-DFID seminar 
with prominent church leaders in the UK, a representative from the NGO, Oxfam, the 
Deputy Director General of the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the President of the 
World Bank, James Wolfensohn. The headline outcome of this meeting was the 
Chancellor’s announcement that he was prepared to cover 10 per cent of 
Mozambique’s debt that it owed to the Paris Club. Strikingly however (and perhaps 
surprisingly given the make-up of his audience) Brown chose not to play the ‘moral 
card’ but instead suggested that his decision was based upon the fact that 
“Mozambique has a strong track record of economic reforms yet still faces a growing 
debt burden”.56 This signalled both to the HIPCs themselves, and to the faith groups 
and NGOs represented at the Chancellor’s meeting that hard economics, rather than 
any moral imperative, would continue to dictate the decisions of Western creditors.  
 
Despite this decision, the rhetoric of senior New Labour officials appeared to suggest 
that the government was on the side of the debt campaigners. Clare Short remarked 
that “the churches and Jubilee 2000 have done a glorious job in mobilising support in 
this country and internationally for debt relief for the poorest countries”.57 Gordon 
Brown actively encouraged MPs “to work with the churches in their areas” to ensure 
that there would continue to be “strong public opinion in favour of action”, since this 
groundswell of public opinion was “already making a difference internationally and will 
help us to secure the necessary debt reductions”.58 This public activism even led some 
government ministers to believe that the debt campaigners were on the side of the 
government. The Economic Secretary, Helen Liddell for instance told the House that 
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“the Treasury *had+ received many thousands of letters supporting the Government’s 
position on the ‘Mauritius Mandate’”.59  
 
Given the evidence that the NGOs involved in the Jubilee movement had presented to 
the Commons Select Committee earlier in the year, and the public policy work that 
these organisations had undertaken themselves, it would be fair to say that Liddell’s 
claims were clearly exaggerated. While it is true that there had been extensive and 
open dialogue between the government and civil society, and a shared commitment 
towards debt reduction, it was clear that there were still distinct normative differences 
between the two as to why and how debt should be reduced. The New Labour 
government remained committed to the economic case for debt sustainability, 
disciplining heavily indebted countries with market reforms, while civil society pressed 
the moral case for deeper and faster debt cancellation to allow these countries to 
develop on their own terms. 
  
Much to the disappointment of the 50-70,000 strong crowd of demonstrators that had 
gathered in Birmingham in May 1998, the G7 summit itself failed to provide any real 
progress towards finding a solution to the debt crisis. New Labour’s proposals to 
modestly extend the ‘Mauritius Mandate’ to a new, global multilateral debt relief 
initiative were blocked by Germany, the United States, Japan and Italy, and all the final 
communiqué contained was a broad and indeterminate agreement supporting “the 
speedy and determined extension of debt relief to more countries, within the terms of 
the HIPC initiative”. Naturally, it urged “all eligible countries to take the policy 
measures needed to embark on the process as soon as possible, so that all can be in 
the process by the year 2000” and encouraged creditors to ensure that “when they 
qualify, [debtor] countries get the relief they need, including interim relief 
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measures…to secure a lasting exit from their debt problems”.60 Therefore, although 
Tony Blair would tell the Commons on his return from Birmingham that the summit 
would mark “a significant step forward in the pursuit of the government’s policy of 
setting targets for the year 2000”, the reality was that a great deal still needed to be 
done.61 How the government would go about meeting this challenge would form the 
second phase of New Labour’s debt strategy.  
 
Fig. 5.1 Phase 1 of New Labour’s Debt Relief Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the above diagram shows (Fig. 5.1) despite what appeared to be a close 
engagement with churches, NGOs and other debt activists, New Labour’s initial debt 
relief strategy prioritised ‘debt sustainability’ over debt forgiveness, and ‘sound 
policies’ over institutional policy reform. This placed New Labour to the left (on this 
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matrix) of the IFIs, who through their management of the HIPC process could set the 
terms of debt relief.  
 
Phase 2:  The Enhanced HIPC Initiative: Towards ‘a New Global Financial 
Architecture’ 
Despite Blair’s arguments to the contrary, Birmingham had unquestionably been a 
huge setback for those committed to securing a fairer deal for those living in highly 
indebted countries. The response to this from both the Treasury and DFID in particular 
was to maintain that developing countries themselves were largely to blame for the 
poverty they found themselves in. If these poor countries refused to adopt the 
necessary ‘sound’ policies that were required to lift themselves out of poverty, then 
the creditor countries could not be expected to agree to more debt relief. As Clare 
Short reminded the House, “countries must have a track record of such economic 
management both before and after they sign on for debt relief” and that “no country 
will receive debt relief unless it is being very responsible in its economic 
management”.62 The Treasury was similarly clear on this point, even going so far as to 
argue that debt relief was not the principal issue at stake:  
 
Debt relief is not enough in itself. It might be a necessary 
precondition for economic growth and development, but it is 
essential in the long term that the indebted countries implement 
policies that will lead to economic growth and development, so that 
they never again return to the high levels of debt that exert such a 
drag on their economics and create the conditions in which poverty 
becomes endemic.63 
 
This led to a growing conflict between the position of the government and that of the 
Jubilee campaign, summed up by Clare Short:   
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Sometimes it [the Jubilee movement] talks as though all debt should 
be relieved unconditionally. We do not agree with that. There are 
countries with high levels of debt that have spent their money on 
luxuries or have excessive military expenditure. We believe that debt 
relief should be linked to a commitment to poverty reduction and 
sensible economic management. We believe in implementing HIPC 
more flexibly, not in cancelling all debt unconditionally.64 
 
Clearly agitated by the increasing public pressure surrounding debt, Short later argued 
that much of the talk surrounding debt relief was “media-driven, and driven by people 
who do not understand debt”.65 The case for faster, deeper debt forgiveness continued 
to be pressed by NGOs and faith groups – the same groups whom the government had 
welcomed during the first phase of its debt strategy – forcing the International 
Development Secretary to declare that it was “not in the government’s power to call 
for a moratorium” on multilateral debt. Rather than displaying the political leadership 
that one might expect, Short capitulated and maintained that if these countries were to 
be helped, there needed to be far greater levels of international co-operation instead.66  
 
Strengthening this international co-operation and locking-in the ‘sound’ economic 
reforms at a global level underpinned the second phase of New Labour’s debt strategy, 
and its focus shifted to building what Gordon Brown initially called “new global 
structures for the new global age”.67 While government ministers continued as they 
had in the first phase of the debt strategy to talk to domestic audiences (fellow 
parliamentarians, NGOs and faith groups) about the need to base debt relief upon 
sound economics and ‘pro-poor’ policies,68 the Chancellor spent the second phase 
delivering a series of speeches and lectures to principally international economic elites 
and financial audiences across the world, in order to build up support for a ‘new global 
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financial architecture’. These addresses were designed to showcase Brown’s proposals 
for a broad set of global mechanisms which would offset the risk of financial crises 
emerging and support the debt relief process. Drawing upon the content of these 
speeches, this section assesses the character of this new global architecture, and what 
it would mean both for the HIPCs and New Labour’s commitments concerning debt 
relief. 
 
DFID’s 1997 White Paper had already spoken about developing a “well-managed and 
regulated set of international mechanisms, such as increased IMF surveillance and 
banking supervision to support beneficial regulation and stability”.69 However, it was 
only during this second phase that this new global financial architecture began to 
emerge in more concrete terms. It would prove to be instrumental in securing the 
agreement for an Enhanced HIPC initiative at the G7 summit in Cologne in 1999, and 
latterly in the third phase of policy, when at the 2005 G8 summit in Gleneagles, New 
Labour ministers introduced the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative.  
 
Brown argued that this new architecture offered “a new framework for economic 
development” and gave “new hope to the poorest and most vulnerable countries”.70 
Indeed, the Chancellor was keen that this new framework was “combined with 
measures to reduce unsustainable debt”, and used to “accelerate” and go “beyond” 
the HIPC process.71 To achieve these aims, Brown transposed the Treasury’s own 
macroeconomic strategy for Britain into this new architecture for the global economy:   
 
I believe that, just as through central bank independence we set 
down a new rules-based system in the UK with Bank of England 
independence and a new monetary and fiscal regime, we should, in 
pursuit of the objectives of stability, development and prosperity, 
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consider also a new rules-based system of economic governance for 
the community of nations. This new system should be founded on 
clear procedures, with all countries, rich and poor, pursuing agreed 
codes and standards for fiscal and monetary transparency, and for 
corporate and social standards.72 
 
Although there was a clear policy fit with the existing economic orthodoxy of the PWC 
and the ‘sound’ reforms advocated by the IFIs, the imprint of New Labour’s domestic 
political economy upon these global policies was unmistakeable. Brown believed that 
“the lessons in monetary and fiscal policy from our experience…are lessons also critical 
to the future of emerging markets across the world”.73 Therefore, by borrowing policy 
ideas intended initially for consumption by domestic audiences and applying them to 
this new global architecture, the Chancellor set about joining-up New Labour’s 
macroeconomic strategy for the UK with its commitment to addressing the debt crisis 
in the developing world.  
 
Brown had wanted “British economic success to be built on the solid rock of prudent 
and consistent economic management, not the shifting sands of boom-and-bust” and 
“to set the British economy on a new long term course that will deliver high levels of 
growth and employment through lasting stability”.74 Similarly, his proposals to create a 
new global financial architecture were designed to “shape a new interdependent and 
integrated global economy through stability and growth, to ensure prosperity and 
opportunity for all”,75 and eradicate “‘boom-and-bust’ on a global scale”.76 At home, 
the Treasury had sought to achieve, in the eyes of its key business and financial 
constituencies, a credible anti-inflationary strategy. To this end, the Treasury took the 
decision to hand over control of monetary policy to the Bank of England to ensure that 
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“interest rate decisions *would+ be free from any political influence” and based upon 
“good long-term economics” rather than “bad short-term politics”.77 Likewise, the 
credibility of this new architecture would rest on the Chancellor’s belief “that the IMF 
is as credible and independent from political influence in its surveillance of economies 
as an independent central bank is in the operation of monetary policy”.78  
 
Drawing from the template of New Labour’s domestic political economy, Brown set 
about redesigning the international financial architecture to institutionalise a set of 
credible policies that would support at the global level, the macroeconomic stability 
sought by investors. As the second DFID White Paper, published in 2000, argued, 
“those countries that apply rules and policies predictably…are likely to attract higher 
levels of inward investment and trade and to generate faster economic growth”.79 The 
Chancellor was firmly of the opinion that “global markets can work in the public 
interest”,80 since “international investment flows bring huge benefits to all 
countries”.81 For this type of ‘globalisation to work for the poor’ however, Brown 
maintained that developing countries in particular, must be open to the global 
economy and “pursue transparent, corruption-free policies for stability and the 
attraction of private investment.82 The role of the IFIs in this was to devise “new 
operational rules” and create a new “institutional architecture” to set market-
approved standards,83 and “help deliver greater stability and prosperity” for 
“industrialised and industrialising economies alike”.84  
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The heavily indebted countries however, situated on the periphery of this global 
economy, would be required to undertake processes of ‘market-civilisation’ by 
institutionalising and locking-in ‘market-reinforcing’ policies. Countries which sought 
the debt relief that – even by the Chancellor’s own admission – was necessary for their 
own development, would only receive this if they accepted “regular surveillance of 
how they are meeting the codes”.85 Under the terms of this new architecture, this 
increased ‘panopticism’ would give the IMF in particular, greater scope to restrict, 
discipline and punish where it deemed necessary, the monetary and fiscal policies of 
developing countries.  
 
This new global architecture was “to address both structural and institutional 
conditions”,86 and as such would be underpinned by four elements: (1) macroeconomic 
stability; (2) ‘sound’ monetary and fiscal policies emphasising credibility and 
transparency; (3) a series of internationally-agreed disciplines and codes to support 
these policies; and (4) increased surveillance and accountability. These elements, 
developed from New Labour’s own domestic political economy, would be assimilated 
to form the ‘new’ conditionality that would apply to countries seeking to secure debt 
relief. I shall briefly examine each of these elements in turn as a means of 
characterising Brown’s proposals for this new global architecture.  
 
As I noted in chapters 2 and 4, ‘stability’ was a theme that ran throughout the 
Treasury’s domestic macroeconomic strategy and was, according to the Chancellor, 
“necessary for *Britain’s+ future economic success”.87 In similar terms, Brown told the 
Annual Meeting of the World Bank and IMF that “stability is an essential pre-condition 
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for long-term investment, growth and jobs”,88 before delivering a lecture at Harvard 
University in which he identified “macroeconomic stability, based on low inflation and 
sound public finances” as “an absolute pre-condition of economic success…in the 
global economy”.89 Reflecting the clear transmission between ‘the national’ and ‘the 
international’ dimensions of New Labour’s political economy, ‘Britain’ and ‘the world’ 
were to the Chancellor synonymous and interchangeable. ‘Stability’ was fundamental 
to the economic success of both and as such, would be crucial in establishing the 
foundations of the new global architecture.   
 
Clearly however, stability would be difficult to achieve within a global economy that 
was understood by New Labour to be dominated by “interdependent and 
instantaneous capital markets”.90 Since individual countries could “no longer shelter 
themselves from massive, fast-moving and sometimes destabilising global financial 
flows”, Brown argued that reform was necessary at both the national and the 
international level.91 Globalisation meant that the ‘rules of the game’ had changed. 
Giving evidence to the International Development Commons Select Committee, the 
Chancellor argued that “there has got to be stability for countries to be able to 
prosper…countries can no longer disguise *from the international community+ what is 
happening to them…they have got to publish figures about what is happening to their 
reserves, what is happening to their fiscal policy [so] that corruption is therefore 
exposed through transparency and through rules of procedure”.92 There were clear 
“procedures which each agree are necessary for an international economy to work”, 
the beneficiaries of whom “will be the poor countries because they are the countries 
which, because of secrecy, because of corruption, because of the lack of agreed rules of 
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the game, are denied international investment…*and+ the access to the money that 
they need to be successful economies”.93 Therefore, rather than attempting to trade-
off “regulation versus deregulation”. States should instead look to achieve “the correct 
balance…to ensure financial systems work better” and assess “how the right kind of 
government can be an essential complement to markets”.94 Despite the instability that 
had been caused to HIPCs in the past as a result of volatile market activity, the assumed 
inevitability of globalisation meant that Brown understood it to be neither feasible nor 
desirable to regulate this global activity. Instead, ‘new rules of the game’ had to be 
drawn up, with an acute responsibility upon national governments to adopt policies 
that would work ‘with the grain’ of these financial systems, and match the expectations 
of this particular set of actors. For Craig and Porter, it was understood that:  
 
Poor states must both conform to global norms, and manage their 
own exacerbated problems. Thoroughgoing reforms were required. 
But even though change was to be domestically contained, the role 
of government was boiled down further, to stability, risk 
management and discipline – staying the course, and owning the 
reforms necessary to connect better with globalized market 
‘opportunities’.95 
 
“The only answer to the uncertainty and unpredictability of ever more rapid financial 
flows” Brown argued, were measures that “deliver the transparency and 
accountability”.96 National governments therefore needed “to deliver stability by 
setting out clear objectives for fiscal and monetary policy”. This openness, the 
Chancellor argued, was critical for investor confidence:  
 
Without transparency and the proper procedures that the codes of 
conduct will require, investors may not make the long term 
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commitments on the scale necessary for jobs, growth and social 
progress.97   
 
These “clear and transparent frameworks for monetary and fiscal policy” were 
designed to “command market credibility and public trust”.98 Reinforcing the new 
‘economics of information’ that was an integral part of the PWC within which this new 
global architecture would be embedded, this emphasis upon ‘transparency and 
openness’ signalled to investors that they could be confident in the policy environment 
of the host economy. To achieve this ‘transparency’ and ‘credibility’ however, Brown 
argued that:  
 
National governments must set clear, long-term policy objectives that 
build confidence and commit to openness in policymaking that keeps 
markets properly informed and ensure that objectives and 
institutions are seen to be credible.99  
 
If countries were to secure both “investment funds and the day-to-day confidence of 
international investors” then national governments must pursue consistent and 
credible policies that would guarantee the required stability.100 This meant for 
developing countries orientating their economic policies towards meeting market 
expectations rather than more immediate poverty reduction concerns. Since these 
measures were an intrinsic part of the ‘sound’ policy reforms that developing countries 
were expected to pursue in order to receive debt relief, these HIPCs would find 
themselves allocating much of their limited resources and capacity creating ‘the right 
investment climate’ and persuading market actors of the credibility of their policies, 
rather than tackling the more immediate, acute problems of poverty faced by their 
own people.  
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Fig. 5.2 Stability, Credibility and Transparency: Gordon Brown’s Standards and 
Codes for ‘a New International Financial Architecture’ 
  
Code Purpose 
Institution(s) Responsible  
for Implementation 
‘Fiscal 
Transparency’ 
 
 
 
‘Monetary’ 
 
 
 
‘Banking’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Corporate  
Sector’ 
 
 
 
 
To introduce greater transparency and new 
disciplines into the world financial system and 
ensure that countries undertaking good policies 
are properly recognised.  
 
To extend the principle of transparency and 
openness into monetary and financial 
information and procedures. 
 
To provide a complete picture of usable central 
bank reserves, forward liabilities, foreign 
currency liabilities of the commercial banks and 
indicators of the health of the financial sectors. 
It also called for the speeding up of the 
publication of data on international banking 
flows. 
 
To improve transparency in the corporate 
sector, to establish more stringent international 
codes in areas like accounting standards, 
insolvency regimes, corporate governance, 
securities markets and other aspects of private 
sector behaviour. 
IMF 
 
 
 
 
IMF 
 
 
 
IMF, World Bank, Bank for 
International Settlements and 
the Basle Committee 
 
 
 
 
 
IMF, World Bank and the 
OECD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the emphasis upon ‘poverty reduction’ remained as the overall justification of 
this new architecture, Brown demanded that there should be “a new resolve from poor 
countries” that in pursuing anti-poverty strategies, they should seek to “be more 
transparent, and…to follow certain codes and principles in macroeconomic and social 
policy”.101 The codes or ‘disciplines’, illustrated in Fig. 5.2, were to be “the key building 
blocks of the new international financial architecture”, designed by the Treasury but 
implemented globally by the appropriate IFI(s). Like the architecture itself, the purpose 
of these was to maintain macroeconomic stability at both the national and the 
international level, and to lock-in the credibility and transparency of policy decisions 
made by national governments. As with New Labour’s decision to hand over the setting 
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of interests to the Bank of England, the IMF was chosen as the institution to “boost the 
international credibility of national policymaking by setting standards for policymaking, 
and monitoring or policing those standards through regular surveillance and 
endorsement of sound reforms”.102 
 
The codes themselves were based upon five weaknesses that Brown had identified in 
the present system: (1) poor economic and financial policymaking; (2) weak financial 
sectors in emerging markets; (3) ineffective supervision; (4) poor crisis management; 
and (5) unacceptable social protection. If developing countries were to benefit from 
globalisation, these were specific areas that needed strengthening. Supported by the 
creation of the international Financial Stability Forum in 1999,103 these new standards 
and codes emphasised greater openness and transparency in monetary and fiscal 
policy; more information, particularly concerning the health of the financial and 
banking sectors; and more robust standards within the corporate sector.  
 
Principally however, these codes were created to institutionalise the reforms 
necessary to secure credibility in the eyes of market actors, such as financial 
institutions, private firms and investors, and increase the public accountability of 
national governments. New Labour understood debt to have been exacerbated, not by 
continuing systemic imbalances in the global economy, but by bad government policy 
decisions, a misallocation of resources, and procedures that encouraged corruption. To 
safeguard the money that would be made available through debt relief, it would be 
necessary to introduce these codes as a means of benchmarking the standards of good 
economic governance. By “strengthening debt sustainability analyses”, placing 
“greater focus on the structural sources of instability”, identifying at an early stage 
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“unsustainable macroeconomic frameworks”, providing “an assessment of adherence 
to codes and standards”, and identifying those “countries which still need to take 
action to forgive debt under the HIPC initiative”, these codes would enable the IMF in 
particular to monitor much more closely the behaviour of these indebted countries 
prior to, during and after they had embarked upon the debt relief process.104 This 
meant that despite the appeal to ‘public accountability’, the reality was that these 
were a set of standards designed to act as signals to global economic elites already 
orientated towards meeting the expectations of ‘market’ audiences. In many respects, 
this is hardly surprising since these codes were drawn up to offset the risk and impact 
of future market failure, and to produce an environment in which financial markets in 
particular could operate more effectively. However, the Chancellor remained keen to 
stress the importance of the other, public audience he had in mind when formulating 
these codes. There was however a striking explanation as to why this was the case.  
 
As I noted in chapters 2 and 4, at home, the Chancellor promised reform and increased 
openness of the labyrinthine processes of those institutions across Whitehall and 
beyond, charged with the task of regulating Britain’s financial activities. To achieve 
this, the Treasury introduced a series of institutional measures including handing over 
monetary policy to the Bank of England; publishing a Memorandum of Understanding 
setting out the division of responsibility between the Treasury, the Bank of England 
and the newly formed Financial Services Authority;105 and a issuing a Code for Fiscal 
Stability.106 These steps were designed to make the decision-making processes of 
governments and financial institutions more transparent and accountable. Alongside 
these institutional measures, the Treasury sought maintain a high public visibility. The 
department itself would make reports widely available, while its ministers would hold 
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regular briefings with journalists and write articles in newspapers, financial and 
academic journals.  
 
These initiatives however were not simply concerned with increasing public 
accountability, or creating a more democratic or participatory form of economic 
policymaking. As Brown himself admitted, these measures were intended to instil “the 
market *with the+ confidence needed for success”.107 Chiming with the orthodoxy of 
the PWC, the Chancellor recognised that markets thrive upon information, and 
increasing the availability of this information within a credible framework “engenders 
greater investor confidence”.108 Indeed, given the complexity and technical nature of 
much of these surveillance measures and procedures, it is unlikely that these 
documents would be read as extensively by the general public as Brown claimed. 
Instead these documents were deliberately aimed at – and picked up by – market 
actors. Within the wider context of the ‘economics of information’ of the PWC, these 
procedures would give the policy decisions reached by national governments the 
credibility with the markets, and market actors the confidence to make more informed 
investment decisions. Again therefore, these processes were designed not to create a 
more accountable form of policymaking, but rather orientate economic policies 
towards market expectations.   
 
For these codes to be effectively implemented however, Brown argued that it was 
necessary to reform these institutions. Taken at face-value, the Chancellor’s proposals 
might have appealed to those constituencies who had long since called for just that. 
However, these constituencies had expressed the need for a change in the ideological 
direction of these institutions and a greater representation of the developing world. 
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What Brown meant by reform however, was “an enhanced role for the IMF monitoring 
and reporting on the operation of codes and standards”.109 According to Brown, 
reform of the IFIs was needed, not because of any ideological failings but because 
“neither the IMF nor the World Bank alone *were+ equipped to carry out the 
surveillance and assist in the development of emerging countries’ financial 
systems”.110 Therefore, rather than weakening the scope of the IFIs, Brown believed it 
was necessary to extend the remit of these institutions, and in particular the IMF, to 
monitor these codes and strengthen the Fund’s surveillance work.  
 
Brown’s proposals would strengthen the ‘panopticism’ of the IMF to ensure that the 
‘sound policies’ supported by both the IMF and the UK Treasury were adopted and 
stuck to by national governments in the developing world. As the Chancellor remarked, 
“countries that want to be part of the global economic system cannot pick and mix 
which good and bad policies they want to pursue”.111 Indeed so important were these 
codes that their “the implementation of codes and standards should be a condition for 
IMF and World Bank support”,112 because “through the effective implementation of 
the codes we can extend good fiscal policy, monetary policy and corporate governance 
throughout the world and help prevent crises occurring”.113 In Brown’s new global 
architecture, the IMF would play a central role in implementing, monitoring, and 
where necessary, disciplining the economic performance of countries.  
 
Unsurprisingly, given that Brown was its Chair, the International Monetary and 
Financial Committee (IMFC) at the IMF welcomed these measures to strengthen the 
surveillance arm and boost its monitoring activities. Giving evidence to the 
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International Development Commons Select Committee, representatives from the 
IMFC identified these measures as “promoting greater financial stability and stronger 
global growth”, and in particular the scope “to help countries strengthen policy 
frameworks and prevent crises, and to “*improve+ the framework for assessing debt 
sustainability”.114 These moves towards increased surveillance however revealed a 
clear tension between the claims of increased country ‘ownership’ supported under 
the HIPC initiative and the PRSP process, both of which were managed by the IMF, and 
the appeal to increase the public – or perhaps more accurately, the market – 
accountability of these sovereign states. By ceding power to a non-elected body of 
external economic elites merely for the sake of market credibility, it begged the 
question, who really did ‘own’ the development of these indebted countries? 
Certainly, it said a great deal about the character of the Chancellor’s new global 
architecture that it was the HIPCs who found themselves restricted in the policies that 
they were able to implement by the same IFIs whose remit for surveillance and control 
Brown had increased.  
 
During this phase, New Labour claimed credit for the role it played in securing the 
Enhanced HIPC initiative at the G7 summit in Cologne, with a series of measures that 
provided “faster, broader and deeper debt relief”.115 Embedded within this new 
financial architecture, although it promoted the goals of poverty reduction and 
sustainable development, the new initiative was also designed to reinforce the need 
for developing countries to reform appropriately. For its part, the Enhanced HIPC 
initiative committed the IMF to “deeper debt relief through lower debt sustainability 
targets, lower qualifying thresholds, and calculations based on earlier actual data 
rather than projections” and “faster debt relief, including through the earlier provision 
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of front-loaded assistance to free up resources for poverty-reducing spending, such as 
on health and education”.116  
 
For those who had gathered in Birmingham the previous year to call for increased 
levels of debt relief, this new initiative may have represented a significant triumph. 
Viewed through the lens of this new global architecture however, these headline 
announcements would prove to be a pyrrhic victory. In return for this “deeper” and 
“faster” debt relief, poverty reduction programmes would have to be reconfigured to 
reflect the new global architecture that was being drawn up. Debtor countries would 
have to ensure “that these outlays *in social expenditure+ and the commensurate 
financing [were] consistent with macroeconomic stability and faster sustained growth”, 
and accept greater levels of surveillance through the “good governance” agenda 
including “full transparency and…monitoring of government budgets”.117 Therefore, 
while Brown and his counterparts in Whitehall, Washington and the rest of the G7 
spoke of poverty reduction as the outcome, the processes required to meet these aims 
remained distinctly neoliberal in their ontology. Crucially, government spending on 
development and poverty reduction policies remained secondary to the principle focus 
of building institutions for markets, and maximising the accountability and 
transparency to market constituencies. In accordance with the orthodoxy of the PWC, 
the main responsibility of the state was to make markets work: to make tax, 
investment rules and economic policies responsive to the needs of increasingly 
globalised markets. The net result of which was to leave entirely intact the neoliberal 
prescriptions of global integration in macroeconomic policymaking.  
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Fig. 5.3  Phases 1 and 2 of New Labour’s Debt Relief Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Insofar as New Labour was concerned, what was striking about these speeches was 
their lack of any ‘moral’ content. Although the New Labour ministers had continued to 
meet with NGOs and faith groups at home, debt in the context of this new global 
architecture had reverted to being principally an economic issue, rather than one that 
had any social dimension to it. The Chancellor spoke in terms of ‘stability’, ‘credibility’, 
‘transparency’, and ‘surveillance’. To his credit, Brown referred to the importance of 
‘poverty reduction’ as an outcome. However, the message of the first phase that debt 
was as much a social issue as much as it was an economic issue had virtually been lost. 
As New Labour prepared to host its second G8 summit in the summer of 2005, civil 
society would seek to remind the government of its moral commitment. This elicited a 
striking response from the government and from Brown in particular, as he sought to 
MARKET 
High 
MARKET 
Low 
SOCIAL 
High 
SOCIAL 
Low 
HM 
Treasury 
DFID 
IFIs 
Churches, NGOs 
and other debt 
activists 
 
274 
reframe his proposals for a new global architecture to this distinctly ‘non-economic’ 
constituency. 
 
The focus that New Labour placed upon debt as principally an economic issue certainly 
blunted its moral commitment. However there was some evidence of a shift towards a 
more ‘social’ set of outcomes – after all, Brown did talk about debt relief as important 
for poverty reduction. What there is precious little of here is a social concern. The 
financial architecture that Brown sought to build spoke of poverty reduction but also 
of developing countries adopting new codes and practices, improving their openness 
and transparency, and being in a position to attract flows of investment.  
 
Phase 3:  The Road to Gleneagles and Beyond: the Multilateral Debt  
 Relief Initiative  
Having convinced the international financial community of his proposals for this new 
financial architecture, the Chancellor’s attention turned – or rather was turned – to the 
constituencies within civil society who had continued to press for a fairer and more 
comprehensive resolution to the debt crisis. During the second phase of New Labour’s 
debt strategy, ministers continued to meet with both the larger NGOs in the British 
Overseas Aid Group (BOAG) and the smaller NGOs that made up BOND, the British 
Overseas NGOs for Development, to discuss progress over debt relief.118 Both the 
Treasury and DFID held a series of meetings representatives of the UK faith groups and 
continued to receive many letters and postcards from members of the public pressing 
for more debt forgiveness.119 However, the relationship between the government and 
these constituencies was an uneasy one. As I have already mentioned in this chapter, 
there were times when New Labour officials were fulsome in their praise for the work 
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of these groups. There were other times however, when these campaigners appeared 
to get under the skin of government ministers with what Whitehall claimed to be an 
unrealistic set of demands.  
 
New Labour’s ambivalence towards the issue was reflected in its “enthusiasm for debt 
relief” but rejection that “all debt should always be written off”.120 Like her 
counterparts in the World Bank and IMF, Clare Short made it clear that “poor countries 
need to be able to borrow and repay responsibly, so that they have a good track 
record and can secure foreign investment and enable their economies to grow”.121 The 
government’s objective was therefore “not to achieve debt relief at any price”, but 
rather “to lever policy so that it would bring real benefit to the poor, in terms of both 
better economic growth and better social policy”.122 For the government, debt relief 
was but one instrument to achieve its commitment to poverty reduction. For these 
faith groups, NGOs and other parts of civil society however, debt relief was far more 
significant than that. In strictly development terms, poverty could not be eradicated 
whilst the governments of these HIPCs continued to spend much of their budgets 
servicing debts that had been accrued decades before. At the turn of the new 
millennium, debt relief symbolised an opportunity to create a more just and equal 
world. Although, as this third phase would reveal, New Labour ministers accepted 
these arguments, they continued to view debt, not as an issue of systemic inequality 
and global injustice, but as principally the result of irresponsible and short-sighted 
policy decisions. For government officials, this was the real cause of poverty. If these 
issues were to be tackled and poverty reduced, then the ‘correct’ policy framework 
and the rubric of the new global architecture would need to be implemented.  
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Although it may have frustrated Brown’s own domestic political ambitions, the 
strength of his position as Chancellor of the Exchequer in Britain had seen Brown take 
up the chairmanship of the IMFC during the second phase of New Labour’s debt relief 
strategy. This position would prove advantageous to Brown as he set about persuading 
his counterparts and other economic elites not only of the need but also the viability – 
and indeed, the credibility – of his new global financial architecture. Hard-wiring his 
proposals into the newly-emerging PWC, Brown knew instinctively what language to 
use to discursively construct a global architecture that would appeal to these particular 
audiences. The Chancellor spoke extensively of maintaining ‘macroeconomic stability’ 
and ‘monetary and fiscal policy discipline’, creating the ‘right conditions for 
investment’, ‘opening up’ and orientating national economies towards ‘the global 
economy’, and supporting these reforms through increased ‘surveillance’. To convince 
NGOs and faith groups of New Labour’s commitment to debt relief and poverty 
reduction, Brown drew upon a set of language and themes distinct from any other 
policy narrative offered by his colleagues in Whitehall. In these speeches, the 
Chancellor spoke not simply about the moral element of debt relief, but instead made 
explicit reference to the scriptures held to by the different faith groups represented in 
the civil society coalition. These scriptures were used to complement Brown’s own 
social liberalism, the philosophy of which underpinned the Chancellor’s work in this 
area.123   
 
These references were designed to send a signal to civil society that the economic 
dimension to New Labour’s commitment to reducing the debt burden of developing 
countries was complementary to, rather than in conflict with, the moral appeal made 
by these constituencies. New Labour’s strategy in this third phase was therefore to 
focus upon the similarities, rather than the differences that existed between the 
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government and the expectations expressed by civil society. This it was hoped would in 
turn build support for the new Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative proposed by Tony 
Blair, Gordon Brown and Clare Short’s successor at DFID, Hilary Benn, initially to the 
Commission for Africa in 2005, before it was formally launched at the G8 summit, 
hosted by Britain later that summer in Gleneagles. This new MDRI would not replace 
the Enhanced HIPC initiative but would cancel 100 percent of the debts owed to the 
IMF, the IDA, and the African Development Fund by countries that had reached 
‘completion point’ under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative.  
 
For its part, civil society was being galvanised by the emergence of a new coalition of 
NGOs, faith groups, trade unions, celebrities and members of the general public. Part 
of the Global Call to Action Against Poverty campaign, the Make Poverty History 
movement sought to raise awareness of global poverty, and in particular issues 
relating to trade, debt and aid. To this end, it had three core messages for national 
governments in the global North: “trade justice”, “drop the debt” and “more and 
better aid”.124 As with other recent anti-poverty and debt campaigns and 
demonstrations, the target of the Make Poverty History movement was to be the G8. 
The question that confronted New Labour was not whether there was sufficient public 
support for its proposals – it was quite clear as the year unfolded that there was – but 
whether the government could persuade civil society that its own proposals 
concerning debt relief were sufficient to meet these expectations. Therefore, in the 
same way that New Labour had sought credibility for its proposals from amongst 
financial and economic constituencies, it now sought credibility from civil society, 
particularly since government officials were keen to throw their weight behind the 
campaign. Given the different set of expectations of these two groups however, the 
problem New Labour faced was how to appeal to these two different sets of 
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constituencies without reneging on the respective commitments that they had made 
to the other. How New Labour would solve this problem would reveal the true 
character of its debt relief policies, and the depth of its commitment to its more 
normative claims of addressing debt as a moral issue.  
 
Developing the analysis of the previous phase, this third phase demonstrates that 
while New Labour officials actively sought to engage with civil society; for example, by 
regularly meeting representatives from the coalition, and borrowing the language and 
the discourse of faith groups and NGOs; these narratives were used only selectively by 
officials to justify New Labour’s own position in relation to debt relief and the IFIs, 
rather than to directly meet the expectations of civil society. This enabled the 
government to talk to certain audiences about its moral commitment to debt relief 
whilst continuing to embed its actual policy within the neoliberal ideas of the global 
financial architecture. For Brown, the only response to the moral challenge that 
developing world debt posed to Western governments and other lenders was the 
creation of a distinctly market-orientated framework, one that would oversee the 
integration of heavily indebted countries into the global market economy.  
 
The idea of debt forgiveness was derived from the Biblical commandment of Jubilee 
wherein every 49 years, those who found themselves enslaved were to be set free and 
allowed to return to their families in readiness for the fiftieth year which would be a 
year of Jubilee or celebration.125 This precept was to act as the referent point for 
church leaders and their various congregations as they called upon government 
leaders to celebrate the year 2000 and the turn of the millennium by freeing those 
countries enslaved by debt. Publically at least, senior New Labour officials were 
fulsome in their praise of churches and faith groups. As Brown remarked:  
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Churches and faith groups that have, across the world, done more 
than any others – by precept and by example – to make us aware of 
the sheer scale of human suffering – and our duty to end it. Indeed, 
when the history of the crusade against global poverty is written, one 
of its first and finest chapters will detail the commitment of the 
churches in Britain to help the world’s poor.126  
 
Whether it was the impulse of Christian socialism (the lineage of which is explored in 
chapter 3) that Blair, Brown and other senior figures shared, or they simply agreed 
with those who argued that “the burden of unpayable debt was morally wrong”,127 
New Labour ministers were receptive to these ideas and keen to meet on a regular 
basis, leaders from the Christian church and increasingly, representatives from other 
faith groups.  
 
Addressing a meeting of the Christian Socialist Movement in 2001, Blair praised the 
work of the Jubilee 2000 movement and confirmed that since the end of the 
millennium year, Britain had derived no profit from the HIPCs. The government had 
already agreed to cancel their debts, or to place these repayments in a Trust Fund for 
when this money could be used to tackle poverty.128 Although this was just three 
months, Blair was clearly keen to demonstrate that he understood (at least in part) the 
Jubilee principal that many in his audience supported. Just as the passage in Leviticus 
spoke of “not *taking+ advantage of each other”,129 so the Prime Minister sought to 
reassure the CSM that his government would not take advantage of indebted countries 
by charging excessive interest on the debts that were owed to Britain. While Blair 
deserves credit for this, he appeared to miss the other crucial points of Jubilee; 
equality and liberty. The underlying reason for the Jubilee commandment was to 
restore freedom and equality to a land that had been torn apart by inequality and 
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economic servitude. Therefore, although Blair’s government would no longer profit 
from its debtors and put on hold the repayments owed to it by the HIPCs, it appeared 
unwilling to deal with the structural inequalities in the wider global economy that were 
keeping these countries immiserated in poverty.    
 
Blair himself continued the theme of slavery when he drew a direct comparison 
between the work of the Christian, William Wilberforce and the abolition of the slave 
trade two centuries earlier, and the “moral challenge” of poverty faced in 2005. In an 
event set up by the Christian organisation, Faithworks, Blair reminded his audience 
that just as churches had been instrumental in that particular fight for justice so 
“today…faith leaders are at the forefront of the campaign to make poverty history”.130 
The Prime Minister used this event to build support for the recently launched 
Commission for Africa report. Described by Blair as “bold and ambitious”, it was “a plan 
with a mission to build international support for…the doubling of aid, 100 per cent 
debt cancellation, trade justice and action on governance and conflict”.131 It was 
“deliverable”, the Prime Minister argued but, adding a note of caution, “we will only 
achieve it together”, implying that the government’s policies required the support of 
his audience.132 Again, what was striking about Blair’s remarks, was not so much what 
the Prime Minister said – the highly laudable, attention-grabbing ‘headline policies’ – 
but what he left out. Although there was a welcome shift away from ‘debt 
sustainability’ and a realisation (finally) that in many instances, “debt ‘relief’ merely 
relieves the creditor of a balance sheet fantasy”,133  the process towards debt 
reduction would still be contingent upon HIPCs pursuing ‘sound’ policies and 
promoting the growth necessary to reduce poverty. In other words, while the 
‘outcome’ or reward might have been improved, the ‘process conditionality’ that 
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underpinned Brown’s financial architecture and Enhanced HIPC initiative would remain 
as steadfast as ever.  
 
What is striking about these two speeches is the way in which they were designed to 
appeal to a clearly defined set of constituency expectations. As well as signifying the 
importance of faith, these speeches tapped into the Biblical themes of ‘Jubilee’, ‘debt 
cancellation’ and ‘justice’. The extent to which these themes could be realised in 
practice however would be clearly undermined by the distinctly ‘economic’ set of 
expectations that embedded within this new global financial architecture. Indeed, 
rather from freeing these countries, as the Jubilee precept demanded, heavily 
indebted states would instead be subjugated through all manner of surveillance 
measures; standards, codes and increased transparency,134 to ensure that they 
orientated their economies to the exigencies of the market.  
 
Although unlike Blair, Brown’s own personal faith remained a private affair, the 
Chancellor nevertheless also made it a priority – arguably more so – to meet with 
church leaders and other faith groups. For Brown, there was “a network of mutuality” 
that binds “together, all of us, citizens and nations, rich and poor, in one moral 
universe”.135 According to the Chancellor, globalisation and increased interdependency 
had created a ‘network of mutuality’ that in turn had strengthened the impulse to fight 
the global injustice of debt. As this third phase unfolded, it would be this mantra that 
Brown would appeal to time and again, and upon this basis that the Chancellor would 
frame his own moral arguments. Brown’s approach to meeting these particular groups 
differed from that of Blair. Although like the Prime Minister, Brown was keen to flag up 
the ‘headline’ achievements of the New Labour government, the Chancellor was also 
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far more willing to place these achievements within the context of the Bible and other 
scriptural texts to spell out to these particular constituencies, the moral and spiritual 
significance of debt relief. Brown frequently showcased what one biographer has 
described as “an osmotic understanding of the Bible” that he would have acquired 
from a young age as a ‘son of the Manse’.136 Therefore, whereas the Prime Minister 
would only sketch out the linkages between ‘faith’ and ‘debt relief’, Brown would 
quote – quite literally, chapter-and-verse – scriptural references in support of his 
arguments. Going even beyond Leviticus, the Chancellor drew upon a verse in the Old 
Testament book of Isaiah which spoke of undoing “the heavy burdens…to let the 
oppressed go free”,137 and used the allegory of building a ‘new Jerusalem’ that appears 
in the Book of Revelation to symbolise a new world, free from debt.138 These 
narratives would appear to suggest a distinctly ecclesiastical and moral purpose to 
debt relief. As Brown told the NGO, CAFOD, debts should be ‘wiped out’ “because 
people weighed down by the burden of debts imposed by the last generation on this 
cannot even begin to build for the next generation”. Moreover, “to insist on the 
payment of these debts offends human dignity – and is therefore unjust. What is 
morally wrong cannot be economically right”.139 Brown’s moral compass was guided by 
spiritual teachings found in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke;140 the Jewish 
Shabbat;141 and the Buddhist teachings of Udana-Varga,142 and the liberal social 
philosophy of Gertrude Himmelfaarb, Abraham Lincoln, Michael Winstanley, Adam 
Smith and James Q. Wilson.  
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The force of these moral arguments was certainly compelling. However, what was 
almost just as striking was the complete absence of these same arguments when 
Brown spoke to financial (i.e. ‘non-civil society’) constituencies. Any references to the 
‘moral sense’ that the Chancellor had spoken about at such great length and with such 
apparent conviction on the eve of Britain’s presidency of the G8 in December 2004, 
had disappeared by the time Brown made his statement to his colleagues at the IMFC 
in Washington four months later. On this occasion the Chancellor preferred instead to 
address issues relating to enhancing “the authority and credibility of surveillance, 
particularly of debt sustainability”.143 Two months later, the ‘moral’ rhetoric returned 
and a virtually identical copy of Brown’s speech on ‘the moral sense’ was delivered at 
UNICEF’s annual lecture in June. Although inflecting less the ‘faith’ aspect of debt 
relief, the Chancellor nevertheless spoke of how this ‘moral sense’ underpinned New 
Labour’s commitment to debt relief as a means of empowering individuals.144 True to 
form however, no mention was made of the moral imperative of debt relief neither in 
Brown’s statement to the IMFC that September,145 or to his counterparts at the 
conclusion of G7 Finance Ministers meeting in London at the close of the year.146 
Therefore, although New Labour had already committed to viewing debt relief as both 
a moral and an economic issue and one that required a solution that was moral and 
therefore economically right, these ended up being two very distinct discourses for 
two very different audiences.  
 
Fig. 5.4 (overleaf) illustrates the bind in which New Labour tied itself into. Keen to talk 
about the ‘moral’ and faith-driven aspects of debt relief to sympathetic audiences, 
Brown reverted to playing the ‘Iron Chancellor’ when it came to discussing debt in the 
corridors and meeting rooms of the IFIs. It would appear that not even Brown was 
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prepared to reconcile the two imperatives. This however would lead to an 
inconsistency in policy that would impede any progress towards to securing debt relief. 
 
Fig. 5.4 Phases 1, 2 and 3 of New Labour’s Debt Relief Strategy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given New Labour’s commitment to a new global financial architecture, this strategic 
selectivity would appear to demonstrate the lack of any real depth to New Labour’s 
commitment to the moral dimension of debt relief. Although New Labour sought to 
engage with civil society and faith groups in particular, these were audiences that did 
not need convincing of the need for more extensive debt forgiveness. To these groups 
the government acknowledged that it could do more. Indeed this was something Hilary 
Benn was happy to concede in a speech to the Jubilee movement in 2004.147 However, 
the general message to this type of audience was that the government had seen some 
success and was looking to improve in those areas where progress had been slow. 
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Interestingly, where this was the case it was never the fault of New Labour. It may 
have been due to the incalcitrance of fellow creditors, the failure of indebted countries 
to reform accordingly, or even the unrealistic demands of civil society. As this phase 
has shown however, New Labour did fall short and did fail to meet its responsibilities 
to the developing world through its inability to voice the same sort of moral 
commitment in the conference halls and meeting rooms of the IFIs as it had when 
speaking to civil society. Although officials spoke frequently about the need to build 
international support for faster and deeper levels of debt relief, when it came to 
flexing its muscle within these institutions, New Labour appeared not to have the 
stomach for a political fight in Washington. The moral dimension that Brown claimed 
would be so crucial as to make any debt relief policy “economically right” was 
overlooked in favour of a policy agreement that would support the expectations of the 
market instead. 
 
Conclusions 
Symbolic in that this was the first of New Labour’s many forays into the realm of 
international development, the response of the Blair government – and the Treasury in 
particular – to the issue of developing world debt provided an early opportunity to 
showcase its model of political economy on the global stage. In many respects then, 
this chapter is much more than simply New Labour’s attitude towards debt relief. Its 
response to indebtedness went beyond simply freeing up the much-needed financial 
resources for development. Instead, New Labour sought to offer an ostensibly ‘new 
global financial architecture’ which would incorporate and reform (or ‘enhance’) the 
pre-existing HIPC initiative, underpin the MDRI and set heavily indebted poor countries 
on the road to not simply debt sustainability but long-term economic growth and 
development. Both the HIPC initiative and MDRI provided an insight as to how New 
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Labour would work, firstly within the established structures of global economic 
governance, and secondly, the reforms it would offer as a means of meeting its own 
objectives in government.  
 
Based upon the reforms that the Treasury had introduced at home (chapters 2 and 4), 
this new architecture was designed in a similar way to maintain macroeconomic 
stability, strengthen economic governance, and provide confidence to investors by 
increasing the visibility of market information. The design of this new architecture was 
striking, since these principles reflected the thinking of PWC subscribed to by the 
nébuleuse of IFIs located in Washington, just as much as it did the policy ideas of 
Gordon Brown and senior Treasury officials in Whitehall. This new architecture was, 
for instance, predicated upon a commitment by indebted countries in particular, to 
‘sound policies’. Macroeconomic stability, market liberalism, economic growth, fiscal 
discipline and anti-inflationary policies were the touchstones of this architecture all of 
which in turn enabled it to be hard-wired into the political economy of the PWC. With 
this framework locked-in through a series of internationally-agreed standards and 
codes at the national level, countries seeking debt relief could be monitored 
‘panoptically’ by institutions such as the IMF, whose remit to maintain stability would 
be strengthened under the terms of this new architecture.  
 
The language used by Gordon Brown to describe these policies, and indeed this new 
architecture, was interesting. Although they appeared to be neoliberal in character, 
these policies were described by the Chancellor as being ‘pro-poor’. Without these 
policies in place, Brown argued that the investment necessary for growth-led 
development would not occur. Failure to attract market investment and to secure 
economic growth would preclude the governments of HIPCs from making the 
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necessary investments in healthcare, education, infrastructure and job creation. This 
understanding of development dovetailed with that of the Washington-based IFIs, and 
the IMF and the World Bank in particular, who viewed development in largely 
economic terms. Labelling these policies as being ‘pro-poor’ however was strategically 
useful when speaking to constituencies who viewed themselves as being outside of 
this orthodoxy. Church groups and NGOs in particular viewed the debt crisis as a moral 
issue and one that was about social justice, rather than simply a matter of economic 
expediency. According to these groups, governments and banking institutions in the 
global North had, for far too long, been guilty of extracting usury from the poorest and 
most vulnerable countries and people on the planet. The issue was not about debt 
sustainability and keeping these countries locked in a two-speed economic system, but 
about debt justice, forgiveness and the removal of this millstone from around the 
necks of the world’s poorest countries. Only then could these countries begin to 
develop and see their standards of living increase.  
 
These constituencies certainly loomed large over New Labour’s strategy in this area. 
Each of the major policy actors, including Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and Clare Short 
engaged with these constituencies. Although the government was guilty at times of 
sending mixed messages – Short, in particular, sometimes praised the Jubilee 
movement, while at other times, criticised the movement for its unreasonable 
demands – overall, it was attentive to what these constituencies had to say. Indeed, 
the issue of debt and the church-based make-up of this movement gave both Blair and 
Brown the opportunity to talk openly about their own faith and the influence that it 
had upon their politics. The speeches made to these audiences were infused with the 
moral imperative of debt justice. While these were no doubt warmly received, what 
was surely disappointing for these constituencies that such support and the moral 
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weight of such arguments, never seemed to materialise when it really mattered. 
Through his role as Chair of the IMFC, Brown held a uniquely influential position within 
Washington as well as Whitehall. To these altogether more ‘market-minded’ audiences 
however, the Chancellor’s moral argument for increased debt relief never arose. 
Instead, the debate continued to be framed in altogether more ‘credible’ terms; 
maintaining stability, the pursuit of growth and creating the right conditions for 
investment.    
 
Despite a clear engagement with civil society, as it passed through its three policy 
phases, New Labour’s debt relief strategy demonstrated a continued orientation 
towards the expectations of these ‘economic’ constituencies. This said a great deal as 
to the character of New Labour. Firstly, rather than representing any real break from 
the market dogma that ‘old’ Labour had frequently criticised the IFIs for championing, 
New Labour framed its own response to the debt crisis on virtually the same terms as 
these Washington institutions. Secondly, and perhaps even more significantly, New 
Labour officials were at least aware of and acknowledged the moral imperative of debt 
forgiveness. Crucially however, they appeared to lack the conviction to carry this moral 
argument right to the heart of where it was needed most; the institutions of global 
finance where New Labour officials could have brought about very real change to the 
lives of millions across the developing world.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Pro-Poor or Pro-Business? Increasing Access 
to Essential Medicines in the Developing 
World 
 
Sandwiched in between the two case study chapters that explore New Labour’s efforts 
to raise finance for development through increased debt relief and overseas aid is my 
analysis of the government’s commitment to increase the availability of essential 
medicines, principally the antiretroviral drugs needed to combat HIV and AIDS in the 
developing world. The focus of this chapter is upon the two main dimensions in the 
partnership between the New Labour government and the UK pharmaceutical 
industry. The first, broadly ‘economic’ dimension concerns Britain’s place within the 
strategic context of an increasingly competitive global economy, while the second 
altogether more ‘ethical’ or ‘moral’ dimension addresses New Labour’s own 
commitment to meet the UN Millennium Development Goals, and specifically to 
achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV and AIDS. The first dimension 
draws upon the findings of chapter 2, which discussed the significance of globalisation 
to New Labour officials and the importance that was, as a result, placed upon the 
‘knowledge economy’ as the primary means by which Britain could compete in the 
global economy. This chapter explores the implications for those living in the 
developing world of a strategy designed by New Labour ministers to meet the globally-
orientated expectations held by domestic pharmaceutical firms, and so retain the 
investment necessary to keep Britain at the forefront of this ‘knowledge economy’.  
 
The second dimension assesses this domestic strategy in the light of the altogether 
more ‘moral’ global commitment made by New Labour to increase the access to the 
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medicines required to address the spread of HIV and AIDS in the developing world. 
Specifically, it asks how much policy space this domestic strategy left for constituencies 
outside this government–industry partnership, such as those developing countries 
affected by the AIDS crisis and NGOs working within this particular field of 
development, to voice their expectations of New Labour’s commitments in this area. It 
was certainly clear from the policy pronouncements made by government ministers 
that there was a strong commitment from Whitehall to address the shortfall of both 
the amount of and access to antiretroviral drugs in these poorer parts of the world. 
What was altogether less clear amongst ministers however was why this shortfall and 
lack of access existed in the first place. The two main groups of policy constituencies 
offered competing narratives which, as this chapter will explain, fed into New Labour’s 
collective understanding of the AIDS crisis and its response to the problem of access to 
antiretrovirals.  
 
The first group, made up of developing countries affected by the crisis and NGOs 
working in this field, identified the pharmaceutical firms themselves as being culpable 
for this lack of access through their failure to roll out more extensive treatment 
programmes. This enclave of ‘non-business’ constituencies pointed to inappropriate 
and expensive pricing structures, a chronic lack of research and development (R&D), 
and continued intransigence over intellectual property (IP) and patent rules as being 
the main reasons why rates of new HIV infections continued to outstrip the provision 
of medicines, and why millions already living with the disease across the developing 
world were still without antiretrovirals.1 According to these groups, British and other 
Western pharmaceutical firms were concerned more about their own profitability and 
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their shareholders than they were about their moral responsibilities as global health 
providers.  
 
For their part, industry groups representing the large ‘research-led’ multinationals 
argued that the continued profitability of their firms was vitally important if they were 
to continue to invest in new drug innovations and formulations. Accepting that they 
did in fact have “a moral responsibility to make its products accessible to poor 
people”,2 these firms, a significant number of whom were based in Britain, argued that 
they needed the protection offered by international IP laws to prevent their drug 
innovations from being copied and sold on by smaller pharmaceutical firms in low cost, 
emerging economies such as India and South Africa. The real barrier to access was not 
the IP rules, but the severely underfunded healthcare systems found in developing 
countries affected by HIV and AIDS. For the British-based GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), one 
of the world’s leading pharmaceutical firms, it was certainly not the patents system. It 
was instead an acute lack of hospitals and clinics, poor medicine distribution networks, 
patient illiteracy and low numbers of healthcare staff that were impeding access to 
these essential medicines.3  
 
The main aim of this chapter is to identify which of these two sets of audiences New 
Labour orientated its policies towards, and crucially what sort of expectations the 
governments’ strategy met.  New Labour’s understanding of the global economy, 
together with these competing assessments of the crisis presented government 
ministers with two discernible policy alternatives. The first would be to meet more 
directly the expectations of those constituencies located outside of this partnership 
between the government and pharmaceutical industry. This alternative would involve 
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the government pressing ahead with its wider commitments concerning global public 
health, and demanding that the pharmaceutical industry takes a far greater 
responsibility for the delivery of and access to antiretroviral medicines in the 
developing world. This option however would risk alienating the industry and, in an era 
of heightened capital mobility, potentially trigger disinvestment from this vitally 
important sector of Britain’s economy. As this chapter shall show, New Labour 
ministers considered this risk and its domestic implications to be far too great. Instead 
they chose to pursue a set of policy measures orientated more towards meeting the 
preferences of the industry itself. Although New Labour’s strategy was far from linear – 
particularly since different government departments appeared to emphasise different 
policies – the overarching strategic narrative of this second option was one designed to 
appeal to and accommodate the expectations of the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
This alternative policy was to be achieved by building upon the partnership that had 
been formed between government and industry officials at the domestic level. Going 
beyond “the privileged position of business” in the economy,4 and the “structural 
dependence” that the state has upon capital,5 New Labour officials had 
accommodated the expectations of the pharmaceutical industry through the creation 
of an economic and regulatory framework conducive to retaining and attracting 
further investment into Britain. As New Labour sought to scale-up the access to 
antiretrovirals overseas, it used and extended its relationship with the industry to 
introduce a number of market-based measures to incentivise, rather than regulate the 
industry into meeting its wider global healthcare commitments concerning HIV and 
AIDS. It was hoped that by keeping the industry ‘onside’ by offering them an 
‘investment-friendly’ policy environment at home and support for increased IP 
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protection abroad, these firms would increase the quantity of research into ‘diseases 
of poverty’ and ‘tier’ their pricing strategies appropriately for developing country 
markets.  
 
Rather problematically however, this option – although framed within the language of 
‘partnership’ – would entail no concrete obligation on the part of firms to change their 
behaviour. This was striking since it perversely rejected the message of ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ that was imprinted elsewhere in New Labour’s political economy, both 
at home in its welfare system (chapter 2) and, as I shall demonstrate in chapter 7, in its 
foreign aid policy. This meant that firms could continue to take advantage of the ‘light-
touch’ regulatory environment offered by the government, orientate their corporate 
strategy towards maximising shareholder value, but still be under no compulsion to 
fulfil their moral commitments. This demonstrated a clear inconsistency with other 
parts of New Labour’s international development policies, and suggested that the 
burden of responsibility lay disproportionately upon the shoulders of the global poor 
rather than on the powerful, resource-rich firms located in Britain and other parts of 
the developed world. Furthermore, if the pharmaceutical firms themselves were under 
no real obligation to deliver on their ethical commitment to those living in the 
developing world then this would in turn clearly present a problem for New Labour’s 
own commitment to increase access to antiretrovirals through these firms. If these 
firms did not consider it to be economically viable or profitable to sell drugs to these 
developing countries at an appropriate price, they simply would not do so.  
 
Structure of the Chapter 
Having already explored in chapter 2, the importance attached to the ‘knowledge 
economy’ by New Labour and the pharmaceutical industry’s significant role within it, I 
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open up this particular chapter by addressing the tension that arose in New Labour’s 
own commitment to meet the market expectations of the pharmaceutical industry and 
the moral obligation that firms in this sector had as providers of global healthcare. 
Against these competing imperatives, I turn my attention to the way in which New 
Labour’s stated aim to increase access to medicines in the developing world unfolded 
during its time in office. As its efforts underwent several phases of policy, I 
demonstrate how New Labour constrained its international commitment by making its 
chief priority the ongoing competitiveness and profitability of Britain’s pharmaceutical 
industry. Despite an awareness of, and some limited appeals towards the moral case 
for action, New Labour continued to orientate its response to the crisis towards 
meeting the economic expectations of the pharmaceutical industry. I conclude this 
chapter with a brief assessment of the implications for those living with HIV and AIDS 
in the developing world of this particular part of New Labour’s political economy.  
 
Moral Obligations and Market Realities: Revisiting New Labour’s  
Relationship with Britain’s Pharmaceutical Industry 
Pharmaceutical firms are not like other businesses, concerned only with the sale of 
goods and services, profit maximisation and satisfying shareholder expectations. They 
have intrinsic duties as health providers, and an acutely ethical commitment to make 
available affordable, effective medicines to all those who need them. As Richard 
Barker, the Director of the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (the trade 
association for more than 75 companies in the UK producing prescription medicines) 
acknowledged:  
 
As a global industry whose aim is to improve health, it is a clear 
responsibility of the pharmaceutical sector to do its part in 
addressing this [global] need.6  
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A similar point is made later on in the same report:  
 
High standards of ethical behaviour must apply equally to the 
marketing of pharmaceutical products in all countries, regardless of 
the level of development of their economic and healthcare systems. 
This is vital if the contribution of modern pharmaceuticals to world 
health is to be trusted and embraced.7 
 
Therefore, while other firms might have duties that fall under the broader umbrella of 
corporate social responsibility, pharmaceutical firms have a much more specific ethical 
obligation in the products they provide, one that extends far beyond their self-
regulating, corporate behaviour but which forms their raison d’être. This point is 
further underlined by GSK:  
 
Increasing access to medicines is important to our business for 
ethical, reputational and commercial reasons because it is morally 
the right thing to do and is valued by our shareholders, employees 
and other stakeholders.8 
 
That this moral commitment was understood by firms such as GSK to be vital for both 
commercial and strategic reasons reflects a large degree of self-interest. Nevertheless, 
it is clear from these statements that the pharmaceutical industry viewed itself as 
having a distinct ethical imperative in meeting the global shortfall in essential 
medicines. Without this moral responsibility, pharmaceutical firms simply become just 
like any other business, whereby the medicines required to maintain and restore the 
health of individuals are commodities, provided only to those who, in a global market 
economy, can afford them.  
 
New Labour itself recognised and acknowledged that “as the producers of existing and 
developers of new, medicines they [pharmaceutical firms] can – and do – make a 
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difference within their sphere of influence”.9 Indeed, this gave pharmaceutical firms a 
“particular role” in the government’s own commitment to increase access to essential 
medicines. Rather strikingly however, if this ‘particular role’ was an ethical imperative 
then it was barely mentioned in the government’s other policy pronouncements. 
Certainly, this ethical dimension was not attributed the same degree of importance as 
the economic imperative, and it was frequently downplayed when addressing industry 
audiences. For instance, while New Labour was keen to stress its economic 
commitment to the industry by providing a series of benchmarks laid out by the 
Department of Health for instance, no audit was made of New Labour’s performance 
in delivering a more ethical framework for the pharmaceutical industry. This suggested 
that the moral obligations of the industry would not be afforded the same degree of 
priority as the economic imperatives of competitiveness and profitability.  
 
Even the Framework for Good Practice in the Pharmaceutical Industry, drawn up by 
Whitehall officials and industry representatives in support of New Labour’s 
commitment to increase access to essential medicines in the developing world, did not 
really press pharmaceutical firms over their moral obligations as healthcare providers. 
It argued that it was not simply the responsibility of the pharmaceutical industry to 
increase access to essential medicines, but “the whole international community”.10 A 
“lack of access to cheap generics” was due, not to a lack of investment in R&D but 
“ultimately, poor quality health systems…and a lack of financing to purchase 
medicines”.11 These excuses for the current lack of access were an attempt to mask a 
fundamental problem that lay at the heart of New Labour’s commitment to those 
individuals in the developing world living with HIV and AIDS. Pharmaceutical firms 
were willing only to invest and provide drugs in well-established markets. That is, 
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those found in the developed world. In these markets, there was no such problem of a 
lack of cheap generics, nor was there any problem for firms to fund high quality, highly 
productive research programmes. In those countries where there were weak and 
underdeveloped healthcare systems however, the industry was simply unwilling to 
invest. Despite the gravity of the AIDS crisis in the developing world and the ethical 
obligation upon the industry and the urgency to provide the antiretroviral drugs, the 
risks to profitability and shareholder value that these firms may incur meant that firms 
were simply unwilling to invest in and supply the necessary medicines to these poorer 
countries.  
 
The residual appeal made by government officials to remind pharmaceutical firms of 
their moral obligations to those countries affected by HIV and AIDS was sweetened by 
a range of policy ‘carrots’ rather than regulatory ‘sticks’, designed to maintain the 
competitiveness and profitability of the industry both at home and abroad. Instead of 
urging the sector to step-up its efforts in rolling out the required levels of treatment, 
senior New Labour officials pledged their support to maintaining and strengthening 
the IP laws in order to protect the ‘intelligence, innovation and creativity’ of British 
pharmaceutical firms. Despite concerns from developing countries and civil society 
alike that these IP agreements actually undermined global public health, Tony Blair 
agreed with the pharmaceutical firms who had lobbied for the TRIPS legislation to be 
more tightly enforced, by describing intellectual property as being the “lifeblood” of 
the industry.12 During her time as Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the 
Department of Health, Hazel Blears repeated the Prime Minister’s statement. 
Addressing the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, Blears argued that 
“intellectual property rights are the lifeblood of the innovative pharmaceutical 
industry, and that they are essential to investment in R&D”. The health minister 
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pledged to the industry that New Labour would “uphold that position in the face of 
those who claim that getting rid of patents would somehow solve the problem”.13  
 
Given New Labour’s understanding of globalisation and how important within the 
strategic context of the global economy that these knowledge-based firms were to 
New Labour, this IP legislation was a hugely important political and economic 
instrument for safeguarding the ongoing profitability of these industries. These rules 
enabled firms to apply for patents on drugs in individual countries and receive 
exclusive rights to produce that drug in that particular country, providing the producer 
with a limited monopoly of the market (under the agreement, twenty years), which 
effectively closes the market conditions to factors such as supply and demand and 
allow the producer to fix the price of the product.14 Policy-wise, both Blair and Blears 
prioritised quite clearly ‘the economic’ over ‘the ethical’ to demonstrate New Labour’s 
recalcitrant support for the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
Insofar as other government officials were concerned however, the issue was less 
clear-cut. Other ministers appeared to suggest however that there remained an 
underlying ethical imperative embedded within these economic concerns, which 
actually stood to benefit developing countries. Baroness Valerie Amos, the 
government’s international development spokesperson in the House of Lords, argued 
that “developing countries need intellectual property protection as a way of 
encouraging more investment, research and innovation, from which they should 
benefit”.15 This is striking since it enabled New Labour to speak to and reassure both 
audiences as to how the government could support IP protection and the interests of 
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pharmaceutical firms yet still remain committed to increasing access to essential 
medicines in the developing world.  
 
These two narratives demonstrate clearly New Labour’s awareness at least of the 
ethical commitment that it and the pharmaceutical industry had towards those 
individuals in the developing world living with HIV and AIDS. Of course, whether New 
Labour and the pharmaceutical industry would actually yield to this moral obligation 
was, as I have already suggested, an altogether different matter. As the government’s 
strategy for increasing access unfolded, New Labour’s policies followed a fine-line 
between maintaining the domestically-orientated position of the UK as a competitive 
and attractive location to the pharmaceutical industry on the one hand, and 
incentivising these firms located in Britain to take more seriously their altogether more 
international obligations to those AIDS-prevalent areas with weak and fragile 
healthcare systems on the other. To explore how New Labour managed this balancing 
act, and the depth of its commitment to the developing world in relation to that of the 
pharmaceutical industry, I now turn my attention to the different phases that 
government policy underwent during its time in office.  
 
Phase 1:  Different Whitehall Perspectives, One Policy Outcome   
Certainly one of the most striking aspects of New Labour’s early policy strategy 
concerning HIV and AIDS was the variety of ways in which different government 
departments diagnosed the problem of access to antiretrovirals, and the different 
solutions they proposed as a result. Not only did this make it difficult to read off a 
linear policy trajectory, but it appeared to undermine DFID’s own commitment, set out 
in its first White Paper, to “ensure the maximum consistency between all these 
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different policies as they affect the developing world”.16 This opening phase of 
government policy assesses the strategies of three key Whitehall departments: the 
Department for Trade and Industry (DTI), DFID, and the Treasury. What this first phase 
of policy reveals is that despite these different policy perspectives, each of these 
departments retained a commitment to meeting the expectations of the 
pharmaceutical industry, supporting the industry’s appeals for greater IP protection, 
defending its claims over the weaknesses in the healthcare infrastructure of 
developing countries, and providing market-led incentives to carry out increased R&D 
into the urgently needed, yet altogether less-profitable ‘diseases of poverty’ such as 
HIV and AIDS. Therefore, despite the different policy approaches taken by these 
different departments, New Labour’s policy was orientated towards meeting the 
market-based expectations of the pharmaceutical industry ahead of any moral 
obligations these firms may have.  
 
The DTI: Maintaining Britain’s Commercial Interests in the Midst of a  
Global Crisis 
New Labour’s initial attempts to mobilise the pharmaceutical industry into taking 
greater action and increasing access to antiretrovirals appeared to be at least, 
relatively straightforward. Strikingly however, it was not DFID who first took the lead 
on this issue but the DTI. Taking the form of a tripartite partnership between the DTI, 
the pharmaceutical industry and the developing country concerned, the New Labour 
government saw its role not as a development agency but as an advocate for the 
commercial interests of British pharmaceutical firms. One country in which New 
Labour wanted to show support for these firms was South Africa. Politically, this was 
significant since South Africa’s leader Thabo Mbeki was a close ally of Tony Blair and 
supporter of the Prime Minister’s ‘Third Way’ project. More importantly however, 
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South Africa had at the time some of the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world. At 
the height of the TRIPS controversy in 1999, an estimated 15 per cent of the adult 
population in South Africa were living with HIV and AIDS.17 The scale of the epidemic 
across sub-Saharan Africa prompted widespread calls from civil society for Western 
governments and global trade institutions such as the World Trade Organisation to 
relax the patent laws that were blocking access to life-saving generic antiretrovirals, 
and for the pharmaceutical industry to take more seriously its obligations as public 
health providers. New Labour’s Trade Minister Richard Caborn however robustly 
defended the UK industry against these accusations, arguing that it was committed to 
providing “greater access to effective treatment for HIV/AIDS and other diseases”.18 
What was needed instead, Caborn argued, was for the South African government “to 
improve healthcare provision for its people while respecting its international 
obligations on intellectual property”.19  
 
This sent the message to the government of South Africa, and other countries in the 
region affected by HIV and AIDS crisis, that they had responsibilities not only to their 
own people, but to the pharmaceutical firms that held the drug technology and the 
treatments needed to combat the spread of the disease. The problem with this appeal 
however was that with increasing AIDS-related mortality rates already taking their toll 
upon their communities, the capacity of governments to invest in healthcare systems 
was diminishing rapidly. As I have already explained in chapter 3, many countries in the 
grip of HIV and AIDS in the developing world had seen their health systems weakened 
as a result of the austerity measures imposed through the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes of the 1980s and 1990s. Consequently, many simply found it impossible 
to fund adequately a response to the health crisis that they now faced. An already 
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under-financed healthcare system, combined with a shrinking domestic tax base 
exacerbated by a decimated workforce and declining overseas aid flows meant that it 
was virtually impossible for these countries to cope with the financial cost of the crisis, 
let alone put in place the highly developed healthcare systems demanded by the 
pharmaceutical firms. Crucially, Caborn failed to conceive of the possibility of the 
resource-rich pharmaceutical industry taking seriously their responsibilities as 
providers of global healthcare. Instead the responsibility lay squarely at the door of 
resource-stretched governments, not only to build up their healthcare systems but to 
orientate these as a means of meeting the expectations of the global pharmaceutical 
industry.  
 
DFID’s ‘Demand-Management’ Strategy  
If the DTI was concerned with maintaining the commercial interests of the British 
pharmaceutical industry abroad, Clare Short’s tenure as Secretary of State for 
International Development saw DFID focus upon what I term ‘demand-management’ 
strategies. Designed to “strengthen basic healthcare systems” in developing countries, 
these focused upon the need to build health infrastructures with sufficient capacity to 
manage the crisis.20 Unlike the ‘supply-side’ measures supported by the Treasury to 
which I will turn to shortly, Short was adamant that “even if the drugs were free, most 
poor people would not get them, because they have no access to healthcare”.21 To 
achieve this, Short had earlier remarked that “international co-operation” was needed 
“between the pharmaceutical companies, the governments of developing countries 
and the international community”.22 Rather than focus upon the responsibilities that 
pharmaceutical firms had as healthcare providers, Clare Short persisted with the view 
that the industry had a much more discrete role in tackling HIV and AIDS in the 
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developing world, working in partnership with “the governments of developing 
countries and the international community to put into place basic healthcare 
systems”.23 Crucially however – and rather tellingly in the light of the discourse of 
‘rights and responsibilities’ that appeared elsewhere in New Labour’s policy discourse 
– ultimate responsibility lay with the developing countries. For Short, it was crucial that 
“there [was] now a much bigger commitment from African heads of state than 
previously, so…that we can make faster progress”.24  
 
Short’s emphasis upon the demand-side stemmed from her belief that developing 
countries did not have the capacity to cope with and administer the huge influx of 
drugs that would be needed to treat the vast numbers of HIV patients. Therefore while 
the Secretary of State welcomed “the initiative by a group of pharmaceutical 
companies to reduce the cost of ARV therapies for developing countries” as “a positive 
step”, Short nevertheless conceded that “even at greatly reduced prices they remained 
unaffordable for many people in developing countries”.25 To address this issue, it 
would be necessary to establish a partnership, not just with pharmaceutical firms but 
with the developing countries themselves in order to “put in place basic primary 
healthcare systems *which would+ deliver basic drugs and other care to all in need”.26 
As the Secretary of State pointed out, these “drugs are complex to administer and 
require constant monitoring of the treatment regime. Many developing countries do 
not have primary healthcare systems and thus, whatever the price of [these] drugs, 
have no means of delivering care to the poor”.27 Although Clare Short was correct in 
her assessment of the situation faced by developing countries, her actual analysis was 
flawed as it ignored the systemic factors that prevented these countries from investing 
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in their own healthcare systems. Therefore, like the DTI’s approach, the role that DFID 
afforded to the pharmaceutical industry in tackling HIV and AIDS remained a 
discretionary one.  
 
The Secretary of State also deliberately underplayed the effectiveness of 
antiretrovirals in fighting the disease, even going as far as to say that she hoped “that 
no one will pretend that antiretrovirals are the answer, because they are not”.28 
Despite a groundswell of calls from civil society demanding that prices of generic 
antiretrovirals be cut, a fairer set of rules governing the sale and distribution of 
essential drugs in developing countries, and access to these medicines widened,29 
Short rejected these calls as “not being helpful”.30 For the Secretary of State there 
needed to be “a global agreement *…+ so that pharmaceutical companies can get some 
return on their investment, particularly their massive research budgets”.31 Again, much 
of what Short said was right. The pharmaceutical firms did have ‘massive’ research 
budgets, and it was important that ongoing and future research was protected. 
However, the research track-record of these firms was less than impressive. In 2004, 
the WHO estimated that “over 95 per cent of global investments in drug development 
*were+ targeted to the medical needs of the richest 20 per cent of the world’s 
population. By contrast, only 1 per cent of the drugs developed over the previous 25 
years were for tropical diseases and TB, diseases that together accounted for over 11 
per cent of the global disease burden”.32 Despite the ‘massive’ budgets that Short 
alluded to, there appeared to be a profound unwillingness on the part of the 
pharmaceutical firms to address the needs of patients living in the developing world 
who lacked the purchasing power to afford the lifesaving antiretroviral treatments.  
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Despite working “in conjunction with the British pharmaceutical industry” to offer a 
“big review into access to medicines”,33 the Secretary of State clearly remained 
sceptical of any efforts to scale-up access to the drugs that large parts of the 
developing world so desperately needed. This scepticism was perhaps no more clearly 
evident than when Short, giving evidence to the Select Committee for International 
Development, rejected out of hand “the whole Western, European obsession with 
antiretroviral drugs”.34 Agreeing with the Secretary of State’s evidence, the Select 
Committee duly concluded that:  
 
Whilst efforts should be made to improve the affordability of 
antiretrovirals, this must not distract donors and governments from 
the need to focus on basic healthcare systems. Antiretrovirals must 
not be seen as a magic bullet; the crisis in southern Africa is primarily 
one caused by poverty and vulnerability, rather than by lack of access 
to medicines.35  
 
Short’s remarks both to the Select Committee and elsewhere provide several striking 
insights into the Secretary of State’s reading of the AIDS crisis, and the response that 
her department, as a result, made to it. Like the pharmaceutical industry, Short spoke 
– quite rightly – of the structural conditions within which the crisis had unfolded, of 
‘poverty and vulnerability’. However, where the pharmaceutical industry 
acknowledged the responsibilities, or at least, the “big role” it had to play in addressing 
“the interlinking issues of poverty and health”,36 the Secretary of State chose instead 
to shore up the commercial interests and market-based expectations of these 
pharmaceutical firms, by making healthcare systems, rather than the actual increase of  
medicines DFID’s priority.  
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The emphasis that Short in particular placed upon managing the ‘demand-side’ was 
tantamount to ‘creating the right market conditions’ for pharmaceutical firms to 
invest. Indeed, the government viewed “the prospect of affordable antiretroviral drugs 
as an additional incentive for strengthening health systems”.37 Essentially for DFID, 
more antiretrovirals would be made available only if developing countries improved 
(i.e. suitably marketised) their health infrastructures. Once these ‘health markets’ were 
properly in place then pharmaceutical firms would be far more prepared to invest and 
provide the drugs that were needed. Again, the responsibility for increasing access to 
these medicines would therefore rest upon the developing countries themselves, 
rather than the pharmaceutical firms who already had the capacity – if not the 
willingness – to boost this capacity themselves and invest in drug formulations suitable 
for use in developing countries. Of course, healthcare services needed to be improved, 
but DFID’s strategy served to ease the specific pressure that the pharmaceutical 
industry should have faced in delivering these medicines, placing it instead upon 
developing countries that were already under considerable strain. Crucially, this 
undermined the moral commitment that other government ministers, MPs and parts 
of civil society felt was upon both the pharmaceutical industry and DFID to increase 
levels of access to these drugs within the developing world. 
 
Clare Short’s own personal remarks meant there was a distinct contradiction between 
her position and the appeals being made elsewhere in the government, including that 
of her own department to increase access to antiretrovirals. Tony Blair himself set up a 
High Level Working Group on Access to Medicines, which the Secretary of State was 
asked to chair.38 Short’s own department meanwhile, had played an “active role in 
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establishing the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria”.39 Despite frequently 
rejecting the importance of antiretrovirals in favour of establishing stronger healthcare 
systems, Short nevertheless appeared to have no qualms chairing this Working Group 
that called upon pharmaceutical firms to keep “prices close to the cost of 
manufacture”,40 and increase “R&D into diseases of poor people in the developing 
world”.41 Similarly, DFID’s contribution to the Global Fund was “designed to improve 
provision of drugs and commodities to treat those diseases”.42  
 
Both these initiatives however had distinct ‘supply-side’ objectives – increased funding 
for drug research and availability of medicines – that contradicted the Secretary of 
State’s argument that it was purely the ‘demand-side’ that needed to be addressed. 
Given Short’s antagonism towards the benefits of antiretrovirals in tackling the AIDS 
epidemic, it was certainly remarkable that she could agree with a remit of the group to 
scale-up the levels of access to these same drugs, or spend “US$200 million…over five 
years” on an initiative which she clearly had some reservations over.43 Crucially, the 
stance taken by Clare Short put her at odds not only with the aims of her own working 
group, but with the measures taken elsewhere in Whitehall, most notably the 
Treasury, to incentivise the pharmaceutical industry and boost the supply-side. Here a 
fiscal policy based upon increased spending and tax relief measures was introduced to 
increase the availability of antiretrovirals suitable for dispensation in developing 
countries. Although this was a welcome move towards encouraging firms to take more 
seriously their responsibilities as healthcare providers in these developing countries, 
these measures remained locked into accommodating the altogether more market-
based expectations of the industry both at home and abroad.  
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The Treasury’s Supply-Side Policy Measures 
Unlike Clare Short, the Chancellor Gordon Brown and his team at the Treasury believed 
that the pharmaceutical industry had an altogether more prominent role and a far 
greater responsibility in the fight against HIV and AIDS in the developing world. Rather 
than focusing upon the ‘demand-side’ issues identified by DFID as being the biggest 
barrier to tackling AIDS, the Treasury probed the pharmaceutical industry over what it 
was doing to combat the spread of the disease in the developing world. The Treasury 
did not criticise the stance taken by Clare Short’s DFID, nor did it suggest that the 
pharmaceutical industry on its own could tackle the crisis. The Treasury did believe 
however that the pharmaceutical industry should step-up and meet its obligations 
over the provision of antiretroviral medicines.  
 
Drawing upon the government-industry links that Tony Blair and other senior New 
Labour officials had been keen to develop at home, Treasury staff designed a series of 
proposals in order to address the problem of chronic under-investment in the health 
sector within the developing world. As part of these supply-side measures, the 
Treasury announced plans for a tax credit to incentivise pharmaceutical firms into 
spending more on R&D on vaccines suitable for developing countries. In the 2000 pre-
Budget Report, the Treasury argued that the underlying problem of access to drugs in 
the developing world was because:   
 
Only a tiny fraction of new patents address diseases in developing 
countries. This is mainly because those who might be able to develop 
vaccines fear they would not be able to recoup the significant 
research expenditures that will be needed.44  
 
To address this problem, the Chancellor proposed a new tax incentive to encourage 
firms to “develop, cut the costs for and ensure the supply of anti-TB, anti-malaria and 
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anti-AIDS drugs”.45 Still working within New Labour’s rubric of ‘partnership’ by building 
upon the extensive consultations already underway between the government and the 
pharmaceutical industry, the Treasury’s proposals would “depend heavily on 
developing a shared commitment to tackle this issue”.46  
 
This tax credit would be part of an overall package of policy measures designed tackle 
the diseases of poverty by stimulating increased investment into R&D.47 Brown 
announced plans to encourage “commitments by the industry…to make donations on 
a more consistent basis, in support of developing countries own health strategies, and 
launch a new global purchase fund, both to encourage the development and delivery 
of effective and affordable treatments that do not yet exist, and for the treatments 
already available”, which the Treasury would link to removing the “constraints in the 
tax system on donations of drugs and vaccines”.48 Given that only a tenth of all 
research was being devoted to diseases that affect the world’s poor, the Chancellor 
argued that it was necessary to “create new tax incentives to accelerate the research 
done on diseases like AIDS, TB and malaria”.49 This tax credit would not only apply “for 
research done in the United Kingdom”, but also “for research done elsewhere”.50 
Brown argued however that there must be “a corporate commitment to create new 
drugs and vaccines in ways that truly meet the needs of the poor and sick”.51 For the 
Chancellor, it did not matter where this research was being undertaken; the tax credit 
would be applied for research carried out by British firms with their bases in the UK 
and elsewhere. Significantly, this indicated that Brown was concerned not simply with 
the means by which these policy commitments would be met, but principally with the 
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outcomes; that the research was carried out and that the supply of antiretrovirals was 
increased. To deliver on these outcomes and this commitment to public health 
however, meant accommodating the market-based expectations of pharmaceutical 
firms and orientating the government’s strategy to ensuring the ongoing profitability 
of the industry.  
 
In the 2001 pre-Budget Report, the Treasury continued its commitment to increasing 
access to essential medicines by rewarding R&D into drugs and vaccines to treat 
diseases threatening lives in the least developed countries.52 While DFID had 
(correctly) identified the AIDS crisis to have been exacerbated by the poverty 
experienced by these countries, the Treasury offered an altogether more acute 
diagnosis. The underlying problem was that “only 18 per cent of the world’s 
pharmaceutical market *were+ in developing countries”, yet these developing 
countries “made up 80 per cent of the world's population”. The poorest within these 
countries were faced with a double-burden, spending a high proportion of their low 
incomes on unsuitable treatments. For the Treasury, “the current R&D pipeline for 
effective drugs and vaccines” that would address this problem was “negligible”.53 To 
boost these levels of research the Treasury pledged to “provide an extra 50 per cent 
relief on qualifying expenditure...for companies undertaking research into specified 
diseases”.54 Crucially, the pharmaceutical industry had a far greater role than that 
implied by DFID in supporting the ‘demand-side’ and sustaining the healthcare systems 
of developing countries. “The government”, the Treasury confirmed, was “also 
investigating options for increasing the incentives for pharmaceutical companies to 
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donate drugs, vaccines and suitable equipment in support of developing countries’ 
health strategies”.55 
 
Underpinning these supply-side strategies was a moral commitment that Brown 
argued the pharmaceutical firms and developed countries had to those countries 
experiencing high levels of HIV and AIDS. The Chancellor argued that pharmaceutical 
firms and rich countries alike had “a capacity to help and a moral duty to act”.56 Of 
course, this was to be a shared commitment by the international community. 
Developing countries “must do all they can to create community-driven strategies to 
tackle disease and despair and prioritise health in their budgets”, and these were to be 
supported in this by the World Bank, IMF, UN agencies and medical foundations.57 
However, in the midst of this shared commitment, Brown maintained that it was vital 
that governments “urge the pharmaceutical companies to do more by supporting 
research and development and making drugs available to the poorest countries at 
affordable prices”.58 Addressing a Special Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, Brown further stepped up the pressure on the industry by urging it to match 
the commitment demonstrated by the developed countries in the creation of the new 
Global Fund with a commitment of its own “to create new drugs and vaccines in ways 
that truly help the poor and sick”.59 The Chancellor called on pharmaceutical firms “to 
step up to their responsibility, to recognise the scale of the challenge we face and to 
respond on an equal scale”.60 
 
Although admirable, what was striking about these speeches and statement was that – 
much like Brown’s apparent support for faster and deeper appeals for debt relief 
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assessed in the previous chapter – this moral appeal was made only to ‘non-industry’ 
audiences. Again, therefore New Labour flattered to deceive. Whilst emphasising to 
these ‘pro-development’ constituencies the moral obligation that pharmaceutical firms 
had, there was a noticeable lack of any similar rhetoric in the government’s own 
partnership and policy dialogue with the industry. While the Chancellor spoke to wider 
audiences of pharmaceutical firms and rich countries alike having a ‘capacity to help’ 
and ‘a moral duty’ to act, its framework with the industry itself spoke only about 
providing market-based incentives to address what the Treasury’s Financial Secretary 
Paul Boateng understood to be little more than “a specific case of market failure”.61 
Even when Labour backbenchers raised the issue that “of the 25 million people in 
Africa with HIV and AIDS, only one in a thousand can gain access to the life-prolonging 
drugs created by that research, because they are simply too expensive”, Tony Blair 
failed to address the clear moral obligation that pharmaceutical firms had to make 
such these drugs more widely available and affordable. Instead Blair shifted this 
responsibility from the pharmaceutical firms to “the whole international 
community”.62 
 
Rather than addressing the failure to deliver on the moral prerogative of the 
pharmaceutical firms, the chronic underinvestment or the lack of access to 
antiretrovirals and other essential medicines, the Treasury’s dialogue with the industry 
treated the issue as one of ‘market failure’. This tied in with the findings of Clare 
Short’s working group which had already pointed out that “pharmaceutical companies 
are of course run for profit…*and+ the poor of the world cannot generate a market”.63 
Short’s logic was simple: firms will not invest where they cannot expect to receive 
adequate returns upon their investment. The Treasury’s tax credit was therefore 
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designed to address this issue. Since the poverty of these developing countries 
affected by HIV and AIDS had triggered a failure in the health market, it was therefore 
up to the government to promote “a market-based solution” as a means of correcting 
this failure.64 As Boateng remarked, “the government believes in the market and in its 
ability to deliver if it is properly regulated”.65 To this end, the tax relief initiative would 
act as a ‘carrot’ rather than a ‘stick’ by encouraging market activity and increased 
research and investment.  
 
The High Level Working Group provided the platform for dialogue between 
government and industry officials. Boateng revealed that it was during these meetings 
that the pharmaceutical firms outlined two concerns. These concerns are telling 
because they articulate precisely what the industry’s expectations were of New 
Labour’s antiretroviral policy.  
 
First, they have shareholders whom they must satisfy and to whom 
they have certain fiduciary responsibilities. Secondly, they see 
themselves, as health providers, as having a moral purpose and a 
degree of corporate responsibility. They recognise that they have 
skills and an infrastructure for research and development, but – they 
are very upfront about it – there is no market because the developing 
world does not have the resource base available to it either to put in 
place the infrastructure or to fund the research and to buy its 
product.66  
 
Like the two imperatives identified earlier in the chapter that underpinned New 
Labour’s policy strategy, the pharmaceutical industry claimed two similar duties: 
economic or ‘fiduciary responsibilities’ to its shareholders; and moral obligations as 
health providers. There was however a distinct prioritisation of these particular 
imperatives. The pharmaceutical firms admitted that while they had the skills and the 
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infrastructure to increase levels of research into HIV and AIDS, they were unwilling to 
invest this capital because there was no market incentive to do so. The developing 
world simply did not have the resources or the infrastructure necessary to facilitate 
these types of investments. While it would be the moral, and indeed ‘the right thing to 
do’ in terms of fulfilling their duties as health providers, to invest in research and 
products solely for use in these ‘non-markets’ would be, in the eyes of their 
shareholders, economically irresponsible. Brown attempted solve this problem by 
assimilating these two elements; talking about increasing access in distinctly moral 
terms but embedding the response of the Treasury’s firmly within the strictures of the 
market. It was clearly felt that if Brown wanted the pharmaceutical sector to play a far 
greater role in scaling-up access to medicines then the Chancellor would need to 
introduce policy measures that accepted these economic realities. Only by 
accommodating the overriding economic expectations held by the pharmaceutical 
industry could New Labour’s own moral commitments be met.   
 
There was clearly a distinctiveness that set the work of the DTI apart from the set of 
proposals offered by DFID and the Treasury respectively. Whereas the DTI had sought 
to maintain and champion the commercial interests of British firms abroad, DFID had 
focused upon managing the ‘demand-side’ of the crisis, and creating the right ‘market 
conditions’ in which the pharmaceutical firms could invest. The Treasury, for its part, 
had sought to address shortcomings in the ‘supply-side’ by incentivising the 
pharmaceutical industry to play a far greater role in scaling-up access. Despite these 
contrasting policy approaches, each of these strategies, as the diagram in Fig. 6.1 
suggests, converged to accommodate the economic expectations of the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
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Fig. 6.1  Phase 1 of New Labour’s Policy Commitment to Increase Access to ARVs 
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government and the developing country in question to support the business interests 
and activities of that pharmaceutical industry. Although DFID took on an altogether 
more ‘development focused’ role, it too set about establishing a ‘pro-market’ 
framework whereby the developing countries themselves were encouraged to manage 
the crisis far more effectively by taking greater responsibility for developing healthcare 
systems into which firms could invest. For the Treasury, the problem was one of 
‘market failure’ and firms needed to be incentivised into (re)balancing the fiduciary 
responsibility they had towards their shareholders, and the moral obligations they had 
as research centres and healthcare providers to deliver the drugs needed by the 
developing world. To correct this market failure, Treasury officials devised a set of 
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proposals that it hoped would enable firms to meet both sets of expectations. As New 
Labour stepped up its dialogue with the pharmaceutical industry into the second half 
of its time in office, it also started to take even more seriously its own commitment to 
those living with HIV and AIDS in the developing world. The second phase of this policy 
would be underpinned by the government’s ‘Taking Action’ strategy, a series of key 
measures designed explicitly to increase access to essential medicines. It is to this 
strategy that I now turn my attention.  
 
Phase 2:  Increased Policy Coherence and Ambition…but Business as  
Usual?  
Throughout this second phase DFID produced a proliferation in policy literature to 
reveal its ambition to increase access to essential medicines in the developing world. 
This message became undoubtedly the focal point of New Labour’s efforts to halt and 
reverse the spread of HIV in the developing world. The ‘Call for Action’ launched in 
December 2003 demanded “better funding *…+ stronger political direction *…+ better 
donor co-ordination *and+ better HIV and AIDS programmes”.67 This was to prove to be 
the catalyst for the UK’s own ‘Taking Action’ strategy the following July which outlined 
how Britain would itself respond to these challenges. This report was flanked by two 
further specific reports, one revealing the UK’s policy and plans for increasing access to 
essential medicines in the developing world,68 and the other detailing the 
government’s HIV and AIDS treatment and care policy.69 Arguably the most important 
document that New Labour published however was its Framework for Good Practice in 
the Pharmaceutical Industry.70 This outlined the partnership between the government 
and the pharmaceutical industry and formed the second part of New Labour’s 
commitment towards ‘Increasing People’s Access to Essential Medicines in Developing 
                                                             
67
 DFID (2004a: 11–12)  
68
 DFID (with the DH, DTI, FCO, HM Treasury, Inland Revenue and Patent Office, 2004)  
69
 DFID (2004b) 
70
 DFID (with the DH and DTI, 2005) 
 
317 
Countries’. Taken together, these policies would provide the template for the 
government’s presidency of the G8 in Gleneagles in 2005, where tackling HIV and AIDS 
would be high upon the agenda.  
 
New Labour’s renewed strategy in 2003 coincided with a change in key personnel 
within DFID. Clare Short’s resignation following Britain’s invasion of Iraq led to the 
appointment briefly of the junior Foreign Office minister Baroness Valerie Amos, and 
then the promotion of junior development minister Hilary Benn to the position of 
Secretary of State for International Development. It would be under Benn and his 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Gareth Thomas that DFID’s HIV and AIDS 
strategy would move into a policy phase away from the emphasis upon the ‘demand-
management’ of the Short years to a policy position that took onboard the ‘supply-
side’ measures introduced by the Treasury. For Thomas it was crucial that the 
government tried “to increase the affordability of key pharmaceuticals *and+ step up 
efforts to encourage the research and development of specific global public goods 
such as new knowledge, new drugs, diagnostic treatments and vaccines, which are all 
necessary to meet current and future challenges”.71 To do this, Benn argued that it was 
important to “engage the pharmaceutical companies because of the contribution that 
they can make to bring down the price of the medicines” and because of their capacity 
to undertake “more research on the diseases to which we paid less attention in the 
past but that matter enormously to developing countries”.72  
 
At the heart of this renewed strategy was an increased dialogue between the 
government and the pharmaceutical industry. DFID’s head of HIV/AIDS team, Robin 
Gornal noted how “massive pressure” had already been brought to bear upon 
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“pharmaceutical companies from people living with HIV and AIDS and from developing 
country governments about the inequity of the lack of access for people living in poor 
countries”.73 This had resulted in a number of pharmaceutical firms taking “very brave 
steps forward to reduce prices”, and the introduction of “differential prices for poor 
countries and rich countries”.74 This clearly represented a significant and welcome step 
forward, and “a DFID voice saying, ‘make these drugs cheaper’”,75 certainly marked a 
change from Clare Short’s argument that less-expensive medicines would not solve the 
problem. Nevertheless, like their counterparts in the Treasury, DFID ministers 
remained reluctant to impose any formal regulations upon the industry. In fact, 
policymakers were content to adopt a broadly deregulatory approach when it came to 
framing the R&D agenda of the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
The dynamics of this relationship continued to lay bare the inherent tensions between 
the economic and ethical imperatives of New Labour’s strategy. The clear ‘moral case’ 
for action was offset by the understanding that ‘business knows best’. Government 
ministers and civil servants were only too aware of the ‘economic’ imperative, and the 
expectations of shareholders that shaped the direction of the industry. In a 
memorandum to the House of Commons Health Select Committee, the Department of 
Health stated quite clearly that:  
 
The government believes that the current model – whereby 
medicines are developed by the private sector in response to what 
they perceive to be the demand of healthcare systems – is more 
effective and efficient than alternatives that could be considered 
(such as nationalising the drug industry, or by government directing 
the research that the industry should undertake).76  
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This view was further reinforced by the Director of the DTI’s Bioscience Unit, Monica 
Darnbrough who believed that “it is very much a question for the companies 
themselves what lines of research and development they choose to go down. 
Obviously, they go down roads where they think there is a real market for their 
products”.77  
 
As the National Institute for Clinical Excellence noted in its evidence to the Health 
Select Committee, the aim of the pharmaceutical firm “ultimately, is to ensure a 
market for their products and a return for their shareholders”.78 These shareholder 
obligations impact upon commercial decisions; how research funding is allocated, 
which drugs are developed, what markets are ventured into, and crucially, its moral 
duties as a healthcare provider. As the Health Select Committee remarked, the 
industry’s “commitment to provide its shareholders with a good return on investment” 
could inhibit the “development of new and improved treatments in the areas of 
greatest medical need”.79 The economic expectations of firms mean that drug 
innovation tends “to be targeted at diseases of affluence rather than priority health 
needs”.80 For the ‘diseases of poverty’ – illnesses such as HIV and AIDS – there was 
little commercial benefit for pharmaceutical firms to invest. This meant that it was 
highly problematic for DFID to make a commitment to increase access to medicines 
that could treat these types of illnesses, whilst supporting a policy of laissez-faire 
whereby the industry was left to regulate itself. Without a more robust regulatory 
framework in place to influence the research direction of firms, the industry would 
continue to focus their efforts upon the ‘diseases of affluence’ and neglect the 
illnesses – the ‘diseases of poverty’ – found in the developing world.  
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Treasury officials had of course already recognised this behaviour within the industry, 
and this formed the basis of Gordon Brown’s earlier ‘supply-side’ proposals. Under 
Hilary Benn, DFID too began to meet with pharmaceutical companies to discuss “issues 
such as the affordability of existing medicines and other health technologies, and the 
need for increased research and development into new technologies – including 
vaccines – for diseases disproportionately affecting developing countries”.81 For Benn’s 
Under Secretary of State, Gareth Thomas it was important that New Labour continued 
“to work with the many pharmaceutical companies that have offered their support to 
the governments of affected countries by, among other things, reducing the prices of 
antiretroviral drugs”.82 Balancing supply-side concerns with management of the 
demand-side, Thomas reaffirmed DFID’s commitment to “press for lower prices for 
those drugs”, but also “meet the challenge of getting antiretroviral drugs out to the 
communities that need them”.83  
 
Despite a greater degree of consistency and convergence in the respective policy 
approaches of DFID and the Treasury, this strategy of increased engagement with the 
pharmaceutical industry took place in the same ‘light-touch’ regulatory framework 
that New Labour had established domestically to attract and retain investment from 
the pharmaceutical industry. There would be no compulsion upon the industry to act. 
Instead as the Secretary of State for Health, John Hutton and the Health Minister, Lord 
Warner remarked, the government’s focus would instead be upon ‘incentivising 
policies’ such as tax relief measures and advance purchase agreements (which would 
‘guarantee’ the market for firms84) “to create the right financial incentives for 
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pharmaceutical companies to invest in research”.85 As the Treasury had sought to do 
through its ‘supply-side’ proposals, these market-orientated incentives would enable 
New Labour to maintain the ongoing competitiveness of the British pharmaceutical 
industry, yet appear to appeal to the moral commitment of increasing access to 
medicines in those parts of the world least able to afford them.  
 
Like each of the three case studies explored here, New Labour’s plans to combat HIV 
and AIDS formed part of Brown’s ‘global New Deal’ or ‘modern Marshall Plan’. To 
tackle the disease, DFID and the Treasury set about drawing together these ‘demand’ 
and ‘supply-side’ policies to form “a comprehensive strategy from funding work on the 
first preventative vaccine to treatment and care to developing health systems and anti-
poverty programmes”.86 This plan is outlined in Fig. 6.2:  
 
Fig. 6.2  The Chancellor’s ‘Comprehensive Plan for HIV and AIDS’ 
 
 A global HIV and AIDS research platform and increased funding for 
research 
 
 A global advance purchasing scheme for HIV and AIDS vaccines  
 
 Treatment for all those who need it and the development of effective 
healthcare systems 
 
 More finance for drugs like antiretrovirals and for other treatments 
 
 Increased funding in support of plans to build up healthcare, education 
and infrastructure systems 
 
 Technical assistance to help countries to scale-up their AIDS measures 
effectively 
 
 Investment in HIV and AIDS research and the development of vaccines, 
microbicides, and new and better diagnostics and drugs  
 
To deal with the funding issue, Brown outlined his proposals for an International 
Finance Facility (IFF), which as I shall explain in more detail in chapter 7, would provide 
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a long-term, predictable source of finance over many years. This set of proposals 
would address the ‘demand-side’ concerns by providing funding for health systems 
that need continued investment, and giving practitioners and patients the confidence 
that the supply of drugs they depend on will be maintained. The IFF would also tackle 
issues on the ‘supply-side’ by encouraging private sector operators into the market 
and raising incentives for increased R&D.87 Therefore, although as chapter 7 explains, 
the IFF was designed to ‘frontload’ resources – to double aid in order to halve poverty 
– it also served to finance the right market conditions into which the pharmaceutical 
industry could invest and meet its core economic expectations.  
 
This way in which the IFF was used as a response to HIV and AIDS, and New Labour’s 
commitment to increase access to antiretrovirals reveals a great deal about the 
character of New Labour’s political economy. Quite simply, the Chancellor defined the 
role of the state as one which provided the conditions necessary for firms to invest. It 
was the state whose responsibility it was to undertake the spadework – “bulk-buying 
drugs; building up healthcare sanitation and education systems” – alongside the fiscal 
incentives such as tax relief credits, all of which were necessary before firms would be 
willing to “set up laboratories and trial sites for testing treatments *and+ develop 
effective vaccines *to make+ them affordable”.88 To meet the moral commitment that 
New Labour had signalled it was willing to meet, government officials considered there 
to be no alternative but to prioritise the market-led expectations of firms.  
 
The disinclination amongst pharmaceutical firms to invest in treatments for poor 
country diseases such as HIV and AIDS meant that in 2005, “only £400 million pounds 
*was+ being spent on researching and developing an AIDS vaccine every year”, which 
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despite the prevalence of the disease, amounted to “less than 10 pence a year per 
citizen”.89 To put these figures into context, in 2009, GSK posted pre-tax profits of £7.8 
billion.90 For Brown the challenge required: 
 
At least a doubling of money for AIDS research…over the next 5 to 10 
years [which] could bring forward the discovery of an AIDS vaccine by 
three years…save six million lives that would otherwise be lost *and 
reduce+ future HIV/AIDS treatment costs…by US$2 billion a year – 
money that could then be spent on education, water supplies and 
other critical needs.91  
 
In encouraging the pharmaceutical firms to meet the challenge, Brown used ‘carrots’ 
of extra funding, tax relief and market guarantees rather than the burdensome ‘sticks’ 
of increased regulation and a more redistributive tax system. Indeed, in these advance 
purchase schemes, the onus was upon the donors of finance rather than the suppliers 
of medicines. For “if donors committed to buying the first 300 million vaccine courses 
at US$20 dollars per course of vaccinations; that would translate into a US$6 billion 
dollar guarantee – large enough to induce much stronger interest from both large and 
small pharmaceutical firms”.92 
 
The offer of these ‘carrots’ to the industry signalled the thinness of the Chancellor’s 
previous appeals concerning the pharmaceutical industry in the first phase of policy. 
To these ‘non-industry’ audiences, Brown had demanded that the pharmaceutical 
industry do far more and take greater responsibility for increasing access to drugs. 
Now however, to industry audiences, Brown spoke in altogether more conciliatory 
terms of the role that the pharmaceutical industry could, rather than should play in 
scaling-up access to medicines. This message was matched by the language of 
partnership that was used by DFID officials when drawing up the principles behind the  
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Framework for Good Practice in the Pharmaceutical Industry. Here Gareth Thomas 
sought “to recognise the good work of the many companies in the industry”,93 while 
‘the spirit’ of the Framework itself was one of “building upon the best work being done 
by the industry”.94 Clearly however, there were areas in which pharmaceutical industry 
practice was far from impressive. The Chancellor had already raised the issue of under-
investment in research for diseases affecting developing countries, but the Labour 
backbencher, Ian Lucas also raised the issue of young children in the developing world 
living with HIV. As Lucas pointed out, “drug companies do not manufacture dedicated 
drugs for young children and as a result there is some over and under-prescribing of 
drugs”.95 Like the issue of under-funded research, this was clearly yet another instance 
whereby market-driven imperatives overtook moral obligations. There was little in the 
way of a market incentive in developing paediatric drug formulations, which led to the 
industry neglecting the illnesses that children living in the developing world were 
vulnerable to. Therefore, while this partnership framework took as its point of 
departure ‘the good work’ that the industry was doing, for it to be truly effective then 
it would need to go beyond the existing economic expectations of the pharmaceutical 
industry. Although well-intentioned, this partnership framework remained firmly 
geared towards meeting these market-based expectations and maximising shareholder 
value. 
 
This framework (summarised in Fig. 6.3) set about addressing the demand-side issues 
since “without effective health systems, or the money to buy medicines, many patients 
will *still+ be denied access to even the cheapest medicines”.96 It did however 
represent a significant step forward from Clare Short’s own position as it argued that 
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the industry has a “significant role to play”.97 Given that the actions of the 
pharmaceutical industry had in the past actually served to deepen the AIDS crisis by 
restricting access to vitally needed antiretrovirals, any strategy which now actively 
engaged the industry and urged them to address the pressing issues surrounding 
access and increased research should be welcomed. This new strategy looked far more 
like what a partnership should look like with responsibilities at least being apportioned 
on both sides.    
 
Fig. 6.3  Joint Government and Pharmaceutical Industry Policy Framework 
 
The Government “will”:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Increase its overseas aid budget to £6.5 billion a year 
by 2007/08 
 
 Commit to spend £1.5 billion to tackle AIDS over the 
next three years, including support for ARV therapy 
and treatment for opportunistic infections 
 
 Work to increase the amount of international 
development finance available by reaching the UN 
target to spend 0.7 per cent of GDP on overseas aid by 
2013; promoting the IFF (see chapter 6), and 
supporting increased debt relief for developing 
countries (see chapter 7)  
Pharmaceutical firms are 
“encouraged” to: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Engage in widespread differential pricing of essential 
medicines in developing countries, especially the 
world’s poorest, to support the development of viable 
markets 
 
 Increase R&D investment for diseases affecting 
developing countries, including engagement in public-
private partnerships 
 
 Work to support broader health and development 
goals in developing countries, including by considering 
voluntary licences 
 
 Report on activities designed to increase access to 
essential medicines 
 
Source:  DFID98  
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This newfound recognition of the responsibilities that the pharmaceutical industry had 
in delivering essential medicines was however skewed by the commitment that New 
Labour said it would make, and the measures that the industry was encouraged to 
take. To its credit, through this framework, the New Labour government did establish a 
series of measurable benchmarks through its ‘Taking Action’ strategy, such as closing 
the funding gap, which could be used to assess performance.99 However, although 
these funding commitments demonstrated New Labour’s willingness to financially 
underwrite its policy response to the crisis, any similar sort of measurability was 
missing in the pharmaceutical industry’s side of the partnership. The strategies, such as 
differential pricing that the industry was urged to take were far less precisely defined 
and problematic in their application. Other questions remained; by how much should 
R&D investment increase? What auditing mechanisms would be in place to report this 
increase in research activity? Put simply, there was no concrete obligation upon the 
firms to undertake any of these measures. It was rather strange then that although 
“the Framework’s development was influenced by a request from some companies for 
a clearer articulation of what the UK government would like to see companies do in 
this area”,100 the document itself provided no regulation and no compulsion for the 
pharmaceutical industry to act in any of these areas. As a result, there was little 
genuine accountability from the pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, despite New 
Labour’s call for the ‘ethical case’, it was not afforded the same priority as the set of 
economic expectations held by the pharmaceutical firms to whom New Labour 
entrusted a role to in increasing access to antiretrovirals. In these terms then, the 
Framework therefore remained a fairly blunt instrument.  
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Rather than the Framework re-orientating the pharmaceutical industry towards 
recognising its unique duties as healthcare providers, it set up the response to this 
crisis in terms of corporate social responsibility.101 Although well-intentioned, this 
merely mapped out the response of the pharmaceutical industry in a rather limited set 
of normative activities designed to appease the calls from developing countries, civil 
society, and in more muted tones, Whitehall officials. The sheer size and scale of the 
AIDS crisis meant that a response far beyond the CSR activities of firms was required. 
Treating the issue of antiretrovirals in the developing world as merely an issue of CSR, 
rather than one that should be central to the purposes of the pharmaceutical industry, 
and one which should distinguish the pharmaceutical firm from other transnational 
corporations, suggests that tackling this human tragedy was ancillary to the economic 
imperative, and the profitability and shareholder value of the industry.  
 
In developing the Framework, New Labour sought to make it as ‘industry-friendly’ as 
possible by focusing upon the ‘business case’ for action. Government officials claimed 
that “ethical arguments about what should be done have developed into arguments 
about the business case for action”.102 The policy measures that DFID proposed as part 
of this framework appeared to be designed not to tackle the moral crisis facing the 
developing world, but rather to combat the “perceived threats to business interests 
and long-term profitability”.103 The continued prioritisation of ‘the economic’ over any 
moral commitment should not be entirely unexpected when one considers the division 
of labour in the Framework, illustrated in Fig. 6.4, between the number of 
representatives from the pharmaceutical industry who were given the opportunity to 
input into the proposals compared to those from a development-based background.  
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Fig. 6.4  Organisations Consulted during the Development of DFID’s ‘Framework for 
Good Practice’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: DFID104 
  
New Labour’s intent to accommodate the economic-based expectations of the 
pharmaceutical industry occurred in two key ways in the Framework. Firstly, the 
government argued that if pharmaceutical firms could scale-up access to essential 
medicines, the pharmaceutical firms would “enhance their *own+ reputation”, “protect 
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the credibility of the intellectual property system”, and leave the pharmaceutical 
companies “better able to maintain and market share in developing countries”.105 
Essentially, pharmaceutical firms could manipulate their response to the AIDS crisis as 
a means of protecting their own competitive advantage. In the face of the 
‘international pressures’ brought about by ‘changes in the global environment’, this 
would of course stand to benefit the firms concerned. In altogether less ethical terms, 
this suggests that pharmaceutical firms could actually use the suffering of the crisis as 
leverage to increase their competitiveness and global market share.  
 
The second means by which New Labour matched the expectations of industry with its 
own commitment to increase access to essential medicines was derived upon the set 
of proposals that emerged out of the UK Working Group formed in the first phase of 
New Labour’s strategy. The group recommended ‘differential pricing’ as an 
“economically and commercially viable” means of achieving this aim.106 Differential 
pricing enables firms to sell medicines at lower prices in developing country markets, 
and at higher prices in richer countries. It is viable because the variable costs comprise 
around 15 per cent of the total costs of producing drugs.107 As pharmaceutical firms 
can decide with some flexibility upon the geographic market in which they can recover 
non-variable costs, pricing remains close to the cost of manufacture, enabling firms to 
retain a profit. As developing country markets offered very little in the way of overall 
profitability – in 2004, Africa for example constituted just 1.1 per cent of the global 
pharmaceutical market by value108 – differential pricing provided a “rational way for 
global companies to maximise profits in both low and high-income countries”.109 
Although this appeared to be a step in the right direction, this strategy was again 
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problematic. Despite its commercial appeal, if such a strategy was undertaken on a 
voluntary basis, as New Labour proposed, then the WHO warned that it would have 
“only a modest impact on peoples’ access to care” and would leave developing 
countries having “little control” over the “availability…the channels of distribution and 
the volume of medicines available”.110 Paradoxically then, given DFID’s commitment to 
strengthen healthcare systems in AIDS-affected regions through its ‘demand-side’ 
policies, this strategy would do little to address the weaknesses of health 
infrastructures in many developing countries and undermine DFID’s attempts to 
ensure a regular, predictable and sustainable supply of antiretrovirals in these areas.  
 
In pressing the ‘business case’ over more moral grounds for action by pharmaceutical 
firms, the Framework added little to the Treasury’s earlier policy initiatives designed to 
address the persistent problem of chronic under-investment in the research of 
diseases that disproportionately affect the poor in ‘low-profit’/low-income country 
markets. Despite these countries remaining hugely unattractive to the pharmaceutical 
firms, New Labour officials continued to keep the industry onside by offering 
incentives on a purely voluntary basis. In spite of the urgent and profoundly moral 
challenge presented by the AIDS crisis, there was to be no regulation of corporate 
research agendas; simply a proposal that firms ‘consider’ increasing their levels of R&D 
for the ‘diseases of poverty’ and participate in a series of public-private partnerships, 
which by spreading the outlay on research investment, would minimise the exposure 
of risk to the firms themselves.  
 
The imprint of the Framework was transposed into the international policy arena, 
firstly through the work of the Commission for Africa, and secondly, the agreement 
reached at the 2005 G8 summit, hosted by the New Labour government. Despite the 
                                                             
110
 WHO (2004a: 71)  
 
331 
orientation of the Framework towards the economic expectations of the industry and 
the problems that this strategy presented, the Commission and the G8 offered a 
combination of demand and supply-side measures designed to ‘revive Africa’s health 
services’,111 and achieve “an AIDS-free generation”.112 As this was extended into the 
global arena however, it was clear that whatever problems there were with this 
strategy at the domestic level, these would only be intensified internationally.   
 
On the demand side, both the Commission and the G8 spoke of the importance of 
healthcare infrastructures being strengthened; African governments increasing their 
healthcare budgets, and recruiting and retaining more staff, and donors supporting 
this with increasing amounts of financial assistance. Although clearly important, these 
solutions raised a number of issues that neither the Commission nor the G8 leaders 
addressed. Firstly, there was for instance, the continuing legacy of structural 
adjustment and the debt crisis that continued to hang over the healthcare budgets of 
many African governments, making the scaling-up of expenditure in this area not quite 
as straightforward as these two reports made out. Secondly, the scale and the nature 
of the AIDS epidemic across Africa brought its own unique pressures, which again the 
Commission and the G8 appeared not to fully appreciate. HIV and AIDS demands that 
governments increase their health and education budgets in order to halt its spread, 
but concomitantly governments in these areas have found their response to the crisis 
hamstrung by dwindling economic growth and a decimated tax-base. These pressures 
have clearly not helped by an already weakened health system and the continued 
migration of many health workers overseas, many of whom have ended up being 
recruited by the NHS to fill the shortage of skilled health professionals in Britain.    
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On the supply-side, there was a marked difference in the language of both the 
Commission and the G8 from the earlier appeals made by Gordon Brown to these 
‘non-industry’ international audiences. The Chancellor’s earlier appeal for the 
pharmaceutical industry to take more seriously its responsibilities as providers of 
global healthcare was not reflected either in the report of the Commission or in the G8 
communiqué. Any moral obligation that these firms had was conspicuous by its 
absence in these two documents, which instead tacitly accepted that firms were 
continuing to put their profits and the shareholders ahead of the lives of the poor. 
Even though both the Commission and the G8 recognised that the paediatric 
formulations and microbicides which protect women from HIV infection were not 
being made available or receiving the priority they deserved by the pharmaceutical 
industry, both these sets of actors let these firms off the hook by placing the burden of 
responsibility upon donors rather than upon these knowledge and resource-laden 
companies. Both the Commission and the G8 leaders instead called upon governments 
to incentivise pharmaceutical firms into investigating the diseases that affect Africa, 
and to make legally binding commitments to buy these drugs so that firms are induced 
into putting these new medicines and vaccines into production.113 
 
In the light of New Labour’s conceptualisation and discourse of globalisation, there 
was a certain irony to this particular phase of government policy. At home, the New 
Labour government had been desperately keen to retain these firms since they would 
place Britain at the forefront of high-skilled, high-tech ‘knowledge economy’ and allow 
it to compete with low-cost, emerging countries. However, once these industries were 
mobilised in the global economy – the same global economy that made this 
‘knowledge economy’ so crucial – the technology, the skills and the innovation that 
these firms had at their disposal was left untapped and under-deployed. The activities 
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of these companies were not truly ‘global’ since in reality they served only to benefit 
those wealthy and affluent parts of the world; a fraction of the world’s population. 
This meant that although New Labour’s ambitions to tackle the AIDS crisis were 
laudable, its strategy of prioritising the economic expectations of the industry above all 
else, did little to address the gross inequalities in access to and quality of healthcare 
that existed between developed and underdeveloped areas. If these were to be 
reversed, New Labour would need to re-evaluate and reconfigure its assessment of the 
role that private firms had to play in the delivery of public goods.  
 
Fig. 6.5 Phases 1 and 2 of New Labour’s Policy Commitment to Increase Access to 
ARVs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The DTI was dropped from New Labour’s response to AIDS, but this only helped build 
coherence between the two leading departments on this issue. There was a great deal 
more convergence in the respective stances of DFID and the Treasury, certainly 
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compared to the first phase where policy was divided. DFID took onboard the views of 
the Treasury in respect of supply-side issues, and both the demand and supply-side 
perspectives were incorporated in the Taking Action and Good Practice strategies. 
Incorporating some of the concerns raised by civil society, there was a slight move 
towards more a ‘social’ set outcomes. However, overall, New Labour’s strategy 
continued to accommodate the expectations of the pharmaceutical industry.  
  
Phase 3: Placing People before Profits? Change and Continuity in New  
Labour’s Strategy 
Under Gordon Brown’s premiership, the fight against HIV and AIDS continued to be an 
important part of New Labour’s international development strategy, and in 2008 
Brown’s government embarked upon another policy strategy to achieve universal 
access to comprehensive HIV prevention programmes, treatment, care and support. 
Although curtailed by New Labour’s General Election defeat in May 2010, this third 
phase of government policy was altogether more nuanced than the previous two 
phases as it sought to introduce a new ‘social’ imperative, one designed to address the 
needs of people living with HIV in the developing world. The government’s new 
Secretary of State for International Development, Douglas Alexander, promised a 
strategy that would place “people at the heart of the response”.114 This section 
explores the depth of this new commitment and where this left the pharmaceutical 
industry as a key interlocutor of policy. This phase reveals that while this shift in 
emphasis appeared to represent a welcome break from the continued prioritisation of 
the industry’s competitiveness over global health concerns, the expectations of 
pharmaceutical firms nevertheless continued to be accommodated, and indeed 
become strengthened in some key areas of policy. 
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As well as the changes in the leadership of New Labour, and subsequent cabinet 
reshuffle, this third phase of policy took place against a backdrop of financial turmoil 
and global uncertainty. Neither of these factors however did little to dampen the 
government’s commitment to tackling HIV and AIDS. Instead, Brown’s government 
pressed ahead with meeting its commitments concerning HIV and AIDS. Initially it did 
this through the publication of a comprehensive policy paper, Achieving Universal 
Access,115 and then, a year later, a fourth White Paper in just twelve years, Building 
Our Common Future.116 Strikingly, neither DFID’s policy paper nor the government’s 
White Paper focused heavily upon the role that the pharmaceutical industry had to 
play in the crisis. These new policies instead focused upon three key areas: (1) 
supporting the claims of the developing countries by responding to the needs and 
protecting the rights of those most affected;117 (2) supporting more effective and 
integrated service delivery;118 and (3) making money work harder through effective 
partnerships.119 The first area was designed to support the ‘people-centred’ response 
that the new Secretary of State sought to put at the heart of this new commitment. 
The second and third areas however emphasised the demand and supply-side policies, 
developed from the government’s previous Taking Action strategy, now designed to 
secure universal, rather than simply increased access to essential medicines.  
 
On the demand-side, the New Labour government committed to contribute a further 
£1 billion to the Global Fund,120 £6 billion on health systems and services by 2015 and 
over £200 million on developing and supporting social protection programmes. In 
addition to this financial support, the government promised to work with international 
partners to support countries with health worker shortages so that there would be at 
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least 2.3 doctors, nurses and midwifes per 1,000 people.121 Although the policy 
proposals that DFID offered concerning the supply-side were slightly less concrete, 
they did at least appear to reflect a significant shift in policy. The government 
committed to use “our central research budget to fund cutting-edge research to 
stimulate innovation”.122 In each of the two previous phases, government officials, and 
Gordon Brown in particular, had called upon the pharmaceutical industry to increase 
its investment into the research of treatments for diseases affecting the developing 
world. In this third phase however, despite the massive research budgets that these 
large multinational firms had at their disposal, the tax incentives that the Treasury had 
offered in order to support this type of research, and the continued accommodation of 
industry expectations in government strategy, investment by pharmaceutical firms into 
diseases that affect the poor, remained stubbornly low. Indeed, despite the 22.4 
million people living with HIV and AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, the government could 
only point to 3 million actually having access to antiretroviral treatment in 2009.123 
Despite repeated claims of an ethical obligation on the part of the pharmaceutical 
industry, this represented a clear failure of government policy. It did however 
underline the need for the government to create its own research fund to finance the 
necessary investments in the required medicines if this access was to be scaled-up, and 
these drugs made available to all those who needed them.  
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Fig. 6.6  The Industry–Government Forum on Access to Medicines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: DFID124  
 
Despite the failure of the pharmaceutical industry to respond adequately to the AIDS 
crisis, New Labour still retained a role for the industry in its commitment to improve 
access to medicines. As a follow-up to the Framework developed in the second phase 
of New Labour’s policies, the Industry–Government Forum on Access to Medicines 
(IGFAM) was set up to “facilitate better and sustainable access to medicines in 
developing countries”.125 The purpose of this new forum however was decidedly 
unclear since, unlike the Framework, it offered neither any sort of recommendations, 
nor did it include any participation from development agencies. Instead, as Fig. 6.6 
illustrates, IGFAM reflected far more the business-driven and altogether more 
economic concerns of the industry, rather than the epistemic, development-based 
expectations, experience and expertise of NGOs and other ‘non-business’ health 
organisations.  
  
                                                             
124
 DFID (2009b) 
125
 Ibid. 
Industry Representatives: 
ABPI 
APG 
British Pharmaceutical Group 
Japanese Pharmaceutical Group  
 
 
 
Sam Walker 
Senior Policy Adviser, DFID 
HM Government Departments:  
Department for BIS (formerly the DTI)  
Department of Health 
DFID 
Intellectual Property Office 
 
 
IGFAM  
Joint Chairs Jon Pender 
Vice-President, IP and Access, 
Global Health Division, 
GlaxoSmithKline 
 
338 
The intent and the interests of the group are clear from IGFAM’s make-up. The Vice-
President of Intellectual Property and Access at GSK was appointed as Joint Chair and 
he was joined by pharmaceutical industry representatives from the UK, the United 
States and Japan, and the government’s own IP Office. The aim of IGFAM was to 
maintain the competitiveness of the industry whilst increasing access to medicines. 
This would ensure that industry expectations are not lost in any commitment to scale-
up the access to and availability of antiretrovirals.  
 
Much like the Framework that preceded it, there was an implicit understanding – even 
amongst firms – that there was an ethical imperative at play here. However, in similar 
terms to the Framework, GSK also argued that “it is good for GSK’s image and 
reputation; and there is a sound business rationale”.126 The company no longer viewed 
emerging markets “as peripheral but as major market opportunities which are 
currently constrained by *a+ lack of purchasing power”.127 This analysis of the issue 
clearly ran counter to the Secretary of State’s earlier commitment ‘to place people at 
the heart of the response’. GSK appeared to understand the issue only in terms of 
projecting the right corporate image and capitalising upon new market opportunities.  
 
Like the Framework, IGFAM also lacked any real representation from the generic firms 
based in these emerging markets. Instead, the group was made up of firms and 
industry representatives based in the global North. If the New Labour government was 
really serious about tackling the issue of essential access in the developing world – as 
opposed to simply maintaining the competitive advantage of these large 
multinationals in the global economy – then one might have expected it to have 
invited representatives from these types of firms to the debate. These firms had a very 
                                                             
126
 Cited in IGFAM (2009: 8) 
127
 Ibid. 
 
339 
different set of expectations from the large, supposedly ‘research-led’ firms which had 
dominated the dialogue between the government and the industry, and who appeared 
to be concerned only with recouping the investment that they had made during the 
initial R&D stage. As the case of the major US pharmaceutical firm Gilead illustrated, 
these larger firms were willing only to invest in those areas in which they could secure 
this return more quickly. Holding the marketing rights to the antiretroviral, Tenofovir, 
in 2006 Gilead voluntarily licensed the drug to more than ten generic firms, each of 
whom paid a 5 per cent royalty back to Gilead. Three years later however, Gilead itself 
was still selling Tenofovir at US$365 (US$200 to governments), while the generic 
licensees were selling the drug for US$100, mainly to developing countries.128  
 
These two cases alone demonstrated why it was simply inadequate for New Labour, 
particularly in the light of its commitment to focus upon the ‘human’ aspect of the 
crisis, to continue to rely upon the corporate goodwill or the research agendas of the 
larger multinational firms. While the Secretary of State was correct to diagnose the 
AIDS crisis as, above all, a human crisis, it cannot be addressed by protecting the 
profitability and the market-driven expectations of a narrow corporate elite.  Strikingly, 
Gordon Brown, in his final conference speech as Prime Minister and leader of the 
Labour Party admitted as much. “Markets need what they cannot generate 
themselves. They need what people alone can bring to them…markets need 
morals”.129 Although perhaps designed to signal to a party low on confidence, that the 
economic crisis was at least beginning to recalibrate the Labour Party away from a 
strictly market-orientated model of political economy, on reflection, this statement 
might well have also served as a useful lesson for the government’s strategy to 
increase access to essential antiretrovirals in the developing world. In concluding this 
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chapter, I assess what these phases tell us about the character of New Labour’s 
political economy and what lessons might be drawn from its strategy in this area of its 
international development policies. Before I do however, I briefly assess the change 
that took place in this phase of policy.  
 
Fig. 6.7 Phases 1, 2 and 3 of New Labour’s Policy Commitment to Increase Access to 
ARVs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite a commitment to place ‘people at the heart of the response’, there was very 
little movement in the respective positions between the Treasury, DFID and the 
pharmaceutical industry. Although the social imperative that was present in the 
government’s strategy was stronger here than it was at any previous phase, New 
Labour’s approach remained predicated upon a continued accommodation of the 
pharmaceutical industry. This stance had softened somewhat, and firms were 
MARKET 
High 
MARKET 
Low 
SOCIAL 
High 
SOCIAL 
Low 
DFID 
HM Treasury 
Pharmaceutical 
industry 
NGOs and 
Civil 
Society 
 
341 
beginning to recognise their ‘ethical’ duties. However, even these were framed in 
terms of self-interest and continued shareholder value.   
 
Conclusions 
In chapter 2, I demonstrated the ways in which New Labour’s discourse of globalisation 
placed considerable constraints upon the domestic policy options available to 
Whitehall officials in accommodating the expectations of business and capital. As this 
particular chapter has unfolded however, the grave effects of internalising such logic 
have been clearly demonstrated. At home, senior New Labour officials stressed the 
importance of the ‘knowledge economy’ as the only means by which Britain could 
compete in this ostensibly new global economy, and set about accommodating the 
expectations of key sectors like the pharmaceutical industry in order to retain the 
inward investment that these firms provided. Abroad however, Whitehall ministers 
were faced with the challenge of a lack of access to the antiretrovirals in the 
developing world that these firms were supposed to be producing. This presented New 
Labour with a dilemma: whether to continue to support and champion the interests of 
its pharmaceutical industry in the face of an unfolding global tragedy, or challenge and 
demand firms to take seriously their obligations as producers of global public goods. 
Over the subsequent three phases of policy, government ministers proceeded to send 
out a series of different and often seemingly contradictory messages concerning the 
importance or otherwise of these industries and their treatments in the developing 
world.  
 
During the first phase in particular, a range of government departments emphasised 
different parts of the government’s initial strategy. While the DTI sought to maintain 
the commercial interests of Britain’s pharmaceutical firms during the height of the 
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unfolding AIDS epidemic, DFID attempted to deflect this responsibility away from the 
industry onto the resource-stretched economies in the developing world with a series 
of measures designed to boost the demand-side. For its part, the Treasury set about 
creating a set of supply-side proposals designed to incentivise the industry into 
stepping up the amount of research that was being undertaken by these firms into 
producing antiretroviral treatments suitable for the developing world. In the midst of 
these different appeals however, there was a common thread that ran through 
Whitehall. Each department concerned prioritised the economic expectations of the 
industry and its firms, over any real moral imperative to tackle the crisis.    
 
There was a tacit understanding in the second phase of the government’s strategy that 
there was indeed an increasingly moral case for pharmaceutical firms to step up their 
efforts into researching and developing treatments for people living with HIV in the 
developing world. This was perhaps most evident in the more joined-up strategy 
between the Treasury and DFID: the Chancellor’s proposals to incentivise the industry 
through a series of tax relief measures, and the commitment from DFID to increase the 
financing and the capacity of healthcare systems in the developing world. By and large 
however, the crisis was visualised through the eyes of the industry, rather than those 
living with the disease and the developing countries who were struggling to cope with 
the impact of the epidemic. Although clearly well-intentioned, both the Taking Action 
strategy and the Framework between the New Labour government and the 
pharmaceutical industry viewed the crisis as an issue of market failure, rather than of 
any moral duty. It therefore attempted to respond to this crisis in largely market-based 
terms, preferring to listen to and to keep onside the concerns of the pharmaceutical 
industry rather than the voices calling for increased access to these essential medicines 
on altogether more moral grounds.  
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Amidst a background of political change within the Labour Party, and economic turmoil 
both at home and abroad, the third and final phase appeared to finally recognise the 
human tragedy of AIDS, and the need to respond to it by meeting the needs of people. 
Despite this shift in emphasis however, the government continued to give what 
appeared to be special dispensation to the pharmaceutical industry. This was 
particularly striking since many of the larger firms were themselves blocking access to 
these antiretrovirals by keeping the prices of these drugs high. Where access had 
increased, it was due largely to the efforts of the smaller generic firms who, having 
secured a patent licence from these large multinationals, were able to sell copies of 
these drugs at a fraction of the price. Although these generic firms were at the 
forefront of increasing access – and therefore far more likely to meet New Labour’s 
commitment in this respect – remarkably, the government did not engage with them. 
They chose instead to continue to protect the interests and the profitability of the 
larger, more research-led firms domiciled in Britain.  
 
New Labour’s strategy to meet its commitment concerning the access and availability 
of life-saving antiretroviral drugs reflected a model of political economy orientated 
towards accommodating the expectations of a small business cadre. That these 
expectations were prioritised over the urgent needs of the global poor undermined 
any moral imperative that may have been present. Had New Labour’s commitment to 
those living with HIV and AIDS in the developing world been beyond meeting these 
‘pro-business’ expectations, then one might have expected it to have engaged in more 
dialogue and demonstrated greater support for those constituencies and those parts 
of the pharmaceutical industry who were attempting to address the crisis and make 
universal access to these drugs a reality. Although these constituencies did not wield 
the structural power that New Labour’s understanding of globalisation had granted to 
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the pharmaceutical industry, they would have nevertheless enabled the government 
to meet far more effectively its commitment to increasing access to these essential 
medicines.   
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Chapter 7 
 
Coming to the Aid of the Developing World: 
Tackling Poverty through the International 
Finance Facility    
 
This final case study chapter returns to the theme of finance for development explored 
in chapter 5. Just like debt relief, overseas aid was seen to be an important instrument 
in raising the money necessary to finance poverty reduction. Despite sharing this 
common objective however, it is possible to separate the formation and the 
management of aid and debt relief along policy lines demarcated at home. While 
chapter 5 embedded the issue of debt relief within New Labour’s macroeconomic 
strategy, this chapter will assesses the transmission into the international realm of the 
Treasury’s ‘golden rule’ for borrowing and spending, and the government’s welfare 
policies.  
 
These domestic principles would underpin Gordon Brown’s proposals for a ‘Global 
New Deal’ or ‘Marshall Plan for Africa’; the centrepiece of which would be the 
International Finance Facility (IFF).1 Both personally and politically for the Chancellor, 
the IFF was a hugely significant initiative since it was, according to one of his 
biographers, Brown’s “single most important political priority” aside from reaching 
Number 10 itself.2 More importantly however, in terms of New Labour’s own 
commitment to tackling global poverty, the IFF, if implemented, would enable Britain 
to finally meet the United Nations target set in 1970 for 0.7 percent of its GDP to be 
allocated to foreign aid. The specificity of this historical target, discussed in chapter 3, 
has made international development distinct from any other area of government 
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spending, so much so that it has can act as a gauge of the significance (or lack of) that 
governments attach to international development. Therefore, although New Labour 
might have claimed that overseas development was “not just…about aid” and that its 
policies in this field were concerned with ‘sustainable development’ and “securing a 
future for our planet and its people”,3 such was the symbolism of the 0.7 percent 
target that if New Labour was genuinely committed to improving the lives of millions 
across the developing world – irrespective of its other endeavours in this field – it 
would have to make meeting this longstanding goal a clear priority for Britain and the 
rest of the international donor community.  
 
The IFF would enable this target to be met by drawing upon two distinct themes that 
appeared in New Labour’s domestic political economy. The first developed the 
Treasury’s commitment to a credible and prudent fiscal policy, and its ‘golden rule’ of 
‘borrowing to invest’. At home, New Labour government promised to borrow only as a 
means of financing long-term capital investment rather than current or ongoing public 
expenditure, which would be funded by the taxpayer. Despite tight spending controls, 
particularly in the first few years in office, New Labour had been able to increase the 
level of long-term public investment by using a combination of Private Finance 
Initiatives (PFIs) and public-private partnerships (PPPs). These arrangements enabled 
the New Labour government to fund large-scale investment projects at home, but to 
do so in such a way that would ease the current burden upon the public purse. These 
spending strategies found their way into the Treasury’s proposals for the IFF. The IFF 
would not detract from Britain’s ongoing commitment to spend 0.7 percent of its GDP 
on overseas aid – its current spending – but in order to fill the US$50 billion funding 
gap that existed in the global level of development finance, Brown suggested 
borrowing from international capital markets to lock-in and ‘frontload’ the future aid 
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commitments of donor countries. Without this money, the Treasury conceded that 
many developing countries would be left unable to reach the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) before 2015, and it was upon this basis that the Chancellor 
was prompted into launching his ‘global New Deal’ and IFF initiative. 
 
The second theme of the IFF drew upon New Labour’s ‘New Deal’ at home; a plan 
which sought to lift people out of unemployment and include them in training schemes 
and an increasingly global world of work. The Chancellor’s ‘global New Deal’, to which 
the IFF was central, worked on the same principles of ‘rights and responsibilities’ to 
equip and to help developing countries enter and participate in the global economy. 
New Labour agreed that ‘claimants’ under both these schemes held rights to 
government support, but that they also had responsibilities to use this support 
appropriately. Like Britain’s own welfare system under New Labour, this assistance 
was not to be an end in and of itself, but rather a ‘springboard’ for inclusion into the 
workplace and the global economy. Similarly, just as welfare claimants at home had to 
comply with a specific set of obligations in order to become eligible for this finance, so 
too were conditions laid down that developing countries were required to meet if they 
were to receive this aid money.  
 
Although this particular narrative of ‘rights and responsibilities’ was inflected 
differently when government ministers were addressing audiences at home and 
abroad, the underlying message articulated by New Labour officials was that economic 
and social exclusion lay at the root of poverty. This, as I noted in chapter 2, signalled a 
clear shift away from traditional Labour and social democratic concerns regarding 
‘equality’ towards a set of policies that placed much greater emphasis upon ‘inclusion’ 
and ‘participation’ in the global economy. Despite its perceived challenges, it was from 
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the processes of globalisation that opportunity, wealth and prosperity could be 
derived. To confer the benefits of globalisation, individuals and countries alike needed 
to work ‘with the grain’ of these processes for poverty reduction to take place. 
Therefore social and economic inclusion became a matter of ‘obligation’ rather than a 
‘right’ requiring the recipient to actively take-up a series of responsibilities and duties. 
As I have already demonstrated in chapter 2, this had far-reaching implications for the 
framing of New Labour’s welfare policies at home. As I shall show in this chapter, it 
would also have repercussions for the delivery of development aid overseas.  
 
There are two key dimensions to the IFF that this chapter explores. The first examines 
the design of the IFF itself, and the feasibility of using finance raised – or to use the 
Chancellor’s terms, ‘frontloaded’ – from global capital markets as a means of 
increasing the amount of aid available for redistribution in the developing world. The 
case for the IFF was made principally on the basis that transnational and instantaneous 
markets – almost as emblems of globalisation itself – could be used to redistribute 
wealth from the global North to the global South, and so meet New Labour’s 
overarching commitment to ‘make globalisation work for the poor’.4 The IFF would 
work on the basis of Britain and other donor countries initially committing to an 
increase in aid resources up to 2015. These legally binding commitments, together 
with the credit-worthiness of donor governments would act as collateral against bonds 
raised on international capital markets. These bonds would enable the proposed 
additional flows of US$15–20 billion per year suggested by the Treasury to be 
leveraged up to US$50 billion per year, which could then be used straightaway to 
finance poverty reduction programmes across the developing world.  
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The second dimension assesses the political economy of the IFF and how New Labour 
sought to manage these expectations through the conditions imposed by the IFF, upon 
the recipients of its finance. This particular dimension reveals a clear 
internationalisation of policy from the way welfare was viewed at home to the 
disbursement of aid overseas. Both at home and abroad, New Labour treated 
individuals and developing countries alike as ‘global citizens’, each with a set of 
obligations to participate fully in the global economy. At home, welfare recipients had 
a clear duty to fulfil these responsibilities. Abroad, developing countries had, in similar 
terms, a distinct set of conditions linked to the new economic architecture discussed in 
chapter 5, that they needed to meet in order to receive this aid. New Labour’s welfare 
system at home and its international aid programme were both imputed with the 
same principles of ‘rights and responsibilities’ that government officials had articulated 
at home. This meant that any redistribution of wealth would be based upon the 
fulfilment of obligations rather than the immediate needs of the poorer and excluded 
members of society, both in Britain and in the developing world. These conditions are 
hugely significant for two reasons. Firstly, given that the very character of these 
‘obligations’ were market-orientated (despite their ‘pro-poor’ rhetoric) they prioritised 
the expectations of market constituencies over the needs of recipients. Secondly, the 
framing of aid in the contractual terms of ‘rights and responsibilities’, would serve only 
to shift the burden of responsibility away from wealthy donors and onto the poorest 
and most vulnerable people on the planet instead.  
 
Structure of the Chapter 
This chapter takes as its point of departure the challenge that New Labour faced in 
raising the sufficient amount of finance required to meet the MDGs. A failure by the 
largest industrialised economies to meet the 0.7 percent/GDP aid target had left a 
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shortfall of US$50 billion per year. This chapter looks at three interlinked policies that 
Treasury officials argued could fill this gap. I look at each one in turn, drawing out the 
domestic lineages of these proposals and assessing the likelihood of their success. The 
first proposal I examine is the International Development Trust Fund, however my 
main focus is upon, its successor, the IFF since this would be central to Gordon Brown’s 
‘global New Deal’. This was predicated upon the rule of ‘borrowing to invest’ and the 
principle of ‘rights and responsibilities’. The final phase explores the IFFIm, the 
International Facility for Immunisation. Based upon the same principles of the IFF, 
rather than raising money purely for aid, this mechanism sought to raise money on 
international bond markets to purchase vaccines for the diseases and illnesses such as 
malaria and tuberculosis (TB) that disproportionately affect the poorest people in the 
world. Throughout each of these phases I demonstrate how, despite the change in the 
content of the policy, New Labour continued to prioritise market expectations over 
those its policies were purportedly designed to help.    
  
The Challenge of Increasing Aid for International Development 
As Fig. 7.1 clearly demonstrates, ever since the UN set the 0.7 percent/GNI target in 
1970,5 only a handful of countries have met, let alone exceeded this commitment. This 
is significant because it provides an explanation as to why New Labour, and indeed the 
rest of the donor community was faced with such a huge shortfall in aid, and why the 
MDGs were unlikely to be met by 2015.  
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Fig. 7.1  OECD/DAC Countries, Overseas Development Aid as a % of GDP, 1970–2010  
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0.14 
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1.10 
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Source:  OECD6 
 
Despite the overall increase in aid seen under New Labour, noted earlier in the thesis, 
a comparison between Britain’s record on aid and that of other similar countries in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD/DAC) makes for mixed reading. None in the G7 group met the 0.7 
percent/GDP target during the forty-year period between 1970 and 2010. Whilst New 
Labour was in office however, Britain did at least lead the way amongst this group of 
nations towards meeting this goal, giving around twice as much from its GDP than 
Italy, Japan and the United States. Despite its position as the G7’s leading donor, 
                                                             
6
 OECD (2011)    
 
352 
Britain was still outperformed by the Benelux countries and the major Scandinavian 
countries. The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden had all met the 0.7 percent 
target within ten years of it being set. Luxembourg met this target in 2000, and 
Belgium was, in 2010, the most likely country to follow suit. Therefore, while Denmark, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden continued to meet and to exceed 
the benchmark set by the UN, Britain, the G7, and the rest of the international donor 
community were all left to play catch-up. 
 
The continued failure of much of the international donor community to meet the 0.7 
percent/GDP target resulted in a huge gap emerging in the aid resources available to 
the developing world. Despite the increasing levels of prosperity across the global 
North, the existing level of bilateral aid given from the DAC countries was insufficient if 
the MDGs were to be met by 2015:  
 
The MDGs will not be achieved without additional resources for low-
income countries. In addition to increasing domestic revenue and 
external investment, a substantial increase in both aid and debt relief 
is needed. This needs to be secure, predictable, and sustained up to 
2015 and beyond.7  
 
Indeed, as Gordon Brown would later remark, if current trends persisted, it was more 
likely that they would be met “in 2150, 135 years *too+ late”.8 In order to reach the 
MDGs, Brown’s Financial Secretary in the Treasury, Stephen Timms argued that “an 
additional US$50 billion of aid was needed immediately”.9 This huge scaling-up of 
finance for development would require a completely new approach to aid.  
 
The first signs of this new approach to aid emerged late in 2001, when Gordon Brown 
proposed his own ‘Marshall Plan’ for the developing world. The Chancellor’s ‘Global 
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New Deal’ would be derived from the same principles of the New Deal and the welfare 
policies taken up by New Labour at home. This Global New Deal would be made up of 
four ‘building blocks’. The first involved the creation of new ‘codes and standards’ 
designed to support stability in the global economy. These new ‘rules of the game’ 
(explored in chapter 5) would, the Chancellor argued, improve the terms upon which 
the poorest countries can increase their capacity to participate in the global economy. 
The second of the Chancellor’s building blocks would see the adoption by international 
businesses of corporate standards, supported through a series of investment forums 
between public and private sectors in developing countries. The third building block 
sought to create an improved trade regime, which Brown identified as being essential 
if developing countries were to participate on fairer terms in the world economy.  
 
It was the fourth building block however that would go on to form the purpose of New 
Labour’s aid policy: “a substantial transfer of additional resources from the richest to 
the poorest countries in the form of investment for development”.10 For Brown, this 
form of wealth redistribution at a global level would signal a shift away from 
“providing short term aid just to compensate for poverty, to a higher and more 
sustainable purpose”.11  The Chancellor argued that aid should instead be viewed as “a 
long-term investment to tackle the causes of poverty by promoting growth, prosperity 
and participation in the world economy”.12 This change in emphasis is striking because 
it meant that aid would no longer be seen just as a charity or as a ‘hand-out’, but as a 
means by which rich countries in the global North could ‘invest’ in the poor countries 
in the global South. Increased spending on areas such as welfare and overseas aid 
would not automatically increase social justice. What was important for New Labour 
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instead was creating the opportunities that would enable developing countries to 
participate and compete in the global economy.  
 
This emphasis upon ‘participation’ and ‘inclusion’ in the global economy is significant 
because, as I noted in chapter 2, it replaced traditional Labourite concerns regarding 
‘equality’ and ‘social justice’. As in its welfare policies at home, the fundamental issue 
of equality was conspicuous by its absence in the speeches and policy documents that 
set out New Labour’s ambitions for international development. Clearly, both at home 
and abroad, New Labour remained firmly in support of redistribution and increased 
spending. However, in both these contexts, equality – that is, correcting the 
imbalances between the poor and the well-off – was replaced with ‘making work pay’. 
As Ruth Levitas has remarked, New Labour justified any inequalities of outcome on the 
basis of ‘hard work’; that the rich were entitled to more wealth because they had 
earned it.13 It followed therefore that New Labour understood the role of the state to 
be one of ‘enabler’ rather than ‘provider’, of ‘hand-ups’ rather than simply ‘hand-outs’. 
State assistance meant creating the opportunities that recipients needed to participate 
in the workplace and the global economy. Having created these opportunities, it was, 
as New Labour officials argued, the responsibility of individuals and countries alike to 
make the most of these opportunities themselves.  
 
Phase 1:  The International Development Trust Fund  
The IFF started life as an International Development Trust Fund (IDTF), a mechanism 
that would involve “the richest countries making a substantial additional commitment 
of resources beyond 2015”.14 Although light on detail, the Treasury’s proposals for the 
IDTF mirrored that of the ‘asset-based welfare’ policies, explored in chapter 2, which 
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were supported heavily by the Treasury at home, most notably through the Child Trust 
Fund (CTF). Designed to create a ‘savings habit’ which government ministers argued 
would give less well-off families in particular, a greater sense of financial 
empowerment and independence, the CTF would give young people a cash lump sum 
on maturity, with which they could finance and make the most of the opportunities 
open to them at that age.  
 
There was, typically, a domestic antecedent to this since trust funds had been used by 
the Treasury in Britain to grant individuals, particularly with low to middle-income 
families, with the means to start a ‘savings habit’, and create a new form of ‘asset-
based welfare’. There was a clear transmission behind what the CTF aimed to do at 
home and what the IDTF sought to achieve abroad. At home, the CTF was designed to 
encourage saving and improve financial awareness. As a means of combating global 
poverty, the IDTF was designed as a means for rich countries to invest in the future of 
developing countries. For poor countries to be lifted out of poverty, it was important 
that these countries became more financially independent, more integrated into the 
global economy and therefore more able to make the most of the opportunities 
presented by globalisation.  
 
New Labour’s welfare logic in an era of globalisation suggested that once integrated in 
the global economy, developing countries could gain greater financial independence. 
No longer would they have to rely upon continued assistance from wealthy donors in 
the global North. Instead, these countries would be transformed into ‘self-capitalising 
subjects’, with greater autonomy and self-reliance to make the most of the 
opportunities presented to them.  Like the CTF, and indeed New Labour’s welfare 
strategy at home, this was to be realised through a contractual, ‘something for 
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something’ arrangement. Monies raised through these trust funds would only be 
forthcoming if recipient countries fulfilled strict conditions concerning their economic 
and trade policies.  
 
Therefore, despite this commitment to move low-income countries from a continuing, 
passive dependency upon aid to an altogether more active culture of financial 
empowerment, this logic relied upon a series of ‘responsibilities’ that government 
ministers demanded be fulfilled. For the IDTF, the source of these responsibilities, or 
conditions, attached to this aid could be traced back to “the existing achievements of 
the World Bank, the IMF and the Regional Development Banks”.15 This was significant 
because, despite a commitment to social justice that such a large spending pledge 
might suggest; it meant that the IDTF was orientated towards an approach to 
development supported by the IFIs, and that favoured market-based concerns and the 
expectations of investors. As Brown argued:  
 
Developing countries must pursue corruption-free policies for 
stability, for opening up trade and for creating a favourable 
environment for investment. In return, we should be prepared to 
increase by 50 billion [dollars] a year in the years to 2015, vitally 
needed funds to achieve these agreed Millennium Development 
Goals.16 
 
These conditions and responsibilities chimed with the expectations articulated by the 
IFIs who, as I noted in chapter 5, argued that for these global institutions, poverty 
reduction was best achieved by embedding market reforms that were open and 
investor-friendly. At the same time Brown was preparing his IDTF, the President of the 
World Bank, James Wolfensohn was noting how important it was for developing 
countries to “put in place good and strong governance, effective legal and judicial 
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systems, and a robust financial system…to attract *the+ foreign and domestic private 
investment [that is] crucial as engines of growth and poverty reduction”.17 Similarly, 
Horst Köhler, the Managing Director of the IMF, remarked that across the developing 
world, “steps to strengthen governance and fight corruption have often lagged behind 
other reforms, undermining credibility and investor confidence”.18  
 
Senior officials, both in Washington and in Whitehall, were convinced that the failure 
to redistribute wealth at the global level and the lack of development finance could be 
traced to the opaque decision-making processes of central government treasuries and 
public financial institutions in developing countries. This argument is explored in 
greater depth in chapter 5, but essentially for these institutions, this lack of 
transparency was destabilising to both domestic and international markets. This 
instability created a sense of unease and uncertainty amongst investors all of which 
inevitably dampened the levels of much-needed investment in these poorer 
economies. As Köhler remarked, “only by getting access to investment capital from the 
rest of the world will the IMF’s poorest member countries be able to make a real 
breakthrough in poverty reduction”.19 For these international finance ministers, if 
there was to be the sustained flow of investment capital to enable poor countries to 
develop and lift individuals out of poverty, any development strategy must be geared 
towards meeting the expectations of markets and investors.  
 
Despite the funding gap required to meet the broadly ‘social’ MDGs, as Fig. 7.2 
suggests, the IDTF was orientated clearly towards the expectations of the IFIs, rather 
than any demands that constituencies calling for a greater increases in aid may have 
had. This would reveal something of an inconsistency in Treasury thinking. While 
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officials would, as I shall show in the following section, press for donor countries to dig 
deeper and give more aid, through its ‘new’ conditionality, New Labour would carefully 
restrict who it would give that money too. 
 
Fig. 7.2  Phase 1: the IDTF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 2:  The International Finance Facility 
It was during the 2002 Spending Review that Gordon Brown announced a “new fifty 
billion dollar International Financing Facility” to spearhead “a new alliance against 
poverty”.20 Evolving out of the Treasury’s previous idea for an International 
Development Trust Fund, this new Facility was designed to address the huge financing 
challenge that the donor community faced for the MDGs to be met by 2015. The first, 
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really concrete proposals for this new IFF first appeared in December 2002, promising 
to:   
  
Lock-in a clear and binding – but conditional – commitment over the 
longer term from donors to provide substantial additional resources 
to 2015 and beyond in order to meet the MDGs. The Facility would be 
able to borrow funds in international capital markets, secured against 
these commitments. It would borrow funds by issuing bonds, and so 
raise additional financing. The finance raised would be distributed in 
the form of grants and concessional loans depending on country 
circumstance, and it would not contribute to a burden of 
unsustainable debt for the poorest countries. Its provision would be 
conditional on developing countries following good governance and 
implementing sound policies. To minimise bureaucracy and avoid the 
costly duplication of existing structures, additional resources should 
be distributed in a balanced way through existing effective bilateral 
and multilateral mechanisms, supporting poverty reduction strategies 
in developing countries.21 
 
The Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, illustrated the 
Chancellor’s proposals in even simpler terms. The IFF (illustrated in Fig. 7.3) was just 
like “the rich world taking out a mortgage to help the poor world, so the people of that 
world can improve their lives”.22 Rather than waiting for there to be enough money to 
tackle poverty, the IFF would borrow from international capital markets – just as a 
homebuyer would borrow from a mortgage lender – on the basis of future aid 
commitments. Indeed, just as a personal mortgage needs to be securitised, Benn later 
argued, so too would this ‘global mortgage’ lock in the political commitment of donors, 
provide a means of securitising borrowing, and provide the predictability and critical 
mass of aid needed for simultaneous and sustainable investment in developing 
countries.23 This, Benn argued, would allow there to be faster progress in the fight 
against poverty.   
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Fig 7.3 Overview of the IFF  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  HM Treasury24 
 
The IFF drew heavily upon several themes and policy narratives evident in New 
Labour’s domestic political economy. The principles underpinning the IFF reflected 
both the Treasury’s own commitments concerning domestic borrowing and spending, 
and the creation of a set of social policies and welfare regime orientated to meet the 
challenges presented by globalisation and the global economy. This phase examines 
the internationalisation of these themes, and their implications for New Labour’s 
overseas aid programme.  
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The IFF and the Treasury’s ‘Golden Rule’ of Spending and Borrowing  
An initial freeze on spending in New Labour’s first few years in office notwithstanding, 
the IFF reflected the Treasury’s subsequent largesse both at home and overseas. 
Although significant, this increase in government expenditure was constrained by the 
self-imposed ‘golden rules’ of borrowing and spending set by the Treasury. 
Institutionalising the prudence that the Chancellor sought to bring to New Labour’s 
fiscal policy, this rule allowed the New Labour government to spend only what it could 
afford, and to borrow only as a means of financing investment that would be of benefit 
to future generations. Laying out its proposals for the IFF, Treasury officials argued that 
the Facility itself would enable rich countries to borrow in order to invest in the 
developing world. Indeed, as the proposals made clear, “borrowing to invest” was “a 
well-established domestic and development principle” since “all donor countries 
borrow to invest in future prosperity, while the World Bank is a long-standing 
borrower in the capital markets”.25 By enabling these rich countries to make an 
investment in the poorer parts of the world in the lead-up to 2015, the international 
donor community could finance a real change in the lives of those not only currently 
living in poverty, but future generations who might otherwise be born into these same 
conditions of want. This money was therefore to act not “as compensation for past 
failures but as investment for future success”.26  
 
Securing investment for the developing world was a key part of the IFF proposals. This 
meant reconfiguring overseas aid as an instrument that went beyond simply a means 
of compensating the poor. As Gordon Brown remarked, the Facility was not only 
“designed specifically to help meet the internationally agreed Millennium 
Development Goals” but it was also “an essential condition to allow the poorest 
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countries to attract private investment and participate in the global economy”.27 
Indeed, the money that the IFF would raise and the means by which it would be 
disbursed was designed to “ensure a domestic environment in which people and firms 
can produce goods and services efficiently and get them to international markets”.28 
Funds raised by the IFF would “provide developing countries with the means to invest 
in schools and healthcare, roads and legal systems”.29 Investment which, the 
Chancellor argued would:  
 
Help create the environment businesses need to start-up, invest and 
grow, as well as create the conditions that will enable countries to 
participate in, and benefit from, global trade. And as families in those 
countries are lifted out of poverty, new and dynamic markets will be 
created.30  
 
The securing of health and education outcomes, the building of roads and 
infrastructure, and the development of a domestic environment conducive to trade 
and inward investment were all part of a ‘virtuous circle’ necessary to lift these poorer 
countries out of poverty. By injecting finance into these developing countries through 
the frontloading of aid, the purpose of the IFF was to create and set this virtuous circle 
into motion. Acting almost as ‘start-up capital’, the IFF would trigger investment in 
these areas, which in turn would benefit future generations.   
 
Given the tight spending rules the Treasury had imposed upon itself at home, it was 
both politically and economically expedient for New Labour to borrow this capital 
rather than simply increase its aid spending. In this respect, the IFF could be cast as an 
accounting device to allow for what would be a significant increase in aid expenditure 
whilst all the while maintaining its tight fiscal stance at home. This was obviously 
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attractive to those within New Labour who were keen to portray their international 
development credentials and their commitment to improving the lives of those in the 
developing world. Politically too, the IFF was an attractive proposition since the 
repayment of the IFF bonds was scheduled to take place long after the current crop of 
ministers had departed the scene. Freed from the future burden of fulfilling the 
pledges made through the IFF, New Labour could claim, quite credibly, to be 
embarking upon a huge increase in ODA without placing undue strain upon the public 
purse now.  
 
As appealing as these considerations were, New Labour officials were nevertheless 
also keen to point out that the Facility would not signal the end of ODA in the medium 
to long-term.31 As Gareth Thomas, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at DFID 
insisted, the IFF should be viewed as being complementary to, rather than a substitute 
for progress towards achieving the 0.7 percent/GDP target.32 Even with the IFF in 
place, and despite the large flows of finance that this was forecast to provide, the UK 
would remain committed to not only meeting, but sticking to this goal.33 For Thomas, 
the IFF was only a short-term mechanism, and it remained important that this financial 
support was sustained beyond 2015 with donor countries increasing their 
development budgets accordingly.34 This would enable there to be the ‘safety-net’ of a 
continuing flow of aid once the disbursement of IFF funds had stopped. As a joint 
Treasury-DFID report argued, “finance ministers in developing countries will not be 
prepared to increase spending on the basis of short-term or unpredictable donor 
commitments”.35 Without sustained, predictable finance, Hilary Benn warned that 
“African governments cannot use it both to employ teachers, doctors and nurses and 
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to buy AIDS drugs for the long term”.36 Benn would later note how finance ministers 
from developing countries needed reliable funding in order to pay doctors and nurses, 
run clinics, and purchase medicines.37 For the Secretary of State, although the IFF was 
important in raising the finance as a means of financing the fight against HIV and AIDS, 
the predictability of this finance was just as crucial “because antiretroviral therapies 
cannot be turned on and off. Countries need to know that if they start the process – 
and individuals need to know that if they start taking the drugs – the treatment will be 
available in the long-term because it does not work any other way”.38 
 
There was a clear transmission of the Treasury’s ‘golden rule’ of borrowing and 
spending policies into the arena of international development. The IFF was to act as 
the means of borrowing long-term capital for investment in developing countries, 
while the current spending, raised by the UK taxpayer, was designed to finance 
Britain’s commitment to reaching the 0.7 percent/GDP target. The internationalisation 
of this policy however revealed a rather striking tension between New Labour’s clear 
commitment to market-led development on the one hand, and the continuing high 
level of overseas assistance promised on the other.  
 
In the first instance, Treasury officials were at pains to portray the IFF as a temporary 
mechanism for frontloading finance; one that could provide the means through which 
aid could be raised and used by developing countries to invest in schools, healthcare, 
and infrastructure. Following a distinctly market-orientated approach to development, 
officials claimed that investment in these areas, combined with an increased market 
liberalisation and openness to the global economy would raise levels of trade and 
attract foreign flows of private finance. Both the Treasury in London and the IFIs in 
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Washington argued that it was these increased flows of trade and finance, which were 
necessary to integrate these developing countries into the global economy and reduce 
poverty accordingly. Over time, this integration into the global economy would lessen 
the dependence of these countries upon foreign aid.  
 
Despite this particular commitment to market-led development however, New Labour 
also continued to promise that it would meet the 0.7 percent aid target both prior to, 
and beyond the lifetime of the IFF. Given that welfare, like the IFF, was viewed by New 
Labour as a temporary measure, by continuing to reassert Britain’s other commitment 
to the UN target, this suggested that government officials were not completely 
convinced that neither the leveraged investment offered by the IFF nor deeper 
integration into the world economy – even under the conditions laid out by the 
Treasury – would actually lift those currently living in the developing world, and future 
generations, out of poverty. Crucially therefore, despite its aspirations to reduce 
poverty by developing the education and healthcare systems and to build 
infrastructures across the developing world, the IFF could not guarantee that 
globalisation, as it was understood by New Labour, could be made to work for the 
world’s poor. 
  
Aid as Global Welfare: The Temporality and Conditionality of the IFF  
Alongside the internationalisation of the Treasury’s ‘golden rules’, there was a clear 
line of transmission between New Labour’s conceptualisation of welfare at home and 
the policy design of the IFF for consumption abroad. This transmission emerged in two 
key ways. Arguably the most significant of these, the conditionality that the Treasury 
built into the IFF will be explored in depth later in this chapter. The first of these 
themes however – the temporality of the IFF – returns briefly to a theme already 
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touched upon in this chapter. Rather than acting as a permanent form of welfare, the 
IFF was designed to temporarily frontload aid and enable recipient countries to 
integrate themselves within the global economy. As New Labour had sought to do 
through its welfare-to-work schemes, most notably through the ‘New Deal’ 
programme, the pursuit of this altogether more market-based form of development 
would enable countries to participate in the global economy, and reduce poverty more 
independently rather than by simply continuing to rely upon foreign aid. At home, 
young people and the unemployed were urged not to rely upon the state for handouts, 
but to instead obtain the skills required to participate in the increasingly global labour 
market. Through the ‘New Deal’ the government would offer support, but once an 
individual had secured employment – and therefore financial independence – this 
funding would stop. Similarly, and certainly insofar as the Treasury was concerned, by 
bringing forward the aid commitments of donor countries, the IFF would support the 
integration of these developing countries into the global economy. This would enable 
these countries to become economically independent, create their own wealth and 
reduce poverty upon these terms.  
 
The temporality of the IFF was reflected in the Treasury’s claim that the Facility would 
be “a limited-life entity” with an estimated lifespan of around thirty years.39 The initial 
surge in aid would be supported by the IFF bonds receiving AAA credit-rating, which 
would enable up to US$50 billion to be frontloaded and disbursed every single year 
leading up to 2015. With the subsequent US$500 billion that the Treasury forecast 
would be raised over the ten-year period between 2005 and 2015 having been 
invested into poverty reduction strategies and development programmes,40 the 
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amount of aid disbursed by the Facility would begin to diminish.41 This would enable 
the recipient country to stand more independently in the global economy and lessen 
their dependency upon foreign aid. Like the Treasury’s earlier proposals for the IDTF, 
the IFF reflected New Labour’s belief that welfare should be a short-term measure – a 
means rather than an ongoing end in and of itself. The high levels of government 
spending seen under New Labour was intended to move recipients – whether welfare 
claimants at home or developing countries overseas – off a culture of dependency and 
into a position of financial independence which would enable individuals and countries 
to make the most of the opportunities presented to them. The projected 
disbursements of the IFF reflected this way of thinking. As a later draft of Treasury’s IFF 
proposals argued, “while increased aid could increase aid dependency in the short to 
medium term, the experience of well-managed countries in receipt of large aid flows 
suggests that aid has helped them to grow fast enough to reduce aid dependence over 
time”.42  
 
The aim of New Labour to reduce aid or welfare dependency also played a part in the 
distinct form of conditionality that the government attached both to its welfare 
policies and its aid programme overseas. The issue of conditionality was a prickly one 
for New Labour officials. Gordon Brown remained adamant that conditionality was 
“essential if we are to ensure the best use of overseas aid” and it certainly was an 
integral part of his proposals for the IFF.43 There was however also a keenness 
amongst government officials to move the conditionality debate on, something that 
was reflected in the policy document, Rethinking Conditionality published in 2005.44 
This did not call for the end of aid conditionality, but rather sought to focus upon the 
issue of ‘process conditionality’, whereby standards of ‘good governance’ would be the 
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benchmark for aid rather than any exacting policy conditions. Throughout this phase of 
policy however, the lines of difference between the ‘process conditionality’ that New 
Labour officials claimed to support, and the ‘policy conditionality’ they claimed to have 
left behind were frequently blurred. As the case of the IFF demonstrated, the 
disbursement of aid would remain contingent upon recipient countries in the 
developing world continuing to put in place the same set of ‘sound’ policies conducive 
to economic growth. It was a recurring theme in the policy speeches and statements of 
government ministers that the implementation of pro-trade, investment-friendly 
policies was not only a necessary prerequisite for poverty reduction but also 
represented ‘good governance’ on the part of developing countries.  
  
The overarching concept of conditionality enabled donors to set out the terms upon 
which aid should be disbursed, and to withhold or stop this money altogether should a 
recipient country renege upon these terms. It has been an integral element in the 
disbursement of both bilateral and multilateral aid programmes and two main forms of 
conditionality have come to dominate the international aid system: tied aid and policy-
based conditionality. ‘Tied aid’ requires the recipients of aid to purchase the goods and 
services needed for development from the donor countries themselves. More often 
than not, tied aid prioritises the export markets and commercial interests of aid donors 
over the more immediate development needs of the recipient economies. ‘Policy-
based conditionality’ requires the implementation of a series of policy prescriptions, 
typically to restructure the economy of the recipient country towards a more market-
based form of development. This particular form of conditionality was introduced as 
part of structural adjustment measures first implemented in the 1980s by the IFIs 
under the rubric of the ‘Washington Consensus’. Again, these policies typically 
prioritised economic growth over equality and market concerns over the more 
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immediate social issues such as healthcare and education that developing countries 
faced. Both these forms of conditionality had invoked widespread criticism from the 
NGO community, and developing countries alike as well as large parts of the Labour 
Party (see chapter 3), who considered these demands to be excessive and indicative of 
the exploitative power relations between the rich countries and those living in poorer 
parts of the world.  
 
Senior New Labour officials were keen to distance themselves from pursuing these 
types of conditionality. In ruling out tied aid however, officials ended up maintaining a 
set of policy conditions akin to those laid out in the initial ‘Washington Consensus’, 
emphasising the importance of macroeconomic stability and economic growth to 
development, and prioritising these over the more immediate social issues faced by 
poor countries. In DFID’s second White Paper, policy officials rejected tied aid as being 
“grossly inefficient”, and outlined their commitment to “untying aid and promoting 
local procurement” instead.45 No longer would the UK’s increasing aid commitment be 
dependent upon recipient countries purchasing British goods or undertaking 
development projects that would benefit British firms and contractors. Previously, this 
policy would have contradicted the remit of the overseas arm of the Department of 
Trade and Industry (and its subsequent rebranding under New Labour) whose role it 
was to support the commercial interests of British firms abroad.  
 
However, the specific discourse of globalisation articulated by New Labour officials 
emphasised the opportunities that this new global economy now afforded to firms 
looking to enter these new, emerging markets. For firms to make the most of these 
opportunities, and for developing countries to confer the benefit of the investment 
that these firms would bring, host countries themselves needed to become more 
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integrated in the global economy by pursuing ‘appropriate’ government policies. 
Consequently, both DFID and the Treasury emphasised the importance of ‘sound’ pro-
investment government policies, open markets and trade liberalisation. These 
neoliberal imperatives would form the principle conditions upon which New Labour, 
through the IFF would disburse aid and provide other forms of development support. 
Although globalisation was understood to have restricted the latitude of policymakers 
at home, if ‘managed properly’ by countries in the developing world, it could lift 
millions out of poverty. British industry stood to reap the benefits of this since it would 
enable more firms to extend their reach into these emerging markets.  
 
The importance that policy officials in charge of drawing up the IFF placed upon open 
markets and trade liberalisation reveals the extent to which New Labour struggled to 
make a distinctive break from the heavily criticised policy conditionality imposed by 
the IFIs based in Washington, and the aid programmes of previous British 
governments. Shortly before succeeding Clare Short as Secretary of State for 
International Development, Valerie Amos argued that the “conditionality in the form 
of the ‘one-size-fits-all’ prescriptions imposed on developing countries is gone from 
our agenda”.46 Amos’s own successor at DFID, Hilary Benn also attempted to put clear 
water between the policies of his department and those of the World Bank and IMF 
where “in the days of the ‘Washington Consensus’…there was scant regard for the 
impact on poverty and social conditions of an inappropriate ‘one-size-fits-all’ economic 
orthodoxy on poor countries”.47 Despite both these claims, a set of conditions 
remained, which Amos made clear, reflected “the international consensus on what 
works in development”.48 However, this rebranding of the much-maligned 
‘Washington Consensus’ with an altogether more progressive sounding ‘international 
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consensus’ simply fudged the issue. In DFID’s 2000 White Paper, the government 
promised to target aid and ensure that development assistance was used much more 
effectively.49 Similarly, the IFF reiterated the importance of a “reform and better 
allocation of aid” which the Treasury’s proposals would help achieve.50 However, 
despite these reformist appeals for a more effective use of aid, the reality was that the 
conditions upon which aid would be disbursed would remain contingent upon a 
‘consensus’ amongst policymakers in the global North rather upon the specific needs 
of individual countries in the developing world. 
  
The character of this ‘international consensus’ was reflected in the distinctly 
neoliberal, pro-market conditions that countries in receipt of IFF finance were required 
to adopt. Laying out its proposals for the IFF, the Treasury spelled out three distinct 
elements to its own policy conditionality; elements that were linked heavily to the 
‘new international economic architecture’ discussed in chapter 5. Firstly, countries 
were required to pursue anti-corruption, pro-stability policies and the necessary 
transparency in economic and corporate policies. Secondly, there must be a 
commitment to a sequenced opening-up of markets to global trade. Thirdly, countries 
must improve their macroeconomic environment to encourage increased investment 
and private sector-led growth.51 Introducing his proposals, firstly to the House of 
Commons Select Committee for International Development, and then in his pre-
Budget Report, Gordon Brown set out these conditions as a partnership – a ‘global 
compact’ – between the developed and developing nations:  
 
In return for developing countries pursuing corruption-free, pro-
stability, pro-investment and pro-trade policies, developed countries 
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should substantially increase the development aid they are prepared 
to offer in the run-up to 2015.52  
 
In return for the developed countries insisting on corruption-free 
policies for stability, better conditions for trade…and a more 
conducive environment for investment, we should in return be 
prepared to put in the additional development aid.53 
 
In continuing to build support for the IFF the following year, Brown again called for “a 
commitment from developing countries to pursue policies for stability, growth and the 
opening up of trade and investment”.54 In return for this commitment, the Chancellor 
went on to argue, “the international community, particularly the richest countries, 
should be prepared to say that we will help to meet the millennium development 
targets: ensuring that poverty is halved by 2015”.55 For Brown:  
 
The opening up of trade and of opportunities for investment that, 
combined with the programme for aid, will help the developing 
countries most… If the developing countries are prepared to open up 
to trade and to allow private investment to play its role in the 
development of their countries, we must in turn support them with 
rises in our aid budgets and with the new International Finance 
Facility.56 
 
In the 2003 Budget, the Chancellor again returned to his ‘global compact’ between rich 
and poor nations. “In return for action by developing countries to tackle corruption 
and establish stable conditions for equitable and sustainable economic growth”, the 
Treasury promised that “developed countries will increase aid from US$50 billion a 
year today to US$100 billion a year up to 2015”.57 Similarly, “in return for African 
countries tackling corruption, pursuing policies for stability and opening up to 
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investment, we will provide the resources to enable them to tackle their problems”.58 
This meant that although the IFF was designed to produce distinctly social outcomes, it 
was understood that these could only be achieved through the pursuit of a ‘pro-
market’ model of development. Put simply, for more children to attend school, for 
more teachers and nurses to be trained and be employed, for more lives of mothers 
and babies to be saved during childbirth, developing countries must open up their 
markets, increase investment opportunities and integrate themselves in the global 
economy.  
 
The conditionality of the IFF was designed to address four key areas – two normative, 
two explanatory – that New Labour officials considered to be of crucial importance if 
the finance raised by the IFF was to be used effectively, and if support for the IFF was 
to be forthcoming beyond Whitehall. The first and most distinctive of these four areas 
addressed the need for recipient countries to “meet their obligations to pursue 
stability and create the conditions for new investment”.59 Although the Chancellor 
promised not to make British aid designed “for education, health and anti-poverty 
programmes conditional on either trade or commercial agreements”, Brown 
maintained that it would be nevertheless necessary for African countries to open up 
their economies “to trade and private investment” as a means of reducing poverty.60 
The character and the imprint of this particular brand of neoliberalism dominated the 
Treasury’s proposals, embedding them firmly within the “international consensus” that 
now existed in the ‘post-Washington’ era.    
 
The second normative issue concerned the need for developing countries to 
demonstrate ‘good governance’ and particularly, a commitment to tackle corruption. 
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For Brown, this was necessary to ensure that the funds earmarked for developing 
countries were “properly and effectively used”.61 Indeed, if Britain and the rest of the 
donor community was “to provide additional help…it must have a guarantee that the 
money will go not to corrupt elites, wasteful military expenditure and prestige projects 
by bureaucracies” but instead be spent on “health, education and anti-poverty 
programmes”.62 Clearly, such a move was to be welcomed. This narrative however 
enabled British government officials to depict their counterparts in the developing 
world in less than favourable terms. New Labour played up to the crude but popular 
caricature of developing world leaders as being despotic, corrupt and profligate. 
Reinforcing the purpose of ‘the new economic architecture’, the Chancellor 
maintained that what was required was increased economic surveillance to discipline 
‘good’ as well as ‘bad’ governments into following the neoliberal orthodoxy of the 
“international consensus”.63 This raised serious questions concerning not only the 
perception of political leaders and decision-makers in developing countries but also 
the autonomy and latitude they would be afforded in formulating policies appropriate 
for their own national contexts. As Brown remarked, “in return for providing additional 
aid…central banks and finance ministers of those countries should be prepared to be 
far more transparent by opening their books to show where money was really being 
spent”.64  
 
These two normative aspects of New Labour’s conditionality policies were linked into 
two further altogether more explanatory reasons why conditionality remained so 
important for the government. Essentially these were used by Treasury officials to 
build support for and ‘sell’ its proposals for the IFF to constituencies both at home and 
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abroad. Again the depiction of corrupt, wasteful elites in the developing world came in 
handy for New Labour ministers like Benn who noted the “fiduciary responsibility” that 
donor governments have “to their taxpayers to ensure that aid is spent on 
development”.65 This particular responsibility was highlighted by DFID’s policy paper 
on conditionality which noted the “particular responsibility” that donors have “as part 
of their accountability to parliament and the public, to ensure that their development 
assistance is not used in ways that abuse human rights”.66 The logic here was simple: 
any government commitment to increasing aid would not be supported by their 
electorate if this money was being spent lining the pockets of the leaders of 
developing countries, particularly those who were guilty of human rights abuses. 
Although designed to appeal to domestic audiences who might otherwise be sceptical 
of aid, this particular narrative also signalled and reinforced the responsibility that 
developing countries had to conform to the demands of the international donor 
community.  
 
As well as building support at home, New Labour’s continued emphasis upon 
conditionality was important in the building of support amongst other constituencies 
from the donor community. Tony Blair even went as far as to suggest that without 
these conditions in place, the IFF would not work. While the Prime Minister believed 
that the IFF was “a sound idea” he warned that Britain would “not obtain the full 
support for [increased] development assistance unless it is in return for a partnership 
with those countries which are taking the necessary measures to improve their 
governance”.67 For government officials, it was clear that an initiative such as the IFF 
needed the safeguard of conditionality to persuade other donors to support the 
                                                             
65
 Benn (2004a) 
66
 DFID (2005b: 8) 
67
 Blair (2003c)  
 
376 
proposals. Without this accountability, donors would be unwilling to scale-up their aid 
commitments to the amount that was required to meet the MDGs.  
 
Two rather striking observations can be made, both from Blair’s remarks and the way, 
in much broader terms, in which the IFF was framed. New Labour officials had 
frequently stated the urgent case for increasing aid as a means of meeting the MDGs. 
For both Brown and his colleagues in DFID, it was essential that the aid community 
took seriously this challenge in order to fund desperately needed poverty reduction 
strategies across the developing world. This appeal however, like the Treasury’s own 
spending plans at home, was tempered with economic caution and constraint. Only if 
recipient countries in the developing world adopted ‘appropriate’ macroeconomic 
policies would the international donor community be under any obligation to deliver 
on its aid commitments. Despite the gravity of the situation faced by the poorest 
countries and people groups in the developing world, any redistribution of wealth was 
to take place on these economic terms, and these terms alone, rather than any moral 
or humanitarian obligation on the part of the rich countries in the global North.  
 
The priority that these economic concerns were afforded over the moral impulse that 
New Labour officials claimed elsewhere was reflected in the design of the IFF itself. 
Although its projected ability to raise US$50 billion in aid enabled government 
ministers to talk about meeting ‘the moral challenge’ of poverty, the Facility itself was 
clearly hard-wired into addressing the ‘economic’ imperative of development. Like the 
IDTF before it, the IFF would not become a ‘new’ aid agency with a new set of criteria. 
Rather, it would continue to disburse money through “existing development agencies” 
and “effective bilateral and multilateral mechanisms”.68 This was significant since it 
appealed directly to the market-orientated expectations of these particular 
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constituencies, by assimilating the neoliberal ideas and the practices of these 
institutions into the design of the IFF. In a clear endorsement of the current practice of 
aid disbursement, particularly by the IFIs, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 
Stephen Timms justified the use of these arrangements as being “tried, tested and 
shown to be effective”.69  
 
Particularly under the terms of the old ‘Washington Consensus’, this approach to aid 
had attracted a great deal of criticism from large parts of civil society, a number of 
Labour backbenchers as well as rank-and-file party members. In spite of these 
criticisms however, neither New Labour officials nor the proposals for the IFF itself 
neither conceived of the need nor the possibility to reform these existing institutional 
arrangements. As John Healey, the Economic Secretary at the Treasury remarked, “the 
International Finance Facility would not impose new conditions on recipient 
countries”.70 Instead, the finance raised and disbursed through the IFF would remain at 
the discretion of the donor. Funds would be allocated “by each donor to its choice of 
country and delivery channel”.71 Despite many donors (including Britain) reneging on 
their aid commitments in the past, the onus remained firmly upon the developing 
country creating “a good policy environment” where this aid could be “used most 
effectively”.72  
 
The IFF was proposed under a series of headlines announcing a ‘doubling of aid to 
halve poverty’ and a commitment to spend US$500 billion over the course of the next 
ten years. These were clearly designed to appeal to civil society constituencies ranging 
from faith groups, NGOs and members of the Labour Party who had pressed the New 
Labour government into taking greater action over global poverty and spending more 
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on overseas aid. In the midst of these bold projections however, the Treasury also 
sought to reassure the altogether more market-based constituencies of the economic 
credibility of the IFF. When addressing the former, New Labour championed the 
Facility as an ‘innovative’ mechanism which could solve the chronic shortfall in 
overseas aid and finance the means by which developing countries could grow and lift 
themselves out of poverty.  
 
At the same time however, the IFF was also talked about as a means of stabilising 
“already shock-prone economies”.73 The importance that Treasury officials afforded to 
macroeconomic stability is explored in greater detail in chapter 5, but what is 
significant here is the way in which the Facility was also presented to international 
financial constituencies as a tool for promoting the stability of aid flows, sound 
macroeconomic management, and creating the right conditions to attract foreign 
investment. This would suggest that what underpinned New Labour’s commitment to 
tackling poverty and increasing aid through the IFF was not principally a moral 
concern, but rather a means to stabilise the global economy and institutionalise 
market-led growth in these developing countries. This rather undermined the claims 
made concerning the moral leadership demonstrated by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown 
over this issue. That the IFF was shaped by largely economic imperatives, rather than 
any distinctly ethical mandate, reveals the character of New Labour’s aid policy during 
this particular phase of government.  
 
New Labour and the Language of ‘Rights and Responsibilities’: Explaining  
the Conditionality of the IFF 
One reading of New Labour’s conditionality policies and the way in which the 
Treasury’s proposals were pitched to economic and political constituencies, would 
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suggest that they emerged out of an increased assimilation with the IFIs in Washington 
and elsewhere. That New Labour almost blindly followed the practices of these 
institutions and simply incorporated these into its own development policies. This 
rather simplistic reading however not only ignores the agency of national government 
actors, but crucially misses the antecedent that New Labour had itself set through its 
own welfare policies at home. The conditionality that was strongly evident in this 
particular phase of development policy overseas borrowed extensively from the 
concept of ‘rights and responsibilities’ that government ministers had used at home to 
underpin its strategy for lifting individuals out of welfare (for which read, aid) and into 
the world of work and global markets. Although there was a clear difference in the 
substantive content of these obligations that both these sets of recipients were 
required to adhere to, these conditions – or moreover, these responsibilities – shared 
a character which reflected the putative demands upon both the state and the 
individual that globalisation was understood to have invoked. As I argued in chapter 2, 
both at home and abroad, government officials understood the changing strategic 
context of globalisation to have necessitated a qualitatively new way of approaching 
and responding to policy issues and challenges.  
 
It was Hilary Benn who explicitly transposed New Labour’s domestic rhetoric of ‘rights 
and responsibilities’ into the arena of international development. The Secretary of 
State argued that “development aid should be about a wider, longer term global 
interest” and this principle “should govern the rights and responsibilities of states in 
this interdependent international community”.74 However, the strong element of 
conditionality evident in the Treasury’s IFF proposals demonstrated what these rights, 
and in particular, what these responsibilities looked like in practice. Indeed, Gordon 
Brown’s ‘global compact’ between rich and poor countries was based upon this 
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relationship between the rights and the responsibilities of developing countries as 
recipients of aid. The Chancellor deemed it essential for developing countries to 
pursue “anti-corruption, pro-stability [policies] to enable them properly to participate 
in the world economy”.75 Both at home and abroad, these policy narratives revealed 
the importance that New Labour placed upon recipient ‘responsibility’ as a means of 
encouraging increased integration into the global economy.   
 
Fig. 7.4  Phases 1 and 2: the IDTF and the IFF  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strikingly – but perhaps not surprisingly – little mention was made in any of the 
numerous draft proposals of the IFF or the speeches made in support of the Facility of 
the responsibilities that donors themselves had in this mechanism. The Chancellor 
appealed for rich countries to increase the amount of aid they gave to the developing 
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world, yet only a handful had so far demonstrated the necessary political will to do so. 
Since 1970, many donors had simply shirked their own responsibilities and pledge to 
meet the 0.7 percent/GDP target. This left the demands of the ‘compact’ between the 
global North and South resting far more heavily upon the shoulders of the latter. 
Rather than redressing this imbalance, New Labour chose to frame the IFF in terms of 
‘global inclusion’, and to prioritise this particular imperative over more pressing – and 
more traditionally, Labourite – concerns such as inequality and social justice. Like the 
wider ‘new international economic architecture’, explored in chapter 5, in which the 
IFF would be animated, the Facility became a means of imposing a series of market-
based responsibilities upon the recipients of this global welfare – a point reflected in 
Fig. 7.4 – with the designated outcome of integrating individual citizens and 
developing countries alike into the global economy. 
    
Phase 3:  The International Finance Facility for Immunisation    
Despite extensive promotion by government ministers both at home and abroad, most 
notably in the report published by the Commission for Africa,76 and in the lead-up to 
and during the 2005 G8 summit in Gleneagles, the IFF as a mechanism for delivering 
increased aid to the developing world was actually dropped by Treasury officials 
shortly after. A failure to convince Britain’s key allies in the G8, most notably the 
United States, of the viability of the IFF, left the Treasury without the political and 
economic support it needed to be successfully implemented. Unperturbed by this 
setback, Treasury officials instead set about exploring the possibility of extending the 
‘frontloading’ principles of the IFF to more specific areas of development, such as 
water and sanitation,77 climate change,78 and children’s health. It was the latter – 
through became what known as the International Financial Facility for Immunisation 
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(IFFIm) – that New Labour set about convincing the international community as to the 
feasibility of the ‘frontloading’ principles as a means of financing the scaling-up of 
access to life-saving vaccines, specifically for children living in the developing world.  
 
The potential for an IFFIm had actually been suggested as early as 2004. Government 
officials noted that such an initiative could “send signals to the manufacturers of 
vaccines to increase production and encourage new investments, as well as providing 
greater predictability and security of funds to countrywide immunisation systems”.79 
Sticking closely to the Treasury’s design for the original IFF, the IFFIm was to be 
operationalised by “converting long-term aid commitments from donors into 
frontloaded resources for immunisation”.80 The first tranche of finance would be used 
to purchase vaccines and other essential medicines, and disbursed over a ten-year 
period.81 DFID ministers claimed that these vaccinations could save an additional 5 
million children’s lives in the years to 2015,82 and over time, enable “over 500 million 
people” to be vaccinated across the developing world.83  
 
The actual design of the IFFIm held a great deal in common with the earlier IFF model 
proposed by the Treasury. No more clearly was this demonstrated than in the 
component of ‘borrowing to invest’, and the use of international capital markets to 
raise the finance necessary to buy in large quantities the life-saving vaccinations, 
suitably modified for use in tropical regions. These aspects of the IFFIm were to be 
achieved by giving market actors a key role to play in the raising of this finance. 
Arguably the most important of these actors was the World Bank, which through its 
Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships (CFGP) division was appointed to act as 
                                                             
79
 DFID (2004c: 33) 
80
 Balls (2006b)  
81
 Thomas (2005b)  
82
 Lewis (2005a) 
83
 Foster (2009)  
 
383 
the Treasury Manager for the IFFIm.84  The remit of the CFGP would include 
responsibility for the funding the IFFIm receives from capital markets, the 
management of risk, and donor co-ordination. The CFGP would also work closely with 
the credit-rating agencies to maintain the AAA rating that the IFFIm bonds needed to 
ensure the ongoing commercial attraction of these bonds to investors.  
 
The CFGP designated the leading investment banks, Deutsche Bank and Goldman 
Sachs to manage the first IFFIm bond issue in November 2006. Priced comparably to 
other sovereign and supranational issuers, the IFFIm bonds were subsequently 
purchased by central banks, fund managers, and insurance companies,85 raising US$1 
billion.86 Although this inaugural bond issue represented just a fraction of the US$50 
billion that the Treasury hoped that the original IFF would raise on an annual basis, this 
money was nevertheless able to be used primarily by the GAVI Alliance (formerly 
known as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation) to finance the purchasing 
of vaccines from pharmaceutical firms on behalf of poor countries, administer 
immunisation programmes, and support healthcare systems in the developing world. 
This process would create the appropriate market conditions and incentivise the 
pharmaceutical firms to invest in the research of vaccine technology and produce 
drugs suitable for use in tropical and ostensibly ‘less-profitable’ regions of the world.  
 
In this respect, the IFFIm formed part of New Labour’s broader commitment to 
increase access to medicines in the developing world (on which, see chapter 6) by 
creating the right market conditions for investment by pharmaceutical firms. It would 
also incentivise these firms into developing paediatric formulations of vaccines to 
protect against diseases commonly found in developing areas. This reinforced both the 
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‘demand’ and ‘supply’-side strategies that government officials had come to recognise 
as being integral elements in the increase of access to vaccines and medicines in the 
developing world. As I have previously remarked, an overriding responsibility to the 
expectations of shareholder and a lack of profitability in poor country markets had 
tended to deter a lot of pharmaceutical firms from investing in the research and 
development of medicines needed in the developing world. Where medicines had 
been made available, countries in these poorer regions were often unable to afford 
these treatments and frequently lacked the infrastructure to administer these 
medicines effectively.  
 
In policy terms, the IFFIm revealed what the Treasury under New Labour actually 
meant when it spoke about ‘borrowing to invest’, particularly within the international 
arena. The IFFIm a mechanism for long-term borrowing designed to be embedded 
within a matrix of global market actors. For the IFFIm to work as policy officials 
envisioned, the Facility needed to be calibrated in order to meet the expectations of 
these particular actors. For this to occur however, New Labour officials clearly deemed 
it necessary to hand over all control of the Facility to IFIs and other economic actors 
that it deemed better placed to credibly deliver its own policy outcomes. The early 
performance and potential of the IFFIm (illustrated in Fig. 7.5) went a long way in 
vindicating this decision and enabled Treasury and DFID ministers to claim New 
Labour’s continued commitment to global social justice.87  
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Fig. 7.5 The Achievements and the Potential of the IFFIm since 2006 
 
What the IFFIm has already achieved:  
 
 The immunisation of more than 100 million children under the age 
of five against polio 
 
 194 million children in 32 developing countries immunised with a 
measles vaccine   
 
 14.5 million children vaccinated against Hepatitis B 
 
 4.4 million children vaccinated against yellow fever  
 
What the IFFIm could yet still achieve:  
 
 The targeting of 26 million women living in developing countries 
with immunisation against maternal and neonatal tetanus 
 
 The support of vaccine security and affordability, and the 
prevention of approximately 687,000 deaths up to the year 2050 
 
The ‘headline message’ of these achievements that New Labour ministers sought to 
get across was that specifically-targeted aid works. Allocated and disbursed through a 
private, carefully monitored mechanism such as GAVI, aid could make a huge 
difference to the lives of millions across the developing world. Despite these successes 
however, a question clearly remained however over how much of a distinctly social 
democratic identity there was, both in New Labour’s domestic and international 
development policies. Despite the initial success of the IFFIm, the moral basis of the 
IFFIm was subsumed by the market-based expectations of a powerful set of 
international economic constituencies. The interests of patients in the developing 
world would continue to be secondary to meeting the expectations of these 
constituencies. Given this policy success, pragmatists might be forgiven for asking why 
this was such a problem. After all, as many, particularly at the heart of the New Labour 
project argued, ‘what matters is what works’. Such an assessment however would be 
to miss what really is at stake here. If it was indeed private markets and investors who 
were raising this finance, even for a policy objective as admirable as increasing the 
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number of children receiving vaccinations and/or scaling-up access to essential 
medicines, these actors – quite understandably – would nevertheless still want to 
know where their money is going and what it is being spent on. Followed to its logical 
conclusion, it would be these market actors, rather than the developing countries 
themselves, who would hold the final say in how and where treatments in poor 
countries were to be distributed.  
 
This market-based logic is particularly evident during a period of financial uncertainty 
and economic recession. Such a scenario unfolded and overshadowed New Labour’s 
final few years in office, making market actors – and concomitantly, political actors too 
– even more risk-averse in their behaviour. The main response to the financial 
difficulties that the New Labour government faced during this time at home, was to 
increase public borrowing in order to stabilising the ailing banking sector and 
stimulating aggregate demand in the slowing British economy. Abroad however, New 
Labour’s fiscal policy had the effect of downgrading Britain’s sovereign AAA-rating that 
as Chancellor, Brown had argued was an important component of the IFF proposals. If 
the markets were to remain convinced of the long-term viability of the IFFIm, it was 
essential that Britain’s own level of borrowing was kept in-check and that the New 
Labour government pursued what the markets considered to be a credible set of 
spending plans. 
 
Although Gordon Brown’s government remained “committed to fulfilling its pledge to 
dedicate 0.7 per cent of its gross national income to development by 2013”, it argued 
that “government spending on its own will not be enough”.88 Instead, a much greater 
emphasis needed to be placed upon sources of private finance and entrepreneurship. 
This was significant since it reinforced the view held by New Labour officials that 
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private finance and entrepreneurial activity in developing countries would not occur if 
recipient governments did not pursue the same sort of market-orientated policies that 
encouraged this type of economic activity in the first place. Therefore, although all 
reference to the conditionalities that underpinned the previous IFF proposals had all 
but disappeared from the speeches made by New Labour ministers during this phase 
of policy, the emphasis upon the private sector meant that these conditions remained 
implicit. Without these types of policies in place, the aid necessary to finance the 
development that New Labour clearly remained in favour of, would not be 
forthcoming. This shift in government policy suggested that if spending on 
development could no longer come from governments – particularly in an era of 
financial uncertainty and belt-tightening – it would be necessary to look to the private 
sector in order to fill this gap.  
 
This particular move is also significant since it reveals New Labour’s assessment of the 
role that the state should play in the delivery of forms of welfare both at home and 
abroad. Continuing the transmission of its welfare policies into the framework of the 
IFF, and in particular the responsibilities that recipients had in order to receive this 
assistance, New Labour understood the state to be one of enablement rather than a 
direct provider of services. This was in stark contrast to ‘old’ Labour which had been 
concerned with what it provided as a government; its outcomes – for instance, a 
universal health service, extensive welfare provision and a large public sector. For New 
Labour, the focus was upon the means, and the effectiveness of these in meeting the 
Party’s overarching commitment to social justice. As in other parts of its political 
economy, both at home and abroad, New Labour officials argued that what was 
important was the effectiveness of policies and how services were delivered. More 
often than not, this was understood to be best achieved through the innovation, 
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entrepreneurialism and cost-effectiveness found in the private sector. Insofar as 
overseas development aid was concerned, DFID emphasised the importance of private 
sector funding in its fourth White Paper. It set out an objective to:  
 
Use innovative ways of working with the private sector to help meet 
financing gaps and to secure better performance, value for money 
and investment. A good example is our support to innovative 
financing in health…through an expanded International Finance 
Facility for Immunisation.89  
 
New Labour was clearly committed to the principle of global healthcare and increased 
aid in the developing world. In achieving this particular set of policy objectives, officials 
in Whitehall considered it necessary to underpin its own development aid programme 
through a series of market arrangements. Although identified by officials as the most 
efficient means of raising finance for example, this strategy nevertheless orientated 
policy towards the expectations of market investors rather than those living in 
developing countries. Periods of recession and market uncertainty tend to reinforce 
this shift in expectations since they draw the emphasis and the focus of these policies 
away from the policy outcome itself towards the means by which these policies are 
achieved. The same is true of forms of direct government spending. Where there is 
pressure over government spending increases, policies become less about the 
outcome and more about meeting the economic – and indeed, electoral – mandate of 
cost reduction and effectiveness, and the maintaining of ‘sound’ public finances. 
Indeed, the Secretary of State of International Development, Douglas Alexander 
believed that:  
 
The British people would expect efficiency savings in a department 
that received such a generous increase of resources in the 
Comprehensive Spending Review. They have the right to know that 
their money is being well spent on their behalf, and the nature of 
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DFID’s work does not, and should not, exempt us from such 
scrutiny.90  
 
Alexander was “determined that the government’s aid, whether bilateral or 
multilateral, should aim to deliver maximum impact and represent value for money”.91 
It is this imperative however that appeared to have become the principal focus of New 
Labour’s aid programme. Although officials continued to talk about the importance of 
aid in poverty reduction strategies, there continued to be restraint in how this money 
should be spent, and the channels through which it should be raised. For both private 
and public forms of aid, the issue therefore became less about what New Labour was 
spending aid money on, but whether it was cost-effective to or indeed worthwhile to 
do so in the first place. 
 
Fig. 7.6  Phases 1, 2 and 3: the IDTF, the IFF and the IFFIm 
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The initial results of the IFFIm do make for impressive reading and, as Fig. 7.6 shows 
there was a discernible shift towards social outcomes and the expectations of ‘social’ 
constituencies and healthcare providers such as GAVI who were responsible for the 
disbursement of the money raised by the IFFIm. However, the design and the 
fundamental principles of the IFFIm mean that problems potentially lie in wait for the 
Facility, post-New Labour, and particularly whilst financial uncertainty remains in the 
British and the wider global economy. For as long as private market actors and other 
investors remain unconvinced by the long-term viability of the mechanism, and 
whether or not the bonds raised by donors will in fact be repaid, the policy outcomes 
of increased immunisation programmes across the developing world that the IFFIm 
promises remain under threat. The moral thrust of what New Labour tried to achieve 
through the IFFIm cannot be disputed. Its means of achieving this however, merely 
prioritised and reinforced the market-based expectations of private actors over the 
health and the well-being of those living in the developing world. For this reason alone, 
the IFFIm cannot be judged to be a complete success.  
 
Conclusions  
The purpose of this chapter has been to assess the character of New Labour’s clear 
commitment to increase the level of Britain’s overseas development aid through three 
closely interrelated policy mechanisms; the IDTF, the IFF, and the IFFIm. Throughout 
each of these three phases of policy, New Labour transposed various policies and 
narratives from its domestic political economy to meet this aid commitment. From the 
Treasury’s proposals for a CTF, its ‘golden rules’ concerning borrowing and spending, 
to New Labour’s broader welfare policies and emphasis it placed upon private finance 
to fund public projects, these themes and cognitive ideas were writ large over this 
particular aspect of the government’s international development policies.  
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The internationalisation of these various domestic policy ideas into Britain’s aid 
programme under New Labour raises broader normative questions for Whitehall 
officials to consider. What I have sought to show in this chapter is that the 
transmission of themes and policy ideas designed initially for domestic consumption 
reveals a great deal about New Labour’s assessment of wider issues such as equality in 
an era of globalisation, the role of the state in an increasingly global economy, and the 
extent to which development policy should be led by, and orientated towards the 
expectations of market actors. The language of ‘rights and responsibility’ that was a 
dominant theme of New Labour’s welfare policies at home prioritised inclusion into 
this global economy over more traditionally social democratic concerns such as 
equality. This shift in emphasis was evident both at home and abroad. Just as at home 
recipients of welfare were disciplined into taking up a series of duties that would 
prepare them for the demands of the global economy, the aid that the IFF promised to 
deliver would also be conditional upon developing countries opening up and 
orientating their economies to meet the challenges of globalisation. Officials both in 
Whitehall and Washington argued that increased market openness, trade liberalisation 
and investor-friendly policies would not only enable these developing countries to 
meet the challenges of globalisation but take what was ‘the only’ route out of poverty.  
 
To its credit, New Labour continued to retain a clear commitment to the redistribution 
of wealth. However, these duties and obligations signalled a significant change in 
emphasis. Wealth redistribution would no longer be based upon the immediate needs 
of the poor, but the extent to which recipients of this welfare were prepared to 
participate and become integrated within an increasingly global society. What this new 
form of wealth redistribution looked like in practice was a weakening of the duties and 
the responsibilities that the donor community had in the delivery of aid to the 
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developing world, to complete and reinforce New Labour’s own discursive shift from 
‘equality’ to ‘inclusion’.  
 
Within this strategic context of globalisation, New Labour viewed the role of the state 
as one of ‘enablement’ rather than ‘provider’. Again, this was reflected initially at 
home through the Treasury’s CTF, and welfare policies which were designed as tools to 
equip individuals with the finance and the skills to participate in the global economy. 
This discourse of ‘enablement’ however also framed the way in which policy was 
formulated. The state should ‘enable’, rather than simply ‘provide’ the best possible 
delivery of policy outcomes by putting in place the most cost-effective structures. For 
both the IFF and the IFFIm, market structures were deemed to provide the most 
efficient way of raising the finance that was urgently required to scale-up levels of aid 
and to fund vaccination programmes in the developing world. The initial achievements 
of the IFFIm were certainly impressive. However, there was a clear sense, from the 
policy statements and speeches of Whitehall ministers, that these achievements 
justified the means, that the real priority of government spending in this area was 
cost-effectiveness and a fiduciary responsibility to the British taxpayer. These reasons 
however undermined any real moral commitment that New Labour might have 
claimed for its continued pledge to increase overseas aid spending. Instead, these 
financial and electoral reasons led to a prioritisation of the expectations of market-
based actors over the more immediate needs of those living in the developing world.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusions: Exporting the Political Economy 
of New Labour from Whitehall to the World  
 
In concluding the thesis, I return to the research questions laid out in chapter 1, and 
review firstly, the extent to which New Labour’s domestic political economy was 
transposed abroad to meet its commitment to international development, and 
secondly, the constituencies that were incorporated at each phase of policy. In 
addressing both these questions I explore the processes of change that these policies, 
and New Labour’s political economy more broadly speaking, underwent during its time 
in office.  
 
This chapter proceeds in three parts. I begin by reviewing the first half of the thesis in 
which I conceptualised the political economy of New Labour in the light of its 
commitment to international development. For the second part, I return to the central 
claim of the research: that New Labour took elements of its domestic political 
economy and applied them to fit the concerns of the developing world. To do this, I 
use as my template the diagram mapped out in Fig. 1.2. Here however I extend this 
original diagram by illustrating not simply the different phases of New Labour’s 
international development policies as they unfolded over time, but crucially, their 
relationship with the timing and the trajectory of those policies identified in chapter 2 
that Whitehall officials had designed for domestic consumption. This leads me in the 
third part of this chapter to offer an analysis of the government’s accommodation of 
the core market constituencies, and the processes of change that were evident here in 
the orientation of New Labour’s political economy. These lines of enquiry lead me to 
offer an assessment concerning the character of New Labour’s international 
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development and the likelihood of success in this area of policy. 
 
Conceptualising the Political Economy of New Labour and its Approach to  
International Development 
Chapter 2 opened with an assessment of globalisation as the dominant leitmotif of 
New Labour’s political economy. The global economy served as the strategic context 
upon which policy decisions were taken and strategies were formed, and the processes 
of globalisation shaped the conduct of officials. The way in which this discourse shaped 
policy however was far from linear. At home, globalisation was, to varying degrees, 
understood as a ‘constraint’ upon policy. Abroad however, and within the realm of 
international development, it was presented largely as an ‘opportunity’. However, 
upon closer reading of even this particular discourse, this was an opportunity that 
could only be realised by working within the parameters of the constraints imposed by 
globalisation. In conceptualising New Labour’s discourse of globalisation, ‘constraint’ 
and ‘opportunity’ can be treated as two sides of the same coin; two ‘faces’ that are 
fused together.  
 
New Labour’s discourse of globalisation was evident throughout its domestic political 
economy and in each of the areas of policy that the second chapter proceeded to 
explore. Placing considerable evidence upon ‘stability’, ‘openness’ and ‘transparency’, 
and institutionalising a series of rules and standards to ensure ‘market credibility’, the 
Treasury’s new economic and financial architecture was designed to navigate Britain 
successfully through the global economy. Similarly, New Labour’s rebranding as the 
new ‘party of business’ was derived from its understanding of globalisation. Officials 
argued that Britain could no longer compete in terms of its declining manufacturing 
base. In order to be successful in the global economy, Britain needed a strong 
‘knowledge economy’. The welfare state under New Labour also underwent significant 
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change as a result of the constraints that globalisation was understood to impose upon 
governments and electorates alike. Such constraints brought about a change in 
discourse and policy, with imperatives of ‘opportunity’, ‘inclusion’ and ‘responsibility’ 
replacing Labour’s own traditional values of ‘redistribution’, ‘equality’ and ‘rights’. 
Each of these areas of domestic policy would reappear and be transposed in the three 
international development policies explored later in the thesis.  
 
The role that New Labour saw for itself in the developing world did not exist in a 
vacuum. Indeed the relationship between the Labour Party and the developing world 
stretched back over much of the Party’s history. In chapter 3 the attention of the thesis 
turned to the Party’s longstanding commitment to matters of global poverty. Placing 
this commitment in an altogether more historical context, this chapter highlighted the 
patterns of change and continuity between ‘old’ and New Labour. Over the post-war 
period, the Party underwent a distinct shift away from an explicitly ‘socialist’ set of 
development policies towards a strategy that was orientated specifically towards 
meeting the broadly ‘economic’ expectations of market constituencies. This is not to 
say that New Labour shed completely its moral commitment to those living in the 
developing world. However, the period of transformation that the Party had 
undergone during the late 1980s and into the 1990s did result in a number of tensions 
in the political economy of Labour’s new international development strategy. 
 
It would be the Treasury, with a newly defined role at the heart of Whitehall, whose 
responsibility it would be to resolve these tensions and manage the expectations of 
different policy constituencies across what I have labelled the ‘market’/’social’ divide. 
As I demonstrated in chapter 4, the Chancellor Gordon Brown and his chief economic 
advisor, Ed Balls set about designing a model of political economy that would give New 
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Labour the credibility with international finance markets necessary to deliver its social 
goals both at home and abroad. In order to placate the perceived interests embedded 
in those markets, institutional reforms were undertaken to the Treasury and in the 
Bank of England in particular. The resulting policymaking apparatus gave Brown an 
unprecedented degree of power across Whitehall, and enabled the Treasury to 
become the pilot agency of New Labour’s political economy. No more keenly was this 
influence felt than in DFID where Brown was able to realise his own personal 
commitment to the developing world. Despite the independence that DFID was 
afforded on New Labour’s arrival into power, this department became, in effect, the 
‘development arm’ of the Treasury. What is more, the Treasury’s influence did not 
stop at Whitehall. Brown’s position as Chairman of the powerful IMFC in Washington 
gave him considerable influence within the corridors of the World Bank and the IMF 
too. This led to a ‘locking-in’ of New Labour’s political economy within the nébuleuse of 
these IFIs; a factor crucial in the ‘internationalisation’ of the New Labour project. 
 
The second part of chapter 4 identified and mapped out the different constituencies 
who sought to engage with the government – and indeed with whom the government 
sought to engage – over issues relating to global poverty. Although the expectations of 
these constituencies would be assessed in the case study chapters that would follow, it 
was clear even from this initial exercise that not all these constituencies could be 
assimilated into the government’s policymaking process. Some would inevitably be 
prioritised over others. The point of policy transmission is instructive here for if there 
was a distinct transposition of New Labour’s domestic policies into its international 
development policies, then it is likely that the government would give precedence to 
those constituencies it had supported at home. Gauging the degree of this 
transmission provides considerable analytical purchase for me to make clear claims 
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concerning the character of New Labour’s political economy both at home and abroad.  
 
The Transmission of Policy from the Domestic to the International Political  
Economy of New Labour 
In Fig 1.2, I mapped out how each of the three policy areas that I would go on to 
explore in the case study chapters, could be divided up into three distinct phases. This 
demonstrated schematically where these policies sat in relation to one another, and 
the ‘point of transition’ at which there was a clear shift from one phase to another.  
Here, my focus was upon the lines of policy transmission that were evident between 
the domestic and international aspects of New Labour’s political economy.  
 
As both my case study chapters and Fig. 8.1 suggests, there was a strong degree of 
transmission between the two domains. All of the policies constructed at home for 
domestic consumption pre-dated the emergence of New Labour’s international 
development policies. Even where the chart appears to show the formation of New 
Labour’s ‘new global financial architecture’ emerging at the same time as the building 
of a similar architecture at home, my analysis in chapters 2 and 4 reveals that 
proposals for the latter were being put together in the early to mid-1990s when Ed 
Balls became Brown’s Economic Advisor. The IDTF emerged at around the same time 
as proposals were being mooted within the Treasury for a CTF at home. While the IDTF 
was quickly replaced by the IFF, the CTF remained a core part of the asset-based 
welfare strategy adopted by the New Labour government in the latter part of its time 
in office.  
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 Fig. 8.1 From Whitehall to the World: The Transmission of New Labour’s Political Economy into the Realm of International Development, 1997–
2010 
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A number of initial observations are striking. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly in 
terms of the overall claims of the thesis, is the extent to which the themes that were so 
central to New Labour’s political economy at home were incorporated into its 
international development policies abroad. There was, as I noted in chapter 2, a clear 
understanding amongst New Labour officials that in an era of globalisation, the lines 
between national and international policymaking had become increasingly blurred. By 
linking this observation with the trends evident in this chart, evidence is provided not only 
of the degree to which officials in Whitehall internalised the logic of globalisation, but 
crucially the terms upon which this occurred. Despite its different discourses, globalisation 
was understood as necessitating a specific set of policy responses. Policies relied upon 
‘constraint’ on the part of governments and ‘responsibilities’ on the part of citizens in 
order to deliver the ‘opportunities’ that globalisation promised. Those themes and 
commitments that remained fixed throughout New Labour’s time in government 
represented the policies that were understood to be the only game in town in terms of 
responding to globalisation. Emphases may, as they did here, go through ‘phases’ at the 
micro-level in terms of specific policy commitments but it is the character of these 
broader themes that reveals arguably the most about New Labour’s political economy. 
The ongoing themes here were designed clearly to maintain the stability that investors 
and other market constituencies wished to see.  
 
In terms of the specific policy strategies deployed by New Labour, there was also a clear 
degree of policy transmission. I shall review each of the case study chapters in turn to 
assess in strictly empirical terms the claims I made in the opening part of the thesis 
concerning the ‘internationalisation’ of New Labour’s aspects of domestic political 
economy, and the accommodation of constituency expectations, both of which occurred 
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over time. Appropriately, the first of these case studies, in chapter 5, explored the first of 
many forays into international development made by New Labour. The response of the 
Blair government – and the Treasury in particular – to the issue of developing world debt 
provided an early opportunity to showcase its model of political economy on the global 
stage. It would be a response framed within ‘a new global financial architecture’, a 
framework based upon macroeconomic stability, market liberalism, economic growth, 
fiscal discipline and anti-inflationary policies; the very same framework that New Labour 
officials had sought to create at home. This new architecture would underpin the reform 
of the pre-existing HIPC initiative, the MDRI and attempt to put heavily indebted poor 
countries on the path to debt sustainability, long-term economic growth and 
development. Although clearly designed to appeal to market constituencies, these policies 
were described by officials as being ‘pro-poor’. This provides an interesting insight into 
how New Labour conceived development. Development – like Britain’s own economic 
success – could only be achieved, it said, through market-led growth and high levels of 
investment. To attract this investment however, New Labour believed that national 
economic policies had to be orientated towards the demands of global capital. Failure to 
attract this investment and deliver the growth necessary to development would preclude 
HIPCs from making the necessary social investments in healthcare, education, 
infrastructure and job creation. As the Chancellor had attempted to do at home, there 
was to be a distinct ‘socialisation’ of New Labour’s international economic policy.  
 
This understanding of development dovetailed with that held by the Washington-based 
IFIs who viewed poverty reduction in largely economic terms. For New Labour however, 
the ‘socialisation of economic policy’ enabled the Chancellor in his many speeches to the 
‘social’ constituencies who viewed development as a moral, rather than a purely 
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economic issue, to present his policies as being ‘pro-poor’. Despite what was, on the part 
of the Chancellor, a clear understanding of, and indeed sympathy towards the way in 
which these issues were framed by civil society, New Labour’s debt relief strategy 
remained orientated towards meeting the expectations of these ‘economic’ 
constituencies and embedded within the existing structures of global finance. Rather than 
representing any real break from the market dogma that ‘old’ Labour had frequently 
criticised the IFIs for championing, New Labour’s response to debt relief virtually mirrored 
the policies endorsed by the IMF and the World Bank. Crucially, despite a clear 
acknowledgement of the moral argument in favour of debt forgiveness, which was voiced 
so eloquently by church groups and NGOs, New Labour lacked the courage to carry these 
demands to where they needed to be heard the most. Instead, New Labour chose the 
‘safe’ option, choosing, in Paul Williams’ memorable terms, to be ‘reformist rather than 
revolutionary’. Yet in doing so, the government limited the prospects for real change that 
deeper and more extensive levels of debt relief could have had for the millions living in 
some of the poorest countries in the developing world. 
 
Having already explored in chapter 2 the discourse of ‘constraint’ that New Labour 
officials articulated at home, the case study in chapter 6 demonstrated the effects of such 
logic on the delivery of its international development policies abroad. New Labour was 
keen to maintain the global competitiveness of Britain through support of the ‘knowledge 
economy’, at the heart of which was the pharmaceutical industry. However, it was also 
committed to increasing the provision of and access to antiretroviral drugs in order to 
combat HIV and AIDS in the developing world. The failure of the former to invest 
adequately into the research and the delivery of these drugs had contributed to the 
worsening crisis. It was therefore vitally important that these firms stepped up their 
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efforts and realised their obligations as providers of public health. The however presented 
New Labour with a dilemma: whether to continue to pursue the close relationship with 
the pharmaceutical industry that officials saw as being vital for Britain’s ongoing 
competitiveness or whether to demand, by intervening in their research agendas, to urge 
firms to take more seriously their moral responsibilities to the developing world. Over 
three phases of policy, government ministers attempted a combination of different 
demand and supply-side policies as a means of incentivising these firms to take the 
necessary action.  
 
As New Labour’s strategy unfolded, a series of different and often seemingly contradictory 
policy messages emerged. Although the focus of this policy commitment slowly converged 
towards an accepted recognition of the need for greater antiretroviral provision, New 
Labour’s strategy remained predicated upon the accommodation of the pharmaceutical 
industry and its expectations in the delivery of these life-saving drugs. One reading of this 
would be that this was simply New Labour, as it had done elsewhere in its political 
economy, using new means to meet old values. However, the extent to which the 
expectations of pharmaceutical firms and their shareholders were prioritised over the 
desperate plight faced by the world’s poor clearly undermined any real moral 
commitment. New Labour did not necessarily have to be ‘anti-business’ to realise these 
aims. However, government officials could have engaged far more with what I have called 
the ‘social’ constituencies and supported those within the pharmaceutical industry, both 
in Britain and further afield, who were attempting to address the crisis and make universal 
access to these drugs a reality. Engagement with these more ‘socially-orientated’ 
constituencies would have enabled the government to meet far more effectively its 
commitment to increasing access to these essential medicines. 
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The third and final case study chapter returned to the issue of financing for development. 
Whilst in office, New Labour displayed a clear commitment to meeting, and indeed 
exceeding the 0.7 percent/GDP aid target. However, of even more pressing concern to the 
Chancellor was the shortfall of US$50 billion that was required to meet the MDGs by 
2015. Therefore, although 0.7 percent/GDP remained the long-term benchmark, Brown 
maintained that it was vitally important that finance was frontloaded immediately to meet 
these international targets. Although this aid strategy would unfold again in three phases, 
it did so using three different policy mechanisms: the IDTF; the IFF; and the IFFIm. The first 
of these actually preceded the domestic equivalent, the CTF that was launched in January 
2005. This was based upon the idea of ‘asset-based welfare’, a qualitatively new form of 
welfare whereby recipients could be ‘taught’ financial awareness and principles of self-
investment. This initiative however lasted only a few months before being replaced with 
the far more robust IFF. The IFF drew upon several aspects of Treasury thinking from its 
carefully prepared, ‘golden’ rule concerning borrowing and spending to the use of private 
finance to fund public projects. The framework within which the IFF was situated was of a 
‘Global New Deal’ for the poor. Similar to the ‘New Deal’ launched at home by Gordon 
Brown, this new covenant between rich and poor countries underpinned the Chancellor’s 
commitment to ‘double aid to halve poverty’.  
 
Of the numerous domestic policy ideas that were incorporated into New Labour’s aid 
commitments, the principle of ‘rights and responsibilities’ was one that stood out the 
most. Under the terms of the IFF, aid would only be disbursed to those countries that 
were pursuing ‘pro-poor’ policies: that is, policies that were aligned with the ‘new’ 
macroeconomic architecture of stability, growth, market liberalisation and fiscal discipline. 
This raised two important issues, the first of which concerns the ‘new conditionality’ that 
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this framework implied. As I noted in chapter 3, ‘old’ Labour, along with several other 
constituencies from the ‘social’ camp, had voiced their disapproval and concern at the 
market-based conditionality that had been imposed upon developing countries as a result 
of SAPs during the 1980s and early 1990s. Here however, New Labour was guilty of the 
same practice. Although repackaged and presented as ‘pro-poor’ policies, countries were 
made to open up their markets and make their economies more attractive to international 
investors. Therefore, just as at home, where recipients of welfare were disciplined into 
fulfilling a strict set of criteria in order to receive benefits, so too were countries made to 
orientate their economies towards the demands of global capital. 
 
The second issue this raised related to Labour’s traditional emphasis upon equality. The 
language of ‘rights and responsibilities’ was deployed by senior New Labour officials to 
chide the old Left which they believed had placed too much emphasis upon ‘rights’ and 
not enough upon ‘duty’ and ‘responsibility’. Although officials did not dismiss equality out 
of hand, neither did they prioritise it. Instead, far greater emphasis was placed upon social 
and economic inclusion, particularly in the global economy, whereby if individuals took 
responsibility and made the most of the opportunities that globalisation presented to 
them, greater levels of inclusion and equality would follow. Neither aid nor welfare was to 
be a hammock, but a springboard towards increased prosperity and self-fulfilment. Of 
course, it would provide some degree of equality of opportunity, but this would still be 
predicated upon the recipient taking responsibility to make the most of this opportunity.  
 
The analysis of the IFFIm in the final phase of policy looked less at the issue of aid, and 
more in terms of the delivery of global public goods, and the respective roles of the state 
and the market had to play in this. As I noted in chapter 4, New Labour sought to create 
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what the World Bank had previously termed ‘the virtuous state’: a government that 
‘enabled’, rather than simply ‘provided’. For both the IFF and the IFFIm, the market and 
private actors were understood to be the most effective means of delivering policy 
outcomes. By contrast, the role of the government was to put in place the right 
framework to guarantee and securitise the money that needed to be raised. Certainly 
insofar as the early achievements of the IFFIm were concerned, this partnership enjoyed a 
great deal of success. This again gave New Labour considerable leverage when talking 
about its successes in this field to ‘socially-minded’ audiences. However, to audiences 
elsewhere, this policy was not pursued for any moral purpose. It was instead done for 
reasons of cost-effectiveness and fiduciary responsibility on behalf of the taxpayer. Put 
simply, the assumed expectations of financial and electoral constituencies were prioritised 
over the lives of those desperately in need of this assistance.  
 
Having reviewed the main analytical claim of the thesis, my attention now turns to the 
two supporting research questions set out in the opening chapter. I begin with the 
constituencies that were present (and indeed, left out) of the government’s policymaking 
process, before exploring the contingency of New Labour over time. This will enable me in 
the final section to offer a fuller characterisation of its political economy, both at home 
and abroad. This, I suggest, should be understood as the ultimate contribution of my 
thesis now that my analysis is at an end. 
 
Capturing and Characterising New Labour’s Changing Political Economy over  
Time 
As I remarked in the opening chapter, much of the New Labour literature has tended to 
characterise its political economy as being uniform and unchanging over time. However, 
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as I have demonstrated throughout the thesis, while there were themes that remained 
fairly constant during New Labour’s time in office, there was still far too much complexity 
present to formulate a linear account that one might be able to singularly read-off. No 
more clearly was this complexity evident than in the three empirical case studies that 
explored in depth New Labour’s response to the core policy areas of debt relief, HIV and 
AIDS, and overseas aid. As a means of exploring and understanding the full extent of this 
complexity, in this section I explore the pattern of New Labour’s international 
development policies as they evolved over time. To do this, I refer back to the charts in 
each of the case study chapters that illustrated the gradual changes that each of the 
policies underwent.  
 
Although uneven, arguably the most striking feature of these diagrams is the overall 
pattern that emerges over time of a clear commitment to delivering ‘social’ outcomes 
through ‘market’ means. In Fig. 8.2, the Treasury – taking the policy-lead over the issue of 
debt relief – positioned itself high up and just left of the central ‘market’ axis, suggesting a 
clear commitment to accommodating the exigencies of the market for the purposes of 
delivering greater levels of debt relief. The debate may well have been framed in moral 
terms, particularly to constituencies from within civil society located in the bottom left-
hand square, but it was not determined by these arguments. The debts of developing 
countries were to be written-off on economic terms rather than on the basis of any moral 
imperative. This placed the government therefore far closer to the IFIs than to the ‘social’ 
constituencies found to the left of the chart.  
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Fig. 8.2  Phase 1 of New Labour’s International Development Policies 
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Treasury show a clear accommodation of the pharmaceutical industry over any ‘social’ 
concerns that were being voiced by civil society. The role of civil society in this instance is 
striking because, generally, it wanted to see greater engagement with the pharmaceutical 
industry and for markets to work in the interests of the poor, hence the spread up the left-
hand side. What these constituencies did not want to see however was ‘business as usual’. 
Both equity and efficiency were important, they argued, but the former should be 
prioritised over the latter. In the minds of the ‘social’ constituencies this would ensure 
that those living in the developing world would have the same level of access to 
antiretrovirals as those living in the developed world.  
 
The IDTF is a slight anomaly in the analysis since no sooner had it been mooted as a 
possible means of delivering aid by the Treasury, it was discarded and replaced by the IFF. 
Making any direct comparisons between this particular policy and the previous two 
opening phases is therefore somewhat disingenuous. Nevertheless, it provides an early 
indication of New Labour’s commitment to deliver long-term aid in a way that facilitates 
financial self-actualisation at the expense of welfare dependency.  
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Fig. 8.3  Phase 2 of New Labour’s International Development Policies 
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global economic architecture, or through the introduction of supply-side reforms to 
incentivise the pharmaceutical industry to invest in the so-called ‘diseases of poverty’. 
Others, like the IFF used the market itself to raise the money required to meet the existing 
shortfall in development aid.  
 
Fig. 8.4  Phase 3 of New Labour’s International Development Policies 
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The third and final set of phases appeared to bolster New Labour’s commitment to social 
outcomes: of increased debt relief, improved access to antiretrovirals and immunisation 
and vaccine programmes in the developing world. Again however, they continued to 
reveal the continuing close relationship between New Labour and the various market 
constituencies. This left the altogether more ‘social’ constituencies on the periphery of the 
core policy network comprising of government actors and ‘market’ constituencies. 
Therefore, while the New Labour government may have moved towards reaching a more 
‘social’ set of outcomes, it did so through engagement and dialogue with other market 
constituencies rather than civil society. For its part, civil society remained relatively static 
in its expectations. Unlike, for instance, the pharmaceutical industry which did at least 
begin to signal its commitment to addressing the AIDS crisis, these ‘social’ constituencies 
showed little evidence of offering concessions over policy. This of course, is no bad thing 
per se. Indeed, it would suggest that these ‘social’ constituencies treated these issues as 
matters of (moral) principle rather than pragmatism. However, this position stood in stark 
contrast to the realpolitik in which the government either sought to or felt it had to 
undertake, through its iterative accommodation of ‘market’ constituencies over time.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The contingency of the different positions taken up by the Blair and Brown governments 
whilst in office does make characterising the political economy of the New Labour project 
problematic. Having taken this contingency into account however, a clear and altogether 
more accurate depiction of New Labour has emerged. Over time, the trajectory of New 
Labour’s international development policies moved towards the delivery of an altogether 
more ‘social’ set of outcomes whilst remaining wedded to accommodating the 
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expectations of the market. On the positive side, New Labour was successful in shifting 
the terms of the debate with other more ‘market’-orientated constituencies such as the 
IFIs and the pharmaceutical industry. However, this it did by prioritising these market-
based constituencies in the policy process.  
 
New Labour’s track-record with regards international development must be judged in the 
light of its domestic as well as international political economy. At home, New Labour went 
to great lengths to present itself as a ‘credible’ government; one that could be trusted to 
look after the economy, and act, as ‘the new party of business’ in the best interests of 
firms and their shareholders. New Labour’s credibility, carefully staked out by the 
Treasury, underpinned its commitment to matters of international development, and at 
the same time, enabled Gordon Brown in particular to transmit his model of political 
economy into the international realm. For New Labour, achieving this required a 
capitulation to the interests of global capital and assimilating market imperatives over any 
moral commitment to address poverty in the developing world. 
 
Of course, this is not to say that New Labour officials did not talk about the ‘moral 
imperative’. In fact, they did so frequently. It was often cited as the basis for New Labour’s 
intervention in the developing world, and enabled Blair and Brown to continue the 
illustrious lineage of Labour leaders, like Wilson, Callaghan and Smith who had been 
committed to tackling global poverty. New Labour ministers however, would be 
‘strategically selective’ in the way they would use this particular discourse. To strictly 
‘market’ audiences, officials would talk of the importance of maintaining macroeconomic 
stability, creating a good investment climate, and pursuing growth in order to achieve 
development. To audiences from within civil society – faith groups, NGOs, anti-poverty 
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coalitions – the ‘moral challenge of development’ would be highlighted. However, 
according to ministers, this challenge could only be met through a series of ostensibly 
‘pro-poor’ policies. That is, they championed the same set of policies that ministers also 
used to ‘sell’ development to ‘market’ constituencies. Therefore, New Labour’s 
international development policies tended to prioritise and in turn, be determined by, the 
expectations of ‘market’ constituencies. This however proved problematic when 
confronting such issues that were, or at least should be, understood in distinctly ‘moral’ 
terms, and which necessitated, for these ‘social’ constituencies, ‘a moral response’. 
 
Why though does any of this matter? After all, Blair’s mantra, and indeed much of New 
Labour’s policymaking was centred upon the idea of ‘what counts is what works’, and 
‘new ways of delivering old values’. Indeed, the Treasury, particularly under the 
chancellorship of Brown maintained that market efficiency was the best way to deliver 
social and economic equity. However, envisaging development in principally market terms 
squeezed the space afforded to constituencies who viewed global poverty as essentially a 
‘social’ or even moral issue. This would leave a deficit in responding to the normative 
issues of who development is for, and what purpose it should have. If only the 
expectations of market constituencies are included, then only market outcomes will be 
delivered.    
 
This draws me to my final point, and one that lies at the heart of New Labour’s political 
economy: the role of the market in the delivery of public goods. Domestically, New 
Labour’s economic and financial architecture, its commitment to business, the way it 
framed its welfare provision were all attuned to meet the expectations of the market. 
Similarly, the provision of public goods abroad within the sphere of international 
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development, whether debt relief, antiretrovirals or aid, relied upon a series of 
arrangements that either depended upon market-mechanisms, such as the IFF and IFFIm 
for their delivery, or were derived from the expectations of the global market. However, 
the increasing marketisation of publicly-provided services leaves societies much more 
exposed to the excesses and inherent instability of market economies. New Labour, of 
course, recognised this and was instrumental in institutionalising a new economic 
architecture both at home and abroad. However, this new arrangement merely reflected 
the role of the ‘virtuous state’: a role that would ‘enable’ the market to flourish. The 
failure of New Labour to conceive of a model of political economy outside the orthodoxy 
of the market left those it sought to help at continued risk from the deleterious effects of 
these self-same market processes. New Labour’s model of political economy, as I have 
described it here, neglected the systemic inequalities that lie at the root of global poverty, 
and continued to expose individuals who are already among the most vulnerable on the 
planet to the crises and failures, let alone ‘constraints’, of global capitalism. 
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 A1:  HM Treasury’s Policy Announcements Relating to International Development, 1997/98–2006/07    
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Spending Report Key Themes Highlights of the Chancellor’s Parliamentary Statement 
Outside Policy 
Constituencies 
1997/98 Pre-Budget Report International development not mentioned either in the PBR or the Chancellor’s statement.   n/a 
 
Budget1 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Millennium Gift Aid’ scheme.  
 
 
 
 
 
‘Millennium Gift Aid’ scheme introduced as a tax relief for giving, designed to 
enable British citizens to contribute more to poverty relief and education in 
developing countries. For every £100 a British citizen donates, the Treasury will 
contribute up to £40. Millennium to be remembered not just nationally but 
internationally for the redemption of debt and the reduction of world 
poverty.2 
Recipients of 
charitable giving  
 
British taxpayer  
 
 
 
 
Comprehensive 
Spending Review3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“An expanded and refocused 
international development programme 
to target help on the poorest people in 
the poorest countries” and “reduce 
poverty and social exclusion”.  
 
Increase in aid to provide the resources 
for DFID to implement the reforms set 
out in its Eliminating World Poverty 
White Paper.  
 
Developing countries which are following 
“sound economic policies” will receive 
more assistance; those which do not will 
receive less.   
Sale of majority stake in the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) 
enables Chancellor to increase overseas aid from the low of 0.25 percent of 
national income – the budget figure New Labour inherited from the 
Conservatives – to 0.3 percent of national income. This aid will be targeted at 
overseas development assistance on health, education and anti-poverty 
programmes. Debt reduction for the poorest countries.4   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aid recipients  
 
CDC 
 
World Bank  
 
UN development 
agencies  
 
British business 
 
HIPCs 
 
WTO 
 
IMF 
 
British taxpayer 
  
                                                             
1
 HM Treasury (1998c: 70) 
2
 Brown (1998b)  
3
 HM Treasury (1998b) 
4
 Brown (1998d) 
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Year 
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Outside Policy 
Constituencies 
1997/98 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comprehensive 
Spending Review 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sale of majority share of the CDC as soon 
as possible to release several hundred 
million pounds into aid spending.  
 
Enhance DFID’s influence with the World 
Bank and the UN development agencies.  
 
Aid no longer to be conditional upon 
trade agreements with British firms.   
 
Build new partnerships with British 
business to support development goals.  
 
Continue to provide an international lead 
on debt relief for the poorest countries; 
building on the HIPC initiative and the 
Chancellor’s ‘Mauritius Mandate’.   
 
Encourage and assist developing 
countries to become more fully 
integrated into the multilateral trading 
system and to participate in the WTO.   
 
Work with the IMF and World Bank in 
helping developing countries to maintain 
macroeconomic stability and sustainable 
growth to benefit the poor. 
 
Implement a ‘Millennium Gift Aid’ 
initiative to enable British taxpayers to 
support poverty relief projects in the 
developing world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1998/99 Pre-Budget Report No mention made of international development either in the PBR or the Chancellor’s speech. n/a 
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Fiscal 
Year 
Spending Report Key Themes Highlights of the Chancellor’s Parliamentary Statement 
Outside Policy 
Constituencies 
1998/99 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No reference to international 
development. Treasury however to 
review charity taxation in order to 
simplify and modernise the system as a 
means of encouraging more people and 
businesses to give to charity and make it 
easier for donors and charities to 
operate. 
Brown urges the “British people to give more to those who have too little” 
through the ‘Millennium Gift Aid’ scheme. “As governments make their 
contribution to Third World debt relief, all of us can make a contribution to 
Third World poverty relief”. Part of a new “democracy of giving, where all 
those who can, help all those who can't”. Charity to be no longer seen as “the 
rich bestowing favours on the poor”. Chancellor proposes “extending the tax 
advantages of ‘Millennium Gift Aid’ so that “in future for every £100 a British 
citizen donates to any charity, the government will contribute £30.6  
Charities and NGOs 
 
British taxpayer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1999/00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Budget Report7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Support for debt relief through the HIPC 
process and new IMF-World Bank 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility.  
 
Contribution to the HIPC Trust Fund as a 
means of financing health and education, 
including prevention and treatment of 
AIDS, and reducing infant mortality.  
 
Key measure of success not just how 
much debt is cancelled, but how many 
people are lifted out of poverty.  
International development not mentioned in the Chancellor’s statement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HIPCs 
 
World Bank and IMF 
 
Education and 
healthcare systems in 
the developing world 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
5
 HM Treasury (1999a: 74–75)  
6
 Brown (1999a)  
7
 HM Treasury (1999b: 88) 
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Year 
Spending Report Key Themes Highlights of the Chancellor’s Parliamentary Statement 
Outside Policy 
Constituencies 
1999/00
cont. 
 
 
 
 
Budget8 
 
 
 
 
 
Further reforms to make the tax system 
work better for charities themselves and 
to promote social responsibility and 
voluntary giving. In future, any donation 
whether large or small, one-off or 
regular, will qualify for tax relief.  
Ticket sales for charitable fundraising events to be exempt from VAT. These 
measures will “help those charities and NGOs who, with the churches, have, 
for decades, led the crusade to combat Third World poverty and secure debt 
relief”. With these reforms, “this government matches their commitment 
because it shares their cause – a virtuous circle of debt reduction, poverty 
relief and economic development for the poorest countries”.9  
Aid recipients  
 
Charities and NGOs  
 
British taxpayers 
 
Churches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spending Review10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increased aid spending by 6.2 percent a 
year in real terms.   
 
Increased bilateral aid to poor countries 
with “favourable policy environments”.  
 
Unsustainable debts of all HIPCs 
committed to poverty reduction to be 
relieved by 2004. 
 
Creation of a public-private partnership 
for CDC plc.  
International development not mentioned in the Chancellor’s statement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aid recipients 
 
HIPCs 
 
CDC plc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Budget Report11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emphasis placed upon ‘the diseases of 
poverty’ (HIV and AIDS, malaria and 
tuberculosis) as barriers to achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals.  
 
Problem of under-research into these 
diseases in developing countries.  
International development not mentioned in the Chancellor’s statement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pharmaceutical 
industry 
 
Healthcare systems 
in developing 
countries 
 
  
                                                             
8
 HM Treasury (2000b: 100–101) 
9
 Brown (2000d) 
10
 HM Treasury (2000b: 39–41, 73–75) 
11
 HM Treasury (2000c: 115–116)  
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Fiscal 
Year 
Spending Report Key Themes Highlights of the Chancellor’s Parliamentary Statement 
Outside Policy 
Constituencies 
2000/01 
cont. 
 
 
 
Pre-Budget Report 
cont.  
 
 
 
Government to discuss with the 
pharmaceutical industry tax incentives 
and strategies to minimise the perceived 
risks in researching and manufacturing 
suitable vaccines and other medicines. 
  
 
Budget12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Debt relief through the HIPC initiative.  
 
Commitment to the 2015 International 
Development Targets (Millennium 
Development Goals).    
 
‘Commonwealth Education Fund’ set up 
to introduce universal primary education 
in Commonwealth countries. 
 
A new commitment to fight the diseases 
of poverty announced by the Chancellor 
and Secretary of State for International 
Development, Clare Short. A 
comprehensive study by the PIU in the 
Cabinet Office, working closely with DFID 
and the Treasury, will examine further 
options and draw up plans for a 
comprehensive global strategy to secure 
the resources to purchase existing 
medicines and to create the market 
required to stimulate research into new 
vaccines.  
A new tax credit that will incentivise British companies to accelerate research 
on diseases – like AIDS, TB, Malaria and other preventable diseases, which 
every year kill 8 million people, including 3 million children in our poorest 
countries. For Brown, Britain had both “a capacity to help and a moral duty to 
act”. Subject to a commitment by the pharmaceutical companies to invest in 
and deliver new drugs and vaccines in ways that truly meet the needs of the 
poor and sick, the Secretary of State for International Development and 
Chancellor willing to extend this new tax credit even further, and support it 
through the introduction of a new purchase fund for global health. This will not 
only develop new life-saving drugs but make existing drugs more widely 
available.13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HIPCs 
 
UN development 
agencies  
 
The Commonwealth  
 
Healthcare systems 
in developing 
countries  
 
Pharmaceutical 
industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
12
 HM Treasury (2001c: 99–100)  
13
 Brown (2001c) 
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Spending Report Key Themes Highlights of the Chancellor’s Parliamentary Statement 
Outside Policy 
Constituencies 
2000/01 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget  
cont.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further incentives to create affordable 
health interventions for the poorest 
countries including a new tax credit for 
R&D into drugs and vaccines for the 
diseases of poverty subject to 
consultations with the pharmaceutical 
industry.  
 
New tax incentives to encourage the 
pharmaceutical industry to raise the level 
of donations of drugs and vaccines and 
to do so in a more consistent manner, in 
support of developing countries’ own 
health strategy and the needs of their 
people. 
 
 
 
2001/02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Budget Report
14
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Four steps to increase global prosperity 
and promote social justice: 
 
(1) New codes and standards to be 
introduced in order to improve the 
terms on which the poorest 
countries participate in the global 
economy; 
 
(2) Business urged to engage in the 
development process by adopting 
high corporate standards, including 
the creation in developing countries 
of investment forums between the 
public and private sectors; 
“If globalisation is to work for all the people of the world including the poor, 
then “a new deal for prosperity” must be forged between the richest 
developed countries and the poorest developing countries”. Proposal to the 
Financing for Development Conference of the United Nations that the 
international community establish a new international fund to leverage up to 
US$50 billion a year to finance the fight against poverty. “Significant” increase 
in the amount of Britain’s overseas development aid and in its share of 
national income.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developing and 
developed countries 
(‘Global New Deal’) 
 
Business and 
international 
investors 
 
WTO  
 
World Bank, IMF and 
the Regional 
Development Banks  
 
 
  
                                                             
14
 HM Treasury (2001e: 97–99)  
15
 Brown (2001g)  
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Spending Report Key Themes Highlights of the Chancellor’s Parliamentary Statement 
Outside Policy 
Constituencies 
2001/02 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Budget Report 
cont.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) A fairer trade regime that enables to 
developing countries to participate 
in the global economy; 
 
(4) An international development trust 
fund to pool aid contributions and 
support the work of the World Bank, 
the IMF and the Regional 
Development Banks.  
 
Continued support for the HIPC initiative. 
Creditor countries urged to adopt the 
UK’s practice of providing 100 percent 
bilateral relief, and holding payments in 
trust for countries yet to receive debt 
relief.   
 
The development of a new Global Fund 
to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and 
malaria as a means of providing 
resources to purchase medicines and 
create a market to stimulate research 
into new treatments for the ‘diseases of 
poverty’.   
 
A High Level Working Group on Access to 
Medicines, chaired by the Secretary of 
State for International Development set 
up to work in partnership with key 
stakeholders to increase access to 
essential medicines by poor people in 
developing countries.  
 
Healthcare systems 
in developing 
countries  
 
Pharmaceutical 
industry  
 
UN 
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Spending Report Key Themes Highlights of the Chancellor’s Parliamentary Statement 
Outside Policy 
Constituencies 
2001/02 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Budget Report 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consultations with the UK 
pharmaceutical industry on a new tax 
credit to reward R&D into drugs and 
vaccines to treat diseases threatening 
lives in the least developed countries.  
 
A new approach to development, in 
which developing countries commit to 
‘pro-poor’ policies, including economic 
stability, good government, and support 
for health and education and developed 
countries open their markets to 
developing country exports, improve the 
effectiveness of their aid and make 
progress towards the 0.7 percent target 
for the proportion of GNP devoted to aid. 
  
 
Budget16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Development Trust Fund to 
pool contributions and leverage private 
sector finance as a means of delivering 
the US$50 billion a year required to 
meet the MDGs by 2015.   
 
A new tax credit to encourage 
companies to increase R&D into the 
‘diseases of poverty’.  
 
Debt relief through the HIPC initiative, 
100 percent bilateral relief as a means of 
reducing poverty. 
International development not mentioned in the Chancellor’s statement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OECD/DAC countries  
 
Recipients of aid  
 
Pharmaceutical 
industry 
 
Healthcare systems 
in developing 
countries  
 
HIPCs 
 
 
  
                                                             
16
 HM Treasury (2002a: 106–108)   
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Constituencies 
2001/02 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spending Review17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increased overseas aid.  
 
Greater levels of debt relief.  
 
A New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD) based upon a 
commitment by African countries to 
improve political and economic 
governance, and promote peace and 
poverty reduction. Developed countries, 
in return, committed to “reward such 
countries with improved market access, 
increased aid, and assistance with 
conflict resolution and peace-building”.  
 
Support for the Global Fund for Health to 
combat the ‘diseases of poverty’.  
 
Increased support for education and in 
particular, the Commonwealth Education 
Fund.  
 
Commitment to make trade work 
developing countries.  
 
Closer partnerships, multilaterally with 
institutions such as the G8, European 
Union, NATO, UN, IMF, World Bank and 
the Commonwealth, as well as bilaterally 
with countries such as the United States.  
Further increases in UK aid from the £2 billion it was in 1997, and the £3.3 
billion in 2001, to £4.9 billion by 2006 – the biggest ever rise. A 35 percent real 
terms increase since 2001, a 93 percent real terms increase since 1997. From 
the 0.26 percent of national income in 1997, 0.32 percent in 2002 to 0.4 
percent by 2006. This new aid money to act as “an encouragement” to the 
international aid community and “a signal for a new US$50 billion international 
financing facility”.18   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OECD/DAC countries 
(particularly in 
relation to a new IFF) 
 
HIPCs 
 
World Bank and IMF  
 
NEPAD countries 
 
Healthcare systems 
in developing 
countries 
 
Global Health Fund  
 
G8 
 
EU countries 
 
NATO 
 
UN 
 
The Commonwealth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
17
 HM Treasury (2002b: 55–58, 101–104 ) 
18
 Brown (2002d) 
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2002/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Budget Report19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fairness at home to be matched by 
genuine progress in reducing global 
poverty abroad. 
 
Fulfilment of the MDGs to require “a new 
deal for the global economy”, with all 
countries meeting their shared 
obligations:  
 
 Developing countries accepting their 
primary responsibility for their own 
development, through good 
governance and policies that favour 
growth and investment and meet 
the basic needs of their people; and 
 
 Developed countries increasing 
international support through open 
markets, reforms to improve aid 
effectiveness and significantly 
greater aid flows for poverty 
reduction 
 
International Finance Facility to increase 
the aid required to meet the MDGs.  
 
Renewed commitment to debt relief.  
 
Support for NEPAD.  
 
Ensuring universal primary education, 
particularly in the Commonwealth.   
 
Tackling the ‘diseases of poverty’.  
“A new imperative” and “a new opportunity to meet the global poverty 
challenge”. Having already agreed US$62 billion of debt relief for 26 of the 
poorest countries “through the Prime Minister’s Africa Initiative” and “the 
tireless work of the International Development Secretary”, the Chancellor 
proposes the cancellation of US$100 billion worth of debt for 38 countries. 
Reference made to “all Members on all sides of the House and all churches, 
faith groups and NGOs in our constituencies for their tremendous work” in this 
area.  
 
Proposal for a new International Finance Facility following recent discussions 
with finance ministers from the US, France, Germany, Italy and other European 
countries, as well as the Heads of the IMF and World Bank. This new IFF would 
leverage long-term international commitments to raise the amount of 
development aid necessary to halve poverty and meet the MDGs by 2015.20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developed and 
developing countries 
(‘Global New Deal’) 
 
OECD/DAC countries 
(IFF) 
 
World Bank and IMF 
 
HIPCs 
 
NEPAD countries 
 
The Commonwealth  
 
Healthcare systems 
in developing 
countries  
 
Global Health Fund  
 
Pharmaceutical 
industry  
 
NGOs, churches and 
faith groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
19
 HM Treasury (2002c: 105–108)  
20
 Brown (2002g) 
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2002/03 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International development commitments 
framed by the MDGs. A “new Marshall 
Plan” for the global economy is required 
with all countries meeting their shared 
obligations in order to meet these 
ambitious targets. To fund this and meet 
these goals by 2015, an extra US$50 
billion a year of development assistance 
is needed. Proposal for an IFF to raise 
this finance.  
 
Continued commitments towards 
improving aid effectiveness, increased 
debt relief, tackling the ‘diseases of 
poverty’, achieving universal education, 
and sequentially liberalising trade to 
integrate developing countries into the 
global economy.  
 
Post-conflict support for Iraq.   
 
 
 
 
“It is now right for Britain and America to lead action against the hopelessness 
and poverty of the poorest countries”. Britain to table plan “for a $50 billion a 
year International Finance Facility to fund primary education for the 115 
million children without it, and to fund health care and life saving drugs to 
tackle AIDS, malaria and TB at prices poor countries can afford” at the 
forthcoming G7 and then IMF and World Bank meetings in Washington.22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Developed and 
developing countries 
(‘Global New Deal’, 
‘modern Marshall 
Plan’) 
 
OECD/DAC countries 
(IFF) 
 
G7/G8 countries 
 
World Bank and IMF 
 
Healthcare systems 
in developing 
countries 
 
Global Health Fund  
 
Pharmaceutical 
industry  
 
The Commonwealth 
 
WTO 
 
Iraqi government  
2003/04 
 
 
Pre-Budget Report23 
 
 
Continued commitment to the MDGs.  
 
 
Brief mention in the Chancellor’s statement concerning “the war against 
poverty in Africa and round the world”. Focus however, largely upon “our 
international development responsibilities in Iraq”.
24
  
OECD/DAC and 
developing countries 
(IFF) 
  
                                                             
21
 HM Treasury (2003a: 124–127)  
22
 Brown (2003h) 
23
 HM Treasury (2003c: 122–125) 
24
 Brown (2003m) 
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2003/04 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Budget Report 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A new compact for development 
between the richest and the poorest 
countries, with shared obligations. This 
global plan is based upon four pillars: 
 
(1) A substantial increase in global aid 
flows through an IFF, coupled with 
further improvements in aid 
effectiveness; 
 
(2) A fairer trade regime that enables to 
developing countries to participate 
in the global economy; 
 
(3) The creation in developing countries 
of the right domestic conditions for 
business investment and adoption of 
high corporate standards by the 
international business community 
for engagement;  
 
(4) A new rules-based system for global 
economic growth and stability, with 
all countries pursuing agreed codes 
and standards of fiscal and monetary 
policy transparency.  
 
Link between aid and trade reinforced.  
 
Continued commitment to the HIPC 
initiative as a means of ensuring the 
world’s poorest countries achieve “a 
robust exit from unsustainable debt”.  
 
Multilateral efforts to support the 
reconstruction of post-conflict Iraq. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WTO  
 
International 
business and 
investors 
 
IMF  
 
Iraqi government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
427 
Fiscal 
Year 
Spending Report Key Themes Highlights of the Chancellor’s Parliamentary Statement 
Outside Policy 
Constituencies 
2003/04 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued commitment to the MDGs.  
 
International community urged to adopt 
the Chancellor’s proposals for an IFF as 
the means by which the MDGs might be 
met.  
 
Launch of the Commission for Africa to 
deal with the specific problems faced by 
the African continent.  
 
Continued commitment to debt relief 
through the HIPC process. 
 
Trade and sequenced market 
liberalisation identified as important 
drivers of economic growth and 
development. 
 
Continued bilateral and multilateral 
support for the reconstruction and 
development of Iraq.  
The UK’s G8 Presidency to be “a presidency for development”. Commitment 
not to “freeze or cut the international development aid budget but increase 
it”.   
 
Announcement of “matched funding for a year for the Commonwealth 
Education Fund which supports the objective that by 2015 every child 
everywhere has primary education” and “for the Sports Relief charity which 
will work with Comic Relief in tackling AIDS and poverty in Africa”.26  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OECD/DAC countries 
(IFF) 
 
Commission for 
Africa 
 
IMF 
 
HIPCs 
 
Developing countries 
 
WTO 
 
Iraqi government  
 
G8 countries  
 
NGOs 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
25
 HM Treasury (2004a: 124–127)  
26
 Brown (2004b) 
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2003/04 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spending Review
27
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commitment to MDGs, financed through 
increased aid. Importance of the IFF as a 
mechanism for achieving this.  
 
Debt relief regarded as “predictable, 
untied and counter-cyclical” and 
therefore regarded as “a good form of 
development assistance for the poorest 
countries”. However, “HIPC debt relief 
alone has not ensured a sustainable debt 
level for the world’s poorest countries”. 
Further measures now needed to relieve 
countries committed to the MDGs and 
poverty reduction of their debt burden. 
Proposed multilateral mechanism which 
would deliver up to 100 percent 
multilateral debt relief.  
 
UK spending on HIV/AIDS-related 
programmes to rise to at least £1.5 
billion over the next three years. 
 
Reform of the global trading system and 
supply-side measures focusing upon 
health, education and infrastructure all 
essential for developing countries to 
realise the benefits of trade.  
 
Commission for Africa established as a 
forum to address the problems that are 
slowing Africa’s progress towards 
meeting the MDGs.     
Africa to receive £1.25 billion to fund health, education and anti-poverty 
programmes by 2007/08. £1.5 billion in total to promote treatments and cures 
for HIV and AIDS across the whole developing world. Increase in DFID’s budget 
from £3.8 billion this year to £5.3 billion by 2008 – an average annual real 
terms increase of 9.2 percent. These increases mean that Britain’s aid 
commitment under New Labour will, by 2008, have risen since 1997 by 140 
percent in real terms. For every £1 of UK aid spent in 1997, New Labour will by 
2008, be spending £3.  
 
Thanks expressed by the Chancellor to “the churches, faith groups and NGOs 
for their representations – to date, and to the Treasury, over 15,000 
representations for this Spending Review – that we raise spending on aid and 
not cut it”.28  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OECD/DAC countries 
(IFF) 
 
HIPCs  
 
IMF and creditor 
countries  
 
HIV-affected 
countries in the 
developing world 
 
WTO 
 
Developing countries  
 
Commission for 
Africa  
 
African countries  
 
NGOs, churches and 
faith groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
27
 HM Treasury (2004b: 77–81, 135–139)  
28
 Brown (2004d) 
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2004/05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Budget Report29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued commitment to the MDGs. 
However progress towards meeting 
these goals is being hampered by a lack 
of investment in key areas. The IFF 
therefore essential to scale-up the 
required development finance.   
 
Importance of the Commission for 
Africa’s findings since they will feed into 
Britain’s presidency of the G8 in 2005. 
Focus here on three key areas: aid, debt 
relief and trade.  
 
Health concerns also highlighted, and in 
particular the impact that the ‘diseases 
of poverty’ are having upon developing 
countries. Importance therefore of 
incentivising pharmaceutical firms to 
invest far more heavily in finding 
vaccines and treatments for illnesses 
such as HIV and AIDS, malaria and TB. 
 
Continued bilateral and multilateral 
support for the reconstruction and 
development of Iraq.  
Focus upon Britain’s G8 presidency and issues relating to debt relief and 
development.  
 
Priorities for 2005, outlined by both the Chancellor and Hilary Benn, the 
Secretary of State for International Development, to be “the International 
Finance Facility designed to double aid to halve poverty; 100 percent 
multilateral debt relief; delivering the Doha development round; 
and…maximising efforts to develop an infrastructure for co-ordinating 
research in AIDS, increase funding for AIDS research, and develop innovative 
advance purchasing agreements for both AIDS and malaria drugs”.30  
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Africa 
 
World Bank, IMF and 
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in developing 
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industry 
 
Iraqi government  
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2004/05 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued commitment to the MDGs.   
 
More and better aid, supported by the 
Chancellor’s proposed IFF.   
 
Deeper and broader debt relief, whereby 
100 per cent bilateral debt relief will be 
matched with 100 percent multilateral 
debt relief.  
 
Sequenced trade policy reforms to 
enable trade to deliver substantial 
benefits to poor countries.  
 
Implementation of the Commission of 
Africa’s recommendations concerning 
finance, trade, debt, governance, and 
peace and security through the UK’s 
respective presidencies of the G8 and EU. 
 
Increased aid and debt relief for 
countries affected by the tsunami in the 
Indian Ocean to help with the ongoing 
humanitarian relief effort.  
 
A three-step approach to develop 
vaccines for malaria and HIV:  
 
(1) Better coordinated research; 
 
(2) An increase in publicly funded 
research;  
Implementation of the Commission for Africa’s recommendations throughout 
Britain’s presidency of the G8.  
 
Announcement that by July 2005, Hilary Benn will have signed new debt 
reduction agreements with 19 of the world’s poorest countries to signal 
Britain’s commitment to unilaterally provide its share of 100 percent relief on 
multilateral debts, and in doing so release money urgently needed to fund 
health and education in developing countries.32  
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2004/05 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget  
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) Advance purchase agreements to 
incentivise investment in R&D and 
make the vaccines produced more 
affordable. 
 
Increased financial support for 
peacekeeping operations in Africa, 
particularly in Darfur.  
 
Continued bilateral and multilateral 
support for the reconstruction and 
development of Iraq.  
  
2005/06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Budget Report33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implementation of the IFF using part of 
the revenues from air passenger duty to 
generate a long-term financial 
commitment to the IFF. 
 
Shift of focus to the IFFIm – the 
International Finance Facility for 
Immunisation as a means of 
demonstrating the technical feasibility of 
the main IFF whilst supporting the 
Vaccine Fund and the Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunisation, projects 
which work to tackle some of the 
deadliest diseases in the developing 
world. 
 
Agreement reached over the Multilateral 
Debt Relief initiative as a means of 
securing the “deeper and broader debt 
relief” pursued by the UK government. 
 
As well as “doubling of aid to Africa and debt relief”, the Development 
Secretary, Hilary Benn is “to expedite the critical negotiations on trade” and 
“treble Britain’s aid for trade to £100 million”.  
 
Britain to “contribute £40 million to an expanded UN Emergency Fund and £50 
million to a new IMF Shocks Facility” to help prepare the world for natural 
disasters.34  
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2005/06 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Budget Report 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commitments to universally free 
healthcare and education. 
 
A fairer international trading system to 
allow for greater integration into the 
global economy by developing countries.    
 
Increased amounts of humanitarian relief 
aid. Call for reform of the Disaster 
Emergency Relief Fund. Support for a 
new IMF Shocks Facility to help the 
reconstruction of countries ravaged by 
natural disasters or hit by commodity 
shocks. Contribution of £50 million to 
this Facility. 
 
Support to facilitate greater flows of 
remittances from people living and 
working in the UK to relatives living in 
the developing world. 
 
Increased support for peacekeeping 
operations in areas such as Darfur and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 
Comprehensive report into terrorist 
financing and money laundering to be 
launched.  
 
Continued bilateral and multilateral 
support for the reconstruction and 
development of Iraq. 
 
IMF Shocks Facility 
 
African peacekeeping 
organisations 
 
Iraqi government  
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2005/06 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continued commitment to MDGs.  
 
Increased aid through the IFF. Launch of 
the IFFIm as a means of providing US$4 
billion over ten years to support the 
efforts of GAVI and its work in tackling 
the preventable diseases found in the 
poorest countries all over the world. 
 
Improved aid effectiveness.  
 
Implementation of the MDRI by the 
World Bank and African Development 
Bank expected later in the year to 
provide US$50 billion in debt relief for 
the 38 HIPCs. 
 
Continued commitment to free and 
universal healthcare and education.  
 
Disappointment at the outcome of the 
latest round of trade negotiations. 
Renewed efforts required by the 
international community to secure a 
fairer trade deal for developing 
countries.  
 
Support for African-led peacekeeping 
operations. Financial support for the DRC 
to organise free and fair elections, and a 
new Peacebuilding Fund.  
Increased ‘securitisation of development’. £200 million set aside to promote 
peacekeeping in the most troubled countries of the world. Disbursement of 
US$30 million in famine relief to the Horn of Africa as a contribution to the 
new UN emergency relief fund alongside Britain’s own emergency contribution 
of over US$60 million.  
 
Proposals for the IFF to be moved forward to deliver on the promises made at 
Gleneagles on aid and transparency. As part of the commitment to double aid 
to Africa, the Chancellor, along with fellow finance ministers will help finance a 
new initiative launched by Nelson Mandela to meet the MDG of free schooling 
for every child by 2015. Contribution to an aid-for-trade fund that will help 
build the infrastructure and capacity to trade in developing countries urgently 
in need of support, and ensure developing countries can both support the 
trade round and benefit from it.36  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OECD/DAC countries 
(IFF and IFFIm) 
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2005/06 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget  
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annual contribution of £40 million to the 
reformed UN Central Emergency 
Revolving Fund. Need to strengthen the 
response of the international community 
to both humanitarian disasters and the 
longer term reconstruction of affected 
countries. 
 
Continued bilateral and multilateral 
support for the reconstruction and 
development of Iraq. 
 
Comprehensive report into terrorist 
financing and money laundering to be 
launched  
  
2006/07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Budget Report
37
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Renewed commitment to the MDGs 
 
Universal access to free healthcare 
 
Universal access to comprehensive HIV 
prevention, treatment and care by 2010 
funded through the Global Fund for AIDS, 
TB and malaria. Particular focus upon 
improving access for girls.  
 
Increasing R&D into cures and vaccines 
for diseases that disproportionately 
affect developing world countries. Use of 
public-private partnerships and Advance 
Market Commitments in order to 
incentivise greater private sector 
investment 
Launch of a new partnership with scientific research councils and charities, 
including the Wellcome Trust and the Gates Foundation to enable British 
science to do more to eradicate poverty and disease around the world.38   
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2006/07 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-Budget Report 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Launch of a research collaborative 
programme for the development 
sciences. Led by a high level steering 
board including leading scientists from 
the Research Councils, the Wellcome 
Trust and government departments that 
fund development science, it will be 
supported by the Gates Foundation in an 
advisory capacity. 
 
Integration of the IFFIm as a means of 
financing this new commitment to 
healthcare.  
 
Improved access to education 
programmes, and long-term finance to 
help countries realise their education 
plans. Again, particular focus upon 
increasing access for girls.  
 
Renewed commitment for debt relief, 
and in particular the MDRI as a means of 
extending debt relief to those countries 
not eligible to enter the HIPC process.  
 
Calls for reform of the UN and in 
particular its coordination and coherence 
in areas of development, humanitarian 
assistance and the environment.  
 
Urgent reform of the global trade system 
required, and resumption of the Doha 
Round of trade talks at the WTO.  
 
Education systems in 
developing countries  
 
HIPCs and other 
countries with 
multilateral debts 
 
IMF  
 
UN 
 
WTO  
 
UN Framework 
Convention on 
Climate Change  
 
The Special Climate 
Change Fund  
 
The Least Developed 
Countries Fund for 
Climate Change  
 
UNCERF 
 
IMF Shocks Facility 
 
African Union 
Mission 
 
Lebanese 
government 
 
Iraqi government 
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2006/07 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Pre-Budget Report 
cont.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increased investment in infrastructure 
necessary to meet the ‘aid-for-trade’ 
pledges made by developed countries.  
 
Drawing upon the findings of the Stern 
Report, climate change identified as 
having a disproportional impact upon the 
poor. Significant funding into strategies 
that will mainstream climate change risk 
reduction in developing countries.  
 
Support for the UN Central Emergency 
Relief Fund and continued commitment 
to the new IMF Shocks Facility. 
 
Continued support for peacekeeping 
operations, particular in the Darfur 
region of Sudan, and the work of the 
African Union Mission.  
 
Humanitarian relief and support for the 
reconstruction of Lebanon in the wake of 
the crisis suffered by the country.  
 
Ongoing support for the post-conflict 
reconstruction of Iraq 
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2006/07 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commitment to the promises made in 
2005 at Gleneagles, as well as to the 
MDGs.  
 
Increased aid to meet the 0.7 percent/ 
GNI target by 2013.  
 
Debt relief initially through the HIPC 
initiative and then the MDRI process 
 
Universal access to free education.  
 
Commitment to increase finance to 
support this improved access to basic 
healthcare systems, principally through 
the IFFIm to enable governments to 
abolish user fees and provide vaccines 
and treatments for preventable diseases 
that primarily affect children.  
 
AMCs to incentivise the R&D by 
pharmaceutical firms into medicines that 
can prevent and treat the ‘diseases of 
poverty’ found in developing countries.  
 
Renewed commitment to achieving the 
goal of universal access to 
comprehensive HIV prevention, and the 
replenishment of funds for the Global 
Fund for Health.  
Focus of international development shifts to climate change and the 
environment. Britain to lead the way working with helping developing 
countries to address climate change. £50 million set aside to support a “path-
breaking” ten-country initiative across central Africa to prevent the destruction 
of the second largest rainforest in the world, and in doing so protect the 
livelihoods of 50 million people under threat.  
 
£800 million allocated to the Environmental Transformation Fund, jointly run 
by the Secretaries for International Development and the Environment to 
signal a commitment to international poverty reduction through 
environmental protection.
40
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2006/07 
cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget  
cont.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
£800 million of ODA for the 
Environmental Transformation Fund to 
support development and poverty 
reduction through environmental 
protection, and help developing 
countries respond to climate change.  
 
Assistance to the World Bank and the 
Regional Development Banks to develop 
a Clean Energy Investment Framework to 
accelerate public and private investment 
in low carbon energy in developing 
countries.  
 
Resumption of the Doha Round of trade 
talks welcomed. Successful conclusion 
dependent upon developed countries 
delivering increased market access; 
ending export subsidies; substantially 
reducing all domestic support; and 
providing effective special and 
differential treatment to enable 
developing countries to capture the gains 
from trade. 
 
Greater ‘aid-for-trade’ required in order 
to support this commitment to increased 
market access. Focus of this investment 
to be upon building the necessary 
infrastructure in developing countries. 
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